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Abstract
Under the eﬀect of both exogenous and endogenous pressures, the territorial organiza-
tion of political power has been deeply transformed in many Western States. In such a
context, intergovernmental relations (IGR) have become increasingly salient, adding (or
redefining) a new dimension of politics within multi-tiered domestic arenas. Diﬀerent
institutional tools for managing transformed intergovernmental relations (Intergovern-
mental Arrangements) are both theoretically possible and empirically observable. In
this dissertation, the causes and the consequences of these institutional structures are
investigated in two neo-regional countries – Spain and Italy – in one of the public policy
sectors most aﬀected by the process of territorial re-scaling: health care. Grounded on
a historical new-institutional perspective and based on the adoption of a Most Similar
System research Design (MSSD), the comparative analysis explores firstly why, in spite
of similar levels of health care decentralization, Intergovernmental Arrangements at work
in this policy field in these two countries diﬀer on many respects; and, secondly, whether
these diﬀerences can account for variations in the processes of intergovernmental policy-
making channeled through them. The analysis shows the relevance, for understanding
IGAs’ diﬀerences, of a set of factors at play in the early stages of decentralization:
the degree of symmetry in the allocation of healthcare competences among subnational
units as well as the kind of intragovernmental relations within the constitutive arenas;
moreover, it suggests that the timing by which causal conditions come into play is a
relevant question to be considered. By assessing the impact exerted by Intergovernmen-
tal Arrangements on IGR, and particularly on the kind of coalitions emerging in IGR
processes, the analysis shows that, in line with previous studies in the field, the general
question "do intergovernmental institutions matter?" can be positively answered.
Introduction
The territorial rescaling of the State and the re-
definition of domestic Intergovernmental Relations:
common trends, diﬀerent solutions, diﬀerent im-
pacts?
During the last decades, under the eﬀect of both exogenous and endogenous pres-
sures, the territorial organization of political power has been deeply transformed
in many Western States: in a more or less intense way, they appear to have been
involved in an action of authentic re-shaping. Unfolding processes of State "de-
structuring" and "re-structuring" have been the object of several contributions in
the field of territorial politics and new-regionalism literature since the late 1990s.
One of the distinguishing characteristics of these macro-level institutional de-
velopments – besides the loss of sovereignty by States in favor of supranational
organizations (the EU, in the first place) – appears to have been the growing rele-
vance of sub-national governments (Marks et al. 2008). What used to be tradition-
ally regarded as "periphery", as opposed to the "center" – in the frozen cleavage
pointed out by Rokkan (Flora 1999) – seems to have gained a more and more
"central" position in diﬀerent stages of contemporary policy-making processes.
As is well known, in the wake of this full-blown territorial recalibration of
the State, periphery does not act any more as a simple executor of decisions taken
elsewhere at the top of the territorial hierarchy of power (i.e., central government),
but tends to become a more active policy player. Decisions taken by subnational
governments determine (or contribute to determine) not only the implementation
mechanisms and criteria, but also the very content of the public policies oﬀered to
their constituencies.
Even if following diﬀerent paths, these processes of State re-calibration have
thus generally led to the emergence (or to the empowering) of new institutional-
political actors within the State (local governments and, particularly, the Regions),
paving the way to the establishment of new (or renewed) patterns of territorial
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politics. The "invention" of regions (Keating, 1997) has led new, relevant political
players coming on the stage: «regional institutions resulting from a territorial
distribution of power, once created, take a life of their own and become the central
structuring forces of territorial politics» (Lecours 2004, p. 86).
In settings characterized by a plurality of territorial jurisdictions, each endowed
with a certain degree of political power, relations between these latter (Intergov-
ernmental Relations - IGR; cf. § 1.5.1) are therefore likely to become increasingly
significant, and to acquire specific political saliency, particularly in those policy
fields more aﬀected by the processes of political devolution. Even more so in the
domestic arenas of former unitary polities (like Belgium, Spain, the UK or Italy,
when looking just at Western Europe), where traditional mechanisms of coordi-
nation between distinct territorial levels of government – like strict hierarchy of
levels and separation of tasks – have been more and more called into question, if
not definitively overcome.
The emergence, within the States, of territorial levels as new actors, playing
the role of front-line players in policy-making processes, has called increased atten-
tion by scholars to the setup and design of institutional systems dedicated to the
management of these relations, both at the horizontal (at the same hierarchical)
level and at the vertical (at diﬀerent hierarchical) level, both in (strictly) federal
and highly decentralized countries.
However, it is interesting to observe that, in spite of common trends towards
the political strengthening of the subnational level by processes of regionalization
(and even federalization), and despite common functional pressures calling for
the establishment of institutional structures designed to cope with increasingly
complex relations between territorial governments within the States (what I refer
to as Intergovernmental Arrangements - IGAs; Bolleyer 2009) a vast array of
institutional solutions for managing IGR – diﬀering on many dimensions – is not
only theoretically conceivable, but also empirically observable (cf. § 1.5.2).
For a long time, large part of the literature on these topics has preferred to stress
similarities among systems, rather than investigating reasons and consequences
of these observable institutional diﬀerences. Because of the prevalence of a sort
of functionalist bias, the so called "policy imperatives" – portrayed, at once, as
causes and eﬀects of the processes of devolution – have been among the factors
evoked most often in order to account, in a quite general way, for the increasing
complexity of multi-level policy-making in many compound polities, as well as for
the pervasiveness of intergovernmental relations.
By contrast, putting the analytical focus on the explanation of diﬀerences more
than on of similarities – as made by a more recent wave of contributions in the
growing literature on these issues – allows addressing two major, broad research
questions, whose inquiry is the main goal of this dissertation. They might be
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summed-up in the following way:
1. Why do diﬀerent systems opt for diﬀerent Intergovernmental Arrangements?
2. Which is the impact (if any) of diﬀerent Intergovernmental Arrangements
on intergovernmental policy-making processes?
As to the first question, it derives from the simple observation (when look-
ing at many federal and devolved countries) of a quite high variance as to the
characteristics of the extant institutional machinery designed to cope with (un-
doubtedly) increasingly complex Intergovernmental Relations. Such a variation is
evident both from a cross-national perspective and – within each national system –
from a cross-sectoral point of view. Hence, the question arises about which are the
factors able to account for such variations: which political-institutional conditions
do favor the emergence of certain Intergovernmental Arrangements?
Such line of inquiry proves even more relevant in the light of the second ques-
tion, which is logically connected to it. As I will argue, on the bases of the general
theoretical insights provided by the new-institutional literature, it is indeed rea-
sonable to expect that diﬀerent institutional structures cannot produce "neutral"
eﬀects as to the ways in which political actors – the State and the Regions – do in-
teract in multilevel policy-making. Put in other words: which are the consequences
on multilevel policy-making of alternative ways of structurally channeling the re-
lationships between territorial actors? Because of the quite scant literature on this
point, this question – even if theoretically grounded – cannot be characterized but
in more exploratory terms.
The logic of inquiry and the research strategy
As implicitly emerged from the previous paragraph, answering the two general
research questions outlined above entails the adoption of two diﬀerent approaches
to explanation, or rather, a shift of the analytical focus when moving from the first
to second one. In a nutshell, while in the first question the institutional machinery
devoted to the management of intergovernmental relations (Intergovernmental Ar-
rangements) is treated as the main dependent variable to account for, in the second
question it becomes instead the main independent variable, possibly accounting for
variations in multilevel decision-making (see Figure 1).
In both cases, the adoption of a qualitative comparative perspective seems the
most fruitful explanatory strategy to be followed. However, the mentioned shift
of the analytical focus also entails some change – when moving from the first to
the second question – in the way in which the research strategy is conceived of as
well as in the way in which the comparative research design is to be organized (see
Anckar 2008).
3
Figure 1: The analytical focus shift.
Explaining IGAs’ variety
The basic logic of inquiry underlying the analysis intended to answer the first
general research question – Why do diﬀerent systems opt for diﬀerent Intergov-
ernmental Arrangements? – may be portrayed as adopting a "causes-of-eﬀects"
approach of explanation (Brady and Collier 2004): the main goal is indeed ex-
plaining why particular empirical cases do present diﬀerent outcomes (that is,
diﬀerent Intergovernmental Arrangements).
To this end, a robust methodological device is comparison through purpose-
ful case selection. This means selecting cases displaying highest variance on the
"dependent variable" (rather: the condition to be explained), while sharing as
many (potentially relevant) conditions as possible (in order to take them under
reasonable control). This is possible through the implementation of a Most Similar
System Design (MSSD, Przeworski and Teune 1970, pp. 32-34).
As known, such kind of comparison – based on Mill’s "method of diﬀerence"
and mostly applicable for small-N situations – allows to focus the attention on a
limited number of potentially relevant explanatory factors (hopefully, just one),
while controlling for many other conditions. The underlying "logic of elimination"
makes therefore possible to exclude as candidate causes for the variance in the
observed outcomes any condition equally present in more than one case, as long
as similarities across cases are logically assumed not to be able to account for
diﬀerences across them (George and Bennett 2005).
According to Anckar (2008), the adoption of a MSSD is compatible, both in
principle and in practice, with both a deductive and a inductive research strategy
(Figure 2). The borders distinguishing the deductive from the inductive strategy
are, in reality, much more blurred than theoretically supposed. Furthermore, when
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speaking of explanartory excercises, it may be more appropriate to refer to abuction
than to induction. Abduction, also known as "Inference to the Best Explanation",
may be seen as relying on the following principle: "Given evidence E and candidate
explanations H 1, . . . , H n of E, if H i explains E better than any of the other
hypotheses, infer that H i is closer to the truth than any of the other hypotheses"
(Douven 2011).
The comparative research design I will implement to answer the first research
question (Why do diﬀerent systems opt for diﬀerent Intergovernmental Arrange-
ments?) may be thus qualified as an "abductive MSSD": the research process will
indeed start by focusing on the dependent, more than on the independent variable.
The goal is selecting cases so as to ensure variation on the dependent variable
among systems which – under many relevant respects – appear quite similar: the
relevant independent variable(s) or condition(s) will be then identified by means
of falsification (of competing explanatory factors) through in-depth comparison.
Assessing the impact of IGAs on IGR
As sketched above, the move from the first to the second research question entails
a shift of the focus of the analysis.
Analytically, once explained the reasons of their diﬀerences, Intergovernmental
Arrangements are treated as the main condition or independent variable, possi-
bly accounting for variations in multi-level policy-making. The explanatory goal –
which is partly exploratory, due to the limited scope of the existing theoretical and
empirical literature on this point – is assessing the impact (if any) of the institu-
tional, organizational structures devoted to the management of Intergovernmental
Relations on the process of actors’ preferences aggregation. As argued above, the
relevance of the first question largely depends on the relevance of the answer given
to the second one.
Following again Anckar (2008), our second research question – Which is the
impact (if any) of diﬀerent Intergovernmental Arrangements on intergovernmental
policy-making processes? – can be portrayed as a "Does X aﬀect Y?" question. In
contrast with the first question, the second one presumes a more deductive ap-
proach, meaning that «the independent variable has been identified in the begin-
ning of the research process by means of theoretical reasoning» (p. 392, emphasis
added). The main research interest is now on the independent variable. The am-
bition is indeed «to establish whether or not there is a causal relation between one
specific independent variable and the dependent variable» (p. 392).
As it will be explained further (Chapter 1), Intergovernmental Arrangements
may be theoretically expected to exert an influence on many, diﬀerent aspects of
intergovernmental decision making. Focus can indeed be placed primarily on the
impact of Intergovernmental Arrangements either on the processes or the outputs
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of such kind of policy-making.
What I will investigate is the impact of Intergovernmental Arrangements in
structuring intergovernmental policy-making processes. In this light, the basic
question addressed through the empirical analysis may be refined in the following
terms: to what extent does the institutional structure of IGAs contribute, in
a given country and in a given policy sector, to determine the kind of politics
prevailing within the intergovernmental policy-making arena? More precisely: do
diﬀerent IGAs have an impact on structuring the kind of divide lines and actors’
coalitions emerging during intergovernmental decision-making processes?
The adoption of a MSSD in the first phase of analysis (in order to answer the
first research question) yields two methodological advantages. On the one side,
it allows keeping under control many conditions virtually able to shape not only
Intergovernmental Arrangements, but also – directly or indirectly – the policy-
making processes carried out by means of these arrangements (under analysis in
the second phase). On the other side, the implementation of a MSSD in the first
stage makes it possible to select cases diplaying enough variance with resepct to
the independent variable, whose impact is to be tested.
Figure 2: Comparative research design strategies. Source: adapted from Anckar (2008,
p. 394).
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Taking a new-institutional perspective
Both questions can be addressed starting, implicitly or explicitly, from diﬀerent
theoretical assumptions, and adopting alternative analytical perspectives. My
view is that the theoretical and methodological insights provided by the "new-
institutional" approach are particularly suited to address this kind of research
questions.
Drawing on Immergut (1998), it is possible to identify three starting assump-
tions or theoretical tenets shared by all new-institutional lines of reasoning (their
"theoretical core"): first – and in fundamental contrast to behaviourism – institu-
tionalists assume that observable behavior does not reveal the "real" preferences
of individuals, but it is conceived as strictly linked to the opportunities and con-
straints provided to them by the institutions in which they act: «behavior occurs in
the context of institutions and can only be so understood» (p. 6); second, mech-
anisms of preference aggregation cannot be interpreted as neutral tools, whose
function comes down to the mere summation of individual interests: in fact, ag-
gregation devices do not simply reflect given interests, but contribute to shape
and reshape them over time; third, and as a consequence of the previous points,
every kind of (political) behavior is seen as somehow "biased" or "distorted", which
implies a sort of normative commitment of the institutional approach towards the
identification of ways of reducing this bias through institutional design.
Even if from diﬀerent angles, new-institutionalism addresses a common set of
questions, basically linked to the exploration of the ways in which preferences ex-
pressed in politics (and their aggregation) are aﬀected by the institutional context
in which policy-makers operate. This institutional context is intended, broadly
speaking, as the web of "rules" – whether formal or informal – which, due to a
minimum degree of stability over time, contribute to structure the political be-
havior of actors. As summarized up by Immergut (1998), the bulk of institutional
analysis consists in the examination of these rules and norms, seen as the black
boxes placed between «the potential political demands and the ultimate outcomes»
(p. 25).
Within this perspective, it is common to identify at least three diﬀerent new-
institutionalisms1 – rational choice; sociological or organization theory; historical
– diﬀering in: the more specific definition of ’institution’; the interpretation of
the relationship occurring between the individuals behavior and the institutional
context (the underlying agency theory); the explanation of the processes of insti-
tutional origin, stability, and change.
For the purposes of this analysis, I will assume a historical new-institutional
1Here, I will not account for a newer type of new-institutionalism, ofter referred to as "dis-
cursive institutionalism" (Schmidt 2008): it may be interpreted either as a fourth, autonomous
perspective, or as a complementary extension of the three older new-institutionalisms.
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perspective. If rational choice institutionalism tends to adopt a "calculus approach"
(for which actors are fundamentally strategic actors) and sociological institution-
alism tends to rely on a "cultural approach" (for which actors are first of all "rule
followers; Hall and Taylor 1996), the so called historical new-institutionalism is
considered more eclectic on this point, insofar it tends not to make a definitive
choice between the two rival agency approaches, but assumes instead a rather "ag-
nostic" perspective (Steinmo 2008). What makes historical new-institutionalism
distinct is not the way of conceiving agency but rather the manner of interpret-
ing institutions as norms, rules, and procedures embedded in the «organizational
structure of the polity or political economy» (Hall and Taylor 1996). The inter-
nal coherence of the approach is given by a particular attention accorded to the
analysis of "institutional configurations" – in contrast to an interest for particular
institutional settings often considered in isolation – and to long-term processes,
unfolding their eﬀects over time, in opposition to the investigation of short-term
events (Pierson and Skocpol 2002). The concepts of "path-dependence" and "feed-
back eﬀects" are often mobilized in order to causally account for institutional devel-
opment and stability over time (Mahoney 2000b; Pierson 2000), while the concept
of "critical juncture" (defined as the interaction of distinct causal sequences that
join each other at a particular point in time) is commonly employed in order to
explain both the origins and the rapid and unexpected transformation of an ex-
isting institution. Moreover, historical institutionalism focuses in particular on
the role of power and on asymmetries of power relations, interpreted as intrinsi-
cally embodied in all institutional configurations. More precisely, the approach
investigates the ways in which institutions concur in structuring conflicts and (un-
evenly) distributing power across diﬀerent social and political groups: these latter
are seen as endowed – because of diﬀerently designed institutional arrangements –
with diﬀerent degrees of access to policy-making processes. Institutions are indeed
assumed to operate as powerful "filters".
In this light, (historical) new-institutionalism seems to oﬀer the best suited the-
oretical tools in order to look at intergovernmental mechanisms as at those "black
boxes" – placed between the political demands and the final outcomes – largely still
to be opened. In this respect, Heinmiller (2002) remarks that, generally speaking,
the adoption of a new-institutional perspective appears as clearly consistent with
the study of intergovernmental policy-making: it does provide, indeed, a useful
framework of reference, allowing researchers to explore and investigate the eﬀects
that intergovernmental institutions may produce on policy processes and policy
outcomes. When taking this view, the basic, underlying assumption is that in
polities in which more than one government can intervene in the definition and
implementation of a policy, intergovernmental relations are likely to exert a "for-
mative impact" on the policy itself (Heinmiller 2002).
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More specifically, the emphasis put by historical new-institutionalists on the
role played by the institutions of the polity and on their organizational structure in
conferring on diﬀerent actors (uneven) access to the policy-making process within
the polity itself seems as particularly consistent with the analysis of institutional
mechanisms of "interface" or of "filtering", involving diﬀerent players such as the
center and the peripheries, the State and the Regions, in territorially compound
political systems. Do diﬀerently organized institutional arenas contribute to struc-
ture and shape Regions-Regions and State-Regions relationships? In case, which
are the consequences on intergovernmental policy-making?
The fundamental insight provided by historical new-institutionalism, accord-
ing to which institutions need to be analyzed not in isolation, but always taking
into consideration their mutual relationships and their joint eﬀects (the so called
"institutional constellation") invites also to look closely at the entire system of in-
tergovernmental relations, that is at both its vertical and horizontal articulations,
as well as at their linkages. Not only that: shedding light on institutional constel-
lations may prove particularly useful when trying to account for the characteristics
of the Intergovernmental Arrangements under analysis. Diﬀerently stated, looking
at the whole set of (potentially) relevant institutional factors defining the broader
political context in which IGAs are embedded is likely to provide important evi-
dence in order to make sense of their diﬀerent structural features.
Healthcare policy in Italy and Spain
In the general framework of State de-structuring and restructuring evoked above,
the principle of decentralization emerged as a real «cornerstone of health policy-
making in numerous Western European countries. Once confined to the Nordic
Region and Switzerland, decentralization from higher to lower levels of government
has become a central principle of health policy in Spain and Italy, in a diﬀerent
context in the United Kingdom (to Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland), and
to a lesser degree in France and Portugal» (Saltman and Bankauskaite 2006, p.
127). While the expansion of the Welfare State had been one of the major drivers
of State centralization at least up to the end of the 1960s, since the 1970s the
territorial parabola of social protection started to take an opposite path, towards
increased decentralization (Ferrera 2005; Loughlin 2009).
As for other welfare policies in Western Europe, at least two diﬀerent macro-
stages of decentralization and devolution – diﬀering on the scope of the powers
accorded to the Regions in the field of welfare policies and on the political reasons
underlying the devolutionary process – can be detected, roughly corresponding,
respectively, to the "regional" (or weak regional) and "neo-regional" (or strong
regional) waves of State rescaling (cf. Chapter 1).
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Following Ferrera (2005), the first wave, which originally started in Scandina-
vian countries partially under the eﬀect of functional pressures, occurred during
the 1970s-1980s, leading to an initial transfer of tasks and competences from the
center to sub-national levels of government, mostly in order to grant a better im-
plementation of nationally-set policies. The second decentralization wave started
instead in the early 1990s: for many reasons – spanning from increasing States
budget constraints (also due to the fiscal requirements imposed by the process of
European integration) to raising costs (determined by management ineﬃciencies,
demographic changes, and technological innovations), from re-emerging local iden-
tities to changes in the internal logic of working of the Welfare State (more and
more oriented towards service provision) – the principle of decentralization arose
as a guiding principle of welfare policies and, particularly, of healthcare policymak-
ing. The devolutionary reforms appeared in this phase more inspired by the desire,
at once, to increase economic eﬃciency in the delivery of welfare services and to
reduce the overall costs, also in a strategy of "blame avoidance" implemented by
central governments: «’[p]assing the buck’ to subnational governments had the
obvious advantage of shifting on to local government the blame for unpopular
policies of retrenchement» (Ferrera 2005, p. 174).
In such a framework, the principle of decentralization seemed thus embody-
ing several advantages, allowing to set the necessary incentives towards greater
competition in service provision (and, therefore, supposed higher allocative and
productive eﬃciency), as well as towards increased fiscal responsibility of sub-
national governments: «decentralisation has been perceived as a means to revamp
the performance of health care systems and as a way to provide services that
correspond to local needs and demands» (Mosca 2006, p. 113). Sub-layers of
government, and particularly Regions, were consequently endowed with greater
political, administrative and partially fiscal responsibilities in this field.
In many Western countries healthcare policy has thus become one of the fields
in which decentralization has gone farthest.
In the tax-funded health systems of Southern Europe – particularly, in Italy
and Spain – «administrative and managerial as well as many political (but not
key fiscal) responsibilities were devolved from national to regional governments»
(Saltman 2008, p. 104), in a process begun at the end of the 1970s, culminated at
the beginning of 2000s, and still in progress. Today, about two thirds of regional
budgets in Italy are devoted to healthcare, making this latter the most relevant
policy sector under regional responsibility, in terms of resources absorbed and
political visibility (France 2007). In Spain healthcare represents, as well, the first
policy sector of regional competence: 90% of public expenditure in health policy
is under regional control, the Communities devoting more than one third of their
total budgets to this field (Moreno A.B. 2005).
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The breadth of devolutionary processes occurred both in Italy and Spain in this
policy field makes healthcare policy in these two countries particularly interesting
to be explored in order to address the two research questions outlined above: the
political saliency of Intergovernmental Relations is indeed likely to be relatively
high in both national cases.
Moreover, from a methodological point of view, Italy and Spain display the ad-
vantage of matching many of the requirements imposed by the logic of the MSSD.
As it will be explained more in depth, these two former unitary countries share
indeed a number of theoretically relevant features, which, by consequence, may be
considered as taken under control, while displaying, at the same time, a compara-
tively high degree of variation as to the system of institutional structures devoted
to the management of intergovernmental relations. These structures, because of
their diﬀerences, may be in turn expected to have a diﬀerent "formative impact"
on intergovernmental policy processes in the policy field under analysis.
As observed by Ferrera (2005) and McEwen and Moreno (2005), Spain and Italy
(along with Belgium) have been moving roughly in the same direction: thoroughgo-
ing decentralization, linked, at the same time, to endogenous politico-institutional
dynamics and to the challenges of welfare state reorganization and European in-
tegration. As a result of institutional evolutions occurred through time, it can
be argued that these two countries – both belonging to the Southern European
model of welfare state (Ferrera 1996) and both historically characterized by the
transition from a highly centralized, healthcare insurance-based arrangement to a
strongly regionalized National Health System – have in common a comparatively
high degree of decentralization in health care: in both cases, fundamental consti-
tutional competences in this policy field are now shared between the national and
the regional governments, and the actual management of the health system as well
as the delivery of health care services fall (almost entirely) under regional respon-
sibility. Furthermore, neither the Italian health system nor the Spanish one have
been the object of re-centralization dynamics (e.g. Maino 2009): on the contrary,
both «Italy and Spain are pursuing greater decentralization at the same point in
time that Northern European countries are shifting away from decentralization in
their health systems» (Saltman 2008, pp. 105-106).
Research sources and techniques
The comparative study of the historical development of intergovernmental arrange-
ments in the healthcare policy sector in Italy and Spain, and the assessment of
their impact on policy-making processes, will draw upon data collected from – and
cross-checked through – multiple sources, so as to increase, whenever possible, the
general robustness of the findings (George and Bennett 2005). Data provided by
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secondary sources on IGR and IGAs (existing academic and gray country-specific
literature) will be thus complemented with information provided by documentary
analysis (minutes and reports of IGAs’ meetings, texts of laws, IGAs’ founding
agreements and regulations, parliamentary speeches), interviews with IGR actors
and country-experts (Richards 1996; Tansey 2007; Harvey 2011), as well as from
an extensive review of newspapers’ articles in both countries.
Data collected from these diﬀerent sources will be then assessed, in the light
of the hypotheses previously identified, through "case study" methods, and par-
ticularly by means of Process-Tracing techniques: these latter will allow to trace
the observed phenomena (IGAs’ and IGR variance) back to their most plausible
causes (George and Bennett 2005). In such way, evidence coming from cross-case
comparative analysis will be supplemented by within-case observations (Mahoney
2000a): this practice will make it possible to compensate for some limitations typ-
ically deriving from (strictly defined) cross-case comparative methods, as well as
from underdeveloped theoretical speculations.
General outline
In order to address the two major research questions outlined above, the remainder
of this thesis is organized as follows.
In Chapter 1 the theoretical, conceptual and analytical foundations of this
comparative analysis will be discussed more at length. After having put the ques-
tion into its broader historical and theoretical context, the meaning of the main
"building-block" concepts – such as Intergovernmental Relations and Intergovern-
mental Arrangements – over which the entire analysis is to be constructed, will
be defined, along with the selected analytical perspective. Once clarified such ma-
jor theoretical and conceptual aspects, the existing literature on the issues under
examination will be extensively reviewed: this will allow to derive two sets of hy-
potheses (each referring to the two above-sketched research questions) to be next
tested through empirical analysis.
Based on secondary literature, documentary analysis and interviews, the essen-
tial features of the Italian and Spanish Intergovernmental Arrangements systems
will be laid out, respectively, in Chapters 2 and 3. Taking a long-run perspective,
the focus of the analysis will be put on the specificities of the historical paths
which have led to current institutional outcomes.
The information contained in these two Chapters will be then the object of sys-
tematic, in-depth comparison in the following Chapter (4), looking for the most
plausible explanation of diﬀerences observable in these two countries Intergovern-
mental Arrangements. To this end, the historical account oﬀered in Chapters 2
and 3, integrated with additional evidence, will be systematically appraised taking
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a more theory-driven perspective, based on the first set of hypotheses derived from
the literature reviewed in Chapter 1.
The empirical test of the second set of hypotheses will be instead the bulk
of Chapters 5 and 6. More specifically, a general overview of the IGR patterns
prevailing, in the healthcare policy field, in the two countries will be the object of
the analysis of Chapter 5. Two case studies of intergovernmental policy-making in
Italy and Spain, selected according to the MSSD logic, will be then carried out in
Chapter 6, in order to explore, from a closer perspective, the hypotheses connecting
the IGAs features to the IGR processes. In this way, some light will be cast on the
causal mechanisms through which diﬀerently organized IGAs contribute to shape
intergovernmental relations in diﬀerent contexts.
Conclusive remarks, theoretical and empirical issues to be addressed in a future
research agenda will be eventually outlined in the last Chapter.
13
Chapter 1
Conceptual, Analytical and
Theoretical Foundations
1.1 Introduction
The present Chapter will provide the analytical, conceptual and theoretical foun-
dations of this analysis. After having put intergovernmental relations in their
broader historical context, I will focus on the value of competing analytical per-
spectives (MLG and IGR) for the research purposes pursued in this work, and on
the definition of the basic concepts which will be used. Then, through a review of
the existing literature, two set of hypotheses will be derived, related, respectively,
to the first and the second general research questions outlined in the Introduction.
1.2 The historical background: devolution of pow-
ers in Western European countries
The processes of "regionalization" occurred in many Western European countries
are certainly to be qualified among the most relevant institutional developments
occurred at the end of the 20th century.
Taking a long-run institutional perspective, Keating (1997; 2008), while noting
that on the one hand the nation-state never monopolized political action in Europe
in the past (the process of State-building having been far less complete than it was
argued for a long time by large part of the literature), and that, on the other hand,
it remains today a powerful actor, he also remarks that in the last thirty, forty years
all large European countries (and some of the smaller ones) have put in place or
largely strengthened systems of regional government. In this regard, it is possible
to speak of a real process of "invention" of regions as new institutional subjects
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(Keating 1997), even in contexts – like (formerly) unitary countries – historically
characterized by high degrees of centralization.
As to the causes or surces of this trend, in the historical-institutional literature
the so called "revival of peripheries" is generally explained as a consequence of the
conjunction of multiple factors, both exogenous and endogenous to each country,
both of functional and political nature.
As to the exogenous elements, the processes of economic integration (globaliza-
tion) and, at a smaller scale, of European integration have been pointed out as the
major forces driving the structural transformation under analysis (e.g. Loughlin
2009; Ferrera 2005; Caciagli 2003; Keating 1997). In a more and more open eco-
nomic environment, the regional scale has been often portrayed, because of its sup-
posed greater flexibility and its potential higher degree of sectoral specialization, as
the best dimension for managing eﬃciently growing market competitive pressures,
and to stimulate endogenous processes of economic growth. At the same time, the
EU cohesion policies (most notably, after the 1988 Structural Funds reform) have
been similarly identified as one of the major triggers for the empowerment of the
so called "meso level" (the administrative and/or political level immediately below
the national one): many contributions in the literature have indeed underscored
the high polity-building potential of such European policies. The tightening of
budget constraints on national governments since the early Nineties (particularly,
since the Maastricht Treaty) has also played a part in making decentralization an
interesting pathway to be followed, in order – theoretically, at least – to increase
eﬃciency in public expenditure patterns1, and to shift responsibility downwards
in policy sectors more likely to be cut ("blame avoidance" strategies). As sketched
in the Introduction, this has been particularly true in the field of welfare policies
and, within this space, in the healthcare policy sector.
With respect to endogenous forces able to account for the observed macro-
institutional reshaping of the State, several country-specific functional, political
and institutional dynamics – both top-down and bottom-up – have been explored.
The empowering of the meso level has been explained making reference to the
end of centralizing dictatorships, the putting into practice of not implemented
constitutional provisions, as well as the re-emergence of grass-roots local identities
and nationalities, and of new territorial parties (also in reaction to the unfolding
global trends sketched above) (Bobbio 2004; Caciagli 2003). The transformation of
the welfare state itself, more oriented towards the provision of "tailored" services
than towards the transfer of monetary payments, has certainly been pivotal in
increasing pressures in the direction of increased peripheries’ autonomy.
Exogenous and endogenous factors have jointly created a breeding ground for
incentives in favor of territorial decentralization.
1Consistently with principles advocated by the New Public Management - NPM supporters.
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Keating (1997; 1998) interprets these two symmetrical processes – economic
integration and re-emergence of the sub-national level – as producing, at the same
time, forms of "de-territorialisation" and "re-territorialisation", "de-construction"
and "re-construction" of the social spaces, at new spatial scales, both above and
below the nation-state. As amply documented, these unfreezing processes have
deeply contributed to the redefinition of the authority within the State, thus calling
into question the very principle of "territoriality" (Ansell and Di Palma 2004).
Following Loughlin (2009), it could be said that a «useful distinction that may be
made [. . . ] is between states as countries, clearly still in existence, and the state
as the main locus of power and decision and it is this aspect of stateness which
has changed. The reforms have succeeded in reshaping these states in the second
sense and in reformulating their role and functions and their relationships both
externally with other states and international organizations and, internally, with
other levels of government and with their own societies and economies» (p. 56).
Empirical trends. . .
Diverse combinations of these exogenous and endogenous factors have led to dif-
ferent institutional outcomes.
Looking more closely at empirical evolutions, alternative "patterns of regional
authority" developments may be identified. Following Marks et al. (2008) analy-
sis, based on a data-set covering institutional reforms in 42 democratic countries
over a long span of time (1950-2005, including diﬀerent waves of reform), the pres-
ence is confirmed of a common trend, meaning that «there has been a marked
increase in the level of regional authority over the past half-century. Not every
country has become regionalized, but where we see reform over time, it is in the
direction of greater, not less, regional authority» (p. 167). According to these
scholars, over 384 reforms aﬀecting regional authority occurred in the time period
considered, 342 (that is almost 90%) have contributed to increase regional author-
ity. Furthermore, consistently with the above-mentioned causal factors pointed
out by the literature, the analysis shows that what the authors name the "identity
eﬀect" – linked to the «relative strength of a population’s identity to the com-
munity encompassed by the jurisdiction» (p. 174), the "democracy eﬀect" – by
which dictatorships are supposed to have lower degrees of regional autonomy than
democracies (though the reverse is not always true), and the "integration eﬀect" –
which points to the devolutionary pressures fueled by both economic and European
integration, appear all playing a role, even if to a diﬀerent degree in each case,
in explaining cross-national and temporal variation in patterns of regional author-
ity. Besides these empirical generalizations, two additional factors help accounting
for the magnitude of change occurred in the regional organization of the State.
Firstly, the population size of a country, which is shown to exert a functional con-
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straint on regionalization: intuitively, small countries have «little space in which
to squeeze an intermediate level of government between local authorities and na-
tional government» (p. 168; also Caciagli 2003). Secondly, the pre-existing level
of regionalization itself: countries already characterized by relatively high levels
of regionalization (like historical federal countries) seem to face a sort of "ceiling
eﬀect" (Marks et al. 2008), in consequence of which they do not have much room
for further regional empowerment.
It should be furthermore remarked that current institutional settings of ter-
ritorial authorities are the results of the layering of diﬀerent "waves" of reform,
implemented in subsequent periods of time. Schematically, at least two waves of
regionalization can be identified. The first one, occurred during the 1970s and the
1980s, contributed to relax centralization in many formerly centralized polities,
through the very creation of a new regional layer (Belgium, Denmark and Italy:
1970; France: 1964 and 1972; Norway: 1975; Spain: 1978 onwards) (Marks et al.
2008, p. 170). The second wave of regional reforms occurred instead in the 1990s,
leading to a further increase of regional (administrative, legislative and, in some
cases, fiscal) powers in many (regionalized) countries.
Among the large European countries, four emerge as particularly interesting:
Belgium, Spain, Italy and the UK. In all these States – originally unitary central-
ized polities – the regional level has been gradually but strongly reinforced, even
if according to diﬀerent patterns. Italy, Spain and the UK have become highly
devolved countries (Italy and Spain to a greater degree than UK, Spain and the
UK in a more asymmetrical way than Italy), while Belgium, after a long and incre-
mental process of transformation (occurred between 1970 and 1993), is now fully
classified as a federal (asymmetrical) State.
. . . and theoretical developments: beyond the federal - unitary dichotomy
For grasping more finely the diﬀerences in the outcomes produced by dynamics of
territorial re-scaling, it must be considered that one noteworthy theoretical conse-
quence of the processes just sketched is the insight that the classical dichotomous
distinction between federal and unitary forms of State has lost at least part of
its heuristic power. As summed-up by Watts (2013), «many undoubtedly uni-
tary systems have incorporated some territorial decentralization including federal
elements. [. . . ] [T]here are those political systems such as Spain, Italy and the
UK that have evolved such a mixture of federal and unitary elements that their
classification as unitary or federal has become a matter of debate» (p. 19). As a
result, the classification of States into either federal or unitary categories would be
impossible, these two categories being no more exhaustive nor mutually exclusive
(Bobbio 2004).
Analytically, I thus concur with large strands of the comparative federalism
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literature, according to which it appears now more correct to imagine the existence
of a conceptual continuum, whose extremities are constituted by (ideal-typical)
pure unitary and pure federal arrangements. The idea of a continuum makes it
possible to identify diﬀerent varieties of territorial organization, avoiding at the
same time an artificial neat and static distinction between them (Watts 2008; Baldi
1999, 2003; Bobbio 2004).
In this line, if Elazar (1987) points to the distinction between federal systems
and federal states, Watts (2008) similarly suggests the advisability of distinguishing
federal political systems from federations. The first term refers to a broad category
of political systems in which, in contrast to unitary systems characterized by a
single central source of political and legal authority, there are two (or more) levels
of government, thus combining elements of shared rule (collaborative partnership)
through a common government, and regional self-rule (constituent unit autonomy)
for the governments of the constituent units. This broad genus, according to
Watts, encompasses a whole spectrum, a set of species of more specific non-unitary
forms: «as in a spectrum, the categories are not sharply delineated but shade into
one another at the margins» (p. 8). This explains why it may be reasonably
argued that "federalism" can be understood as «a principle present [to diﬀerent
degrees] in every political system acknowledging some forms of autonomy (self-rule)
to peripheral governments within a common government (shared-rule)» (Baldi
2007, p. XIII, translated). To summarize, "federalism" and "federation" cannot be
anymore treated as synonyms (Burgess 2013, p. 46), as long as federal features
can be traced out even in non-federal countries.
Consistently with these insights, a way of grasping diﬀerent varieties of regional
governments present in Western Europe is the one suggested by Keating (1998),
according to whom it is possible to identify four alternative kinds of regional
government, diﬀering on the administrative-political "strength" accorded to the
institutional expression of the meso-level.
In such classification, the weakest form of regional government is the one that
can be found in case of "functional decentralization", a setting characterized by the
establishment of ad hoc agencies for the fulfillment of specific tasks at an inter-
mediate level (between the state and the local one): the regional agencies set up
in the United Kingdom during the 1970s or in Italy and France during the 1950-
60s, particularly for economic development and planning, may be considered as
good examples of such kind of regional government (still fully consistent with the
maintenance of a unitary setting). The next form of regional institutionalization
is labeled by Keating as "weak regionalism", and points to those cases in which
regional governments are «deconcentrated arms of central government» (p. 112):
what we witness in these cases is a form of State deconcentration. Historically,
this coincided with the "first regionalization wave" evoked above (1970s-1980s).
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The term "strong regionalism" refers instead to cases – like the Spanish Estado
de las Autonomías (State of the Autonomies) – located in an midway position,
being the Regions neither a mere articulation of the central government nor polit-
ical units fully comparable to federated entities. Eventually, the strongest form of
regional government is the one we find in strictly federal countries. The categoriza-
tion proposed by Keating puts in evidence, again, that «the distinction between
federalism and the stronger forms of regionalization is becoming ever more diﬃ-
cult to make» and that «[r]ather than making a sharp distinction between federal
and regional models of government, we can see them as a continuum, from the
strongest, represented by the German federal system, to the weakest, represented
by administrative deconcentration of the central state, or purely functional forms
of decentralization» (Keating 1998, p. 113 and 114-116).
Relying on Baldi (1999; 2007) an operationally clearer distinction can be drawn
between diﬀerent forms of territorial organization of the State – "centralist", "re-
gional", "neo-regional" and "federal" –, depending on the degree of what the au-
thor defines as "center-constraining potential" (c-c-p) present in each institutional
setting. The advantage of this categorization consists in that it is based on an
operationalization of the concept of federalism, intended as the degree to which
constitutional and para-constitutional variables ensure the existence of mecha-
nisms designed to prevent any center of power to freely and unilaterally alter the
distribution of competences (Baldi 2007, pp. 30-31). The center-constraining po-
tential is hold to be minimum in centralist states, where constitutional guarantees
of the meso level do not exist; it is relatively higher in regional systems, where
State centralism is instead constrained by the legislative power accorded to au-
tonomous Regions (like in the case of Italy after the 1948 Constitution or the UK
after Scottish and Walsh devolution); the constraints put on the center are even
greater in so called "neo-regional" States – whose two more evident examples are
today Spain and Italy –, in which Regions are accorded exclusive legislative powers
and/or the possibility to take part to the national policy-making. Obviously, the
center-constraining potential is maximum in federations (where the basic federal
principles are entirely fulfilled), even if to diﬀerent degrees in each case. In fact, in
a sort of symmetrical trend, many historical federal countries have indeed moved
in a centralizing direction (see § 1.5.1).
The overlaps between Keating’s and Baldi’s classifications, even if not complete,
are quite evident. In Table 1.1, the outline oﬀered by Baldi (2007) is integrated
with the labels proposed by Keating (1998)2.
In conclusion, some points seems to emerge quite clearly from the previous dis-
2Many other classifications are obviously available in the comparative federalism literature:
for a more recent contribution on this issue see, for instance, Burgess (2013).
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Table 1.1: The Federal-Unitary continuum
Keating (1998) Baldi (2007) Country
Functionally Decen-
tralized
Centralist France
Weakly Regionalized Regional UK; Italy (1948)
Strongly Regional-
ized
Neo-regional Italy (2001); Spain
Federal Low c-c-p fed. Austria
Medium c-c-p fed. Canada
Australia
Germany
High c-c-p fed. US
Switzerland
Source: Own elaboration. The ordering of countries is based on Baldi
(2007).
cussion. As a consequence of subsequent regionalist waves, spurred by many dif-
ferent pressures, the meso level appears to have been institutionally strengthened,
even if in diﬀerent ways and to a diﬀerent measure, in many Western European
countries. From a heuristic point of view, these evolutions have definitively called
into question the very usefulness of a dichotomous conceptual distinction between
federal and unitary arrangements, inviting instead to look at more fine-grained
categories of contemporary States’ territorial organization.
Such considerations may be considered as one preliminary, fundamental step
in the process of country case selection, as well as the premise of the conceptual
and theoretical frameworks adopted for this analysis, which will be discussed in
the next paragraphs.
1.3 Increasing interactions between levels of gov-
ernment
The historical background just skectched explains the increasing attention towards
the systems of relations connecting several territorial governmental units jointly
involved in the definition and provision of public policies, both at the same and at
diﬀerent hierarchical levels, both in (strictly) federal and non-federal countries.
From a functionalist perspective, on the basis of the existing literature, several
sources spurring the need (or advisability) of exchanges between diﬀerent govern-
mental units may be indentified. Looking more closely at functional pressures,
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mostly related to policy-making dynamics, it is possible to distinguish several
kinds of purposes intergovernmental relations can fulfill or, diﬀerently stated, sev-
eral kinds of policy issues requiring intergovernmental intervention. Four general
goals of intergovernmental linkages may be identified (Keating 2012; Swenden and
Jans 2007):
1. The first goal refers to the desire to attain policy harmonization or, at least,
to reach an integrated approach to specific policy problems across diﬀerent
levels, despite formal allocation of competences. This may be particularly
true when the issues at stake concern fundamental citizenship’s rights: in
this respect, the case of health policy may be especially illustrative.
2. The second pressure fostering the urgency of intergovernmental interactions
may arise from the desire to solve "spill-over" problems, that is to deal with
fundamental externalities issues, which – in spite of formal legal provisions –
could hardly be eﬃciently tackled without changing the scale of public inter-
vention (for instance, through the involvement of higher levels of government
into the issue or by means of subnational units’ alliances). Several scholarly
contributions on this point, particularly in the field of (first generation) fis-
cal federalism literature, have clearly shown the risks virtually deriving from
an allocation of competences to a non-optimal territorial scale: the overpro-
duction of negative externalities, the underproduction of positive ones (like
redistribution), a "race to the bottom" in regulatory and welfare policies are
the most common perverse eﬀects pointed out by theoretical and empirical
elaborations (e.g. Oates 1999). From a fiscal federalism point of view, the
normative goal should be a "perfect mapping", that is a clean coincidence of
political-administrative jurisdictional borders with the eﬀects of the policies
under the authority of these jurisdictions. Real institutional arrangements,
nevertheless, tend always to be much more complex, increasing (rather than
reducing) the functional pressures towards cooperation between territorial
levels.
3. Thirdly, exchanges between governments may be implemented in order to
manage (possibly, even to prevent) potential conflicts over the formal distri-
bution of competences, and to overcome them through political, rather than
judicial means.
4. Finally – and strictly related to the first point –, as stressed by Keating
(2012), the urgency of interactions may derive from the appearance of entirely
new political problems, which, cutting across existent divisions of powers,
force governments to mutually come into contact: from this point of view,
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the existence of a web of intergovernmental relations may increase, over time,
the flexibility, eﬃcacy and adaptability of an institutional setting as a whole.
In this line, Agranoﬀ (2007) remarks that «managing policies through coopera-
tive intergovernmental processes has become a continuing concern with federalism
of all types» (p. 249). Similarly, Watts (2008) observes that it is the «inevitability
within federations of overlaps and interdependence in the exercise by governments
of the powers distributed to them» that has required the diﬀerent levels of govern-
ment to «treat each other as partners. This has necessitated extensive consultation,
cooperation and coordination between governments» (p. 117).
It is important to stress that – as it clearly emerges from the previous two quo-
tations – the very notions of "inevitability" or of "policy-making imperatives" stand
at the basis of many accounts about the emergence of intergovernmental relations,
and the consequent need of multi-level cooperation, coordination and exchanges
within decentralized settings (e.g. Inwood et al. 2011). In this vein, the sup-
posedly unavoidable links between public policy dynamics and intergovernmental
relations are often stressed.
In what may be defined as a basically functionalist perspective, the underlying
idea is, in a few words, that the growing complexity of societies and public policies,
as well as the empirical evident diﬃculty to separate – according to a legalistic
and dualistic criterion – the competences of diﬀerent jurisdictional levels, have
made quite widespread the reasons spurring intergovernmental interactions just
reviewed. Such a development can be seen, at the same time, as a consequence
of the territorial re-organization of the State (leading, as seen, historical unitary
and federal countries towards more similar patterns of institutional design), and
as an endogenous cause of such a process (actual policy-making making dynamics
having made necessary converging institutional adaptations and transformations).
It should be remarked, however, that the notions of "inevitability", "policy im-
peratives", "necessity", and the like, if not adequately qualified, may appear overly
generic, if not misleading. What could be qualified as the "inevitability argument"
seems, in fact, being more understandable if related to the emergence of simi-
lar functional pressures pushing for increased interactions between governments,
than to the mechanistic, eﬀective establishment and working of such relations.
Otherwise, such kind of reasoning risks to conceal observable variations of the
phenomenon across space and time.
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1.4 Competing analytical perspectives: Intergov-
ernmental Relations (IGR) and Multilevel
Governance (MLG)
These considerations bring us to briefly explore two diﬀerent (and partially alterna-
tive) streams of literature which can be seen as the natural candidates for framing
this analysis. Indeed, although grown in diﬀerent settings, they both share a com-
mon emphasis on the role played by interactions between governmental units and
coordination mechanisms in policy-making within multi-tiered, compound politi-
cal systems: the Intergovernmental Relations (IGR) and Multi-level Governance
(MLG) approaches. In the next lines, I will try to underscore both the commonal-
ities and the diﬀerences between these two analytical perspectives, as well as their
advantages and shortcomings in relation to the research goals of this analysis.
The first body of studies (IGR) originated in the United States, within the
broad field of comparative federalism and public administration studies, to ac-
count for and make sense of the ongoing transformations of the American federal
system (e.g. Wright 1974). At the basis of this literature, there was in fact the
awareness that the so called model of "dual federalism", suggested by legal scholars
like Corwin (1950) to describe the constitutional-institutional design of the Amer-
ican federal system – characterized by a neat and clear distinction of competences
and tasks between diﬀerent levels of government – seemed definitively unrealistic:
Corwin himself (1950), spoke, in this respect, of «an altered constitutional order»
(p. 2)3.
Historically, this was interpreted as the result of an increased intervention (if
not of an intrusion) of the federal government in federated states’ aﬀairs, for facing
new challenges, linked to the economic crisis of 1930s, WWII, and the expansion
of the Welfare State since the New Deal (see Obinger et al. 2005). Simeon (2002),
who, echoing the "inevitability argument" just sketched, stresses the policy imper-
atives spurring intergovernmental interactions, argues for instance that, in spite
of many diﬀerences still existing among federal countries, «intergovernmental re-
3The classical "dual federalism" model (also called the "coordinated authority" model, Wright
1995, or the "separation model", Bobbio 2004) normatively provides for two levels of government
– central government and federated states – each of which must act exclusively in areas of its
own jurisdiction, according to what set by the laws or the Constitution, through an allocation
of competences as precise as possible. The institutional design must pursue as an overriding
objective the avoidance of duplications and overlaps, supposed to only produce, as an eﬀect, an
increase of the likelihood of frictions between the diﬀerent levels of government jointly involved
in the same area. According to Elazar (1991), «the theory of dual federalism held that a proper
federal system is one constructed on the basis of two separate spheres of authority – federal and
state – that overlap only minimally where absolutely necessary» (p. 67).
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lations have become ubiquitous and pervasive in all of them. This flows from the
inevitable fact of interdependence among their constituent governments, a result
of the complexities of the contemporary policy agenda and the impossibility, even
when the inspiration originally was to create water-tight compartments, of drawing
clear and separate lines of responsibility» (p. 91).
Symmetrically, in unitary countries, the emergence of intergovernmental rela-
tions may be seen as a consequence of similar policy-making dynamics (first of
all the emergence and transformation of the Welfare State) as well as of the more
recent processes of political devolution, often tending to rest more on the estab-
lishment of spheres of shared rule (through, for instance, the definition of wide
areas of concurrent legislation) than of self-rule (Ruggiu 2006; Baldi 2007).
Wright (1995) suggests that these institutional dynamics have led, on the whole,
to the establishment of diﬀerent kinds or patterns of "overlapping authority", all
characterized by a high degree of interdependence between jurisdictions and by
relatively small areas of complete jurisdictional autonomy. As well known, the
image adopted in order to illustrate the actual working of multi-level systems thus
increasingly shifted from the so called "layer-cake" (in which – plainly speaking
– all levels and tasks are pictured as clearly distinct) to that of a "marble cake",
suggested by Grodzins in the 1960s, whose colors and tastes appear as definitively
and inevitably mixed together, meaning that diﬀerent governmental levels tend to
be jointly involved in the same policy field.
Theoretically, as usefully suggested by Bolleyer (2009), within the very large
and varied IGR subfield of studies it may prove fruitful to distinguish at least two
diﬀerent analytical perspectives: the "systemic" and the "policy oriented". This
latter refers to the interpretation of Igr as «a factor which helps to account for the
formation and implementation of policy across a range of separate jurisdictions»,
while from the systemic point of view, «Igr is the phenomenon to be accounted for»
(p. 15). In the first case, intergovernmental relationships and arrangements are
looked at as the independent variable, whilst in the second case as the dependent
one.
It should be also remarked that, even if the Igr approach may prove helpful
for casting light on and identifying diﬀerent patterns of relations among govern-
ments, I perfectly concur with Trench (2006) when he points out – amongst the
flaws most aﬀecting this approach – the «profoundly empirical nature of much
work on intergovernmental relations» and notes that the field is clearly «an area
lacking theoretical debate but in need of it» (p. 224). In fact, the major weakness
of the IGR literature is that many contributions in this area tend to be highly
country-specific, comparisons (when implemented) usually being quite loose and
not systematically built within an explicitly defined theoretical framework. More-
over, the field is aﬀected by some terminological and conceptual problems, which
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will be reviewed more in depth below (cf. § 1.5.1).
Before proceeding to examine basic IGR concepts, it appears worthy consid-
ering the second stream of literature I have previously referred to as relevant in
approaching the issues under analysis: the Multi-level Governance (MLG) ap-
proach.
The conceptual tools as well as the vocabulary provided by the MLG literature,
developed since the early Nineties to account for the unprecedented complex way of
working of the institutional system of the European Union, have been later widely
mobilized to describe and analyze the actual functioning of domestic decentralized
arrangements, in the wake of the more general transformation of the role played
by the State, whose control capacity over society would have been more and more
unraveled, as a consequence of the conjunction of the exogenous and endogenous
pressures previously reminded (Peters and Pierre 2001; Piattoni 2005).
As well known, the most basic definitions of "multi-level governance" point to
the emerging set of «negotiated, non-hierarchical exchanges between [both public
and private] institutions at the transnational, national, regional and local levels»
(Peters and Pierre 2001, p. 131) or, diﬀerently stated, to the new ways of «reach-
ing authoritative decisions, by trying to take into account the preferences and the
abilities of decision-takers at diﬀerent jurisdictional levels» (Piattoni 2005, p. 417,
translated). Trying to identify a "common core" of the MLG approach, it might be
argued that the analytical emphasis tends to be directed mainly towards the net-
works of informal relations set up by governmental and private policy stakeholders
located at diﬀerent territorial levels, as well as to the non-hierarchical nature of
the exchanges occurring among these latter, within rather unstable institutional
frameworks. As summed up by Peters and Pierre (2002), «relationships among
institutions at diﬀerent tiers of government in this perspective are believed to be
fluid, negotiated, and contextually defined» (p. 3).
The employment of MLG approach and concepts to explain multilevel policy-
making processes within the domestic arenas cannot appear as surprising, given
the initial focus of MLG studies on Structural Funds and on their above-mentioned
hypothesized impact on region-building within the EU member States. Moreover,
given the quite broad nature of the concept – and, in a sense, of its vagueness –it
may be easily stretched beyond its original focus, in order to look, more generally
at the achievement of coordination patterns between formally sovereign and yet
increasingly inter-dependent entities (Piattoni 2005). When employed in this way,
the MLG approach seems really coming close to the above-sketched tradition of
research, that linked to federal and intergovernmental relations studies: in a way,
as observed again by Peters and Pierre (2002), the very novelty of the MLG per-
spective may easily appear overstated to those familiar with territorial politics,
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Table 1.2: Types of MLG
MLG TYPE I MLG TYPE II
General-purpose jurisdictions Task-specific jurisdictions
Non-intersecting membership Intersecting membership
Jurisdictions organized in a limited num-
ber of levels
No limit to the number of jurisdictional
levels
System-wide architecture Flexible design
Source: Hooghe and Marks 2003, p. 236.
comparative federalism and Igr literature.
The points of contact between the two traditions of research under analysis
become even clearer by looking at a further distinction within the MLG field,
suggested by Hooghe and Marks (2003), between two distinct, logically coherent
types of multi-level governance: the so called MLG "Type I" and "Type II".
As summarized in Table 1.2, the first kind of multi-level governance refers to
an institutional setting in which several functions are bundled together into a lim-
ited number of jurisdictions, located at a defined number of territorial levels, and
designed to be stable over long periods of time. By contrast, the picture emerging
from "Type II", more congruent with the logical consequences of fiscal federalism
tenets reminded above, points to a context in which territorial jurisdictions are
mainly functionally defined, so there is no a priori limitation to their number and
no necessarily stability as to their design. In this view, jurisdictions, whose con-
stituencies are often overlapping, must be suﬃciently flexible in order to eﬃciently
adapt to a frequently changing environment (ensuring, in this way, the previously
evoked "perfect mapping", invoked by fiscal federalism theorists).
As it should appear clear from the previous discussion, the focus of MLG
"Type I" can be considered as the strongest point of convergence between federal
and IGR studies, on the one hand, and the newer MLG tradition of research
on the other hand. Actually, as explicitly remarked by Hooghe and Marks (2003),
«the intellectual foundation for Type I governance is federalism, which is concerned
with power sharing among a limited number of governments operating at just a few
levels» (p. 236, emphasis added). Basically, both perspectives – MLG (Type I)
and IGR – imply and shed light on the existence of multiple interactions between a
limited number of interdependent governments operating at diﬀerent levels within
multi-tiered political systems, and stress the complex nature of policy-making in
such kind of compound institutional settings.
Nevertheless, drawing on Stein and Turkewitsch (2008), it is still possible to
identify a number of major diﬀerences between the concepts employed in federalism
and Multi-level governance literatures, as well as between their research focuses.
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Amongst the most relevant, it should be stressed that while the MLG ap-
proach tends to be conceptually applied «to all levels and units of governance
in any polity, diﬀerentiated either vertically (e.g. global, regional-supranational,
national, subnational-constituent and local levels) or horizontally (e.g. public,
private and voluntary third-sector organizations)» federal studies are more often
focused on a limited number of jurisdictional levels (two or three) within a single
State (that is, they take more commonly a domestic perspective) (Stein and Turke-
witsch 2008, p. 13). Secondly, federalism tends to describe (and, normatively, to
encourage) a relatively high degree of formalization of joint policy decisions be-
tween the diﬀerent levels of governments; by contrast, MLG generally depicts a
setting characterized by a higher degree of informality and flexibility. Finally, and,
perhaps, most importantly, conceptual tools provided by federalism and IGR seem
better able to seize both cooperative and conflicting or competitive patterns of in-
teraction between the diﬀerent units (either vertically or horizontally) than the
MLG approach, where the emphasis seems to be put mainly on patterns of non
hierarchical cooperation and mutual adjustment among actors.
This last point is in my view one particularly worthy to be considered, insofar,
as shown for instance by Lecours (2004), in all devolved settings, the very cre-
ation of regional institutions «leads to patterns of territorial relationships (central-
regional, inter-regional) which always present potential for territorial tensions», in
addition to the fact that «regional institutions lead to the establishment of po-
litical systems which become new arenas for power struggles» (p. 86, emphasis
added), the dynamics of which are, in turn, likely to aﬀect the wider system of
territorial relationships.
Moreover, the quite lose nature of the MLG concept has been the object of
several critiques by a number of scholars: being too vague (undenotative), the
concept would be prone to be overly "stretched" in order to indiscriminately de-
scribe «any complex and multifaceted political process» (Stein and Turkewitsch,
2008, p. 11) or to merely underscore that «no single centre has power to resolve
conflicts» and that «coordination between levels must be achieved by an exchange
of information and resources and by processes of negotiation and cooperation»
(Benz 2000, p. 22). The risk, according to Keating (2008), would be even that the
more debate around the term continues «the less enlightening it becomes» (p. 75).
Without trying to artificially over-emphasize the diﬀerences between the two
strands of literature just reviewed (which, in a sense, seem to suﬀer from many
common weaknesses), and keeping in mind the several above-mentioned points of
overlap between them (in particular, the analogies between IGR and MLG Type I,
which partially share the same object of analysis; on the possible interconnections
between the two fields, cf. also Ongaro et al. 2010), federal and IGR studies appear
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as providing clearer empirical referents, and an analytical framework more fitting
with the research goals pursued through thus analysis. Furthermore, in the light
of the macro-institutional transformations described above (leading to a reduction
of the distance between federations and federal systems), the risk of conceptual
stretching, due to the well-known phenomenon of "concept traveling", seems to be
kept reasonably minimized: as remarked by Trench (2006), «a virtue of Igr is that
it is to be found in all federal systems, but also in many others. Thus, even what
was (wrongly) considered to be a centralized or unitary political system [. . . ] can
develop a literature on Igr, to make sense of relations between central and local
governments» (p. 226).
1.5 Defining building-block concepts
In other words, for my research purposes, while considering the multifaceted MLG
literature as a rich source of theoretical propositions and empirical evidence, the
IGR approach appears as more adequate. In particular, the concepts of "Inter-
governmental Relations" (IGR) and "Intergovernmental Mechanisms" or "Arrange-
ments" (IGAs) seem providing clearer empirical referents. Even if aﬀected – as
it will be explained in the next lines – by some degree of ambiguity (requiring a
necessary work of clarification), these concepts, relying at a lower ladder of ab-
straction than those proposed by the MLG approach, are characterized by a fair
amount of denotative power. Because a certain degree of confusion aﬀecting the
use of these basic terms, a work of conceptual clarification by reconstruction is
suitable. In the remainder of this section, my purpose is to review the existing
literature on the topic, in order to unambiguously define the concept of Intergov-
ernmental Relations, as well as to grasp an operational definition of IGA through
the identification, drawing on the existing contributions in the field, of its most
relevant analytical dimensions: the degree institutionalization; the territorial scale
(vertical or horizontal) at which they operate; the policy-sectoral or generalist
focus of their activity (Bolleyer 2009).
1.5.1 Intergovernmental Relations (IGR)
As reminded by Wright (1974) and Agranoﬀ (2007), the term "Intergovernmental
Relations" (IGR) appeared as a neologism in the 1930s in the US. Since then, many
definitions of the concept have been suggested in the literature.
Anderson (1960, p. 3), frequently considered one of the first authors who
explicitly analyzed the concept, after having identified some relevant dimensions
characterizing it (later developed more extensively by Wright, 1974), simply de-
fined Igr as «an important body of activities or interactions occurring between
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governmental units of all types and levels within the federal system» (quoted by
Wright 1974, p. 1). At the most basic level and in its broadest sense, it might thus
be simply argued that Igr are «relations among governments within a federation»,
as summed up, for instance, by Cameron (2002, p. 9). If defined in such a way,
however, Intergovernmental Relations clearly risk to be as much undenotative as
many definitions of the most recent concept of multi-level governance.
The often mentioned conceptualization elaborated by Wright (1974), with spe-
cific reference to the American federal system, allows going deeper into the concept,
by identifying more precisely diﬀerent distinctive features or defining dimensions
of Intergovernmental Relations (Igr). Following Wright, the concept embodies five
major dimensions.
Firstly, Igr refers to activities which occur within the federal system: feder-
alism, in this view, is the legal-institutional context, not the totality of Igr (in-
tergovernmental relations cannot be interpreted as a synonym for "federalism").
Secondly, the concept of intergovernmental relations must be «formulated largely
in terms of human relations and human behavior» (p. 2). Intergovernmental rela-
tions do not exist as such, but are always carried out by individual oﬃcials located
in diﬀerent governing units: in Wright’s words, «individual interactions among
public oﬃcials is at the core of Igr»; this may be labeled as the "interpersonal
dimension" of Igr (McEwen et al. 2012; León and Ferrín Perreira 2011 ). Thirdly,
the term Igr does not refer to «one-time, occasional occurrences, formally ratified
in agreements or rigidly fixed by statutes or court decisions»: it rather points to
the «continuous, day-to-day pattern of contacts, knowledge, and evaluations of
governmental oﬃcials» (p. 2), that is to the ongoing both formal and the informal
working relationships «in institutional contexts». The fourth distinctive feature of
Igr points to the role played by elected oﬃcials – mayors, councilmen, governors,
legislators – as well as to the function exerted by administrators (bureaucrats).
The fifth and last distinctive feature of Igr identified by Wright corresponds to
the policy component or "policy core" present in intergovernmental relations: as
clearly seen, the need of Igr tend to emerge as a way to serve policy programs. In
the light of these remarks, Wright concluded that «the term Igr alerts one to the
multiple, behavioral, continuous and dynamic exchanges occurring between various
oﬃcials in the political system» (p. 4, emphasis added).
Several additional features, not explicitly mentioned by Wright, may help iden-
tifying further relevant dimensions characterizing Igr, by contributing to clarify its
meaning. As long as the term refers to «all the permutations and combinations
of relations among the units of government» (Wright 1974, p. 2), a basic dis-
tinction to be considered pertains to the hierarchical level or territorial scale at
which relations between governments occur: if governments in mutual interaction
are located at the same territorial level, intergovernmental relations are said to be
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"horizontal", while if they are situated at diﬀerent levels of the hierarchy Igr are
said to be "vertical". Additionally, both vertical and horizontal Igr may involve all
the governmental units, that is either the central government and all (or the most
part of) the constituent components (vertically) or all (or the most part of) the
constituent units (horizontally): in this case, Igr are "multilateral"; by contrast,
if interactions concern only two players (vertically: the central government and
one of the constituent units; horizontally: two constituent units), they are to be
defined "bilateral".
As to the central actors in Igr, some additional clarifications are needed. Even
if the literature seems unanimous in attributing to administrators a central role in
Igr, many others may be considered as playing a part (more or less central) in inter-
governmental relations. Trench (2008), for instance, includes among these actors:
judicial courts (specifically, constitutional courts), which through their rulings,
may exert a direct impact on the system of Igr; parliaments and "back-benchers",
who would tend to play a greater role in presidential rather than parliamentary
systems (where Igr are usually dominated by the executives: cf. § 1.5.2); special-
ized ministers and the heads of cabinets (whose involvement, according to Trench,
tends to vary according to the political saliency of the issues at stake). Finally,
political parties may play a role as actors in intergovernmental relations: however,
the balance between territorial and partisan aﬃliation logics (one of the two pos-
sibly prevailing over the other) is a particularly complex question, which I will
develop more extensively next.
All this considered, the often-quoted definition suggested by Agranoﬀ (2004),
according to whom the term ’intergovernmental relations’ captures «the working
connections that tie central governments to those constituent units that enjoy
measures of independent and inter-dependent political power, governmental con-
trol and decision-making» (p. 26) appears at least as incomplete, given its exclu-
sive focus on vertical relations, the lack of clarity about the goal of Igr, and the
not-specification of its actors.
By contrast, a clear and convincing definition of Igr is, for instance, the short
one proposed by Swenden and Jans (2007), who, oﬀering a sort of minimal formu-
lation of the concept, characterize Igr as «patterns of central-regional (vertical) or
inter-regional (horizontal) interaction between diﬀerent (levels of) government(s)
within a state with a view of co-ordinating issues of mutual concern» (p. 1). This
kind of characterization, while reducing complexity, displays several advantages.
First of all, it clearly highlights the very interactive nature of the phenomenon un-
der analysis: as seen, Igr are basically patterns of interaction, dynamic exchanges
or, as put by Anderson, an important body of interactions. Also, it stresses the po-
tential simultaneous working and saliency of both vertical and horizontal relations:
Igr are not just federal-state or center-periphery interactions, but also interstate
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or inter-regional relations: every analysis of Igr must hopefully consider both di-
mensions at the same time. Furthermore, updating Wright’s view, this definition
conveniently allows to grasp the occurrence of Igr not only in strictly federal coun-
tries, but «within a state», without further specifications. The "policy component"
of Igr is also implicitly evoked (the goal of Igr being the coordination of «issues of
mutual concern»), and the possibility of diﬀerent "patterns" of interaction across
diﬀerent policy fields, even if not explicitly mentioned, is left open. Eventually,
as to the main actors of Igr, the emphasis is put on the governments: even if this
undoubtedly narrows the analytical focus, it points to the major relevant actors
in the intergovernmental arena, particularly in parliamentary democracies (see §
1.5.2).
Such a way of conceptualizing IGR allows to avoid a certain degree of ambigu-
ity, which instead surrounds (quite widespread) definitions of ’intergovernmental
relations’ present in the literature, tending to harmfully conflate into a single
proposition distinct analytical dimensions, as clearly put in evidence by Bolleyer
(2009, pp. 18-20). These dimensions are related, at once, to the interactive nature
of the phenomenon under investigation and to its structural-institutional side: as
put by Wright (1974), «federalism deals with the anatomy of the system, whereas
IGR treats its physiology» (p. 2, emphasis added). Paraphrasing this sentence, it
could be argued that several IGR definitions (or they ways in which the term IGR
is employed) tend to blend together both the "physiology" and the "anatomy" of
the issue under investigation.
As eﬃcaciously summarized by Bolleyer et al. (2010), the term "relations" of
the expression Igr can indicate, at the same time, numerous diﬀerent referents.
Firstly, it makes reference to «exchanges between governments» (operationally
intended as the intensity of communication, the density of meetings or exchanges
between governments); secondly, to «patterns of interaction» (whose indicators
would be the regularity of meetings, the regularity of meetings between particular
partners, dominant modes of interaction that might be more or less conflictual,
more or less cooperative); eventually, the term "relations" might refer to those
«structures that channel government interaction or intergovernmental processes»
(whose relevant dimensions would be the composition of and the decision-making
rules employed in intergovernmental institutions).
Keeping distinct these dimensions may usefully contribute to improve the level
of analytical clarity when looking at the object of analysis (Bolleyer 2006; 2009).
Equating "intergovernmental relations" to "exchanges between governments" does
not seem problematic, even if extremely broad, considering the profoundly dy-
namic and interactive nature of the referent. Following Bolleyer (2009), the idea
of "patterns of interaction" diﬀers from that of "exchanges" basically because it
presupposes a greater degree of regularity (as to the actors involved in the pro-
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cesses or to the kind of oﬃcial meetings between those actors) than the mere idea
of exchanges. Anyway, this may be considered as a diﬀerence in degree, not in
kind. By contrast – and for my research purposes more importantly – employing
the term relations as a synonym for «structures that channel government interac-
tion or intergovernmental processes» may easily appear misleading, if not logically
inconsistent. In my view, the same term should not be employed to refer, simul-
taneously, to the relations occurring between governments (either as exchanges or
as more regular patterns of interaction), and to the formal structures designed to
channel these same relations.
It is for these reasons that I suggest, in order to focus less ambiguously on in-
tergovernmental structures or "machinery", to employ the term "Intergovernmental
Arrangement" (IGA), already introduced in the literature by Bolleyer (2006; 2009).
In this way, I aim avoiding both the confusion deriving from the use of a single
term with many diﬀerent meanings (homonymy), as well as from the introduction
of an unnecessary new synonym, likely to increase, rather than reduce, concep-
tual confusion (Sartori 1970). In fact, as shown by Bolleyer (2009), the fact that
many existing Igr studies refer indiscriminately to all three mentioned dimensions
at once, «without trying to separate one from the other» is openly «problematic,
since each [dimension] has distinct implications for the way Igr are theorized and
operationalized» (p. 18). I then follow the "Sartorian" rule, according to which it
is always better to use one word for each meaning.
To sum up, by IGR I will refer to what McEwen et al. (2012) call the "inter-
governmental dynamics", while by IGA I will mean what these authors call the
"intergovernmental machinery". I will now turn to the analysis of this latter.
1.5.2 Intergovernmental Arrangements (IGAs) and Exec-
utive Federalism
If policy-making dynamics have increased the functional pressures towards the
emergence of a web of intergovernmental relations and exchanges for policy coor-
dination, the appearance of organizational channels of interaction in many coun-
tries has been interpreted, drawing on Hirschman’s and Rokkan’s categories, as
the materialization of new institutional devices through which the "peripheries" –
now endowed with higher "exit" options than in the past – have been given the
way of exerting their "voice option" at the center of the political system (Ferrera
2005). Indeed, within the national arenas, «regions have increased their bargain-
ing power vis-à-vis the central state and have tended to gain new institutionalized
opportunities for voicing their interests and influencing policymaking at the do-
mestic level, for example through the establishment of new specialist bodies for
intergovernmental bargaining and concertation» (Ferrera 2005, p. 180; Ruggiu
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2006). According to Baldi (2007), the development of «political and institutional
channels which enable Regions to participate to national policy-making, with spe-
cific reference to the emergence of structures of intergovernmental cooperation and
concertation» (p. 115, translated) can even be considered as one of the defining
characteristics of the latest regionalist wave evoked above (along with increased
legislative powers accorded to the Regions).
These "specialist bodies for intergovernmental bargaining and concertation"
at the domestic level are capture by the term ’Intergovernmental Arrangement’
(IGA). Notice that many synonyms can be found in the literature: Igr machinery,
structures, arenas, bodies, institutions, forums, councils or conferences are the
most commonly employed. All these terms essentially describe «the structures
set up to channel [. . . ] exchanges» between governments (that is Igr), within the
domestic arenas (Bolleyer and Bytzek 2009, p. 371).
While the term ’intergovernmental relations’, as seen, pertains to all the com-
binations and permutations of relations, exchanges and contacts occurring among
and between governments within a multi-tiered state, the term "Intergovernmen-
tal Arrangements" refers more narrowly to those organizational structures built
up to institutionally channel formal IGR. All these formalized structures «perform
the same general function, namely, to manage the interface between constituent
units» (Cameron 2002, p. 9), in order to ensure the exchange of information, the
attainment of agreements, the coordination of interdependencies, and so on (Baldi
2007). IGAs may thus be intended as those «arenas in which matters aﬀecting
intergovernmental relations are determined», as the «formal institutions for in-
tergovernmental consultation and negotiation» (Watts 1989) or, similarly, as the
«formal institutions [set up] to facilitate intergovernmental relations» (Watts 2008,
p. 118). According to Agranoﬀ, IGAs may be conceived as a primarily political-
administrative tool for the management of IGR, alongside many other instruments
(often empirically overlapping), respectively of more fiscal, economic and legal na-
ture (such as fiscal policies, often used as incentive-levers; courts rulings, and so
on; Agranoﬀ 2007, p. 262) .
As remarked by Simeon (2002), while the emergence of IGR is a common phe-
nomenon, «the institutions and processes that [federal] countries have developed
to manage the intergovernmental relationship vary widely in several dimensions.
They vary from country to country and within countries between diﬀerent time
periods and between diﬀerent policy areas» (p. 91); likewise, it has been argued
that «what is readily apparent [. . . ] is that intergovernmental relations are a
common characteristic of each federation. [. . . ] The diﬀerences [are] particularly
evident when examining the organizations each federation had developed to deal
with intergovernmental relations» (Meekison 2002, p. 2). The same holds true for
non-federal countries.
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Before pointing out the most relevant dimensions or properties allowing to
characterize and distinguish IGAs, it is necessary to specify that the focus here
will be on those institutional arrangements in which the most relevant political
(and administrative) actors are the governments, meaning by "governments" not
the "jurisdictions", but the "executives" representing each jurisdiction. The rea-
son of this choice simply derives from the empirical observation – condensed in
the expression "executive federalism" coined by Watts at the end of the Eight-
ies (1989) – that the management of intergovernmental issues in institutionalized
arenas has increasingly become a matter of executives intervention, at least in par-
liamentary systems: «[i]n all the parliamentary federations [reviewed], the major
instrument for the resolution of intergovernmental relations has been consultation
and negotiation between the executives (and their representatives) of the diﬀerent
governments within these federations» (Watts 1989, p. 8, emphasis original). In
other words, main participants to IGAs tend to be the representatives of diﬀerent
executives (both at the political and at the administrative level). Eventually, it
should be also clarified, in order to further reduce ambiguity, that vertical IGA,
to which executive representatives take part, are often mentioned in the literature
as particular forms of "intra-state federalism" (alongside with alternative channels
such as, among others, the legislative chambers of territorial representation).
In sum, for this research purposes, by IGA I do refer to those permanent insti-
tutional boards, composed of representatives of executives placed either at the same
or at diﬀerent territorial levels, dealing with the management of intergovernmental
relations, (mostly) within the domestic arena.
Having clarified these points, IGAs can be classed considering diﬀerent analyt-
ical dimensions, which also display empirical variation. Surprisingly – as rightly
stressed by Bolleyer and Bytzek (2009) – «despite their relevance, intergovern-
mental arrangements composed of subnational government representatives (and
partially also their federal counterpart) [. . . ] have neither received much attention
nor have they been subject to systematic comparative research» (pp. 371-372).
Similar remarks can be made with reference to arrangements composed of both
national and subnational executives. An established classification or typology of
such institutional bodies is therefore still lacking. Many possible dimensions may
be employed and crossed in order to make sense of the IGA variety.
In Table 1.3, main Intergovernmental Arrangements at work in several Western
federal and quasi-federal countries4, are reported according to two basic dimen-
sions. From a preliminary point of view, indeed, a first distinction to be considered
pertains to the territorial scale at which intergovernmental arrangements operate.
IGAs can in fact be organized vertically or horizontally, depending on their mem-
bership and their goals. While in the former case they include both central and
4Extensively reviewed in Appendix A.
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subnational level representatives, for the management of center-states or center-
regions relationships, in the former case they are just composed of lower level
units, concerned with inter-state or inter-regional coordination: in this respect, the
Canadian First Ministers Conference (FMC) and the Canadian Council of Aus-
tralian Governments (COAG) are good illustrations of vertical intergovernmental
arrangements, while the Swiss Conference of Cantonal Governments (KDK) or
the Austrian Conference of State Presidents (LHK) may be taken as examples of
horizontal IGAs.
Secondly, as shown in the Table, both vertical and horizontal IGAs may be de-
signed to cope with issues related to specific policy-fields or to deal with every kind
of matter of mutual concern in IGR. In the first case, it is to speak of generalist
bodies, while in the second case of sectoral or policy-specific arrangements. Sev-
eral policy-specific arrangements exist, at the vertical scale, in Canada, Australia,
Germany, Austria and Belgium; likewise, at the horizontal level, IGAs composed
of subnational levels representatives in charge of a policy sector do convene in
Canada, Germany and Switzerland.
While these two dimensions – the vertical or horizontal design, and the gener-
alist or policy-specific focus – may help making sense, in a preliminary way, of the
complexity and variety of existing intergovernmental arrangements, at a deeper
level an additional dimension may be added.
In fact, insofar IGA are intended as the institutional arenas in which matters
pertaining to IGR are determined, a crucial point is related to the rules, the orga-
nizational norms and resources structuring these arenas. From this point of view,
the basic questions to be answered are thus the following: «To what extent are the
institutions of intergovernmental relations built into formal governing structures?
To what extent is the machinery of intergovernmental relations mandated by the
constitution or by legislation? To what extent are the operations of the institutions
themselves governed by explicit procedures and formal decision rules? Or are the
institutions fluid and ad hoc, developing and changing according to the political
needs of the participating governments?» (Simeon 2002, p. 92). Shortly, the point,
strictly consistent with the theoretical perspective adopted here, is about the de-
gree of institutionalization of IGAs. An empirical review of these bodies reveals
indeed a high level of variance in what concerns this dimension: «IGR in a given
country may be highly institutionalised, with formal structures and processes that
channel intergovernmental activity, or it may be conducted in an informal, ad hoc
fashion, depending heavily on the nature of the circumstances and the preferences
of the particular political actors» (Cameron 2001, pp. 124-125).
The first conceptualization and operationalization of "institutionalization" with
specific reference to IGAs has been introduced in the IGR literature quite recently
by Nicole Bolleyer (2006; 2009). Her conceptualization – giving preeminence to
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Table 1.3: Main multilateral IGAs in federal and quasi-federal western countries.
Horizontal Vertical
Generalist Policy-specific Generalist Policy-specific
US National Gov-
ernors’ Associa-
tions (NGA)
Canada Annual Pre-
miers’ Confer-
ence (APC),
then Council of
the Federation
(COF)
Ministerial Coun-
cils
First Minis-
ters’ Conference
(FMC)
Ministerial Coun-
cils
Australia Council for the
Asutralian Feder-
ation (CAF)
Council of Aus-
tralian Govern-
ments (COAG)
Ministerial Coun-
cils
Germany Premiers Confer-
ence (MPK)*
Conferences
of Specialized
Ministers*
Joint Bund-
Länder Ministe-
rial Conferences
and Councils
Austria Conference of
State Governors
(LHK)
Referentenkon-
ferenzen
Switzerland Conference
of Cantonal
Governments
(KDK)*
Conferences of
Cantonal Direc-
tors*
Belgium Concertation
Committee
Interministerial
Conferences
UK Joint Ministerial
Committee (JMC
- plenary format)
Joint Ministerial
Committee (JMC
- functional for-
mats)
Italy Conference of the
Regions
State-Regions
Conference
Spain [Conference of
the Govern-
ments of the
Autonomous
Communities]*
Conference of the
Presidents
Sectoral Confer-
ences
Source: Own elaboration.
Key: * = horizontal IGAs providing for the participation of federal/central level representatives;
[ ] = met just one time.
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structural rather than to resources aspects – relies on diﬀerent assumptions. The
first is that the level of institutionalization of an IGA «becomes visible in a process
of internal institutional development» (Bolleyer 2009, p. 24), which materializes
in a more complex internal functional distribution of tasks to diﬀerent oﬃces or
subunits. Secondly, the institutionalization process is assumed to become visible
by a process of external diﬀerentiation, through the establishment of boundaries
towards other arrangements, in terms of functions exerted and material resources
enjoyed.
On these bases, Bolleyer points out several indicators for categorically estimat-
ing the level of IGAs’ institutionalization. An IGA is appraised to be institutionally
weak when meetings between actors (governments) are regular, but lack a sound
organizational infrastructure (that is able to constrain or structure to a certain
degree individual actors’ interests). Medium institutionalization is identified when
an autonomous organizational infrastructure is present: the existence of an in-
dependent secretariat or of a statute can be seen as a possible manifestation of
that. Eventually, an IGA is argued to be strongly institutionalized when indica-
tors such as the adoption of decisions by non-unanimous rule (either by simple
or qualified majority), the internal diﬀerentiation of the IGA into (stable) diﬀer-
ent sub-units with specific tasks (such as policy committees), the legal status of
agreements reached within the IGAs and the high degree of specificity of such
agreements (targeting specific problems rather than oﬀering general statements)
can be observed.
Such way of conceptualizing the degree of institutionalization of Intergov-
ernmental Arrangements implies, consistently with the rational-choice approach
adopted by this scholar, a sort of logical development of the institutionalization
process. In fact, even if no element is to be considered as a necessary condition
for the other, elements are nevertheless assumed to cluster together. As explained
by Bolleyer (2009), indeed, «it can well be imagined that an IGA with its own
secretariat fulfills mainly advisory functions and its members meet only ad hoc.
Such combinations, however, should not occur too frequently since ad hoc contacts
are equally possible and less costly without a secretariat» (p. 25). IGAs sets of
features are thus assumed to be mutually and consistently related.
In my view and for my research purposes, it is not necessary to see IGAs’ in-
stitutionalization features as logically mutually related. Relaxing rational-choice
assumptions and broadening the scope of the analysis from institutions voluntarily
set up in the intergovernmental arena to all (executive federalism) institutions de-
voted to the management of multilateral intergovernmental relations, it is possible
to consider each element as not necessarily logically clustered to each other. If the
point is about the measure to which «interactions between diﬀerent governmental
actors become regular and sustainable» (Colino and Parrado 2008, p. 7), then it is
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reasonable to agree with McEwen et al. (2012) when they implicitly consider that
the higher the number of indicators empirically observable, the higher the level of
an IGA’s institutionalization (p. 325). Similarly, León and Ferrín Pereira (2009)
simply argue that «by institutionalization we mean the following elements: the ex-
istence of an internal regulation [. . . ], the frequency of called meetings (the higher
the frequency, the higher the institutionalization) or the existence of secondary
level bodies» (pp. 62-63, translated).
On the basis of the existing research, I propose to systematize the indicators
most commonly evoked in the literature as pertaining to the level of IGAs’ in-
stitutionalization into diﬀerent dimensions or – in Goertz’s (2005) terminology –
into four "secondary level dimensions". No one of these dimensions has to be seen
neither as logically preceding another one, nor as a necessary condition for the
concept of institutionalization itself. Rather, an additive logic may be seen at the
basis of their combination. Following these principles, four clusters of indicators,
related to as many secondary level dimensions, may be identified:
1. Formal Basis. This dimension refers to the existence or not of any kind of
formalized document, specifying the establishment, the members, the func-
tions, and the decision rules of a given IGA. Such a document may take the
form of a constitutional provision (extremely rare), of a founding Law or of
an internal regulation voted by the partners.
2. Density of Contacts. Besides the existence of a formal basis, many schol-
ars agree on the importance of what may be called the "density" of contacts
occurring in practice between the members of an IGA. As seen, the so called
"interpersonal dimension" has been pointed out by many scholars as a major
feature of IGR. Such density of interactions may, in turn, refer to diﬀerent
indicators: the frequency of the meetings (how often are IGAs meetings ef-
fectively called?) as well as to the regularity of such contacts (are meetings
called irregularly, according to an ad hoc logic, or are they scheduled con-
sistently with established temporal patterns?). The higher the density of
contacts, the higher the level of institutionalization. As summarized by Sim-
mons (2002), «an institutionalized forum would have an established history
of consistent interaction among its ministers» (p. 291, emphasis added).
3. Network of Bureaucratic and Technical Support. An important di-
mension pertains undoubtedly to the availability, for the governments be-
longing to an IGA, of a structured network of bureaucratic and technical
support, dedicated to the management of intergovernmental relations. As
previously reminded, as already put in evidence by Wright (1974), the role
of bureaucrats is to be considered as central when examining IGR. The ex-
istence of an autonomous Secretariat, dealing with preliminary issues and
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practically organizing intergovernmental meetings following established pro-
cedures, as well as the diﬀerentiation of the IGA into technical specialized
units (or secondary level units, composed by oﬃcials with a specific expertise
in a given domain), may be interpreted as manifestations of relatively high
degrees of institutionalization.
4. Powers. Even if, as argued before, all IGAs deal with the management of
IGR issues, not all enjoy the same set of powers. Some IGAs are indeed
endowed with true decision-taking powers (able, by consequence, to legally
bind the parties), while others (the large majority, in practice) can exert a
consultative power, or be even more simply devoted to activities of informa-
tion exchange.
Obviously, while the concept of "institutionalization" refers to a process, the
"level of institutionalization" refers to what could be called the stock of institu-
tionalization that an IGA displays at a given point in time.
Crossing the three dimensions just reviewed – the scale of coordination, the gen-
eralist/sectoral design, the degree of institutionalization – allows to synchronously
identify and compare diﬀerent types of Intergovernmental Arrangements. Such
kind of exercise may help to partially overcome the already reminded highly
country-specific and unsystematic nature of much work on IGR and IGAs, en-
abling to make sense of the variety of the existing intergovernmental institutional
arrangements operating in many diﬀerent federal or quasi-federal countries.
1.6 IGR and IGAs as dependent variables: main
hypotheses
As previously reminded, IGR studies may be labelled either as "systemic" or as
"policy oriented", depending on whether IGR and IGAs are taken, respectively, as
the dependent or the independent variable to be analysed. Even if much work on
IGR has been, for a long time, highly a-theoretical and deeply country-specific,
more recently some general theoretical hypotheses about the working of Igr have
been (implicitly or explicitly) developed, mostly on the side of the "systemic ap-
proach". In this paragraph these hypotheses will be briefly reviewed, trying to
put in evidence the assumptions on which they rely and the causal mechanisms
which they presuppose. Due to the terminological confusion present in the field
evoked above, some hypotheses seem to refer more to IGR intended as exchanges
or patterns of interaction between governments (their cooperative or conflicting
nature, their hierarchical or non-hierarchical management), while others appear
more linked to the structural side of the phenomenon, that is to the development
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of intergovernmental arrangements (and their degree of institutionalization).
This first set of hypotheses will be the basis for empirically answering our first
research question: Why do diﬀerent systems opt for diﬀerent Intergovernmental
Arrangements? However, as it will be explained next, many of the factors consid-
ered in these hypotheses are to be kept in mind also when considering the second
general research question outlined in the introductory Chapter.
For illustrative purposes, these several hypotheses – while all broadly referring
to institutional factors – may be clustered into three main groups, depending on
whether the analytical focus is put specifically on the polity, the politics or the pol-
icy dimension supposed to aﬀect IGR and/or IGAs (see also Bolleyer et al. 2010).
The first group of hypotheses encompasses the propositions linking IGR to the
institutional-constitutional architecture of the State and to its societal character-
istics; the second group covers the hypotheses exploring the connections between
the political and party system dynamics, on the one hand, and the intergovern-
mental relations and arrangements on the other hand; eventually, the third set of
hypotheses explores the possible connections between the nature of policy fields
and issues at stake, IGR and IGAs.
While some propositions or models present in the literature blend together dif-
ferent hypotheses at once, attributing to the variables under analysis either the
role of independent or the role intervening factors, I will try to single out dis-
tinct hypotheses and detect the supposed eﬀect of each variable taken in isolation
(ceteris paribus).
1.6.1 The polity: the role of the institutional-constitutional
structure of the state
Most of the hypotheses proposed in the literature, either explicitly formulated or
implicitly assumed, tend to relate the nature of IGR and IGAs to the characteristics
of the broad institutional-constitutional setting within which IGR occur, that is
to the key-features of the polity. In an extremely recent contribution to the field
(Bolleyer, Swenden and McEwen, 2014), the usefulness is stated exactly of bringing
"classic institutionalism" back into the study of multi-level systems, looking in this
way at the very basic elements of the legal and constitutional context within which
both IGR and IGAs develop. From this point of view, diﬀerent elements of the
constitutional architecture of the State have to be taken into careful consideration.
First, the kind of competences allocation between territorial levels is normally
supposed to play an important role in structuring both IGR and IGAs. It is often
argued that, all other things being equal, the need of extensive vertical intergov-
ernmental relations is higher in those systems in which a considerable part of the
40
central legislation is to be enacted by the subnational level (Watts 2008), or, con-
versely, that this need is comparatively lower when competences are attributed in
an exclusive way to just one level of government (e.g. Bolleyer 2009; Bolleyer, Mc
Ewen and Sweden 2012). Shortly, the hypothesis is that constitutional provisions
attributing exclusive competences to each jurisdictional level contribute to reduce
the room for vertical IGR, while, symmetrically, shared competences, structurally
increasing overlaps, tend to amplify the need/intensity of such relations. As long as
the kind of competences allocation is considered as the pivotal feature distinguish-
ing diﬀerent kinds of federalism, the hypothesis may be reformulated (and often,
it is), arguing that "dual federalism" reduces the incentives towards the establish-
ment of a web of IGR and to its institutionalization (IGAs), while "cooperative
federalism" increases them (see, for instance, Watts 2008). Looking at recent fed-
eral states, the best example of dual federalism (and of its consequences on IGR)
is surely represented by Belgium (e.g. Popelier and Cantillon 2013; Swenden and
Jans 2006).
Likewise, the allocation of competences – exclusive vs. shared – may also play
a central part in the definition of the balance, at the system level, between vertical
and horizontal relations. "Watertight compartments" division of responsibilities
(like in the case of dual federalism and exclusive competences), while reducing
the need of vertical IGR, could comparatively strengthen horizontal cooperation
as well as the the institutionalization level of IGAs at work at this level: in such
an institutional context, subnational governments would face stronger incentives
to collectively organize in order to avoid appropriation of the competences by the
center than in a vertically intertwined setting. Logically, the reverse should also be
true: in presence of shared competences, the incentives towards institutionalized
horizontal cooperation, mainly oriented towards the preservation of single units
powers, should be comparatively weaker.
An additional key-variable pertaining to competences’ allocation is the sym-
metry or asymmetry of the distribution of powers. An often considered hypothesis
(e.g. Swenden and Jans 2007, McEwen et al. 2012) is, in this case, that symmetry
would tend to favor (both vertical and horizontal) multilateral cooperation, while
asymmetry – distributing political power in an unequal way among the constituent
units, each likely to be willing to preserve it in diﬀerent ways – would rather tend
to favor bilateralism and flexibility: in this way, every single unit would guess to
defend its own special prerogatives in a more eﬀective manner. As summed up by
McEwen et al. (2012), «the asymmetric distribution of competences between the
devolved territories contributes to the perceived lack of benefits of [. . . ] concerted
action. In contrast, symmetry is more conducive to multilateral interaction, regu-
lar co-decision and the institutionalisation of IGR than asymmetry, which puts a
strong premium on bilateralism and flexibility» (pp. 333-334). As an illustrative
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example of such a tendency, it could be reminded that the Memorandum of Un-
derstanding, the oﬃcial document regulating the relationships between the center
and the regions in the UK – a highly asymmetrical devolved system – explicitly
defines the recourse to the main multilateral IGA (the Joint Ministerial Commit-
tee) as possible only when a previous bilateral exchange at the ministerial level
has proved to be unsuccessful in order to solve the issue at stake (see Appendix
A).
Besides the kind of competences allocation, a second institutional variable often
mentioned as potentially aﬀecting IGR and IGAs is the nature of the second parlia-
mentary chamber. With respect to this dimension, a frequently evoked hypothesis
is that the centrality of IGAs in the management of IGR (more clearly: the degree
of IGAs’ institutionalization) should be higher the weaker the role played by the
second chamber in ensuring eﬀective territorial representation at the national level
(e.g. Ruggiu 2006), and vice-versa. Vertical IGAs are, in a sense, depicted as func-
tional equivalents of a federal senate (the German Bundesrat being its prototype).
Such kind of argument is proposed, for instance, by Karlhofer and Pallaver (2013)
when they argue that in Austria the Conference of State Governors (LHK), the
main horizontal, generalist intergovernmental arrangement, «established itslef as
a lasting compensation for the second chamber’s and state parliaments’ weakness,
and, in general, for the lack of an eﬀective institutionalized body for the partic-
ipation of the states in federal policy-making processes» (p. 48). This example
makes it clear that the weakness of the territorial parliamentary chamber as a tool
of regional representation at the center may be assumed to have an impact on
the institutionalization of IGAs at both the vertical and horizontal level. From a
logical standpoint, the reverse should hold valid: the stronger and more eﬀective
the second territorial chamber as a tool of intergovernmental management and ter-
ritorial representation, the weaker the incentives favoring the set-up of alternative
institutions for channeling IGR.
The form of government – parliamentary vs. presidential – has also been
pointed out, as previously seen, as an important element likely to shape both
IGR and IGAs. According to Watts (1989; 2008), in parliamentary systems, IGR
are likely to be structured in a more formal way through the institutions of "ex-
ecutive federalism" (higher institutionalization of IGAs around executives), while
in presidential systems IGR are likely to be managed in more dispersed and less
structured forms, as a sort of lobbying activity exerted by peripheral governments
on single congressmen. The hypothesis is that channels of center-periphery rela-
tions are likely to be structured around the executives in parliamentary systems
(where legislative power tends to be marginalized in many issues, the manage-
ment of multi-level issues included), while in a context characterized by a greater
dispersion of political power, such as in presidential systems (like the U.S.), IGR
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channels are likely to be less institutionalized, and IGR to be carried out on a
more dispersed and individual basis (see also Radin and Boase 2000).
Furthermore, the very distinction between strictly federal states and devolved
states, apparently losing empirical saliency, is sometimes pointed out as poten-
tially playing a role in shaping the nature of IGR and IGAs. According to this
argument, vertical IGR would be more likely to be dominated by the central exec-
utive in devolved settings than in federal ones, basically because "power devolved
is power retained". Under the so called "shadow of the hierarchy", subnational gov-
ernments would play in devolved settings a minor role in IGR than the one played
by constituent units in a federation (Swenden and Jans 2007; Bolleyer et al. 2010).
The virtually always possible re-appropriation of devolved powers by the central
government, due to the lack of constitutional guarantees, would always keep them
in a state of subordination. Such a domination of the center would be visible at
the level of both IGAs (their composition and decision-making rules) and of IGR.
As to the first dimension, a vertical IGA could be considered as giving less room
to hierarchical control by the center in case of consensus as decision-making rule,
rotating chairmanship between the center and the regions, joint organization of the
meetings. As to IGR, domination by the center would take the form of termination
of center-regions conflicts by decisions taken unilaterally by the center.
Following this line of reasoning, Bolleyer, Swenden and McEwen (2014) propose
a broader theoretical framework for analyzing IGR based exactly on the diﬀeren-
tiation between "distinctive constitutional categories of multi-level government":
federalism, confederalism, and regionalism. Here, the main hypothesis is that dif-
ferent territorial forms of State are likely to exert a varying impact on the nature
of IGR, on the kind and degree of IGAs’ institutionalization, on the relative im-
pact of party political (in)congruence across central and lower-level governments
on coordination processes, as well as on the long term constitutional evolution
of competences allocation. A set of more specific hypotheses is derived by the
authors. First, as a consequence of their equally, constitutionally protected sta-
tus, lower-level governments of a confederation or a federation are expected to be
more likely to engage in multilateral IGAs (both vertically and horizontally) than
their equivalents in a non federal state (more depending on the goodwill of the
center); to compensate for their weaker status, these latter should generally be
more in favor of bilateral intergovernmental arrangements, apparently best suited
to ensure them greater individual advantages. The second hypothesis suggests
therefore that – in the long run – this kind of behavior by lower-level govern-
ments should favor an asymmetrical allocation and reallocation of competences
in regionalized States, contrasting with a more symmetrical setting of confederal
and federal systems (as seen, the set-up of asymmetrical settings would, in turn,
favor the emergence of bilateral, rather than multilateral practices of intergovern-
43
mental relations). Finally, a more fine-grained interpretation of the above-evoked
"shadow of the hierarchy" argument is proposed, implying that the constitutional
subordination of lower-level units (and the related fear of an always possible unilat-
eral withdrawal of competences by the higher level) in regionalized and confederal
systems would lead the subordinated units to strategically "play down" partisan
diﬀerences in their relations with the center; on the contrary, the absence of any
hierarchy of levels in federal settings, removing the fear of any competence loss,
would make IGR more exposed to partisan clashes (in case of incongruence, that is
of non-coincidence between governments partisan compositions5). Following this
line of reasoning, we should then expect, ceteris paribus, (vertical) IGR to be
more exposed to inter-party confrontation in fully federal than in non-fully federal
political systems.
When looking at "polity factors", the basic features of the units composing
the polity may also be investigated as conditions potentially shaping actors’ in-
centives towards intergovernmental relations. From this viewpoint, the number
of constituent units can be seen as a possibly relevant factor, accounting for the
strength of intergovernmental arrangements (at least, of those voluntarily set up).
In a rational choice perspective, Breton (1996) argues that the higher the num-
ber of constituent units, the higher the transaction costs that could be reduced
through the set-up of a collective organization. At the same time, coordination
eﬀorts to set up intergovernmental arrangements could be expected to be higher,
the higher the number of participants. More recently, Boschler (2009) looks at the
geographical smallness of regional jurisdictions as a possible variable explaining
the relatively high degree of cooperation among Swiss cantons (if compared with
horizontal cooperation in other contemporary federations). In line with fiscal fed-
eralism, the hypothesis is that the small-scale scale structure of subnational units
would make horizontal intergovernmental cooperation particularly urgent. Be-
cause of reasons linked to economies of scale and increasing need of governmental
specialization (due to more and more complex public policies), as well to spillover
problems, smaller subnational units would be faced with greater incentives towards
the practice of horizontal cooperation.
Eventually, the degree of societal homogeneity of the polity (or of "regional
distinctiveness" of the component units; Watts 2008) may be assumed to play a
part in shaping the nature of IGR and the level of institutionalization of IGAs
designed to channel them: the higher the internal (cultural and economic) consis-
tency of a society across territory, the more likely the emergence of multilateral
cooperative relations and of structured channels of interaction among constituent
units (horizontal), and between these latter and the center (vertical); conversely,
5I will come back more in depth on the concept of political intergovernmental (in)congruence
in the next paragraph and, particularly, in Chapter 4.
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the more inhomogeneous a society, the more likely the establishment of conflicting
intergovernmental relationships and the setting up of relatively weak multilateral
IGAs (Baldi 2009). Boschler (2009), for instance, finds higher degrees of horizontal
cooperation among the Swiss cantons pertaining to the same linguistic community.
The hypothesized eﬀects on IGR and IGAs of the "polity factors" just reviewed
are summarized in Table 1.4.
1.6.2 The politics: partisan congruence
A second cluster of variables potentially aﬀecting IGR and IGAs may be linked to
politics dynamics. These factors are mainly related to the partisan composition of
diﬀerent governmental units involved in IGR, and, indirectly, to the main logics
of decision-making internal to each participant government. While the hypotheses
referring to the polity features seem to be, on the whole, in agreement as to their
predicted eﬀects, the consequences of politics variables on IGR and IGAs appear
by contrast more contested, being subject to alternative expectations. Moreover,
as previously reminded, many authors seem to diminish the role played by polit-
ical parties in IGR, by highlighting the greater saliency of territorial rather than
partisan aﬃliation of governments involved in intergovernmental activities, or by
stressing the relevance of non-elected oﬃcials.
When looking at politics in the IGR field, the main variation to be considered
pertains to the partisan composition of the interacting executives, and the related
degree of "intergovernmental political (in)congruence" (Ştefuriuc 2009). This factor
is assumed to yield consequences on diﬀerent dimensions of IGR: the balance in the
use of "intra-party channels" and "extra-party channels" like IGAs for dealing with
IGR issues; the degree of IGAs’ institutionalization; the cooperative or conflicting
nature of patterns of IGR interactions; the role played by the central government,
as a more or less dominant actor in vertical IGR.
Watts (2008) suggests, in passing, that the partisan congruence between the
central and the subnational governments will tend either to make the central gov-
ernment position prevalent in their relation (domination), or to make intra-party
channels more relevant than formalized patterns of interaction (IGAs; see also
Swenden and Jans 2007). Symmetrically, in case of partisan incongruence, for-
mal intergovernmental processes (those carried out through IGAs) would tend to
become the major channels of interaction and negotiation (intra-party channels
being lacking), while central government position could become less dominant.
By contrast, a concurring hypothesis is suggested by Bolleyer and Bytzek
(2009), according to whom, given intense disagreement over policy issues across
governments due to distinct party compositions, and expecting that the internal
politics of individual governments is a strong driving force of IGR, the set-up of
relatively highly institutionalized IGAs will be unlikely since these latter tend to
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be beneficial only in the long run. In other words, contrary to what expected by
Watts, the level of institutionalization of IGAs should be comparatively weaker in
presence of party incongruence than in case of party congruence. By the same to-
ken, it is reasonable to hypothesize that – unlike Watt’s expectations – the recourse
to IGAs for dealing with IGR issues will be less intense when diﬀerent actors are
belonging to diﬀerent political groups (plausibly, pursuing diﬀerent policy goals)
than when they, given partisan homogeneity, share the same policy objectives.
These hypotheses refer also to the expected eﬀects of partisan congruence on
the balance between the use of intra-party channels and IGAs: as seen, according to
Watts, partisan congruence should make intra-party channels of communication
more important at the expense of IGAs, while these latter would be activated
mostly in contexts of partisan incongruence; by contrast, according to the second
argument, the recourse to intra-party channels and to IGAs should go in the same
direction, both being more (un)likely in case of party (in)congruence (McEwen et
al. 2012).
A second set of hypotheses strictly linked to the first one and encompassing it,
has been built – drawing on rational choice micro-foundations – by Bolleyer (2009).
This argument clearly stands at the borders of what I have labeled as polity and
politics factors. The latter are indeed seen as a consequence of the former. From
this perspective, a decisive factor shaping the degree of institutionalization of IGAs
pertains to the «internal nature of governments» (p. 29) involved in IGR. The in-
ternal nature of governments is hold to shape IGR actors’ incentives towards a
stronger or weaker institutionalization of IGAs. The main hypothesis is based on
the distinction between diﬀerent forms of "power limiting democracies" – power
sharing vs. power dispersion. Given predominantly majoritarian decision-making
dynamics within the sub-states and the center (power dispersion democracy), the
degree of institutionalization of IGAs (both horizontal and vertical) will be weak;
conversely, given predominantly multiple power sharing within the constituent are-
nas (power sharing democracy), the degree of institutionalization of IGAs will be
comparatively stronger. Diﬀerent causal mechanisms are indicated as relevant.
Firstly, majoritarian decision-making tends to increase the instability of «the in-
terest configuration among the constitutive arenas»: one-party majority cabinets
are indeed likely to turn-over frequently, making investments in institutions able to
constrain individual governments’ will (IGAs) less convenient over time; secondly,
the likelihood of party incongruence will be higher in presence of majoritarian or
power-concentrating governments than in presence of power-sharing governments
(where oversized coalitions are frequent): here, party incongruence is assumed to
play a negative role with reference to the level of institutionalization (indeed, gov-
ernments of diﬀerent partisan aﬃliation, not sharing similar goals, would not face
any incentive to mutually collaborate on a regular and constraining basis); thirdly,
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the high governments’ alternation probability, due to majoritarian decision-making
systems, would favor "blame shifting" strategies (thus, reducing even more the in-
centives towards joint action with other governments); finally, "autonomy losses",
virtually deriving from engaging in interaction with other governments, would be
comparatively greater for «parties which govern alone and are unrestricted by a
second chamber [like in power-concentrating, majoritarian systems] than for par-
ties which govern in a coalition and face a strong upper house» (p. 36).
Obviously, the degree of political party-congruence can be assumed to shape
not only intergovernmental structures, but the very nature of intergovernmental
interactions: while congruence should be associated with «co-operative and cordial
relations», incongruence should be instead be expected to be correlated with «more
confrontational IGR» (McEwen et al. 2012, p. 328).
1.6.3 The policy: the conflict potential
A third group of hypotheses may eventually be linked to policy dynamics. As
pointed out several times in the previous Sections, the literature on these topics
underlines the strict linkages existing between policy-making dynamics and the
emergence and management of IGR and IGAs. One could also conceive of the
dynamic side of IGR as nothing but an essentially policy-making process involving
many governmental jurisdictions within a polity. The so called "policy core" of IGR
(Wright 1974) is therefore to be considered as a crucial element for explaining the
patterns followed by IGR as well as the level of institutionalization of IGAs.
Distinguishing among policy sectors may be seen as theoretically relevant for
at least two reasons. First, even if multi-level polities tend to be classified, as a
whole, as either dual or cooperative systems (depending on the dominant kind of
competences’ allocation), within-systems variations do exist: while some (subject-
releated) competences will be attributed according to a dualistic rationale, other
will be assigned in a less exclusive way, creating by consequence diﬀerent incentives
for both IGR and IGAs within the same polity (see above). Second, as known,
diﬀerent policies are likely to structure diﬀerently the (intergovernmental) power
arena, and its dynamics. The basic assumption, based on Lowi (1964), is that
the politics of IGR tends to be determined by its policy content: «As the policy
literature emphasizes, each policy field embraces a variety of issues representing
diﬀerent interest constellations, inviting diﬀerent patterns of conflict» (Mc Ewen
et al. 2012, p. 334). Colino and Parrado (2008) go further, by arguing that the
«institutional account is not satisfactory for explaining the nature of IGR or its
sectorial or temporal variation» (p. 3), and that within-country, cross-sectoral IGR
variations should even be expected to be higher than within-sector, cross-country
variations. Looking at the impact of the policy on the politics of IGR allows
to capture the coexistence, within the same system and the same subject-related
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policy, of diﬀerent patterns of intergovernmental relations.
One possible way of focusing on the policy core of IGR is to look at the "conflict
potential" present, to a diﬀerent degree, in each policy field, depending on its
nature (Swenden and Jans 2007; León and Ferrín Pereira 2011; McEwen et al.
2012). Following the fundamental Lowi’s lesson (1964), the hypothesis is basically
that IGR are likely to be conflict-driven when their object are re-distributive,
regulatory or high politics (e.g. "constitutive" or constitutional) policies, whereas
they are likely to be conducted along more cooperative and less confrontational
pathways when they deal with more distributive issues6. For these reasons – as
remarked by McEwen and al. (2012) – fiscal and welfare policies, because of their
highly redistributive nature, are likely to be «prone to high conflict» (p. 334).
Likewise, it could be hypothesized that intergovernmental issues characterized by
relatively higher degrees of visibility and political saliency should be more inclined
to conflict as well (particularly, to political confrontation).
A diﬀerent hypothesis linking IGR dynamics to policy features underscores the
importance of the relative weight of the technical and ideological content of the
object of intergovernmental activity: accordingly, «intergovernmental cooperation
will be [more easily] promoted over policy areas that involve high technical content,
as ideological divisions among political representatives are less likely to emerge. If
premiers negotiate over issues that have a strong ideological nature, multilateral
cooperation is more diﬃcult, because the potential for ideological divisions among
sub-national governments and central government is higher» (León and Ferrín
Pereira 2011, p. 518).
A further policy element virtually relevant for IGR and IGAs is the degree of
"Europeanization" aﬀecting the policy field under analysis. The hypothesis firstly
advanced by Börzel (2000; 2002) implies that multi-level policies aﬀected by high
degrees of Europeanization are more likely to develop increasingly institutional-
ized, multilateral and cooperative forms of intergovernmental relations. Such a
process refers both to the patterns of intergovernmental interaction, whose na-
ture is supposed to become more and more cooperative (rather than competitive
and/or conflicting) and multilateral (rather than bilateral), and to the organiza-
tional channels of interaction (IGAs), expected to become increasingly institution-
alized. The main argument on which the hypothesis relies is that «in order to
meet the challenges of Europeanization, the central government and the regions of
dual federal states have to expand and build up mechanisms of intergovernmental
6Such a way of distinguishing types of public policies when studying IGR has been contested,
for instance, by Conlan and Posner (2008): according to these scholars, it should be more
fruitful to look at four alternative "pathways" of IGR policy-making, each structurally linking a
specific kind of policy (e.g. categorical grant programs, comprehensive federalism reforms, federal
mandates and so on) with specific kinds of actors, predominant decision styles and legislative
dynamics.
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cooperation that allow eﬀective participation of the regions in the formulation and
adoption of European policies on one hand, and facilitate the eﬀective implemen-
tation of European policies by the regions on the other» (Börzel 2000 p. 22; Börzel
2002). One good example of such dynamics is surely represented by agricultural
policy, undoubtedly one of the most Europeanized fields (through the Common
Agricultural Policy): many empirical contributions seem indeed agreeing on the
fact that, within diﬀerent EU member countries, agriculture is the policy field in
which the most formalized, cooperative and multilateral arenas of intergovernmen-
tal relations have developed. This has been the case, for instance, in Italy, Spain,
Belgium (Beyers and Bursens 2006; Swenden and Jans 2007; Colino and Parrado
2008; León and Ferrín Pereira 2011; McEwen et al. 2012).
A seldom evoked hypothesis concerns, eventually, the urgency of the policy
problems requiring an intergovernmental solution: as suggested by León and Fer-
rín Pereira (2011), «the probability of successful cooperation is higher on issues
that require urgent coordinated intervention by the governments. When coor-
dinated action is needed to prevent or mitigate a serious problem whose eﬀects
go over territorial borders, such as an epidemic or a natural disaster, the electoral
costs of not intervening may prompt governments to reach an early agreement» (p.
518). Even if equating "successful cooperation" to the attainment of an agreement
may appear reductive, the bulk of the argument is worthy to be considered, mean-
ing that the so called "focusing events", suddenly turning governments attention
towards the need of intergovernmental coordination, would contribute to increase
the pressures for the establishment of a more cooperative pattern of interaction
between territorial levels. As mentioned above, indeed, the urgency of intergov-
ernmental interactions may derive from the appearance of entirely new political
problems, which, cutting across existent divisions of powers, force governments to
mutually come into contact (Keating 2012). Although not mentioned by León and
Ferrín Pereira (2011), one could hypothesize the "focusing events" playing a role
for explaining the genetic stage of IGAs: in other words, it appears reasonable to
hypothesize that the establishment (or the strengthening) of a structured channel
of interaction should be more likely to enter the governments agenda when the lat-
ter are faced with particularly urgent and unexpected policy problems, unlikely,
by their nature, to be dealt with by any single government in isolation. Anyway,
if in the long run intergovernmental patterns of interaction are largely dominated
by the ups and downs of focusing events, their degree of institutionalization could
not be considered as particularly high.
1.6.4 Summary
The review of the literature just presented allows to cast some light on the dimen-
sions of both IGR and IGAs expected to vary, depending on the polity context in
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which they develop, the politics dynamics pervading them, and the policy issues
to be dealt with. In summary, it is possible to conclude that IGR are likely to
show variation along the following, major dimensions:
• Number and territorial scale of participant governments: as seen, IGR may
indeed be either bilateral or multilateral, and may develop more on the hor-
izontal or the vertical dimension;
• Style of interaction: this may be more cooperative or, alternatively, more
confrontational (or conflict-driven);
• Equality of actors: vertical IGR may be dominated by the central government
or develop on more equal ground;
• Level of politicization: both vertical and horizontal IGR may be driven or
influenced, by the degree of political aﬃnity (or lack of aﬃnity) among in-
teracting executives.
As to IGAs, both vertical and horizontal intergovernmental arrangements may
vary in what concerns:
• Number and territorial scale of participant governments: bilateral IGR will
be channeled through bilateral IGAs, while multilateral IGR will be chan-
neled by means of multilateral IGAs;
• Level of institutionalization: as seen above, IGAs may be more or less struc-
tured.
Even if no explicit hypothesis may be found in the literature tracing the gen-
eralist or policy-specific nature of IGAs back to any potentially explicative factor,
this variation should be nevertheless kept in mind.
1.7 IGR and IGAs as independent variables: main
hypotheses
IGR and IGAs may also be considered as factors helping to account for the forma-
tion and implementation of a policy across a range of separate jurisdictions, that
is for the features of the policy-making processes carried out and the outputs even-
tually generated by these processes. Whereas in the literature taking a "systemic"
perspective it is possible to identify and reconstruct some quite clear hypotheses
(explicitly formulated or implicitly assumed), few "oﬀ the shelf" hypotheses are
instead available as to the supposed impact specifically exerted by IGR and IGAs
on the nature of policy-making, and on its outputs.
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While in the previous Section the possible impact of policies on IGR and IGAs
has been considered, here the potential impact of IGAs on IGR will be high-
lighted. As sketched in the introductory Chapter, from our point of view, the
goal is indeed to understand how diﬀerently organized Intergovernmental Arrange-
ments may contribute to shape IGR, intended as the policy vertical and horizontal
interactions among governments in compound institutional contexts. My basic
assumption, based on new-institutional grounds, is that a central role is played
by the degree and kind of institutionalization of the tools designed to cope with
these intergovernmental issues: do intergovernmental machinery exert any "shap-
ing eﬀect" (or "formative impact": Heinmiller 2002; or "transformative impact":
Bolleyer 2009) on intergovernmental interactions?
On the bases of the scant literature produced up to now on these issues, the
hypotheses investigating the impact exerted by IGAs on IGR may be organized
into two diﬀerent groups, according to the dimension of IGR looked at: that is, its
process or its outputs. Obviously, this is a quite schematic way of distinguishing the
expected impact of IGAs on intergovernmental relations, as long as IGR outputs
may be seen as nothing but the logical consequence of the kind of prior IGR process
that generated them. From an analytical point of view, however, I do prefer to
keep these two dimensions distinct, also in order to make clearer that my focus
will be on the process side of the question. More specifically, to what extent does
the institutional structure of IGAs contribute to determine the kind of politics
prevailing within the intergovernmental policy-making arena? More precisely: do
diﬀerent IGAs have an impact on structuring the kind of actors’ coalitions emerging
during intergovernmental decision-making processes?
In the remainder of this Section, I will first review the hypotheses connect-
ing IGAs’ features to IGR outputs; then, I will address the issue of how IGAs
may be expected to have an impact on IGR processes, and outline, starting from
the literature just considered, a set of hypotheses to answer our second research
question.
1.7.1 The impact of IGAs on IGR outputs: quantity and
quality of agreements
A straightforward way of looking at the (potential) relationship between Intergov-
ernmental Arrangements and Intergovernmental Relations is to investigate whether
the former exert any kind of impact on the outputs produced by the latter. From
this perspective, the basic hypothesis is that higher levels of IGAs’ institutionaliza-
tion should be conductive towards higher levels of intergovernmental cooperation.
Such an impact can be assessed in diﬀerent ways.
One possible research strategy is the one followed, for instance, by León and
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Ferrín Pereira (2009; 2011). Looking at variations in the degree of cooperation
among Spanish vertical intergovernmental policy-specific IGAs, these scholars have
hypothesized, amongst others, the existence of a link between the degree of insti-
tutionalization of the IGAs, on the one hand, and the level of cooperation carried
on within them, on the other hand. The level of cooperation is operationalized as
the number of cooperation agreements achieved, in a given time period, in each ar-
rangement. The hypothesis is then that the higher the level of institutionalization
of an Intergovernmental Arrangement, the higher the probability of an agreement
between its members. Empirically, these authors show that, after the (more or less
technical) nature of the policy issues at stake, the level of institutionalization was
mentioned by the IGR actors interviewed as the major factor facilitating (when
high) or hampering (when low) the attainment of intergovernmental cooperation.
The reason would be linked to the precious role played by the existence of what
I have labeled "network of bureaucratic and technical support", and, particularly,
of the so called secondary level units, by which political parties influence on IGR
matters would be defused.
A related, but alternative research goal consists in putting the emphasis more
on the quality than on the quantity of the agreements achieved within IGAs.
Taking this path, Simmons (2002) and Bolleyer (2009) have empirically tested,
based on new-institutional premises, the existence of a causal link between the
level of intergovernmental institutionalization and the nature of the decisions taken
in these arenas. Their results seem to point towards opposite conclusions.
Exploiting the diﬀerences in the organization among policy-specific ministerial
conferences in Canada (cf. Appendix A), Simmons’ analysis aims at assessing
whether «a link is present between the degree of "institutionalization" or "formal-
ization" of ministerial conferences and ministers’ ability to develop compromise
and consensus» (p. 286). The «surprising conclusion» reached by this scholar
is that, in contrast to theoretical expectations, «greater institutionalization does
not appear to result in compromise and consensus in ministerial decision-making
either in terms of the process leading to the agreements or the eﬀects of the agree-
ments on policy development» (p. 287). The more institutionalized IGAs led,
indeed, to not-binding, quite vague accords, imposing little commitments on the
parties, while other contingent factors – such as the goodwill of governments in-
volved, the personalities of interacting actors, developments and pressures specific
to the policy sector and problem, and the like – would be more telling about the
nature of the IGR outputs analyzed. In other words, what matters the most would
be a set of hardly identifiable "intangible factors" (León and Ferrín Pereira 2011)
surrounding IGR processes, more than IGAs features (particularly, their level of
institutionalization).
In order to assess the relevance of the degree of IGAs’ institutionalization as
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a factor able to account empirically for the nature of IGR outputs (agreements),
Bolleyer (2009) implements instead a cross-country comparison, exploiting diﬀer-
ences in the level of institutionalization in diﬀerent federal countries’ intergov-
ernmental arrangements. Her expectation is that «the institutional development
of IGAs aﬀects the quality of agreements drafted within them» (p. 171). More
specifically, this scholar aims at assessing if and, in case, to which measure the level
of institutionalization of intergovernmental machinery impacts on the capacity of
intergovernmental agreements to constrain individual governments. The analysis
focuses on the "constraining capacity" of non-binding agreements in Switzerland,
the U.S. and Canada. Even if devoid of any legal force, indeed, non-binding agree-
ments may vary as to the "sense of obligation" they generate in each governmental
unit signing it. IGAs displaying a higher degree of institutionalization should pro-
duce more precise and more deep agreements (targeting unambiguous goals and
specifying the tools to be employed for their implementation), while IGAs charac-
terized by a lower degree of institutionalization should be leading to the draft of
general and abstract accords. Unlike Simmons, Bolleyer finds empirical evidence
supporting theoretical expectations, although attention is called to the possible
direct eﬀects played on IGR by the same institutional conditions shaping IGAs.
1.7.2 The impact of IGAs on IGR processes: policy learn-
ing, actors’ coalitions and conflict lines
Looking at the impact exerted by the IGAs on intergovernmental relations may also
mean to examine whether the institutional structures channeling such relations are
able to account for the features of the process through which intergovernmental
policy decisions are taken. As reminded above, from a broader perspective, the
impact of IGAs on IGR processes may be seen as an analytical intermediary step,
preceding the assessment of the "shaping eﬀect" of the IGAs under examination on
the eventual policy outputs: in both cases, indeed, the central question is about
the capacity of intergovernmental institutions to exert a constraining power on
individual IGR actors’ behavior.
In a recent contribution to this field, Füglister (2012) assesses, for instance,
the impact of institutionalized horizontal intergovernmental cooperation on policy
diﬀusion. Even if this latter can be interpreted as the final outcome of a longer
policy processes, the ability to explain it as a consequence of learning rather than of
alternative diﬀusion mechanisms (such as competition or imitation, possible even
in the absence of any intergovernmental arrangement) depends on the analysis of
the IGR processes conducted within the IGAs. As illustrated in Table 1.3, the
Swiss horizontal intergovernmental landscape is populated by a high number of
institutions. According to Füglister, who explores health policy in this country,
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the highly institutionalized horizontal IGAs collecting Swiss cantons in this policy
field would provide «a fruitful environment for exchange, which, in turn, enhances
policy learning and the spread of best practices» (p. 321). The basic causal
mechanism underlying such hypothesis is that such IGAs would be places where
regional ministries, because of their joint membership, can exchange information
about their experiences about the implementation of policies, and formulate and
reformulate their opinions as to the most eﬀective ones, through a real process of
policy learning.
Another way of assessing the possible shaping eﬀect of IGAs on IGR policy
processes – more directly consistent with the research question explored in the
second part of this analysis – is to look for the existence of a relationship between
the IGAs features and the "conflict lines" and "intergovernmental coalitions" (Grau
i Creus 2000; Colino and Parrado 2008) emerging in IGR policy-making process
carried out through them. Drawing on Grau i Creus (2000), a possible way of
distinguishing intergovernmental coalitions consists in assessing to which measure
«the nature of the intergovernmental game [. . . ] depend[s] upon the political party
in charge of the diﬀerent governments», or, by contrast, to which measure a terri-
torial perspective is prevalent, meaning that subnational units «take institutional
positions towards the central government policies; that is, notwithstanding the
party in control in central government, the governments of the [regions] constitute
the ’subnational level opposition’ (pp. 69-70, emphasis added). While this latter
perspective would make intergovernmental conflict lines and coalitions indepen-
dent of the the degree of intergovernmental political congruence among actors (see
above), the organization of the arena according to partisan conflict lines would
make IGR actors’ coalitions dependent on the parties in oﬃce across governments.
The question is then: are divide lines and actors’ coalitions emerging during
IGR processes mainly organized around governments party or territorial aﬃliation?
If so, can be IGAs considered as playing a role in shaping these coalitions?
As explained in the previous paragraph, IGAs’ institutionalization may be
expect to shape the final outputs produced by these means. Taking a step back
and looking at causal mechanisms through which institutionalization is assumed to
to influence IGR may also provide useful hints in order to understand how IGAs
may contribute to structuring conflict lines and actors’ coalitions within these
arenas. León and Ferrín Pereira (2011, pp. 518-19) list several mechanisms by
which higher institutionalization of vertical IGAs should lead towards increased
cooperation.
First, in these authors’ view, eﬀective intergovernmental cooperation is likely to
be easier when decision-making processes are divided into specialized bodies with
technical expertise: these bodies would indeed be less "permeable" to high politics
and political parties logic of confrontation, which, as seen, is generally supposed
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to reduce the likelihood of cooperation (obviously, in case of incongruence).
Second, and in line with the definition of IGAs’ institutionalization introduced
above, León and Ferrín Pereira suggest that the frequency of meetings between
governments may play an important part in shaping the nature of the policy
processes and the kind of prevalent orientations of participants: from this point
of view, the hypothesis is simply that «the higher the frequency of meetings, the
higher the probability of successful cooperation» (León and Ferrín Pereira 2011,
p. 519). This would be due to the fact that a relatively high frequency and
regularity of encounters (what I have called "density of meetings") would favor –
by enhancing ties of trust among participants and making defection more costly –
the adoption in negotiations of a "problem solving" mode (or decision style) rather
than a "bargaining" one.
As explained by Scharpf (1988), "problem solving" is characterized by the ap-
peal to common values, interests or norms, as opposed to "distributive bargaining",
which is instead dominated by the appeal to the individual self-interests of all par-
ticipants. In problem solving, the emergence of an orientation towards common
interests and values «may facilitate voluntary agreement even when sacrifices in
terms of individual self-interest are necessary and cannot be immediately com-
pensated through ’side payments’ or ’package deals’» (Scharpf 1988, p. 261).
The emergence of such an orientation may be rooted in the perception of a com-
mon identity and/or of a common vulnerability, and while the preconditions of
problem-solving are diﬃcult to be created, they may be easily eroded (Scharpf
1988, p. 265). The problem-solving mode of policy-making is usually linked to
the formation of a community of experts (a "policy community"), that is a quite
stable network formed around common, shared orientations: these communities –
according to Benz (2009) – may have the eﬀect of "shielding" intergovernmental
cooperation from the influence of parliaments and party competition. In their ab-
sence, or when exogenous shocks alter routinary paths of policy-making, IGR are
instead more likely to be driven by partisan aﬃliation considerations.
León and Ferrín Pereira (2011) suggest eventually that cooperation between
governments is likely to be fostered in presence of a formal basis of intergovern-
mental meetings (such a statute), defining the basic rules of working of the IGA,
and/or of independent administrative bodies (such as a secretariat), endowed with
the responsibility to prepare meetings and to carry out the follow-up of the dis-
cussions.
Trying to integrate the diﬀerent insights just reviewed, it may be possible to
lay out a set of theoretically-derived hypotheses from a "policy oriented" perspec-
tive, linking the types of IGAs (their features) to the kind of politics and degree of
politicization characterizing the policy-making processes channeled through them.
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In the light of these lines of reasoning, I first hypothesize that relatively high
levels of IGAs’ institutionalization should be likely to play down, to defuse the level
of politicization of the IGR processes: conflict lines among the actors involved in
IGR as well as their coalitions should be thus less likely to be organized around
respective governments’ party compositions, than in case of relatively lower levels
of IGAs’ institutionalization. In case of highly institutionalized intergovernmen-
tal arrangements, a community of policy experts, sharing a strong institutional
memory is indeed likely to emerge. Frequent and regular contacts among IGAs
members, following a set of established rules and procedures to solve IGR issues,
should furthermore contribute to increase the level of mutual trust among them,
irrespective of their partisan aﬃliation. Consequently, in such an institutional con-
text, a "problem solving" style of decision-making is more probable to be followed
than a bargaining one. The conflict line, in this scenario, will be therefore less
likely to be structured along party lines: stalemates deriving from «heterogeneous
partisan complexion of government at diﬀerent levels of government» (Obinger et
al. 2005, p. 45) should be expected to become a relatively unlikely intergovern-
mental scenario.
By contrast, in case of relatively scarcely institutionalized multilateral intergov-
ernmental arrangements – lack of formal basis; low density of contacts; absent or
scarce development of a network of bureaucratic support; few powers – it appears
reasonable to presume that, ceteris paribus, the development of a common iden-
tity around "common values, interests and norms", strong linkages of trust among
participants and a policy community reasoning mainly in technical terms, will
be unlikely. Consequently, a "distributive bargaining" style of policy-making will
be probably prevalent as a way for managing (State-Regions or Regions-Regions)
conflicts. In terms of the degree of politicization of the IGR process, it may be
consequently hypothesized that the IGR debate will be relatively more exposed to
the influence of party competition: the conflict divide active within the IGAs will
be more likely to be driven by IGR actors’ respective political aﬃliations.
To summarize, given weakly institutionalized IGAs, I expect IGR carried out
by their means to be more likely to be exposed to party politics dynamics, and
vice-versa.
Secondly, the distinction between a generalist and a policy-specific design of
IGAs appears as worthy to be explored as well. Scharpf (1988) calls the attention
to the fact that sacrifices in terms of individual self-interest can be compensated
by means of "side-payments" or "package deals". In this respect, I hypothesize that
a generalist arrangement is more likely to favor the emergence of agreement among
the IGR actors than a policy-specific one: indeed, while a generalist organization,
making possible cross-sectoral exchanges and compensations, can widen the me-
diation spectrum between opposite stances, a policy-specific arrangement, which
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does not allow for cross-sectoral exchanges and compensations, can by contrast be
expected to exacerbate existing tensions among actors, included those driven by
the partisan aﬃliation logic.
Some caveats are nevertheless necessary.
The first is that the hypotheses just illustrated refer to the potential impact of
IGAs taken in isolation. However, it has been shown that in practice IGAs tend
very often to work in a broader institutional constellation, including a plurality
of IGAs, diﬀering on several dimensions (vertical, horizontal, generalist, policy-
specific: see again Table 1.3.). This means that looking at the role played by
IGAs, particularly in vertical IGR, may entail to take into consideration both ver-
tical and horizontal intergovernmental arrangements, as well as their interplay: in
other words, IGAs "institutional constellations" are worthy to be taken into ac-
count. A high level of institutionalization and a generalist design of IGAs could
be expected to defuse partisan conflicts both at the exclusively horizontal and the
exclusively vertical level. However, it could be imagined that a vertical IGA, in
spite of a comparatively high degree of institutionalization, could interplay with a
relatively poorly institutionalized horizontal IGA, making partisan conflicts at the
regional level spillover into the vertical arena. By contrast, the strengthening of
the links among participants of an horizontal IGA, while appeasing the influence
of respective partisan aﬃliation at that level, could be expected to increase the
relative saliency of the "territorial" dimension in vertical IGR: a strongly institu-
tionalized exclusively horizontal multilateral arrangement might indeed favor the
formation of a "common front" of the regional level as such against the center,
irrespective of political aﬃliations (a "subantional level opposition"; Grau i Creus
2000; Bolleyer 2006). From these considerations a third hypothesis can thus be
derived: looking at a given country’s IGAs system as a whole (that is, at combi-
nation of the arrangements at work within it), rather than at intergovernmental
arrangements taken in isolation, an exclusively vertical IGAs system should be
more likely to favor the emergence of party-partisan coalitions, compared with a
system characterized by the co-presence of vertical IGAs (equally institutionalized)
and horizontal IGAs: the existence of these latter could indeed be interpreted as
a condition favoring the emergence of territorial, thus cross-partisan, alignments
among IGR actors.
The second caveat to be kept in mind is that the hypotheses linking the features
of IGAs and the level of politicization of IGR carried out within them presuppose
a more general ceteris paribus clause. It must indeed be reminded that many other
"background" or intervening conditions reviewed in the previous Section, diﬀerent
from IGAs features – ranging from the form of State to the kind of policy at stake
to the degree of partisan (in)congruence among IGR actors – may be assumed
as potentially equally relevant. The hypotheses just laid out try to "isolate" the
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impact of IGAs: from a methodological point of view, this entails that the other
"confounding factors" are to be kept under control. In other words, the potential
shaping eﬀect of an IGA on the IGR process can only be assessed comparing cases
as most similar as possible in what concern all these alternative explanations.
The last caveat, strictly linked to the previous one, refers to the scope condi-
tions limiting the applicability of the hypotheses under consideration: obviously,
only IGR processed through IGAs should be expected to be shaped by these latter.
This Chapter has focused on main analytical, conceptual and theoretical issues
of major importance when addressing intergovernmental relations and arrange-
ments. The next two Chapters will focus on the historical development and the
main features of the Intergovernmental Arrangements at work, respectively, in
Italy and Spain. As shown in Table 1.3, in these two parliamentary, strongly
regionalized States, diﬀerent intergovernmental institutional constellations exist:
whereas the Italian intergovernmental landscape is characterized by the presence
of generalist IGAs both at the vertical and at the horizontal level, Spain is marked
instead by the operation of both policy-specific and generalist intergovernmental
arrangements (almost) exclusively at the vertical scale. By an in-depth analysis
of these two cases, with a special focus put on healthcare policy, an assessment of
the institutional strength of their respective IGAs will be possible.
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Chapter 2
Intergovernmental Arrangements
in Italy: Historical Evolution and
Current Setting
2.1 Introduction
The evolution and functioning of intergovernmental arrangements operating in
Italy, both at the vertical and at the horizontal scale, will be the object of this
Chapter, which is divided into four main Sections, including this introduction.
In the second Section, the focus will be put on the vertical dimension of IGR
and IGAs: it will begin by giving an historical account of the development of the
institutional systems of cooperation between the center and the periphery. Special
attention will be devoted to the establishment of the State-Regions Conference –
the major vertical, generalist IGA currently operating in Italy – as an institutional
way to limit the growing "sectorialization" of intergovernmental relations occurred
in the previous decades. The institutional landscape prior to the establishment
of the State-Regions Conference as well as its next, progressive transformation
will thus be outlined. The evolution of the legal framework regulating the verti-
cal Conference will be subsequently reconstructed. The outcome of this process,
namely the set of tools and powers the Conference can currently use to play its
role in multi-level decision-making processes, will be discussed in the third part of
this Section, together with an illustration of the current organizational and func-
tional features of the Conference. More specifically, taking into account both the
regulatory framework and the established procedures consolidated in the course of
its history, the working organization of the Conference will be highlighted. Qual-
itative and quantitative data on the activity carried out by the Conference over
time will also be provided, with special attention to the relative weight of activity
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related to the management of health policy.
The horizontal dimension of IGR and IGAs will be addressed in the third
Section, where the role played by the Conference of the Regions – an exclusively
regional self-coordinating body set up in the early 1980s – will be analyzed: after
having reconstructed its origins, the basic rules governing its functioning and its
organization will be the object of this part. The activity carried out by this
horizontal IGA will be then examined.
The last Section will be concerned with the analysis of the dense network of
relations occurring between the vertical and horizontal arrangements.
2.2 The vertical dimension of IGRs and IGAs
Although there is no doubt that the establishment of the Conferenza Stato-Regioni
(hereinafter, State-Regions Conference) in 1983 represented a first step towards the
systematic involvement of the regional system into the national decision-making
circuit (for issues of "common interest"), and that this Conference represents today
the only instance of eﬀective multi-level institutional link in Italy, it is still useful
to remember – also in order to clarify the institutional environment in which the
Conference was inserted, and to seize the reasons of its birth – that other forms
of interaction between the central and the regional level had been growing during
the previous decades.
2.2.1 The constitutional framework
As in the vast majority of contemporary multi-level democracies1, Italian vertical
IGAs developed well beyond constitutional provisions.
The 1948 Constitution was indeed particularly weak as to the planning and de-
sign of tools specifically devoted to the management of intergovernmental relations.
Besides some forms of regional participation to the exercise of State functions (like
the involvement of the regional representatives into the appointment process of the
President of the Republic), which «proved to be completely non influential as to
their incidence on the final decisions» (Caretti e Barbieri 2007, p. 293, translated),
the only institutional communication device between the Regions and the center
provided for by the Italian Constitution was a Bicameral Parliamentary Commis-
sion on Regional Issues (Commissione parlamentare bicamerale per le questioni
regionali). Even if this latter, according to the definition of intergovernmental
arrangement adopted here (see § 1.5.2) should not be strictly considered as an
IGA (its members were not representatives of central and regional executives)
1On this point, see the overview of main IGAs at work in major Western federal and quasi-
federal countries provided in Appendix A.
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nor, more generally, as an arena of intergovernmental relations (significantly, its
composition did not include any regional representatives, but an equal number of
national deputies and senators), the Commission is still worthy to be mentioned
since it was de facto conceived by the constituents as a tool for ensuring protection
of local autonomy (and partially, it actually fulfilled this function, mostly after the
first waves of decentralization occurred in the Seventies; cf. Griglio 2008). This
provision was in fact the only institutional device designed in the Constitution in
order to introduce in some way the regional "voice" into the national (legislative)
arena.
Overall, therefore, the institutional tools envisioned by the Constitution for
building channels of communication between the center and the periphery turned
out to be particularly limited, even more so because of the lack of any strong
provision concerning the involvement of the Regions neither into the appointment
of the judges of the Constitutional Court, in charge – among other things – of the
resolution of conflicts of competence both between the State and the Regions, and
among these latter, nor into the process of constitutional amendment2.
2.2.2 Emergence and evolution of Executive Federalism
Fragmentation and sectorialization: the "Mixed Organs"
It was thus not on the parliamentary front that major channels of vertical IGR
developed: in the enduring absence of a chamber of territorial representation (often
evoked and never implemented), vertical IGAs tended to consolidate, since the
second half of the Sixties, around the national and regional executives, consistently
with the so called "executive federalism" trends described in the previous Chapter
(cfr. § 1.5.2).
In 1967, even before the establishment of the ordinary Regions (put in place
only in 1970)3, Law no. 48 of February 27th provided for the creation, within the
Budget Ministry, of an Advisory Interregional Commission (Commissione Con-
sultiva Interregionale), composed of regional representatives and chaired by the
Minister, to be consulted over economic planning issues (since 1978, its advices
became compulsory). The establishment of such Commission is worthy to be re-
membered not as such, but because it did not represent anything but the first step
of a full-blown process of proliferation of so called "State-Regions mixed organs"
(organismi misti Stato-Regioni).
2Regional legislative assemblies (five, at least) were however accorded the right to call ref-
erendum to abrogate ordinary or constitutional laws passed by the national Parliament, if the
constitutional revision had been passed by a less than two-thirds parliamentary majority (Section
no. 138).
3I will focus more extensively on the regionalization process in Chapter 4, § 4.3.2.
64
These bodies, whose activities developed along with established practices of
"procedural coordination", were characterized by: the policy-specific nature of
their intervention; the occasional frequency of their meetings; the fragmentation
of the State action, limited to that of the Ministries and central bureaucratic
structures each time provided for by the sectoral laws at issue. The landscape
of intergovernmental arrangements appeared thus dominated by «very loose and
generic collaborative formulas and procedural models, not supported by any ho-
mogeneous logic, intervening in policy sectors and policy-making phases extremely
varied» (Capotosti 1981, p. 900, translated). As remarked by Torchia (1990), the
layout of the relations between the State and the Regions which gradually emerged
as a result of the norms layered over time, between the end of the Sixties and the
end of the Eighties, proved marked by a high level of disorder – as to the policy
sectors in which a regional participation was implemented (even if tamely) and
those from which the Regions were instead completely excluded –, and by a high
level of non-homogeneity as to the functions and the membership of these mixed
bodies.
In that logic, the law establishing the Ordinary Regions (no. 281/1970) pro-
vided for the creation of a new Interregional Commission (Commissione Interre-
gionale), endowed with advisory powers on allocation criteria of a financial fund
devoted to development plans. In the following years, this Commission would be
provided with additional tasks.
Without any claim of completeness, it may be interesting to briefly mention
some of the numerous mixed organs which developed in the following decades, in
order to make evident the multiple, heterogeneous and sectoral nature of these
IGAs as well as the concomitant lack of a unified arena of dialog between the
regional and the central governments. It was particularly since the first regional
legislative session (1970-1975) that a real explosion of vertical, sectoral IGAs oc-
curred (Agosta 2008, p. 50).
In 1975 the National Council for Cultural Heritage and Environment (Consiglio
Nazionale per i Beni Culturali e Ambientali) was established, chaired by the cor-
responding national Minister, and provided with advisory powers. Two years later
a Central Commission for Employment (Commissione Centrale per l’Impiego) was
created: it was accorded consultative powers over the "general lines" and imple-
mentation criteria of the employment policy. In 1978, a Committee for Council
Housing (Comitato per l’Edilizia Residenziale) was instituted, made up of represen-
tatives from all the Ministries considered as subject-related (as many as thirteen)
and one representative from each Region. In 1984 a mixed organ for transports pol-
icy, composed by several central ministries and only five regional representatives,
was set up. In 1985 were funded the Show Business National Council (Consiglio
Nazionale dello Spettacolo), composed of fifty-seven members (whereof just three
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in representation of the Regions), and the National Council for Craftsmanship
(Consiglio Nazionale dell’Artigianato): in this latter case, the regional point of
view was expressed by the regional Councilors in charge of that policy sector as
well as by the presidents of the Regional Commissions for craftsmanship. Finally,
when in 1986 the national Ministry of Environment was established, a National
Council for Environment (Consiglio Nazionale per l’Ambiente) was set up, chaired
by the Minister and including all regional Presidents (see Table 2.1).
Health policy: the National Health Council For the purposes of this anal-
ysis, it is particularly important to notice that the setting-up of the new National
Health Service (Servizio Sanitario Nazionale; see § 4.3.2) led to the establishment,
in 1978, of the Consiglio Sanitario Nazionale (National Health Council), an in-
tergovernmental body with specific competences in the policy sector at the heart
of this work (Law no. 833/1978, Sect. no. 8). Both the composition and the
powers of the National Health Council were perfectly consistent with the broader
institutional landscape just sketched.
This vertical, policy-specific IGA was composed of one representative of each
Region, in addition to those of an extremely high number of central Ministries,
State organs and professional associations: three representatives from the Health
Ministry; one representative from the following list of Ministries: Employment and
Social Security; Education; Interior; Defence; Treasury and Economic Planning;
Agriculture; Industry and Commerce; Merchant Marine; Scientific and Technolog-
ical Research; finally, the directors of two organs of technical-scientific support to
the National Health System (the National Health Institute and the Institute for
the prevention and safety in the working environments), one representative from
the National Research Council, as well as ten "experts" appointed by the National
Council of Economy and Employment. In all, the National Health Council resulted
composed of forty-seven members, of which twenty-one representing subnational
governments.
This "mixed organ" – which would be working until 1993 – was accorded powers
of consultation and proposal towards the Government as to the setting of the
"general lines" of this policy sector, and the processing and implementation of the
National Health (Piano Sanitario Nazionale) Plan, the major planning document
in this field (in fact never implemented until 1993). Advices issued by the Council
had to be compulsorily asked by the national Government also on comprehensive
prevention programs, on the determination of the levels of health services to be
guaranteed across the country, on the planning of health workforce requirement,
as well as on the allocation criteria of the National Health Fund (Fondo Sanitario
Nazionale), the basic source of financing of the entire NHS. As far as the actual
functioning of this IGA is concerned, the hearings of some members of the Council,
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promoted in 1984 by the Health Commission of the Senate (in the framework of
a cognitive survey on the actual implementation of the National Health Service),
prove particularly interesting in order to understand the working dynamics of this
intergovernmental arrangement (Senato della Repubblica, 1984).
The representatives of the Council agreed to remark that, in spite of many ef-
forts put in place by its members to make the Council the real governance arena of
the new Health System, the Council had been suﬀering from many structural and
organizational weaknesses: these were ranging from the insuﬃcient staﬀ employed
in its Secretariat to the absence of a standing seat of its oﬃces (they spoke in this
respect of a "peripatetic activity" of the Council), from the confusion and overlap
of powers with those of others advisory bodies (such as the Consiglio Superiore di
Sanità) to the lack of consideration of its activity by the Government: «the ad-
vices issued by the Council – according to one of its representatives – remain in the
oﬃces of the Ministry of Health. I do not know of any advice ever arrived to the
Presidency of Council and to all the Ministers» (Senato della Repubblica, 1984,
translated). According to the Secretary General of the Council, during its first five
years of life, this IGA, which had met in its plenary format 51 times, had not been
supported by a "constant and routine" Secretariat activity; one of the persons in
charge of the "Planning" Section of the Council said that, when writing the oﬃcial
"Report on the Health Status of the Country" (a document to be drafted by the
Council), they had been forced to «act in an extemporaneous way, as people who
start writing things without a structure, without an arrangement» (Senato della
Repubblica, 1984, translated). The Government did not activate the advisory
function of the Council in all the cases provided for by the law and, even when the
Council was convened, it was given too few time to elaborate a "genuine" advice.
As summed up by one representative of the social partners in the Council, this
latter rested «on courage, on imagination, but certainly not on the identification
of roles, of suﬃciently adequate tools» (Senato della Repubblica, 1984, translated).
Still at the end of the Eighties the Italian intergovernmental arrangements
system resulted thus overcrowded with a number of intergovernmental arenas,
each endowed with a variety of assignments ranging from planning to management
activities, and each with responsibilities either over broad general issues, pertaining
to a whole policy sector, or over micro-issues, linked to very specific questions.
Some common traits can nevertheless be identified. Besides the policy-specific
design of these organs, coupled with the irregularity of their meetings, one of the
most relevant features shared by these diversified arrangements appeared to be
that very seldom the Regions were accorded the role of unique interacting subjects
with the central Government: in most cases, they were indeed involved in systems
of interaction in which the regional presence (either at the level of Presidents or at
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the level of regional Councilors, always with consultative functions) proved to be
watered down into a broader framework. The heterogeneous, hybrid composition
of these "mixed organs" tended indeed to (confusingly) blend together various
functions, such as the coordination between diﬀerent levels of government as well
as the concertation with the social partners (Desideri and Torchia 1986)4: the
complexity deriving from such an organization of Intergovernmental Arrangements
clearly emerges from data contained in Table 2.1.
Beyond sectorality and fragmentation: the genesis of the State-Regions
Conference
The limits deriving from such a configuration of the tools designed for the man-
agement of State-Regions relations appeared increasingly evident to many actors
since the second half of the Seventies.
Besides jeopardizing the unity of the central Government political and ad-
ministrative orientation, the so called "sectoral powderization" of IGR and IGAs
appeared to several observers as functional not to an eﬀective involvement of the
Regions into central level decisions, but rather to the implementation of what was
defined as an "organicist regionalism": regional governments would have risked to
end up playing the role of mere implementers of goals still largely defined by the
center, the administrative structure of which, despite two waves of regionaliza-
tion already occurred (1970-72; 1975-77), had remained largely unchanged (if not
strengthened) (Bifulco 2006, p. 243). In other words, the then existing system of
IGAs appeared as no more fitting the new institutional landscape, characterized by
the emergence of the subnational units as relevant territorial players. The major
attempt to go beyond these limits was carried out through the establishment, in
1983, of the State-Regions Conference – a vertical and generalist IGA – at the end
of a «long and troubled» genetic path (Pignatelli 2006, p. 52, translated), marked
by uncertainties and afterthoughts (Capotosti 1987). This path will be analyzed
in the remainder of this part.
Its beginning is generally identified with the presentation to the Parliament,
at the end of 1979, of a "Report over the Main Problems of the Administration of
the State", elaborated by the then Minister for Public Administration, Professor
Giannini. In the section specifically devoted to "State-Regions Relations", the
Report urged the Parliament to become aware that the territorial logic embodied
4In the second half of the Eighties, Desideri and Torchia (1986) observed in this regard
that «regionalization may have been perceived as a threat to traditional connections between
[social partners] interests and administrative systems. Sectoral laws have thus decided to give
reassurances that the connection between the State and the Regions would not exclude and, on
the contrary, would take into account sector-based interests» (p. 124, translated).
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in the 1948 Constitution had been definitively overcome, even "overwhelmed", as
a consequence of the two occurred waves of regionalization:
«the State-Regions relationship consists no more in a control of legitimacy
of the State over regional acts, or in a power of the State to limit, by means
of its framework laws, the legislative powers of the Regions, in a context of
separated levels [of competence]. The state of aﬀairs is now characterized by
reciprocal implications in planning activities and in those sectors of public
interest in which functions are shared (health, housing, etc.); [the state of
aﬀairs is characterized] by concertation in all remaining fields» (Giannini
1979, p. 31).
In that Report, it was also significantly remarked that, despite this evolution,
the State had not yet «put in place any means to activate, on clear and trans-
parent bases, its relations with the Regions» (Giannini 1979). Neither clarity nor
transparency could be considered as achieved by means of the then extant plethora
of "mixed organs", which, due to their sectoral nature, were not able to eﬀectively
coordinate general interests.
In the next years, between the end of the Seventies and the beginning of the
Eighties, diﬀerent projects and proposals were advanced, all sharing the idea of the
necessity to go beyond the fragmentation and sectorialization of the IGAs grown
over time: the creation of a unitary seat of intergovernmental political coordina-
tion, able to translate into practice the cooperative principle, was by that time felt
as necessary by many actors (Sandulli 1995). According to reforms’ supporters,
it was indeed indispensable to modify the meaning itself of the regional presence
inside State organs, and, above all, to create a channel of communication charac-
terized by open procedures, without any pre-established constraints, not only for
the joint definition of planning goals, but to recognize more broadly the existence
of a relationship between political (and not simply administrative) bodies, such as
the State and the Regions were (Capotosti 1981).
In February 1980, the conclusions of a cognitive survey promoted by the Parlia-
mentary Commission on Regional Issues mentioned above (Senato della Repubblica-
Camera dei Deputati, 1980) stressed explicitly, for the first time, the urgency and
utility of establishing – within the administrative structure of the Presidency of
the Council – a "Standing Conference of Regional Presidents", so as to create an
organic place for State-Regions confrontation. Regions were to be accorded in
that way the possibility to have a part in: defining the general political line of
the central Government action; allocating financial resources; setting the general
goals of economic planning, and sharing decisions (of regional interest) related to
the European Community (Mangiameli 2007). On July 10th of the same year,
the Senate passed an order of business which – in line with the above-mentioned
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proposals – committed the national Government to take all the necessary initia-
tives so that State-Regions relations were managed in a unitary, generalist seat, to
be established within the structure of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers
(Senato della Repubblica 1980).
Also in the light of these requests, at the end of 1980 a further ministerial
research commission was established (the so called Commissione Bassanini), in
charge of elaborating some proposals – even in the form of draft bills – about the
overall, concrete redefinition of the whole system of Italian IGR. As to the identifi-
cation of a new institutional arrangement for the management of center-periphery
relations, the Commission proposed to create a "Permanent Conference", able to
ensure and to promote over time the participation of the Regions to the elaboration
and implementation of the "general political lines" of the central Government. This
proposal also envisaged the suppression, and the consequent incorporation into the
new Conference, of two of the above-reminded mixed organs: the Advisory Interre-
gional Commission established in 1967 and the Interregional Commission created
in 1970. If compared with the intergovernmental landscape described above, the
project put forward by the Bassanini Commission might be considered, on the
whole, as groundbreaking. The main goal – according to one of the members of
that Commission – was «to allow the coordination, at the highest political level, of
the exercise of state and regional functions, overcoming and preventing any form
of sectorialization of these relationships» (Capotosti 1981, p. 903, translated).
This project, however, was never implemented: as stressed by Azzena (1999),
«the resistances to according the Regions a role at least equal to the one written
in the Constitution were still powerful, because of an ensemble of interests, both
of political and bureaucratic nature, to put it mildly. And those resistances were
directed, obviously, also towards the new body, still to be established» (p. 418,
translated). The «statist concern to preserve the autonomy of the executive in
defining its own administrative-political line» (Sandulli 1995, p. 840, translated)
thus prevailed over the growing claims coming from the "regional front" and the
more advanced proposals put forward in those years.
Such an ensemble of resistances materialized in the "Spadolini draft bill" (1982),
which, while envisioning the establishment of a Conference for the management of
IGR within the Presidency of the Council, was generally perceived as a clear come
down if compared with the proposals put forward by the Bassanini Commission.
First of all, this draft bill did not provide for the suppression and inclusion into the
new organ of the existing interregional commissions; secondly, it accorded to the
new organ powers for passing coordination acts exclusively in the administratively
decentralized policy sectors.
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Table 2.1: Main vertical Italian IGAs: date of establishment and composition.
IGA Year Members
Commissione Consultiva Interregionale 1967 National Minister of Budget and one representative of each
Region.
Commissione Interregionale 1970 National Minister of Budget and Regional Presidents.
Consiglio Nazionale per i Beni Culturali e Am-
bientali
1975 National Minister of Culture; one representative for each of the
following Ministries: Foreign Aﬀairs; Budget and Economic
Planning; Interior; Public Works; Agriculture and Forestries;
Public Education; Industry; Scientific Research; one represen-
tative of each Region and ten representatives of the local gov-
ernments, appointed among people with specific expertise in
the field; eight University professors; fourteen representatives
of the scientific personnel of the administration (three of which
appointed by the most representative national trade unions);
six experts of national reputation appointed by the Ministry.
Commissione Centrale per l’Impiego 1977 National Minister of Employment and Social Security; eight
representatives of workers, four representatives of employers,
one representative of each of the following categories: corpo-
rate executives; independent farmers; artisans; business own-
ers; cooperatives (all appointed by the most representative na-
tional trade unions); several central Ministries Directors Gen-
eral (employment services, labor relations and social security,
general aﬀairs and personnel); five regional representatives
chosen by the Minister among those designated by all the Re-
gions.
Comitato per l’Edilizia Residenziale 1978 National Minister of Public Works; two representatives of the
Treasury Minister; one representative of each of the follow-
ing Ministries: Budget and Economic Planning, Employment,
Scientific Research, Industry; Extraordinary interventions in
Southern Italy, Agriculture and Forestries, Interior, Defense,
Transports, Telecommunications, Culture; one representative
of each Region.
Consiglio Sanitario Nazionale 1978 National Minister of Health; one representative of each Region;
three representatives of the Ministry of Health and one of the
following: Employment, Public Education, Interior, Defense,
Treasury, Budget and Economic Planning, Agriculture and
Forestries, Industry, Merchant Marine, Scientific Research; the
Director of the Istituto Superiore di Sanità; the Director of the
Istituto superiore per la prevenzione e la sicurezza del lavoro; one
representative of the National Research Council; ten experts
on health matters, appointed by the National Council of Econ-
omy and Labor, taking into account functional competences
representativeness criteria.
Conferenza Stato-Regioni 1983 President of the Council of Ministers and Regional Presidents.
Comitato presso il Ministero dei Trasporti e
della Navigazione
1984 National Minsters of: Transports, Treasury, Budget, Eco-
nomic Planning, Defense, Public Works, Industry, Commerce,
Craftsmanship, Merchant Marine, Tourism and Show Business,
Extraordinary Interventions in Southern Italy, Scientific Re-
search; five representatives of the Regions, appointed by the
Conference of the Regional Presidents.
Consiglio Nazionale dello Spettacolo 1985 National Minister of Tourism and Show Business; one represen-
tative of each of the following Ministries: Foreign Aﬀairs; Trea-
sury; Public Education; Culture; State Participation; twenty-
seven representatives of diﬀerent categories of Show Business
workers; one representative of the public television network,
of the Italian theatrical Institution, of the copyright collecting
agency, and of the Ente Autonomo di Gestione per il Cinema;
three representatives of the Regions, appointed by the State-
Regions Conference; six representatives of the local govern-
ments, appointed by the Associazione Nazionale Comuni Ital-
iani; three representatives of the Provinces, appointed by the
Unione Province Italiane.
Consiglio Nazionale dell’Artigianato 1985 National Minitser of Industry; regional Craftmanship Coun-
cilors; Presidents of regional Commissions for Craftmanship;
eight representatives of national craftmanship associations;
four representatives of craftmanship workers; the president of
the Cassa per il credito alle imprese artigiane; the President of
the Unione italiana delle camere di commercio, industria, arti-
gianato e agricoltura.
Consiglio Nazionale per l’Ambiente 1986 National Minister of Environment; one representative dele-
gated by each Region; six representatives appointed by the lo-
cal governments (Associazione Nazionale Comuni Italiani) and
three by the Provinces (Unione delle Province d’Italia); fif-
teen representatives appointed by the Minister of Environ-
ment among those proposed by national associations for the
safeguard of environment; one representative of the National
Research Council, one of the National Committee on Alterna-
tive and Nuclear Energies, and one of the National Agency for
Electric Energy.
Source: Own elaboration.
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Establishment and development of the State-Regions Conference: leg-
islative framework
The outcome of such a complex genetic path came eventually on October 12th
1983, when the Government led by Bettino Craxi established – on administrative
bases – the new Conferenza Permanente per i rapporti fra lo Stato, le Regioni e le
Province Autonome (Standing Conference for the Relations between the State, the
Regions, and the Autonomous Provinces; more briefly, State-Regions Conference)
(D.P.C.M. October 12th 1983). The creation of this Conference by means of an
administrative act – instead of a legislative one, as previously envisioned – was
immediately pointed out by many observers as indicative of the scant conviction
characterizing the decision taken by the Government: for this reason, the estab-
lishment of the Conference was defined as no more than "experimental" (Sandulli
1995).
In fact, the new IGA was accorded quite vague and abstract powers of «infor-
mation, consultation, research and coordination over the issues of common interest
for the State, the Regions and the Autonomous Provinces» (Sect. no. 1.1). The
call of the Conference was entirely depending on the discretion of the Prime Min-
ister5, who was also accorded the chairmanship of this IGA; furthermore, regional
Presidents were defined as simple "guests": in legal terms, they were not neces-
sary members of the Conference, as well as national Ministers possibly involved
each time by the Prime Minister, depending on the subject-matters to be debated.
What emerged was thus a «muted Conference» (Capotosti 1987, p. 360, trans-
lated) if compared with those envisioned in all previous proposals. The architecture
of this new, generalist intergovernmental arrangement, presenting numerous struc-
tural and functional inconsistencies, was still entirely fitting in with a centralist
and statist view of IGR (Ruggiu 2000, p. 860).
Notice also that in this same period the proliferation of mixed State-Regions
organs showed no sign of decreasing (see again Table 2.1): such a dynamic may
be easily understood as an indicator of the still little recognition accorded to the
State-Regions Conference by many IGR actors as the privileged seat of political
coordination between the center and the periphery, all to the good of the existing
sectoral circuits between regional Presidents and Councilors, on the one hand, and
national Ministers, on the other hand.
It was only five years later, in 1988, that the Conference was accorded a legal
status. Law no. 400 of August 23rd (Sect. no. 12), pertaining to the overall re-
organization of the Presidency of the Council, introduced a number of important
innovations with respect to the composition, the powers and the organization of
the Conference, marking a major step towards a full-blown transformation of the
5The Decree stated indeed that the President of the Council might convene the Conference.
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role played by this vertical arrangement in the Italian system of intergovernmental
relations. The relevance of this step for the "take-oﬀ" of the Conference was also
confirmed by IGR actors interviewed for this analysis.
First of all, according to the new provisions, Regional and Provincial Pres-
idents were no more considered as "guests", but as full-fledged members of the
Conference. The Prime Minister was confirmed as the chair of the Conference and
was accorded the possibility to "invite" other Ministers, depending on the subject-
matters to be debated each time. Second, a minimal frequency of the meetings was
set (once every six months), reducing in such a way the discretionary power of the
President of the Council. Third, the competences of the Conference were defined
more precisely. In addition to the vague assignments included in the 1983 Decree,
Law no. 400 specified that the Conference was to be consulted by the central Gov-
ernment on the following issues: the general lines of the regulatory action of the
Government in matters of direct regional interest; the definition of the national
economic planning goals, as well on the objectives of financial and budget national
policy; the general political line as to the elaboration and implementation of EEC
acts impinging on regional competences; any other issue considered by the Prime
Minister as worthy to be discussed within the Conference. Particularly important
was also the provision about the institution of a permanent Secretariat Oﬃce, an
administrative structure of support, fundamental for ensuring the ongoing worka-
bility of the system: significantly, it was to be partly staﬀed by regional oﬃcials.
Eventually, Law no. 400 committed the Government, through a delega legislativa
(a delegation), to enacting a series of legislative Decrees with the goal of rational-
izing the existing, intricate web of policy-specific IGAs and, when necessary, to
suppress them (with a consequent absorption by the State-Regions Conference of
their competences). This process occurred at the end of 19896.
The next regulatory step towards the consolidation of the Conference was the
passage of Law no. 86 of 1989, 9th March (better known as "La Pergola Law", after
the name of the then Minister for European Aﬀairs), concerning the participation
of the Italian State to the EEC legislative process and the procedures for the im-
plementation of the European Community obligations. This new law provided for
a call of the State-Regions Conference in a special format (the so called Sessione
Comunitaria, "Community session"), exclusively devoted to the debate – at least
every six months – over the aspects of the EEC policies of regional interest. In
this special session, the activity of the Conference was of consultative nature, and
6By means of Legislative Decree no. 418 of December 16th 1989, which pointed out the kinds
of tasks, attributed up to that moment to existing sectorial IGAs, to be transferred to the State-
Regions Conference, as well as some assignments immediately transferred to this latter (advisory
powers on: acts of sectoral and inter-sectoral planning; acts pertaining to the distribution of
financial resources among the Regions or between these latter and the State; guidelines issued
by the central administration on matters of regional competence).
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advices could be given only on the legislative (and not administrative) acts of the
Government. The Conference was required to give its advices both on the gen-
eral criteria of elaboration of Community acts impinging on regional competences
(ascending phase), and on the criteria and modalities by which the Community
obligations were implemented in the Italian legal order (descending phase). It
should be noted that the additional provision of a minimal frequency of meetings
(in the Community format) contributed to further reduce the degree of discretion
enjoyed by the Prime Minister in calling the meetings (whose minimal number was
in that way set at four per year: two ordinary sessions plus two in the European
format).
If the Eighties appear thus characterized by a number of key-legal interven-
tions for the general development of the Conference, the early Nineties were rather
marked by a «sectoral legislation, of alluvial nature, which [. . . ] attributes to the
conference a large number of functions» (Ruggiu 2000, p. 861, translated), expand-
ing in fact its field of intervention. As shown in Figure 2.1, this period witnessed
indeed an intense sectoral regulatory activity, which provided for an involvement of
the Conference in specific, diverse decision-making processes. Although the tasks
conferred to the Conference were still of consultative nature in most of the cases, it
is nevertheless interesting to note that it is in those years that were contemplated
the first legislative provisions of State-Regions "understandings" (the intese, which,
compared with strictly advisory activity, entail a greater involvement of the Re-
gions into the decision-making process; see § 2.2.3).
It should be also reminded that, in this period, the Conference was involved in a
twofold process of internal reorganization. More specifically, a Decree of the Prime
Minister (D.P.C.M. January 31st 1991) set the composition and the functions of the
six General Committees in which the Conference had to be articulated7. In fact,
the nature of the tasks attributed to these oﬃces (basically preliminary activities)
as well as their composition (one representative of the Ministry in charge of the
sector at issue, and just four regional Presidents) made the Committees unable,
from the outset, to support the Conference in its daily working in an eﬀective way.
This is why in 1992 a further Decree was issued to re-organize the Conference,
establishing this time five Sectors, in turn divided into services8.
In these same years a significant ruling of the Constitutional Court (no. 116/1994)
helped to dispel many doubts (relevant not only from a strictly legal point of view)
about the ultimate nature of the Conference: whether it should be understood as
a simple articulation of the central Government (as many legal provisions, such
7As reconstructed by Bifulco (2006, p. 246), these General Committees were in fact the
State-Regions mixed organs not suppressed by the 1989 Decree.
8Institutional Aﬀairs; Planning and General Services; Land, Environment and Productive
Activities; Health Services, Social Aﬀairs and Education; National Health Service Collective
Bargaining; Archive of State-Regions mixed organs.
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Figure 2.1: Trend of sectoral legislative acts conferring new tasks to the State-
Regions Conference (1984-2005). Source: Ruggiu (2006, p. 291).
as the location of the Conference within the Presidency of the Council, allowed
to suppose); if it should be intended as an expression of the regional level, or if
it should be, eventually, considered as an arrangement endowed with its own au-
tonomy. The Court, which was already intervened to underscore that the whole
system of State-Regions relations should be inspired by the so called "loyal collab-
oration principle", argued that «the permanent Conference, far from being a body
belonging to the State or Regions apparatus» was instead to be intended as «the
privileged seat of confrontation and political negotiation between the State and
the Regions, in order to favor collaboration between the former and the latter. As
such – according to the Court – the Conference is an institution operating within
the national community as a tool for implementing cooperation between the State
and the Regions (and the Autonomous Provinces)» (translated, emphasis added).
As remarked by many law scholars, the norms layered during the Nineties,
while largely broadening the scope of the Conference intervention and contribut-
ing to consolidate collaborative practices between the center and the periphery,
tended to envision single, punctual interventions, which generally concluded with
the fulfillment by this IGA of the specific tasks defined each time by the laws at
issue. Such a situation made legitimate enduring doubts about the stabilization
and working continuity of this IGA (Ruggiu 2006). This is why, in the framework
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of a third wave of regionalization occurred in the second half of the Nineties, an
attempt to overcome these weaknesses was implemented. An overall revision of
the Italian IGR system, mainly based upon a clarification of the role played by the
State-Regions Conference and the introduction of a new vertical IGA, was put in
place. The State-Regions Conference appeared indeed in this phase as the unique
body able to channel – without the need of resorting to complex constitutional
changes – the exigencies of territorial representation expressed by the regional
(and local) governments, in a particularly complex phase of institutional transfor-
mation of the State. Not only that, but the State-Regions Conference oﬀered also
the template for the introduction – despite the strong opposition shown on many
occasions by the regional front – of a new Intergovernmental Arrangement aimed
at involving in central Government’s decisions also the municipal and the provin-
cial level: the State-Municipalities and Local Autonomies Conference (Conferenza
Stato-città ed autonomie locali) (1996).
The new State-Municipalities Conference was thus put alongside of the pre-
existing State-Regions Conference, which was involved, in turn, in a significant
reform, through the approval of a Legge delega (Law no. 59/1997). This latter
represents the last, major step in the definition of the regulatory framework gov-
erning the Conference: according to some scholars, it might even be considered as
the «legislative intervention which qualifies, in the sharpest way, the role of the
Conference» (Allegerezza 2002, p. 15, translated). If many legislative interven-
tions before 1997 had determined a «not at all linear evolution» of the Conference,
the 1997 reform led eventually to «coherent solutions, making the Conference a
seat of joint and equal collaboration [of the Regions] with the State, and adjusting
the role played by the Regions» (Azzena 1999, p. 422, translated). In fact, it
mainly contributed to define its role from a more general perspective.
Among the guidelines the Government had to follow in implementing this del-
ega, it was established that: first, the powers and the functions of the Conference
had to be strengthened through the provision of its participation to every deci-
sional process of regional, interregional or infraregional interest, at least by way of
compulsory consultative activity; second, State-Regions relations were to be sim-
plified, by means of the concentration into the Conference of all the tasks still
assigned to mixed committees, commissions and bodies (to be definitively sup-
pressed); third, the subject-matters in which an intesa (i.e., an "understanding";
see § 2.2.3) was to be considered as necessary were to be specified, as well as the
rules to be followed in case of non agreement; finally, the modalities and forms of
Municipalities and Provinces participation to the Conference works should have
been determined. These guidelines were later implemented in Legislative Decree
no. 281 issued on August 28th 1997. Though not modifying neither its composition
nor its general goals (still defined by Law no. 400/1988), this Decree contributed
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to rationalize the diverse competences acquired through time by the IGA under
analysis, and introduced some significant novelties, strengthening further the role
played by this intergovernmental body (Carpani 2006; La Falce 1998).
Among the major innovations introduced in 1997, the compulsoriness of the
consultative activity of the Conference over all normative initiatives (draft-bills,
draft-decrees and so on) enacted by the central Government in the fields of Re-
gional competence appears as particularly relevant. In such a way, indeed, the
activation of the Conference was no more linked to the existence of specific legisla-
tive provisions, but was made "automatic" (at the minimum level of compulsory,
not binding advices) whenever the Government was willing to intervene in sectors
of regional competence. In this respect, it should be remembered that in 1988 Law
no. 400 had not specified the necessity of the advices issued by the Conference:
according to many scholars, in principle at least, the pareri could in fact be re-
quested by the Prime Minister on a discretionary basis. Moreover, if before 1997
the advices were given almost exclusively on secondary, administrative sources,
after the reform process the Conference proved to be directly acting in the leg-
islative production of the Government, to the point that, in the opinion of some
scholars, it would be even possible to accord to the Conference a full-blown role
of "co-legislator" (Ruggiu 2006). As to the State-Regions mixed organs then still
being in existence, the decree went on to suppress them, attributing their functions
to the Conference.
Decree no. 281 also redefined the so called "Community session", confirming
its minimal frequency of a meeting every six months and strengthening its inter-
face function between the Regions, the national Government and the European
Union. More specifically, the Conference, when called to meet in this special for-
mat, was asked to intervene in order to: connect the national political lines as to
the elaboration of the Communitarian acts with the exigencies put forward by the
Regions (ascending phase); to give an advice over the "Community Law" (Legge
Comunitaria)9 (descending phase); to appoint the regional representatives within
the Permanent Representation of Italy to the EU; to give advices – when requested
by the Regions and with the consent of the Government – on administrative draft
bills aimed at introducing in the Italian State principles of the Community Law
or of rulings of the Court of Justice (in such a way, the Conference activity was
no more limited, in this special format, to legislative acts). Eventually, the reform
envisaged a fruitful collaboration between the Conference itself and the National
Steering Committee (Cabina di Regia Nazionale)10 in order to ensure a full and
9The major legislative act, by means of which, every year, the legal rules produced at the
European Union level are introduced in the Italian legal system.
10Established in 1995, the Cabina di Regia Nazionale is a structure operating under the Min-
istry of Economy and Finance to ensure the coordination and promotion of initiatives on the use
of EU structural funds.
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timely use of Community funds.
Finally, the 1997 reform arranged for the unification – as to the issues of com-
mon interest among the State, the Regions, and the "local autonomies" (i.e. mu-
nicipalities, provinces and territorial associations of mountain regions) – of the
State-Regions Conference with the above-mentioned State-Municipalities Confer-
ence. When called in this special format, the Conference is named Conferenza
Unificata (Unified Conference)11; its composition is nothing but the result of the
summation of the members of the two distinct arenas12. Compulsorily consulted
on the Budget Law draft, on the annual Document of Economic and Financial
Planning (Dpef – Documento di Programmazione Economica e Finanziaria), as
well as on the draft legislative decrees concerning the transfer of administrative
functions from the State to the local governments, the Unified Conference was also
accorded the power to promote the attainment of agreements and understandings
between the diﬀerent levels of government.
More generally, it should be evident, in the light of previous considerations,
that 1997 reform constituted an important stage in the evolution of the intergov-
ernmental relations system of Italian regionalism (at least on the regulatory side),
as long as it further contributed at consolidating «the exclusive and excluding
character assumed by the [State-Regions] Conference as to the relations with the
center, and [. . . ] set the compulsory advisory activity as the minimum level at
which regional participation [to the national policy-making] may be considered as
suﬃcient» (Ruggiu 2000, p. 862, translated).
The State-Regions Conference after constitutional reforms
During the next decade, the Italian regional system underwent two considerable
Constitutional reforms: they impacted indirectly, but remarkably, on the Confer-
ences system.
On the one hand, the introduction of the direct election of the Regional Pres-
idents (1999), while not determining any legislative change directly involving the
State-Regions Conference, altered nevertheless its composition: Regional Presi-
dents negotiating with the central government were no more expression of the
Regional Councils (the regional legislative bodies), but administrators endowed
11Note that the Conferenza Unificata is not to be intended as a third Conference, by a joint
session of the State-Regions and the State-Municipalities ones.
12More specifically, its members are: the President of the Council of Ministers; the Minister
of the Interior; the Minister of Regional Aﬀairs; the Minister of Economy and Finance; the
Minister of Infrastructures and Transports; the Minister of Health; the President of the National
Association of Italian Municipalities (ANCI); the President of the Union of Italian Provinces
(UPI); the President of the National Association of Mountain Municipalities and Communities
(UNCEM); 14 mayors appointed by the ANCI; 6 Provincial Presidents appointed by the UPI;
all the Regional Presidents.
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by their constituencies with a full-blown direct investiture, and, by consequence,
of higher political weight and political visibility13.
On the other hand, the amendment of Title V of the Second Part of the Con-
stitution (Constitutional Law no. 3/2001), although not oﬀering constitutional
recognition to the Conference, had an impact on it, in diﬀerent ways.
First of all, Law no. 3 provided for the strengthening of an alternative channel
of intergovernmental communication, operating not at the executive, but at the
legislative level: it envisaged indeed the possibility that, for a transitory period (be-
fore the possible establishment of a Senate as a parliamentary chamber of territorial
representation) the statutes of the two houses of the Parliament would provide for
the integration of the above-evoked Parliamentary Commission on Regional Issues
(see § 2.2.1) with representatives of the Regions and local governments. Theo-
retically, they could be allowed the right to take part to all those parliamentary
decision processes concerning local and regional governments’ finance and matters
of concurrent legislative competence. In cases of non agreement, the Commission
could make use of a suspensive veto power. Until now, nevertheless, the possibil-
ity of reforming the Commission in such way has not been implemented by the
Parliament.
If this reform option (if implemented) might appear as moving the barycenter
of the center-periphery relations from the executive towards the legislative arena,
it is still true that the Title V reform de facto impacted on the role played by the
Conference in the opposite way, that is broadening the scope of its interventions,
as a consequence of increased (and often badly defined) regional competences. As
stressed by Carpani (2006), «with the coming into eﬀect of the reform of Title
V of the Constitution [. . . ] the coordination ensured by the Conferences acquires
a new role, to some degree [. . . ] almost essential to the working of the system.
A legislative and administrative system organized in such a way does not only
reaﬃrm, but does increase the need of tools able to implement strong and eﬃcient
forms of collaboration between the State and the local governments» (pp. 146
and 150, translated). And even more so in the light of the "leveling" (pari ordi-
nazione) of governmental levels principle formalized by new section no. 114 of the
Constitution14.
Consistently with this new state of aﬀairs, in 2003 and 2005, two important
laws were passed, in order to enact the new constitutional provisions. The first
one – the so called "La Loggia Law" (no. 131, June 5th 2003) – introduced the
possibility of reaching, in specific circumstances, what is commonly defined as a
"strong understanding" (intesa forte) between the State and the Regions, which, as
13On this point, see § 4.3.2.
14"The Republic is constituted by Municipalities, Provinces, Metropolitan cities, Regions and
the State".
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will be explained in the next Section, is a cooperation tool entailing a particularly
deep involvement of the regional front into State decisions (cf. § 2.2.3). Moreover,
the 2003 law improved the advisory role of the Conference: its advices must be
taken on the drafting of Governmental decrees identifying the existing fundamental
principles regulating matters of concurrent legislation15.
In 2005, Law no. 11, February 4th, canceled "La Pergola Law" provisions,
updating the modalities of participation of the Regions to the elaboration and
implementation of the Community laws, also in the light of the principle of "loyal
collaboration", now included among constitutional tenets (Section no. 120.2)16.
Along with these legislative interventions, it should also be reminded the per-
sistence of the above-evoked sectorial "alluvial lawmaking": a number of new legal
provisions was indeed passed, paving the way to the provision of further cases of
punctual intervention by the Conference. Even after the general norms contained
in Decree no. 281/1997, the amount of sectorial laws passed each year – envis-
aging in diﬀerent ways and for diﬀerent reasons the activation of this IGA – may
be defined as significant: it determined a full-blown normative "layering process",
still in progress (Ruggiu 2006; see again Figure 2.1).
It must be finally reported that a draft bill, never passed, was advanced in 2006
by the then Ministry for Public Administration with the aim of rationalizing the
working of the Conference. In 2011, a new draft (Delega al Governo per listituzione
15As a transitory solution, before the enactment of new national framework legislation.
16In particular, Law no. 11 provides that the Government presents all the European Union
and Community measures and projects before the Conference of the Regions (cf. § 2.3); that
the Regions must be promptly informed about projects touching on matters within their compe-
tences, and that they may express – within a specific time frame and by means of the Conference
of the Regions – observations on such projects, in view of the formation of the Italian position
in the EU. Regions may then request (the demand may be advanced by any single Region) the
convening of the State-Regions Conference to reach an understanding on the draft Community
legislation covering regional legislative powers. In this latter case, the State-Regions Conference
may also request the Government to condition – at the Council of Ministers of the European
Union – its acceptance of the project under discussion. In failure of understanding, however, the
Government may still proceed with the activities aimed to implement Community acts. Law
no. 11 further envisions that the Regions must be informed in advance by the President of the
Council – during a special Community Session of the Conference – on the agenda of the next
European Council. On this occasion, the Government must also inform the Regions about the
position the Government intends to take in that forum; the Government is finally required to
report to the Regions the outcome of the meetings of the European Council and the Council of
Ministers of the European Union (with respect to matters falling within regional competence).
Eventually, Law no. 11 (sect. no. 17) has confirmed that the special Community Session of
the Conference has to be held, at least, every six months. In such a session, the Conference is
required to express its advice on: the general guidelines as to the elaboration and implementation
of Community legislation concerning regional powers; the criteria and procedures aimed to make
the Regions compliant to the obligations arising from belonging to the European Union; finally,
on "Community law" draft-bill.
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e la disciplina della Conferenza permanente dei livelli di governo), pursuing a
similar goal and envisioning the establishment of a unique Conference, embodying
both regional and local governments, was proposed by the Government: as the
previous proposal, the draft bill was not approved by the Parliament.
2.2.3 Powers, organization and functioning of the State-
Regions Conference
Tools
Italian legal literature usually distinguishes – at least after the 1997 reform – two
major kinds of State-Regions activity. The first one encompasses diﬀerent forms
of "participation of the Regions to the central Government activity" or, diﬀerently
stated, of "collaboration of the Regions with the national executive". The second
one, quantitatively secondary, consists instead in the "direct management" of a
series of functions by the State-Regions Conference as such.
The first kind of activities may be divided, in turn, into activities of strict
advisory nature and activities of "concerted co-management" (Ruggiu 2000).
Starting from the advisory activity, it basically consists in the issuing of pareri
(advices) over primary and secondary legislative acts initiated by the central Gov-
ernment.
Parere. Central Government must take into consideration the advices issued by
the Conference in a great deal of cases. As previously seen, the advisory
activity constitutes the minimum, compulsory form of involvement of the
Regions in all decisional processes initiated by the Government in fields of
regional competence, in addition to all specific circumstances envisaged by
sectoral laws. The Conference may also be consulted on whatever subject
of regional interest the Prime Minister considers as opportune to debate
within this IGA, also at the instance of the Regions. Notice that, while of-
ten compulsory, pareri are never binding – legally speaking, at least – for the
Government, which remains, in the last resort, responsible of its own regula-
tory initiatives. As an established practice, advices issued by the Regions in
the Conference may be distinguished into several categories: positive advices;
negative advices; and "conditional" (positive or negative) advices (pareri con-
dizionati). Conditionality is linked to the acceptance, by the Government, of
specific, very detailed "amendments", put forward (collectively) by the Re-
gions: in these cases, the Government may decide to immediately accept or
refuse regional requests, or to evaluate them in a later stage. Furthermore,
even when the regional advice is (fully) positive, the Regions may convey
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"recommendations" (raccomandazioni) or "remarks" (osservazioni), that is
requests of modifications, whose acceptance by the Government is neverthe-
less presented by the Regions themselves as non fundamental for their overall
positive assessment of the measure under discussion. It should be finally re-
minded that in case the central Government should proceed to the adoption
of a legislative act without having the time to previously take into account
the Conference advice (because of urgency reasons), it must nevertheless get
it later, following the approval of the act at issue by the Council of Ministers.
As to the forms of "co-management" activity, the available legal instruments
are the following two: the intesa (understanding) and the accordo (agreement).
Intesa. The intesa, already envisaged by some punctual legislative provisions
since the early Nineties, represents what legal scholars define as an activity
necessarily occurring during the course of the proceedings (atto endopro-
cedimentale). In other words, the attempt to reach an "understanding" is
considered as a necessary step within the sequence of a procedure aimed at
enacting a State legislative or administrative act. It is an instrument whose
primary aim is to guarantee – only in those cases provided for by law – a
very co-determination by the State and the Regions, on equal footing, of the
act at issue. Whenever a law provides for the reaching of an understanding,
the Conference results in a way directly "projected" into the construction
of the decision itself (Ruggiu 2000, p. 800). While the legal provision of
an advice leads often to the emergence, de facto, of a negotiating practice
between the State and the Regions before the formal issuing of the advice by
the Conference (see § 2.4), the provision of an understanding "imposes" in a
way the preparation and conducting of an intense negotiation activity among
the partners (Carpani 2006), able to overcome – by the adoption of flexible
and genuinely bilateral schemes – the rigidity of a non coordinated sequence
of unilateral acts (Anzon Demmig 2008, p. 193). It is for these reasons that
the intesa is generally qualified as the most eﬀective and penetrating tool of
regional participation to the elaboration of State acts (Anzon Demmig 2008).
It is nevertheless true that, according to Decree no. 281/1997, the central
Government, in case of non-achievement of an understanding within thirty
days after the inclusion of the issue in the order of business of the Confer-
ence, is allowed (even if not obliged) to take the final decision unilaterally:
in this case, it must simply provide a formal justification. Put diﬀerently,
the central Government is always accorded the last word17. Eventually, as
17An exception to such provisions is however contained in the above-evoked "La Loggia Law"
(2003). It has disposed that, whenever the Government is willing to promote the achievement
of an understanding with the Regions in order to «favor the mutual harmonization of respective
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in the case of pareri, an established practice is that the Regions may define
an understanding as achieved, provided that the Government amends the
text under discussion in a certain, specified way (intesa condizionata). In
this case, the Government may (politically) commit to make the required
changes (which, however, cannot be directly verified by the Conference).
Accordo. The accordo (agreement) represents instead a tool through which the
State and the Regions can coordinate the implementation of their respec-
tive functions and carry forward activities of common interest, «complying
with the principle of loyal collaboration, and pursuing goals of functional-
ity, cheapness and eﬀectiveness of the administrative activity» (Decree no.
281/1997, Sect. no. 4). The main goal of the accordo consists in the attempt
to ensure the highest uniformity as possible in the policy fields devolved to
the Regions, when sectoral laws do not provide for the attainment of an
understanding. Usually, the prime mover is the State (Carpani 2006). The
literature calls often attention to the discretionary and spontaneous nature
of the agreement, whose achievement – in contrast with understandings –
must not be provided by any law, being as such entirely dependent on the
will of the partners (Pignatelli 2006, p, 56). It has also been remarked that
agreements, far from being a marginal (administrative) tool, frequently ac-
quire strong political salience18. Except in few cases, however, the State has
no power in order to monitor the actual implementation of the agreements
by the Regions. Agreements, in order to become enforceable, must indeed
be adopted by each single Region (Carpino 2006).
Eventually, the "direct management" or deliberative activity of the Confer-
ence is constituted by the exercise of all those powers exclusively attributed to
the Conference, as such not ascribable to any partner individually considered.
When carrying forward direct management activities, the Conference "carves out"
an autonomous position within the institutional system (Ruggiu 2000). As men-
tioned above, this kind of activity is nothing but a quantitatively marginal part
of Conference action. It basically consists in: the determination of the sharing
criteria for the financial resources attributed to the Regions by law; the sending
of invitations and proposals to other State bodies and other subjects managing
public functions or services; the appointment of regional representatives in other
legislations, as well as the achievement of unitary positions or the pursuing of shared goals», no
time limits are imposed as to the attainment of the intesa: this is why these understandings are
commonly defined as "strong" (intese forti), as opposed to those envisioned by the 1997 reform
(intese deboli, weak understandings).
18In this respect, Carpani (2006, p. 71) mentions, for instance, the numerous agreements
preparatory to the covering of the regional debts in the health care sector by the State, later
transformed into decree-laws by the central Government.
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organisms (for instance, the appointment of the regional members within the Per-
manent Representation of Italy to the EU, as well as in many national technical
and advisory bodies)19. Furthermore, the Conference approves the guidelines for a
uniform implementation of diagnostic-therapeutic workups at the local level, and
– making use of its direct management powers – may formally establish Working
Groups and Committees, for supporting the Conference functioning from an ad-
ministrative point of view. This was an already long-established practice, then
simply formalized in 1997 (Decree no. 281, section no. 7.2). In the exercise of co-
management and direct management activities, the Conference is also enabled to
use some "instrumental" assignments, such as the monitoring of the planning acts
over which it has given its advices, as well as the data and information exchange
between State and regional administrations.
Concluding, it must be remembered that the Italian Constitutional Court has
clarified – on many occasions – that no decision taken by the Conference can
be considered as legally binding for the central Government: such an eventual-
ity would indeed entail an overturn of the legislative procedures designed by the
Constitution20.
Internal structure and working organization
The Conference composition is still the one established in 1988 by Law no. 400,
which defines as members of this IGA the Prime Minister, which chairs it (unless
delegation to the Minister for Regional Aﬀairs, a very usual practice), and the
Presidents of the Regions and Autonomous Provinces. Ministers in charge of the
issues to be debated may be invited by the Prime Minister, who may also ask
other representatives of State Administrations and Public Authorities to take part
in the Conference, depending on the items included the orders of business of the
meeting.
The Conference does not have its own seat, but meets in Rome behind closed
doors either at Palazzo Cornaro (the Regional Aﬀairs Department of the Presi-
dency of the Council, which is also the headquarter of the Conference Secretariat
Oﬃce) or in the Sala Verde (the Green Hall, traditionally devoted to meetings be-
19As will be explained, this latter function is essentially a task performed by the Regions.
20Decree no. 281 does not provide for any consequences in case of non-activation of the Con-
ference by the Government or in case of non-consideration by the Government of the advices and
understandings issued by this IGA. However, according to several judgments of the Constitu-
tional Court, national laws impacting on fields characterized by a strict overlap of regional and
central powers must provide for an involvement of the Regions into the national decision-making
process, by means of an advice or of an understanding of the State-Regions Conference, in order
to comply with the constitutional principle of "loyal collaboration" (see Ruggiu 2011).
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tween the Government and the social partners) of the central Government Palace21:
such a physical location has been interpreted by some observers as the structural
proof of the "material" dependence of this IGA from the Government. As already
reminded, ordinary meetings must be called, by law, at least every six months
(plus two European special sessions) and whenever the Prime Minister considers
it as convenient, also taking into account the requests coming from the Regions.
As a matter of fact, the frequency of meetings is much higher (cf. § 2.2.3).
A fundamental organizational aspect such as the institutional agenda setting
is formally a competence of the Prime Minister (or of the Ministry designated by
her)22. In fact, however, the established standard (political) procedure is that even
the agenda setting process is considered as an object of negotiation between the
State and the Regions, which advance their own requests, not individually, but
collectively, by means of the Conference of the Regions, the regional multilateral
horizontal IGA (cf. § 2.3) (Bin 2007). As plainly illustrated by the manager of
the Conference of the Regions in charge of Health policy,
dates are agreed on a semester basis: so, the Deputy Minister for Regional
Aﬀairs and our President are in touch with each other and a six month
calendar is made, providing for fortnightly meetings. The chosen day is
Thursday. [. . . ] Roughly, what is looked at is avoiding overlaps with the
meetings of the Committee of the Regions, of which [Regional] Presidents
are members. [IT4]
As to the identification of the issues to be jointly debated within the State-
Regions Conference, 1997 reform provides that, besides all the cases in which the
IGA is to be compulsorily consulted, the Conference is to be heard on whatever
object of regional interest indicated by the President of the Council, «also at the
instance of the Conference of the Presidents of the Regions» (Sect. no. 2.4). In
practice, as reported by IGR actors interviewed, this means that the President of
the Regions writes a letter asking the President of the State-Regions Conference for
the inclusion of a given item on the agenda: generally, these requests are accepted
[IT4]. One interviewed spoke of a "joint agenda" to describe the high degree of
State-Regions "interpenetration" in such a process, while another stressed in this
respect that State and Regions
are in a situation of almost equality: to be sure, the [central] Government
is still the Government of the Country, and therefore has the responsibility
21There have been, however, some exceptions, such as the meeting held in Bruxelles (at the
Permanent Representation of Italy to the EU) in April 1999.
22According to Law no. 400/1988, «The conference is convened by the President of the Council
of Ministers at least every six months, and in any other circumstance in which the President
deems it appropriate, also taking into account the requests of the Presidents of the Regions and
Autonomous Provinces».
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of [giving] a political line, but the Regions experience every day the man-
agement of [health] services so there is not a . . . let’s say . . . a prevalence [of
one level over the other when setting the agenda] [IT3].
Regarding the procedures to be followed for the definition of the agenda, a
circular letter addressed by the Ministry of Health to its Directorates-General
specified in 2005 that three weeks to one month must be allowed, in all, for adding
one item in the order of business of the Conference: the technical preparation
of the measure to be debated requires indeed fifteen to twenty days, "insofar all
Regions must be informed"; then, the order of business is to be sent to the Regions
at least one week in advance.
All actors interviewed agree that, in most of the cases, the central Government
does not misuse its formal agenda setting power, by including items on the agenda
just at the last minute, in order to reduce the regional involvement into the process:
No, I can honestly say there is no such thing here. [. . . ] Here, if such a
thing happens, it is because there have been some technical problems. No,
I just rule it out in the most absolute way: it never happened that this tool,
this trick was used in a conscious way. [IT8]
In case of delays in the involvement of the Regions into the agenda setting, due
to technical reasons (imminent deadlines set by law, for instance), the Regions
generally ask for additional time, which is usually granted.
The internal working organization of the Conference results strictly linked to
the activity of its network of bureaucratic support, such as the Secretariat Oﬃce,
the Working Groups and the Committees (Pignatelli 2006).
The Secretariat Oﬃce of the Conference is especially worthy to be considered.
Provided by Law no. 400/1988, it was established in 1989 (Prime Minister Decree
February 16th) and further modified many times as to its functions and organi-
zation23. Nowadays, the Secretariat, which according to the law «works directly
reporting to and according to the orientations of the President of the Conference»
(Decree no. 281/1997, Sect. no. 10), is structured into six policy-specialized
23The measures of organization and re-organization of the Secretariat of the State-Regions
Conference are, in chronological order and in addition to those already mentioned: the DPCM
June 4th, 1992 no. 366 (which provided, for the first time, for the Secretariat to be divided into
sectors); the DPCMOctober 26th, 1995 no. 589 (redefining both the number and the competences
of sectors); the DPCM March 19th, 1999 no. 98 (specification of functions and redefinition of
the powers accorded to each sector); the DPCM April 15th, 2000 (setting the maximum number
of services at six, technical secretariat excluded); the Decree of the Secretary General of the
Presidency of Council of Ministers of April 19th, 2001 (new division of responsibilities among
sectors); the Decree of the Minister for Regional Aﬀairs July 22nd, 2003 ("Organization and
functioning of the Secretariat Oﬃce of the Standing Conference for the relationships between
the State, the Regions and the Autonomous Provinces of Trento and Bolzano").
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units, called Servizi (Services), and a Technical Secretariat, endowed with tasks of
research and support to the activities of the Director General of the Conference.
As shown in Figure 2.2, the Secretariat Services currently operating are the
following ones: I. Education, Research, Technological Innovation and General Af-
fairs; II. Institutional Reforms, Public Finance, Employment and International
Relations; III. Health Care and Social Policies; IV. Productive Activities and In-
frastructures; V. Environment and Land; VI. Agricultural and Forestry Policies.
The existing literature identifies the Secretariat Oﬃce as a fundamental place for
the actual management of State-Regions relationships.
This oﬃce is at least half-staﬀed by State oﬃcials and by regional bureaucrats
for the remaining part. It is established within the Presidency of the Council
and run by a Director General. Even if reporting directly to the Presidency of
the Council from a structural point of view, the Secretariat implements an im-
portant support activity to the Conference, which makes it the fundamental tool
through which the relations between the partners have been developing over time
(Allegrezza 2002). It is indeed the Secretariat which ensures the fulfillment of all
necessary administrative tasks, before and after the Conference meetings (such as
preliminary activity, exchange of information and so on), and, most importantly,
organizes the activity of Working Groups and Mixed Boards.
Concretely, the Director General of the Secretariat transmits the Government
proposals of regional interest to the subject-related Service(s) of the State-Regions
Conference, which, in turn, transmits them to each single Region as well as to the
horizontal IGA (the Conference of the Regions; cf. § 2.3). The function of coordi-
nation granted by the Secretariat is not limited to the transmission, exchange and
circulation of the necessary information, but consists also in the call and organiza-
tion of "the so called State-Regions mixed technical boards" (incontri tecnici misti
Stato-Regioni), in which take part representatives of the Ministries involved and
of the Regions: here a full-blown negotiation process is started over the acts and
measures to be then debated within the Conference in its plenary format. During
this process, the documents are processed, modified and corrected by the central
administration, which often tries to incorporate the amendments requested by the
Regions in order to gain their consent. As described by the former manager in
charge of the Health Care and Social Policy Service of the State-Regions Confer-
ence Secretariat, this latter plays (or was playing, at least up to the mid 2000s:
cf. § 2.4) a role of "active coordination":
The Ministries sent [to the State-Regions Secretariat Oﬃce] the measures at
stake. The measures to be examined in the State-Regions Conference, to be
put on the agenda, were prepared by the Secretariat of the Conference ac-
cording to the diﬀerent subjects and, say, the preliminary activity was a deep
investigation. The preliminary inquiry started from an analysis of reference
standards, that is, what was the legal environment, the legal framework in
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Figure 2.2: State-Regions Conference: organizational structure. Source: own elab-
oration from www.statoregioni.it.
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which [these measures] were going to fit. Upon completion of this inquiry,
the competent oﬃces of the Ministries were summoned, the Regions were
called and, say, a debate on the content of the measure initiated, and where
there were any disagreements or situations to mediate, this mediation was
carried out by the Secretariat Oﬃce. [. . . ] The Secretariat Oﬃce was an
active Secretariat, of inter-institutional coordination, [. . . ] which sometimes
even proposed solutions. [IT10]
Such an active coordination function run by the Secretariat Oﬃce of the Con-
ference meant that full-blown, detailed amendments, on very specific points, are
often drafted in a joint way by the representatives of the central Ministries involved
and those of the Regions. The major goal of the Secretariat, in such a phase, was
to conclude in a positive way the preliminary inquiry of the measures at
stake, and to bring them at the Conference. So the goal was: to bring [at
the Conference] as many measures as possible and with a positive solution.
[IT10]
This step is concluded by the drafting, by the Secretariat, of a memorandum
about the work done and the legal framework of reference.
Decision-making rules
As to the decision-making rules of the Conference, it is important to stress that
a punctual procedural discipline has been lacking up to now. Most part of the
norms regulating the working of this IGA are defined by established procedures,
since provisions provided on this point by the 1997 reform are characterized by
an «evident uncertainty as to the formulation of the procedural rules regulating
the modalities of decisions formation» (Catelani 2004, p. 549, translated). Such
procedures tend to impose themselves even in the few cases regulated by law. Legal
literature remarks therefore the high degree of "de-formalization" and informality
characterizing the working of the Conference, which, moreover, is not accorded self-
organizing powers: in other words, the State-Regions Conference cannot approve
any internal regulation.
Of particular interest are the rules concerning the approval of decisions, as long
as they allow to understand the centrality of the interaction dynamics between
the State and the Regions (and among these latter), occurring before plenary
Conference meetings are convened, and out of its framework (cf. § 2.3 and 2.4).
The structural quorum – that is the minimal number of attending members
required for the meeting to be valid – is extremely low: de facto, usually, in addi-
tion the Prime Minister or the Deputy Minister, who chairs the Conference, just
a couple of Regional Presidents take part to the encounters with the Government.
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Customarily, one of the attending Regional Presidents is also the head of the Con-
ference of the Regions (cf. § 2.3), and represents, acting as spokesman, the common
position reached immediately before by the "regional front" in the horizontal IGA.
On the basis of the established procedures, it is thus commonly argued that the
presence of one representative for each part – one for the State and one for the
Regions – are suﬃcient conditions for a meeting to be considered valid. In the
light of these dynamics, it has also been remarked that «what is made and said in
the Conference is not of direct interest for the Regions» (Bin 2007, p. 697, trans-
lated). Put diﬀerently, all this seems to indicate that the State-Regions Conference
plenary meetings represent just the final step of a much longer decision-making
process, which unfolds over time, also in other institutional places (particularly in
the dense network of exchanges occurring between the State-Regions Conference
Secretariat and the articulations of the horizontal Conference of the Regions).
All these considerations are strictly linked to the deliberative quorum, that is the
minimal number of votes for a proposal to be validly passed by the vertical IGA.
The 1997 reform provides indeed that – given central Government agreement –
regional consent may be given by majority, when consensus among Regions cannot
be attained (sect. no. 2): this is valid, however, only in case of direct management
activities (which represent a small share of its work). As to all remaining cases
(advices, agreements and understandings: quantitatively and qualitatively much
more significant), provisions of Decree no. 281 are not at all clear. The established
practice shows that, in fact, in the vast majority of cases, the Conference does not
vote, but decides by consensus, since the Regions have already voted or anyway
determined their own position (often, unanimous) within the Conference of the
Regions: «The practice shows that the Regions as well as the Municipalities, the
Provinces and the Mountain Communities [in the Unified Conference] tend to come
to a shared position towards the Government, trying to find, when necessary, a
mediation solution among themselves, just not to put in evidence diﬀerences and
contrasts. [. . . ] Moreover, [. . . ] the central Government tries in every way to attain
a shared position with the Regions and the local governments so that Conferences
can decide by unanimity» (Pizzetti 1998, pp. 481-482, translated).
The activity
Taking into account the eﬀective functioning of the Conference (particularly, its
level of activity), it is possible to detect diﬀerent temporal phases of institutional
evolution of the vertical IGA under examination.
1984-1988: the Conference as a "phantom body"
As clearly shown in Figure 2.3, the first years of life of the Conference were
characterized by an extremely low and irregular activity. Just two meetings
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Figure 2.3: State-Regions Conference: Number of Meetings per Year (1984-
2012). Source: own elaboration from www.statoregioni.it.
were celebrated in 1984 as well as in 1985, no one between 1986 and 1988.
In fact, as seen, the 1983 administrative Decree establishing the Conference
did not contain any reference to a minimum number of annual meetings
to be celebrated. In its first five years of existence, the Conference was
convened only in two years, as a proof of the discontinuity of its activity.
This has been interpreted as the evident willingness of the central State to
keep the Regions out of the formal decision-making circuit (Bifulco 2006,
p. 247). Besides being infrequent and irregular, the bulk of the meetings
activity was devoted – from a qualitative point of view – to communications,
exchanges of information, and merely non-compulsory advices (Pignatelli
2006, p. 52)24. This situation was partly due to the very weak nature of
the above-reminded regulatory provisions, but also to the climate of mutual
distrust still characterizing the relations between the State and the Regions.
These dynamics led some scholars to define the Conference in this period as
a nothing more than "phantom body" (Sandulli 1995).
24As to the subject-matters debated in this first period, Carpani (2006) mentions: drugs; local
public transport; agriculture; extraordinary State financial interventions in Southern regions;
and the National Health System.
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1989-1991/2: a "testing and adjusting" period
The temporal phase comprised between 1989 and 1991/1992 has been defined
as a "transitory" or "testing and adjusting" period (Sandulli 1995).One of the
actors interviewed for this analysis labeled such a period as "experimental"
[IT3]. During these years, the number of meetings per year started to increase
(as shown in Figure 2.3), passing from four in 1989 to eight in 1992, with a
peak in 1991 (thirteen), also as a consequence, as previously reconstructed,
of the suppression of many sectoral IGAs still existing. Among these latter,
the National Health Council, whose advisory powers – those concerning the
allocation of the National Health Fund included – were transferred to the
Conference. In 1989, the first Conference in the Communitarian format was
celebrated, while in 1991 and 1992 the Conference approved the first "un-
derstandings". More generally, as reconstructed by Carpani (2006), between
the end of the Eighties and the early Nineties, the Conference was a tool
of support to the administrative activity of the Government, even at a high
level, being involved in issues related to economic and financial planning, or
to the definition of the criteria used for the allocation of financial resources;
strictly political issues, although not completely excluded from the agenda of
this IGA, did not represent the ordinary aspect of the Conference working.
1992/3-1996: a period of stabilization
In this period, the activity of the Conference started becoming more regular
and acquiring increased frequency: about one meeting per month was cele-
brated. Also as a consequence of multiple claims coming from the "regional
front", in this phase a cooperative intergovernmental culture consolidated:
the State-Regions Conference appeared in those years as the most appropri-
ate seat where to translate such kind of governance culture into institutional
practice (Pizzetti 1998; Ruggiu 2000). Besides the increased number of an-
nual meetings of the Conference, the quantitative growth of its activity may
be easily grasped by looking at the augmented number of acts passed each
year as well as at the kinds of acts approved by this IGA (see Figures 2.4 and
2.5). From a more qualitative perspective, indeed, changes in the Confer-
ence activity are mainly linked to an increase of the understandings (intese)
reached within the Conference (due to the provisions contained in a growing
number of sectoral laws), as well as to the approval of the first agreements
(accordi). Strictly advisory activity – full-blown hard core of the 1988 regu-
lations – was anyway still quantitatively largely predominant.
1997-2001: a period of consolidation
The 1997 reform entailed the above-mentioned suppression of the still exist-
ing State-Regions mixed organs. This dynamic – along with the continuation
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of the "alluvial" legislative intervention conferring new tasks to the Confer-
ence – contributes to explain the quantitative and qualitative growth of the
activity carried on by this body. A noteworthy overall activity growth – in
terms of meetings held and number of acts passed each year – can be clearly
seen after the 1997 reform. Indeed, if one looks at the annual number of acts
passed by this IGA will easily notice a steady increase since that year25. As
to the frequency of the meetings, it boosted, reaching an average of two meet-
ings per month. Dispositions contained in Decree no. 281, defining advices
as the minimum involvement of the Regions into the Conference work, clearly
determined a neat increase of the strictly advisory activity (the issuing of
pareri), which reached its peak in 2000 (see Figure 2.4). Because of the "gen-
erality and abstractness" of the cases in which its consultative intervention
was defined as necessary, the Conference activity became thus particularly
relevant, at least as to the scope of the acts over which a regional advice had
to be formulated (Carpani 2006). In relative terms, an even more impressive
growth can be recorded with respect to the "co-management" activities: the
average number of understandings (intese) approved each year passed indeed
from less than six in the previous periods (1990-1996) to almost fifty in the
period under analysis (1997-2001). Equally interesting should be considered
the trend of State-Regions agreements (accordi). Since, as already reminded,
the accordi are not imposed by any law and, as such, are completely depen-
dent on the spontaneous willingness of the partners, their number – always
increasing between 1997 and 2001 (passing from five to twenty-five per year)
– can be easily interpreted «as the most evident symptom of the strength-
ening of the Conference and of its recognition by the central Government»
(Pignatelli 2006, p. 56, translated).
2002-2012: the Conference after constitutional reforms
As shown before, Constitutional reforms have had an indirect, but relevant
impact on the working of the State-Regions Conference. This impact can be
easily understood by looking at the data contained in the graphs. The num-
ber of meetings per year, after the peak reached in 1999, has been decreasing:
this cannot be considered as surprising, considered the occurrence of adminis-
trative devolution in the second half of the Nineties, mentioned above. What
may result as more interesting is that in the period under consideration the
number of meetings celebrated each year by the Conference has never been
lower than before 1997 (which means, on average, almost eighteen meetings
25It should be reminded, with respect to this trend, that the Regions were then directly
involved in the transfer of new competences and functions from the central Government towards
peripheries mainly by means of the Conference.
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per year). Secondly, from a more qualitative perspective, it is possible to
notice the stabilization of the number of agreements achieved, as a further
proof of the strengthening of the Conference and of the willingness of both
regional and central Governments to use it as a means of intergovernmen-
tal collaboration. Not only that: as put in evidence by the literature (e.g.
Carpino 2006) and by several actors interviewed, after 2001 constitutional
reforms, resorting to agreements has been seen, because of their peculiar
nature (as explained, they are a sort of contract, which is consensual by
definition), as the best way for preventing conflicts of competences between
the State and the Regions. In the health sector, as explained by a former
Director General of the Ministry of Health,
sometimes also a question of principle showed up, that is to say: "As
the Title V [of the Constitution] provides that the State has exclusive
jurisdiction only on the essential levels of health care, while the organi-
zation of services is under concurrent jurisdiction. . . ". So the Regions
said: "Although we agree, we cannot allow you to say that". So the
question shifted from the content to the form. They said: "We [the Re-
gions] will never support an "understanding" on a Ministerial Decree,
since we will always tell you that the jurisdiction is concurrent, so you
cannot make a Ministerial Decree [. . . ] But, at best, we can make a
State-Regions "agreement", in which we say the same things, but in the
form of an agreement. [IT8]
Thirdly, it results particularly interesting that in the last four years of activ-
ity here considered (2009-2012), the number of understandings passed by this
IGA has been – for the first time in its history – higher than the number of
advices issued: in other words, the "co-management activity" has quantita-
tively exceeded the traditional major kind of intervention of the Conference,
i.e. strict consultation, whose trend has been constantly decreasing between
2007 and 2011. Although it might be too early to assess this kind of evolu-
tion, it is still possible to notice, looking at the whole period under analysis
(2002-2012), a general decreasing trend of advices along with an opposite
trend of understandings. This is perfectly consistent with the new distribu-
tion of powers as defined by the Constitution, entailing a greater involvement
of the Regions in a vast array of policy fields. The understandings may be
thus possibly perceived – both by the central State and by the Regions – as
an eﬀective way, along with agreements, to respect the loyal collaboration
principle and to prevent, as fare as possible, legal conflicts of competences.
As a whole, these data, showing the quantitative increase of the workload car-
ried out by the Conference (in terms of meetings held and acts passed) and its
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Figure 2.4: State-Regions Conference: number of acts passed (1990-2012). Source:
own elaboration from www.statoregioni.it.
qualitative transformation, allow some remarks about the gradual process of insti-
tutionalization in which the Conference has been involved. The data seem indeed
to confirm that this body – well beyond the above-reminded regulatory framework
and after an uncertain starting phase – has been actually able to impose itself as
the central arena for the management of center-periphery relations in Italy, even
exceeding in fact the role and the room of intervention accorded to it by the laws:
bear in mind, for instance, that the minimal, compulsory number of Conference
meetings per year is still set at four (Ruggiu 2006). All this appears to be clearly
indicative of a gradual process of institutionalization of the Conference, increas-
ingly recognized by the actors – both the Regions and the State – as the natural
and privileged seat for multilevel institutional debate, even in the absence of strict
regulatory requirements in such direction (consider again the case of accordi). As
a further proof of the phenomenon under analysis, attention is generally called
towards the existence of the above evoked whole set of rules and procedures – not
of legal nature – governing the concrete functioning of the Conference and driving,
within this latter, the behavior of elected oﬃcials and bureaucrats. Ruggiu (2006)
speaks, in this respect, of the accumulation, over time, of what could be called
"institutional memory" (p. 305).
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Figure 2.5: State-Regions Conference: number of acts passed per kind (1990-
2012). Source: own elaboration from www.statoregioni.it.
Health Policy Data and observations considered until now, however, do not
allow, per se, to understand the relevance and the kind of the policy issues con-
sidered and debated within the Conference. These appear as extremely heteroge-
neous, both as their scope and as the policy field involved. The superseding of
sectoral fragmentation dominating Italian IGR and IGAs before the establishment
of the State-Regions Conference has made this latter a generalist intergovernmen-
tal arrangement in which measures pertaining to very diﬀerent policy fields are
addressed: «the vast array of acts debated – as remarked by Bin (2007) – are,
in majority, pertaining to minute administration, while others represent delibera-
tions of utmost political importance. Among these latter there are not only the
advices on the Governmental drafts or regulatory acts, but also the wide variety
of understandings and agreements» (p. 691, translated).
For the purposes of this analysis, it is relevant to capture how much of the
Conference activity is specifically devoted to the management of health policy
issues.
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From a preliminar point of view, it is important to remember that, as a conse-
quence of Decree no. 418, all the advisory competences of the Consiglio Sanitario
Nazionale (cfr. § 2.2.2) – included those pertaining to the allocation of the National
Health Fund – were attributed to the State-Regions Conference as early as in 1989.
In 1993, the Council was definitively suppressed, with the consequent passage to
the Conference of all its residual competences in health policy26. It may also result
interesting to note that, since the very beginning (even before the formal abolition
of the National Health Council), the policy sector in which were contemplated the
first provisions of "understanding" to be reached within the State-Regions Confer-
ence was health. The very first legal provision of an understanding was indeed
envisioned in 1991 by Law no. 412 (December 30th), according to which health
care levels as well as activity and organizational standards to be used to calculate
the per capita financing parameter of each health care level had to be determined
by the Government through an understanding with the Regions (Sandulli 1995).
In 1992, it was then provided by Legislative Decree no. 502 (December 30th) that
the State and the Regions should reach an understanding on the National Health
Plan (Piano Sanitario Nazionale), in that moment the major planning act in this
policy field: as seen above, before a simple advice by the Council was envisioned
(something which, in fact, had never happened).
More generally, one can observe that the interventions of the Conference in
matters related to health care and social assistance policies have represented, since
its origins, a substantial part of its activities, both from a quantitative and a
qualitative point of view (La Falce 1998).
Qualitative evidence supporting the centrality of healthcare policy in the Con-
ference activities comes also from the interviews conducted for this analysis. As
put, for instance, by one regional manager in charge of health policy during the
1990s and the early 2000s,
health, by itself [. . . ] was always present, there was no meeting . . . in
every Conference, every three weeks, there could be one item on the agenda,
could there be ten [. . . ] everything goes there, even appointments [. . . ] any
example that comes to your mind [. . . ] passes by there . . . therefore, every
three weeks, there is at least one argument, often, three, four, ten [related
to health policy] [. . . ] So true that [health policy] is absolutely the most
substantive argument discussed in the Conference. [IT3]
Such kind of statements appears confirmed if one looks at how many meetings
of the Conference have been devoted – in an exclusive or in a partial way – to
the debate of problems linked to this policy sector, over the last decade. From
an analysis of the orders of business of the Conference in the period 2001-2012
26Legislative Decree no. 266, June 30th 1993.
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the centrality of this policy field emerges indeed without any doubt: while just
about 4% of the meetings have been entirely dedicated to the analysis of health
policy-related issues (meaning that all issues in the agenda were linked to health
policy), at least one item on the Conference agenda has been linked to health
care matters in more than 94% of meetings held in the period of reference (Table
2.2). In absolute terms, this means that, on average, in only one meeting per
year health policy issues have not been debated by the Conference. Furthermore,
it may be interesting to observe that the relative number of meetings in which
health care policy has been discussed has followed a quite regular pattern over
time (being comprised between a minimum of 86.4% and a maximum of 100%):
this makes clear that health care policy can be considered as a constant object of
intergovernmental relations within this generalist IGA.
Table 2.2: State-Regions Conference: meetings with health policy items on the
agenda.
Year Meetings at least partially
devoted to healthcare issues
Meetings entirely devoted to
healthcare issues
2001 100% 6.25%
2002 86.36% 0%
2003 95.24% 14.29%
2004 100% 0%
2005 92.86% 0%
2006 94.44% 5.56%
2007 94.12% 0%
2008 92.86% 7.14%
2009 86.67% 6.67%
2010 100% 0%
2011 93.75% 0%
2012 94.74% 10.53%
Average 94.25% 4.20%
Source: own elaboration from documents available at: www.statoregioni.it.
While the indicator just discussed confirms the frequent and regular presence
of health policy items on the Conference agenda (they are addressed, on average,
once every three weeks), it does not provide any evidence about the relative im-
portance of this policy field if compared to the overall activity performed by this
Intergovernmental Arrangement: although regularly on the agenda, health policy
could just represent a tiny share of the Conference work. In order to assess the
relative weight of health policy in the State-Regions Conference activity, two more
indicators may be taken into consideration: the percentage of intergovernmental
acts involving health issues, as well as their kind, over the total passed by the Con-
ference. In the period 2002-2012, 36% of the State-Conference acts were related
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to health policy. Interestingly, the relative weight of health issues in the Confer-
ence, in terms of acts passed, appears as quite stable over the years, having being
roughly comprised between 30 and 40% (for variations over time, see Figure 2.6)27.
Perhaps more interestingly, looking at the kind of these acts, it emerges that the
"strictly advisory" activity (issuing of advices) has represented about 40% of the
total, while the remaining 60% was instead linked to the so called "co-management"
activity: understandings (35%) and agreements (25%).
Oﬃcial data on the activity carried on by the Conference at the technical level
are lacking. However, as a consequence of the high and always increasing number
of legal provisions of agreements and understandings, entailing an activation of the
Conference, the activities carried forward within technical boards prove relevant.
According to some estimates, about three-hundred meetings are held every year
(Vandelli 2004). This seems a quite reasonable estimate, in so far – as explained by
one interviewed – for addressing each measure to be then discussed in the plenary
sessions of the Conference at least one technical meeting is usually organized. As
long health is concerned, according the former manager of the Health Policy Ser-
vice of the Secretariat Oﬃce, the annual number of technical meetings addressing
health-related measures ranged, roughly, between 150 and 200 [IT10].
As a whole, data collected clearly demonstrate that healthcare policy consti-
tutes a constantly present, qualitatively and quantitatively relevant share of the
total activity carried out by the generalist Intergovernmental Arrangement under
analysis.
2.3 The horizontal dimension of IGRs and IGAs
What has emerged clearly, although implicitly, from above is that in the Ital-
ian system of vertical Intergovernmental Relations a central role is played by the
horizontal self-coordination body of the Regions: the Conference of the Regions
and of the Autonomous Provinces (Conferenza delle Regioni e delle Province Au-
tonome; hereinafter, Conference of the Regions). Indeed, it is not possible to
fully understand the working organization of the State-Regions Conference (and
of its Secretariat) without taking into account the exclusively interregional IGA,
its origins and its functioning rules.
27Percentages refer to advisory and "co-management" acts. As emerged from interviews, the
appointment of regional representatives into State organs may indeed be considered as a strict
interregional business: during the State-Regions Conference meetings, Regions simply communi-
cate the names of the persons to be appointed as regional representatives in national or European
bodies. Anyway, even taking appointments into consideration, the picture does not change sig-
nificantly: on average, between 2002 and 2012, the percentage of acts related to health issues
has been equal to 33% (ranging from a minimum of 24% in 2002 to a maximum of almost 41%
in 2005).
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Figure 2.6: State-Regions Conference: percentage of acts related to health policy
(2002-2012). Source: own elaboration from www.statoregioni.it.
2.3.1 Emergence and evolution of Executive Federalism:
the Conference of the Regions
The Conference of the Regions (originally named Conferenza dei Presidenti delle
Regioni e delle Province Autonome, Conference of the Presidents of the Regions
and of the Autonomous Provinces) was voluntarily established by Regional Pres-
idents in January 1981, that is even before the administrative creation of the
State-Regions Conference (1983).
According to its Founding Agreement (of strictly political rather than legal na-
ture), the main goal of the new horizontal arrangement was «to give a contribution
in order to overcome the inertial forces and resistances preventing the system of
regional and local governments to fully express its potential contribution to the
recovery and to the social and economic development of the Country»28. More
significantly from our point of view, the founding document stated unambiguously
that this new Conference put itself as a "precursory initiative" to the establishment
of a vertical IGA, a Conference of the Regional Governments within the Presidency
28This document is available on the Conference of the Regions website: http://www.regioni.
it/it/show-atto_costitutivo/show.php?id_pagina=18.
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of the Councils of Ministers, as unanimously proposed by the Regions and by the
Parliamentary Commission on Regional Issues (cf. § 2.2.2).
The content of this founding document is particularly worthy to be remembered
since it enables to understand that, since its birth, the Italian horizontal IGA was
mainly directed towards the establishment and, then, the management of direct
relationships with the centre. Put diﬀerently, as remarked by Ferraro (2007), from
the very beginning, the Italian horizontal Conference presented itself as an antic-
ipatory initiative in view of the creation and functioning of a vertical, generalist
IGA, through which the Regions – recognized as political actors – would gain ac-
cess to the central decision-making circuit. The perceived need of an horizontal
intergovernmental arrangement was thus linked more to the regional willingness
to promote a stable and eﬀective channel of vertical cooperation with the State
than to foster exclusively horizontal intergovernmental relations. The pursuing
of these latter was also partly hampered by the constitutional text, which did
not provide for any kind of interregional cooperation, neither of procedural nature
(through the signing of agreements), nor of organic nature (by the establishment of
common intergovernmental arrangements), making the constitutional legitimacy
of such practices uncertain (Ferraro 2007, pp. 707).
As to the membership of the Conference, the document designed a typical
"executive federalism" arrangement, specifying that this horizontal IGA was to be
composed by the Presidents of Ordinary and Special Regions29 and of Autonomous
Provinces. It was also decided that the Conference, which was defined as "stand-
ing", would normally meet every three months; its presidency would rotate among
Regional Presidents.
Over the years, many diﬀerent State laws have attributed to this IGA a number
of relevant functions and tasks (for instance, the appointment of regional represen-
tatives within the Permanent Representation of Italy to the EU); nevertheless, the
Conference has never been established by law, formally still being no more than
a private law association. This has not impeded the Conference of the Regions
to become a «crucial arena» (Ruggiu 2006) in State-Regions relationships, insofar
it is within it that the above-evoked unanimity of the "regional front" is pursued
(and often reached), through an intense negotiating and technical activity. As
stressed by Bin (2002), the seeming regional unanimity resulting from the minutes
of the State-Regions Conference often hides conflicts among the Regions, which
have been previously settled within the Conference of the Regions: it is there, in-
deed, that Regional «Presidents clash, debate and bargain, producing, so to speak,
"pre-decisions" which generally allow them to appear unanimous in the discussion
with the Government» (Ruggiu 2003, p. 208, translated).
29The distinction between these two kinds of regional government will be explained in Chapter
4, § 4.3.2.
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2.3.2 Organization and functioning of the Conference of
the Regions
Since 1984, the headquarters of Conference are in Rome, at the CINSEDO - Centro
interregionale di studi e documentazione (Interregional Center for Studies and
Documentation), an associative structure, created by the Regions themselves in
1981, provided with tasks of information and study, as well as of logistical and
operational support to the Conference. While at the beginning this structure
actually carried out analysis, research and documentation activities, as a tool of
support to interregional cooperation, since the early Nineties the activities related
to the strictly Secretariat functions have became largely predominant, due to the
increasing frequency of regional Presidents’ meetings (see Figure 2.8).
In order to ensure a stronger functionality of its own working, till then regu-
lated exclusively by established procedures, in June 2005 the Conference adopted
some internal rules of procedure (a Regolamento). As reported by diﬀerent actors,
these latter have not introduced significant novelties, if compared with practices
established over the years in the actual functioning of the Conference (in many
cases, they have basically increased the degree of precision of rules followed, up to
that moment, in a more informal way). According to the rules formalized in 2005,
the current internal articulations of the Conference of the Regions are the follow-
ing: the Assembly, whose members are the twenty Regional Presidents, plus the
Presidents of the two Autonomous Provinces; the President; the Vice-President;
the President’s Oﬃce; eleven policy Commissions.
The President – the so called "President of the Presidents" – is appointed by
the Assembly of the Conference among its members, as the oﬃcial spokesperson,
at the State-Regions Conference and in all other institutional settings (such as
the national Parliament or the EU), of the positions adopted by the Assembly.
Without doubt, her public visibility has grown considerably due to the direct
election of regional Presidents (2000). According to the Regolamento, in the first
two ballots the President must be unanimously elected; from the third ballot on,
an absolute majority is suﬃcient (but the vote, in this case, is kept secret). As
a matter of fact, such an event has never occurred: all the Presidents of the
Conference have always been elected unanimously.
The President, in charge for five years, is supported by a Vice-President, who –
similarly to what occurs, for instance, in the National Governors Association in the
U.S.30 – is generally expression of the opposing political side (a relative majority is
suﬃcient for her election), and of a diﬀerent geographical area (Center-North vs.
Center-South). The President’s Oﬃce – integrated by three additional Presidents,
30See again Appendix A. Interestingly, as reported in the Conference of the Presidents’ website
and confirmed by the Director General of this horizontal IGA, the NGA was actually taken as
an institutional template when the Conference was created [IT6].
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who are selected following the same geo-political criteria – assists the head of the
Conference in preparing the preliminary inquiry of the issues to be debated within
the Assembly. The five years long mandate of the President and of the Vice-
President has represented a major innovation, if compared to previous established
practices. Indeed, up to 1993, the Presidency of the Conference had been rotating
among Regional Presidents in a quite irregular way, with the length of the mandate
ranging from one to fourteen months; from 1993 to the end of 1997, the Presidency
had acquired more stability, lasting regularly six months (following the template
of the EU Presidency). However, as explained by the Director General of the
Conference, this was «a not productive situation, because a President took the
chair, and when he realized what needed to be done, she had to go away, because
the six months were over» [IT6]. In the period between 1998 and 2000 it was
agreed to elect just one President. De facto, the first five years long Presidency
was inaugurated after the 2000 regional elections (the first direct elections of the
Regional Presidents): the new President of the Conference received indeed, by
tacit agreement, two consecutive mandates (2000-mid 2002; mid-2002-2005). The
new Rules of functioning passed in 2005 simply ratified such a practice.
The meetings of the Conference of the Regions are called by its President, ac-
cording to a six-monthly calendar previously agreed upon by its members, and
anyway each time the State-Regions Conference convenes: usually, regional Pres-
idents meet the day before or the same day; extraordinary meetings of the Con-
ference of the Regions may also be organized at the instance of three Regional
Presidents. The agenda is set by the President, but every President is accorded
the right to propose to add some items on the agenda itself. In part, the agenda
setting is not problematic, insofar it includes almost "automatically" all the items
in the orders of business of the next State-Regions and Unified Conferences.
The functioning of the Conference is organized according to a quite complex
internal structure31.
The eleven policy Commissions, mentioned above, are of political nature, and
are made up of all the regional Councilors in charge of related subject-matters.
One of these Councilors is appointed by the Assembly as the Coordinator of the
Commission (he or she is the so called capofila regionale, that is the Regions’
leader), while another one – generally, as for the President and the Vice-President,
of diﬀerent partisan aﬃliation – is designated as Vice-Coordinator for the same
matter. It is the Assembly of the Presidents which, once an item has entered
31From an organizational point of view, the Conference has undergone several transformations
over the years. While during the 1980s there were not formalized and stable forms of policy
coordination, it is since the early 1990 that the Conference started to organize its work by
splitting into policy areas. Each "Area" was then divided into units dealing with more specific
matters. One Region was selected as overall coordinator of each Area, while other Regions were
responsible of the corresponding matters (1992-1997).
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the Conference agenda (either on the initiative of the Regions themselves or as
a consequence of its inclusion on the agenda of the State-Regions Conference32),
allocates it to the policy-related Commission.
The works of these Commissions – which follow highly stabilized procedures,
also thanks to the ongoing technical support provided by the oﬃcials and managers
from the Region in charge of coordinating each Commission – are particularly
important, since they systematically "intersect" the works undertaken by the State-
Regions Conference Secretariat (Carpani 2006, p. 144). When looking at health
policy, two Commissions emerge as particularly relevant: the one devoted to Health
(Commission no. VII) and the one dealing with Financial Aﬀairs (Commission no.
II). Due to the strictly intertwined nature of these issues, these two Commissions
can also meet in a joint format. As a general rule, according to the Conference
regulations, the Commissions must convene at least once a month, and must be
called with a minimum advance notice time of six days.
Even if not provided for by the Regolamento, for each Commission there is,
at a lower level, an "Interregional Technical Committee" (Coordinamento Tecnico
Interregionale), composed of all the highest regional administrative managers re-
sponsible for the policy area at stake (generally, the regional Directors General in
charge of it). The coordination of such Committees is a task attributed to the
same Region in charge of the corresponding political Commission. Such Commit-
tees are called by the Commission after that this latter has been entrusted by
the Assembly of the Regional Presidents with a specific item to be prepared. It
is interesting to notice that the secretariat functions (such as keeping the min-
utes of these technical meetings) fall on the Region in charge of the Commission
and the Committee, and not on the Secretariat of the Conference of the Regions.
One former regional Director General of Health interviewed for this research de-
fined the activity carried on by the technical Committees as an «an underground
part, always getting very little visibility, but which is very influential» [IT1]. Such
Committees were formally established, although in slightly diﬀerent forms, in the
early Nineties (Toniolo 2009). This may be seen as a form of high administration
coordination, ensuring a link between the strictly political level (Presidents and
Councilors) and the strictly technical one: as clearly put by one former coordinator
of the Interregional Technical Health Committee,
It is not that Directors General are technicians, and just technicians. They
also ensure the translation of the political constraints of their Regions, which
they know very well. So, they know where one can get, how far one can get,
and how far one cannot get. [IT9]
These Committees may, in turn, rely on the technical work carried on by the
32Which, in turn, as it was illustrated, tends to be jointly defined with the Conference of the
Regions.
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so called "Technical Groups", which operate at an even lower, purely technical-
administrative level. These Groups – which may be established on ad hoc or
permanent bases – are composed of regional oﬃcials and managers with a spe-
cific expertise in the field at issue. As for the Committees and the Commissions,
there is one regional coordinator (generally, a Director General) for each Technical
Group, but she is not necessarily issued from the same Region in charge of the
corresponding Commission and Committee. This feature allows Technical Groups
to develop their activity on an ongoing basis, their composition not changing ac-
cording to the geo-political criteria sketched above. Generally, oﬃcials who take
part to these works are selected from all the Regions when the issue at stake is of
general relevance, while when matters to be debated are of a more limited scope,
just a subgroup of Regions is chosen, because of a particular knowledge of those
Regions in the field. In the framework of Commission no. II (Health) several
Technical Groups are at work in a stable way: the most relevant ones deal with
patients’ interregional mobility; pharmaceutical issues; financial issues; emergency
care; psychiatry; safety in working environments, prevention. Because of the com-
plexity of the subject-matter, each Technical Group may, in turn, be articulated
into further subgroups. The Technical Group devoted to Prevention, for instance,
is then organized in subunits, respectively in charge of: vaccines; food hygiene; vet-
erinary medicine; health education, and so on. The overall coordination of all these
Technical Groups (and their articulations) must be ensured by the Coordinator of
the corresponding Committee.
Once completed, the preliminary work conducted by these Technical Groups
is reported to their respective Committees. If the Committee agrees, the issue is
then reported to the subject-related policy Commission, that is to the regional
Councilors. Such a report is generally made by the regional Director General who
has been in charge of preparing the document to be discussed. If the technical
work is not approved by the Councilors because of contrasts among the Regions,
technicians are generally given some more time in order to revise the document
and put forward a new, hopefully shared proposal. When the agreement is found
among Councilors, the issue comes eventually back to the Regional Presidents,
which are always given the last word on everything. The conclusions reached by
the Commissions are indeed to be approved (and, where necessary, to be discussed)
by the Assembly in its plenary format: once passed by the Assembly, these conclu-
sions become the oﬃcial position of the Regions (to be then spent, for instance, in
the State-Regions Conference). As explained by the Director General of this Con-
ference, the intensive work previously done by Councilors and technicians makes it
possible to accelerate "tremendously" the final decision-taking by the Presidents.
Extensive debate during plenary meetings occurs indeed just in few cases.
As to the Secretariat Oﬃce of the Conference, it is articulated into seven policy-
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related Oﬃces. It is managed by a Secretary-General and her staﬀ, composed by
27 managers and oﬃcials. In comparative terms, this is a quite remarkable equip-
ment: the Swiss horizontal IGA (the Conference of Cantonal Governments), often
quoted in the literature as one of the most institutionalized interregional IGAs
(Bolleyer 2006; 2009; Bolleyer and Bytzek 2009), has an almost identical staﬀ (in
quantitative terms; cf. Appendix A). These managers and oﬃcials support the
preliminary works of the Conference and all the coordination activities. Several
organizational tools have been developed over the years by the Secretariat Oﬃce
of the Conference, in order to make as easiest as possible the full participation
by the highest number of Regions to every Conference activity. To this end, an
on-line information system has been build up (the so called Conferenza virtuale,
"Virtual Conference"), which allows Presidents and a number of selected oﬃcials
from each Region to access, whenever they want, the Conference agenda. In this
way, they can follow the update of each item on the agenda itself (participants,
development, results of the technical preliminary activity, and the like), to down-
load the documentary material employed by the technical groups in charge of the
issues, and so on33. In order to reduce costs and favor the largest involvement
of the Regions in the complex decision-making chain described above, since 2005
Commissions, Committees and Technical Groups (but not the Assembly) can also
meet by conference call (an option in fact frequently used).
More generally, the main goal of the Secretariat is to grant the overall "regu-
larity" of the procedures followed during all this complex decision-making process.
As significantly put by the Director General of the Conference,
we only have the task of ensuring the Presidents for the regularity of all the
procedures. Our task is a bit as the one of the oﬃcials of the House, of the
oﬃcials of the Senate, isn’t it? They do not enter into the merits. [IT6]
This does not mean that the managers of the Conference Secretariat policy-
related Oﬃces, who take part in all the meetings, do not know the subject-matters
in depth and, if asked, abstain from giving advices and even driving the debate
when a solution is to be found. However, the Secretariat "core business" is, first of
all, to ensure the full regularity of decision-making procedures.
Decision-making rules
As to the rules of decision-making, the Regolamento sets the structural quorum
at one third of the Presidents (that is, eight); the functional quorum requires,
instead, unanimity, when agreements (accordi) and understandings (intese) with
33For an example of the supervision of the entire decision-making process ensured by the
Secretariat Oﬃce of the Conference, see Appendix C, Figure C.1.
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Figure 2.7: Conference of the Regions: organizational structure.
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the central Government are to be debated; consensus is required also when the
President and the Vice-President have to be elected (but, as seen, just in the first
two ballots)34. Unanimity is also required in case of amendment to the internal
regulations of the Conference, as well as in case of oﬃcial stances of the Conference
on general (political) issues (not under direct regional responsibility).
The possibility of majority vote is however left open when advices to be given
on a State measure (pareri) are debated: the internal regulations of the Conference
state indeed that, in case of advices to be given towards "constitutional bodies",
this horizontal IGA can take a "diversified" stance. In other words, some Regions
can give a positive advice, while others a negative one. Eventually, decisions by
majority can be taken in case of internal resolutions, particularly when designations
of regional representatives into State bodies are the point at issue. Anyway, actors
interviewed for this analysis tend to regard majority voting, even when possible, as
a quite remote hypothesis. This appears supported by empirical evidence. Looking
at the advices given by the Regions on State acts in the State-Regions Conference
in the period 2003-2012, it is indeed easy to remark that the great majority of these
advices – either positive or negative – was issued in unanimous way: over a total
of 1005 advices given by the Conference of the Regions, just 20 were "diversified"
(that is, about 2%).
As a proof of the existence of internal rules for managing contrasts, interest-
ingly, when appointments of regional representatives are at stake, the Regions, in
case of disagreement, tend to resort to what could be defined as an established
"conflict resolution" procedure. An internal, confidential document sets indeed the
number of representatives to which each Region is entitled. Such a number – de-
fined as "theoretical representation" – is proportional to the demographic weight
of each Region (plus two representatives for each one). Next, the (constantly up-
dated) number of representatives actually belonging to each Region is reported
(this is the so called "actual representation"). Disagreements on the appointments
among the Regions may thus be settled by making reference to the diﬀerence (pos-
itive or negative) between these two numbers (such a diﬀerence is called "degree of
representation satisfaction"). These rules can obviously be disregarded whenever
regional Presidents find an alternative, shared solution35.
34In this case, nineteen Presidents must attend the Conference.
35This procedure is followed in case of appointments of regional representatives in State organs
classed by the Conference itself as of "higher relevance". For appointments of regional represen-
tatives in State organs as of "minor relevance" (basically because of the more limited powers
attributed to them by law), the procedure consists in that the names of the persons to be ap-
pointed are selected by the Director General of the Conference of the Regions: if no regional
President questions his proposal within a given time limit, this proposal is approved by tacit
agreement.
108
Figure 2.8: Conference of the Regions: number of meetings, compared with
those of the State-Regions Conference (1998-2012). Source: own elaboration from
www.regioni.it and www.statoregioni.it.
Activity
As to the actual activity carried on by the Conference of the Regions, it is interest-
ing to note, from a general point of view, a relatively high frequency of its plenary
meetings36. As shown in Figure 2.8, in the time period considered (1998-2012)37
the number of meetings celebrated each year by the Conference has been lower
than thirty only on two occasions, 2000 and 2005 (significantly, years in which
regional elections took place). Moreover, in the whole period under analysis, the
average number of plenary sessions per year has been equal to almost thirty-four,
clearly higher than the number of State-Regions meetings (equal to almost twenty).
Notice also that that while the number of State-Regions Conference meetings, as
observed above, has tended to decrease, the number of sessions of the Conference
of the Regions, on the contrary, has been increasing over time (see Figure 2.8).
As regards the groups and subgroups described above, the frequency of their
meetings varies according to the subject-matter. Oﬃcial data on this point do
36Particularly if compared to its equivalents in many other countries: see again the overview
oﬀered in Appendix A.
37On the oﬃcial website of the Conference of the Regions – www.regioni.it – information on
meetings is available from 1998 onwards.
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not exist. However, actors interviewed reported a quite high frequent activity of
the Health Interregional Technical Committee, which would meet, on average, a
couple of times per month; Subject-related Technical Groups would be called even
more frequently (once a week, on average).
Health Policy Because of the generalist nature of the Conference of the Regions,
the same question arises as for the State-Regions Conference, namely which is the
actual weight of health policy over the whole set of questions addressed by this
intergovernmental arrangement. To answer this question, available data make
possible to compute, as previously done for the vertical arrangement, the share
of meetings whose orders of business included health policy among the issues to
be debated. As shown in Table 2.3, in the period of reference (2001-2012), on
average about 77% of the meetings have addressed at least one issue related to
health policy, while little more than 8% have been exclusively dedicated to the
analysis of health matters. Compared with the results about the meetings of the
vertical IGA exposed above, one can notice, on the one hand, a lower percentage
of meetings at least partially devoted to health care: this can be easily explained
by considering that the horizontal Conference addresses all the issues to be then
treated both in the State-Regions and in the Unified Conferences; on the other
hand, one can note a higher share of encounters dealing exclusively with health
care policy: this can be seen as a good indicator of the centrality of this policy
field for regional actors within their Conference.
Table 2.3: Conference of the Regions: meetings with health policy items on the
agenda (2001-2012).
Year Meetings at least partially
devoted to healthcare issues
Meetings entirely devoted to
healthcare issues
2001 78.80% 6.06%
2002 75.57% 6.06%
2003 78.79% 3.13%
2004 82.76% 3.45%
2005 79.17% 4.17%
2006 90.32% 16.13%
2007 64.86% 0.00%
2008 54.54% 3.03%
2009 76.19% 27.50%
2010 80.64% 3.13%
2011 75.00% 10.00%
2012 89.19% 16.22%
Mean 77.15% 8.24%
Source: own elaboration from documents available at: www.regioni.it.
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2.4 The interactions between the vertical and
the horizontal dimensions
As it has been shown in the previous sections, the Italian system of Intergov-
ernmental Relations may defined as characterized by an high level of interdepen-
dence of the vertical and the horizontal dimensions of IGAs. To sum up, such
a complex and dense network of interaction is represented, in a simplified way,
in Figure 2.9, combining territorial and decision-making levels. The territorial
scale has been divided into three parts: the exclusively central level, the exclu-
sively regional level, and the one in which these two levels do actively interact; the
decision-making level has been in turn schematically divided into several spaces:
the political level may be conceived as the highest one (which may then be broken
up into generalist and policy-specific levels); hierarchically subordinated, there is
the technical/administrative level.
As seen, the initiative to debate an IGR issue may come either from the State
or from the Regions. As a matter of fact, the initiative is taken most of the time
by the State, because of the high number of cases in which the activation of the
State-Regions Conference is made compulsory by law, as previously explained.
Generally, the intention to debate a certain issue is informally announced by the
central Government well in advance of the introduction of that item on the oﬃcial
State-Regions Conference agenda.
Once all the political actors have been informed on this intention, two prelim-
inary decision-making processes are concurrently activated. From the side of the
(exclusively) State level, such a process involves, from a political point of view, the
competent Minister or Ministers, which then rely on the technical-administrative
structures of their departments (Directors General, managers, etc.). From the side
of the (exclusively) regional level, the Assembly of the Presidents of the Regions
discusses the point at issue, and each President has the possibility to stress his
own Region’s priorities. The case is then assigned to the competent Policy Com-
missions, which, as seen, are supported, in turn, by several technical bodies (In-
terregional Technical Committees, Subject-related Technical Groups, etc.). When
the technical work carried out by these second (third, and fourth) level bodies is
politically agreed by the corresponding political Commission, the Regions have «a
basic document, suﬃciently shared at the level of the Regions» (as an interviewed
put it; [IT3]) from which they can start a second round of technical negotiation,
this time with the the State, that is with ministerial representatives.
Such a bargaining phase takes place in the so called "State-Regions Mixed Tech-
nical Boards", organized by the Secretariat Services of the State-Regions Confer-
ence. It is there that – as seen above – this vertical IGA Secretariat plays what
was defined an "active coordination" function. Discussions occurring in these meet-
111
Figure 2.9: Vertical and horizontal dimensions of Italian IGAs: a simplified
representation of the interaction network.
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ings concern very specific points of the measures under consideration. Obviously,
any change in the measure in question has the potential to alter the balance ini-
tially found on both sides. This is why such processes are generally described
by IGR actors as extremely complex, laborious, demanding, and time consuming.
State and regional technicians must indeed always check the political feasibility
of any eﬀect of their bargaining activity on the measures under examination. As
a general rule, and as confirmed by all actors interviewed for this analysis, just
when both sides agree, the item is oﬃcially included in the order of business of
the State-Regions Conference: «no topic is discussed by the Conference, without
having been previously "digested" by an extremely detailed, meticulous technical
preparation» [IT8]38.
As a consequence, most of the time, measures at issue are simply "validated"
during the plenary session of the State-Regions Conference. This explains why, as
put by one former Regional Health Director General, «in fact, in the State-Regions
Conference there is no discussion, no debate ever»[IT3], and according to another
one, «the Conference is not a . . . very useful forum for an in-depth analysis [of the
measures to be discussed], for a discussion on the merits. It is a formal situation in
which measures are ratified, and one says: "Yes, we agree", "Yes, we agree", or "No,
we do not agree".» [IT9]. It is in this latter case that the Conference may become a
full-blown arena of actual political debate between the Regional Presidents, on the
one hand, and the representatives of the central Government, on the other hand:
in such circumstances, the final decision on the disputed issue may be delayed or,
when time limits have expired, may be unilaterally taken by the central executive.
To be thorough, it is important to notice that – according to what reported
by several actors interviewed – since the second half of the 2000s the interactions
between the State and the Regions, even if not taking place outside of the network
just described, would have been more and more unbalancing towards the regional
side.
As summed up in a revealing way by one of the actors interviewed for this
analysis, from the regional point of view
the State-Regions and the Unified Conferences matter very little: they mat-
ter very little in the sense that there, there is not a debate, but it is merely
taken note of the stance that the Regions have previously assumed in an-
other location [this is, in the Conference of the Regions].
[. . . ]
38Such a practice was oﬃcially reported in the above mentioned 2005 Circular Letter of the
Health Ministry as the standard procedure to be followed: it was indeed stated that items are
added on the Conference agenda only when the technical preparatory work has been positively
concluded.
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The Conference of the Regions is taken in regard as much as, if not more,
than the State-Regions Conference, because it is known that here is the
decision point, here the regional stance is formed. [IT6]
The State-Regions Mixed Technical Boards are sometimes pictured as some-
thing pretended more by the State-Regions Secretariat than by the representatives
of the regional front:
[The Conference of the Regions] is related to the State-Regions and to the
Unified Conferences as to the items on their agenda. But if it wants to have
a direct relationship with a Ministry, it does not turns to the State-Regions
Conference and says: "I would like to have a relationship with . . . ". The
State-Regions Conference tends, especially at the bureaucratic level, to say:
"It’s up to us to organize everything, let us do it. Why are you bypassing us?
Why are you going to talk, say, with the Ministry of Public Administration?
Meetings are to be done here". [. . . ] However, we do what we want. [IT6]
The State-Regions Secretariat would have thus come to play a less central part
in the final definition of the content of the measures at issue. In the wake of
the progressive strengthening of the interregional IGA (particularly, through its
complex internal structuring and increased activity; see again Figure 2.8), indeed,
two, interrelated processes would have occurred.
Direct relationships between the Health Minister and the regional Health Coun-
cilors would have been growing over the years. As reported by several actors, in-
formal meetings between the Minister and the regional Councilors (at least those
representing the "most active" Regions) have become a quite common and frequent
practice. Furthermore, contacts at the political level would be paralleled by an
intense work carried out at the technical level, outside the formal network of the
State-Regions Conference Secretariat. Either on input of the Minister or on their
own initiative, indeed, Directors General from the Health Ministry often set-up ad
hoc mixed State-Regions technical working groups in order to formulate in a shared
way the measures to be then passed by the Conference. This is partly due to the
high level of technicality of the matters to be addressed. Such practice was defined
as an "extremely useful shock-absorber" during the decision process [IT8]. Even
if the State-Regions Conference Secretariat is still accorded the last word in the
technical preparation of the Conference’s meetings, the scope of its intervention
may result as narrowed: documents prepared by these mixed technical working
groups can indeed be seen as technical material largely "pre-chewed".
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Chapter 3
Intergovernmental Arrangements
in Spain: Historical Evolution
and Current Setting
3.1 Introduction
The institutional morphology of the Spanish intergovernmental arrangements sys-
tem appears as quite distinct from the one described in Chapter 2 as characteristic
of the Italian case. As it will be highlighted, contrary to Italian IGR, Spanish in-
tergovernmental relations have tended indeed to develop mostly along the vertical
dimension, leaving horizontal cooperation almost devoid of any significant stable,
institutionalized arena: as clearly stressed by García Morales (2006), «collabora-
tive relations are formalized mostly – and sometimes almost exclusively – at the
vertical scale. This is a trend [. . . ] that has consolidated to the point that it rep-
resents a distinctive feature of the Spanish system, compared to most politically
decentralized countries of the European surroundings, where horizontal collabora-
tion – for us almost nonexistent – is not only very common, but is seen as natural»
(p. 11, translated, emphasis added). Moreover, in contrast with what happened
in Italy, the process of sectoralization of State-Regions multilateral relationships
was not significantly reduced over time, becoming on the contrary another defining
feature of the Spanish system as a whole. Finally, it must be stressed that in Spain,
since the beginning of the process of decentralization, IGR have been channeled
through both multilateral and bilateral intergovernmental arrangements, which
still coexist.
The existing literature clearly shows that the main locus of institutionalized,
multilateral intergovernmental relations is represented by the Conferencias Secto-
riales (Sectoral Conferences), a set of IGAs, composed of representatives of the
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Central Government and Autonomous Communities’ executives, each with a fo-
cus, as their name clearly implies, on a specific and delimited sector of public
policy. These Conferences are the basic, most used tool of institutionalized co-
operation and coordination between the Central State Administration and the
Autonomous Communities. As to bilateral relations, the major instrument of co-
operation between any single regional government and the center is constituted by
the Comisiones Bilaterales de Cooperación (Bilateral Cooperation Commissions).
The remainder of this Chapter is organized, with necessary adaptations, as
the previous one. In the second main Section, after having located the Spanish
intergovernmental system within its more general constitutional framework, I will
follow the historical evolution of vertical IGAs, since the transition of the country
to democracy and the beginning of the decentralization process. The genetic path
of policy-specific vertical arrangements will be thus reconstructed. A specific focus
will be given to the organizational features and the actual functioning of the two
Sectoral Conferences dealing – directly or indirectly – with health care policy
in Spain: the Interterritorial Council of the National Health System (Consejo
Interterritorial del Sistema Nacional de Salud) and the the Fiscal and Financial
Policy Council (Consejo de Política Fiscal y Financiera). The description of the
vertical dimension of IGAs will be then concluded by taking into consideration
the role played by the recently established Conference of the Presidents (2004),
a vertical but generalist arrangement, as well as by the Bilateral Cooperation
Commissions. The third Section will conclude this Chapter by highlighting the
weakness of the horizontal arrangement of intergovernmental cooperation currently
present in the Spanish intergovernmental system.
3.2 The vertical dimension of IGRs and IGAs
3.2.1 The constitutional framework
Similarly to what was observed for the Italian case, it must be remarked that
intergovernmental cooperation in Spain lacked any clear and explicit bases in the
Constitution (1978).
As stressed by Colomer (1998), in the Spanish Constitution «there are few
institutions that promote cooperation between the central government and the
regional governments in Spain, a part from the arbitration role played by the
Constitutional Court» (p. 49). The Tribunal Constitucional, provided for by the
Spanish Constitution (Title IX), was legislatively established in 1979 by Organic
Law no. 2. It was given power over the conflicts of competence between the State
and the Autonomous Communities and among these latter (section no. 161): to
this end, four of its twelve members were to be appointed by the Senate among
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those proposed by the legislative assemblies of the Autonomous Communities.
Overall, however, not diﬀerently from what happened in Italy, the "means of voice"
accorded by the Charter to the Regions in the central decision-making proved to
be particularly weak (Börzel 2000, p. 24).
Note that the lack of any constitutional provision about vertical cooperation
may appear as even more remarkable as long as the model of competence allocation
envisioned by the Constitution itself seemed naturally leading to the necessity of
establishing some forms of cooperation among territorial institutions, the compe-
tences being mostly allocated according to a sharing regime (Ruiz González 2012,
pp. 288-89; Ruiz González 2013, p. 1).
3.2.2 Emergence and evolution of executive federalism: the
Sectoral Conferences
The major tool for the management of multilateral vertical intergovernmental rela-
tions in Spain is represented by the so called Sectoral Conferences. In the absence
of any unambiguous reference in the 1978 Spanish Constitution to whatever prin-
ciple of territorial cooperation and, even more so, to any specific IGA to ensure
it in the government practice, the constitutional jurisprudence and the legal doc-
trine contributed, very early, to stress the urgency of establishing such a principle,
and to outline some templates of institutional territorial collaboration, paving the
way to the concrete regulatory design of current vertical IGAs (Ceccherini 1999,
pp. 907-908). The constitutional coherence of the introduction of such kind of
institutional tools with the simultaneous implementation of the so called "State
of the Autonomies" project was generally justified appealing to (a quite extensive
interpretation of) Sections no. 103.1 and no. 149.1.18 of the Spanish Constitution.
The first one made a reference to the fact that the Spanish Public Administra-
tion – in the "objective pursuit of the general interest" – must behave according to
the general principles of eﬃcacy, hierarchical order, decentralization, deconcentra-
tion and coordination. The second Constitutional section of reference was the one
listing the competences exclusively attributed to the central State: among these
powers, there was the responsibility over the "basic rules of the legal system of Pub-
lic Administrations". It has been observed that section 149.1.18 was the object of
a particularly liberal interpretation by the Spanish Constitutional Court, which
de facto stretched its meaning in order to give constitutional legitimacy not only
to inter-administrative but also to political relationships between governments, as
those actually carried out in the Sectoral Conferences (García Morales 2009, p.
47).
In fact, the actual development of the extant tools for the management of
State-Regions relations was implemented well beyond any explicit constitutional
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provision and, as in many other national cases (Italy included), not on the parlia-
mentary front. Indeed, despite the formal role attributed by the Charter to the
upper house1, and consistently with many other comparative experiences, Spain,
since the start-up of the State of the Autonomies, took the route of "executive
federalism", as a pragmatic way to give answers to emerging policy needs, due to
increasing overlaps between governments in the eﬀective exercise of constitutional
powers (García Morales 2009, p. 46).
The necessity of some institutional tool for managing the relationships between
the State and the subnational units, already evident to many observers and policy-
makers, led, just two years after the approval of the Constitution (1978), to the
establishment of the first Sectoral Conference, the Consejo de Política Fiscal y Fi-
nanciera (Fiscal and Financial Policy Council). Informal meetings between central
State Minister and Autonomous Communities Councilors had already took place.
This arrangement, whose first oﬃcial meeting was celebrated in 1981, was provided
for by Organic Law no. 8/1980 (Sect. no. 3) about Autonomous Communities’ fi-
nancing (Ley Orgánica de Financiación de las Comunidades Autónomas, LOFCA).
The establishment of this Council is worthy to be remembered because, a part from
its specific relevance for this analysis (see see below § 3.2.3, and Chapters 5 and
6), it represented nothing but the first attempt to regulate the issue of multilateral
IGR in Spain, through the specific adoption of a policy-specific template of multi-
level cooperation. As specified by that Law, the Conference was to be composed
of a number of central Ministers – the ones in charge of Treasury, Economy and
Territorial Administration – and by the Budget Councilors of each Autonomous
Community. The body was accorded both consultative and deliberative powers in
the field of its competence.
A couple of years later, in 1983, a new Sectoral Conference was established,
with the aim of coordinating State and regional actions, this time in the field
of agricultural policy (Conferencia Sectorial de Agricoltura y Desarollo Rural).
Diﬀerently from what happened in the first case, this new IGA was established in
a more spontaneous way, that is not by law.
In this same period, in parallel with the establishment of the first Conferences,
numerous rulings of the Tribunal Constitucional contributed to define the coop-
eration principle as fully consistent with the general territorial architecture of the
State laid out by the Charter. Particularly, in 1982, two rulings of the Court –
nos. 18 and 64 – stressed the legitimacy and even the suitability of the practice
of intergovernmental cooperation within a complex and compound State as Spain.
In the first ruling, the Court defined cooperation as «implicit in the essence itself
of the territorial organizational form of State introduced by the Constitution», as
1I will discuss the role of the second parliamentary chambers both in Spain and in Italy in
Chapter § 4.
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such not requiring to be specifically provided by any punctual constitutional pro-
vision. In ruling no. 64, the constitutional judges went one step further, adding
that an «opportune collaboration» between the Administration of the State and
that of Autonomous Communities would be "advisable", in order to get fair policy
solutions; they stated moreover that «this collaboration [. . . ] is necessary for the
good functioning of the State of Autonomies, included [in the matters located] on
the borders of constitutional and statutory distribution of respective competences»
(cit. in Corcuera Atienza 2002, p. 5, translated).
Despite the legal tenets specified by the Court, the next regulatory steps in the
attempt to regulate the institutionalized management of Spanish IGR followed a
more bumpy path, characterized by a persisting mood of conflict and mistrust
between the central State and the subnational units (called Autonomous Commu-
nities), which were gradually established2. Such a mood emerged particularly in
the period between 1981 and 1983, when the central State tried to "adjust" the
starting decentralization process triggered by the Constitution. In fact, as stressed
by Aja (1996), the reform of the territorial organization of the State proved to be,
without a doubt, one of the most intense and hard tasks to be pursued in the
starting phase of the new Spanish State.
Evolution of the Sectoral Conferences: legislative framework
In 1982, a project of Organic Law of Harmonization of the Autonomic Process (Ley
Orgánica de Armonización del Proceso Autonómico, better known by its acronym:
LOAPA) was passed by the Spanish Parliament, as an implementation of the so
called Autonomic Pacts (Pactos Autonómicos), a political agreement, signed by
the Socialist Party (the PSOE) and the Center Party (the UCD) in 1981. It had
been elaborated in the light of a Report produced by a Committee of experts on
autonomies led by the academician García de Enterría3.
The goal pursued through these Pacts was to "redirect" the starting Autonomic
process, without nevertheless directly emending Title VIII of the Constitution (the
one devoted to the "Territorial Organization of the State")4. In this way, the two
major nation-wide parties were basically trying «to contain the pressures for de-
centralization by mutual cooperation» (Colomer 1998, p. 47). The LOAPA project
envisioned indeed that the national Government could enact basic legislation in
2Because of the "open" nature of the Constitution, the Spanish regional units were not estab-
lished all at the same time: for a more detailed reconstruction of such a process, see § 4.3.2 and
Table 4.3.
3This working group had produced, in May 1981, a Report entitled Informe de la Comisión
de Expertos sobre Autonomías (Report of the Commission of Experts on Autonomies).
4A constitutional amendment would have indeed implied to follow an extremely complex and
long procedure, as designed by Sections nos. 166-168 of the Spanish Constitution.
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matters reserved for the Communities, and that, in case of contrast with autonomic
legislation, national norms would prevail.
For the purposes of this analysis, what is relevant to stress is that, among many
other things, the LOAPA contained the first eﬀort to design a common legal frame-
work of reference for regulating and giving legal support to the raising phenomenon
of multilateral intergovernmental cooperation and, particularly, of Sectoral Confer-
ences. In their Report, the experts on autonomies had indeed argued that, despite
the lack of any explicit constitutional reference about rules governing the relations
between the State and the Autonomic powers, it was evident that the State of the
Autonomies needed some "binder elements" – like cement or clay in architectural
works – in order to ensure its own cohesion and prevent its own collapse (cit. in
Tornos Mas 1994, pp. 71-72). In that Report, the experts also added that some
specific "technique" had to be introduced into the institutional system in order to
make eﬀective the abstract principles of cooperation and participation. Among
these techniques, the Report made explicit reference to the institutionalization
of "Conferences of Ministers and Councilors" in charge of diﬀerent policy fields:
as seen, the Consejo de Política Fiscal y Financiera as well as the Conferencia
sectorial de Agricoltura, already in place, could oﬀer a template in such direction.
The Constitutional Court, however, declared large part of the LOAPA as un-
constitutional. This obliged the national Parliament to transform the survived part
of that law into a new law, called Ley de Proceso Autonómico (Law on the Auto-
nomic Process), eventually approved in 1983. Along with later Law no. 30/1992,
this is to be considered, despite its many and evident weaknesses, as one of the
pillars of the legislative framework of reference regulating Sectoral Conferences.
As to these latter, the new law did not envision anything but the same section
originally contained in the LOAPA, since the Tribunal Constitucional – explicitly
asked on this point by the claimants – acknowledged in ruling no. 76/1983 the full
constitutionality of this kind of intergovernmental tools, as designed by that law.
The Court stated indeed that, in order not to impinge on the prerogatives of the
Autonomous Communities, the Conferences were to be conceived of as «bodies of
meeting with the goal of examining common problems and debating the appropri-
ate lines of action [to be taken]». In this light, according to the Tribunal, Section
no. 8 of the LOAPA (regulating Sectoral Conferences) could not be considered
as incompatible with the division of powers set by the Spanish Constitution: in
fact, it confined the scope of Conferences’ activities to nothing more than the mere
"exchange of points of view and common analysis of the problems of each sector,
as well as of the planned actions to address and solve them". It is important to
remark that, in this way, the Court – while clearly confirming the constitutional
legitimacy of the Conferences – also introduced specific constraints to the design
of the Conferences themselves, by neatly circumscribing the scope of their legiti-
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mate activity. The ruling of the Constitutional Court stressed, indeed, that these
new intergovernmental arrangements «could not replace the bodies of Autonomous
Communities, nor could their decisions nullify the decision-making powers of these
latter».
All this contributes to explain the «limited meaning of the collaborative for-
mulas» provided for by Law no. 12/1983 as well as by following legislative inter-
ventions (Corcuera Atienza 2002, p. 7). As remarked by Montilla Martos, the
current regulation of Sectoral Conferences developed, partially, in the shadow of
the conflict on the LOAPA project, and of ruling no. 76/1983: a sort of "LOAPA
syndrome" (2006, p. 99) – making the Communities highly suspicious vis-à-vis any
central Government intervention in IGR – would have aﬀected the next evolution
of the regulatory framework of the Conferences.
As a result of all this complex and troubled process, section no. 4 of Law no.
12/1983 (Sects. nos. 1 and 2) simply stated that «in order to ensure at all times
the necessary coherence and the indispensable coordination in the action of pub-
lic powers, Sectoral Conferences, composed of the Councilors of the Autonomous
Communities and the sector-related Minister or Ministers, will meet, under the
presidency of one of these latter, in a regular and periodic way, at least twice a
year, with the goal of exchanging points of view and examining together prob-
lems of each sector, as well as the planned actions to address and solve them».
As specified by Section no. 2, the call of meetings would be made by the sector-
related Minister, both in case of ordinary meetings and in case of extraordinary
ones, celebrated to deal with issues that could not be delayed. In this latter case,
the call could be formulated at the request of each of the members of the Confer-
ence. In this respect, it should be noted that, in the above-mentioned ruling, the
Constitutional Court had argued that these functional and structural features of
the Conferences – particularly, those pertaining to their presidency and the power
to call them, questioned by the regional claimants – did not necessarily entail a
hierarchical superiority of the central State over the Communities.
As observed by García Morales (2009), this first design of vertical IGAs appears
evidently as characterized by an «extraordinary prudence» (p. 47), due to the
diﬃculty for the Central State to set up the necessary tools for the management of
IGR, without, at the same time, being suspected of unconstitutional interference
in the Autonomous Communities’ aﬀairs.
It is within this very vague and general regulatory framework that – in the
period between the second half of the Eighties and the early Nineties – a num-
ber of new Sectoral Conferences (more than ten) grew up, leading to a full blown
process of proliferation of vertical IGAs, doomed to continue until today. As it
is clear from the information contained in Table 3.1, the progressive layering over
time of diﬀerent sectoral IGAs was the result of a largely non coordinated process,
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rather characterized by the introduction of quite distinct organizational templates
(e.g. as to the membership) as well as by the use of diﬀerent normative tools.
While some of these Conferences were created by a State law (either organic or
ordinary) some others born more spontaneously, without any specific legal basis,
aside from those provided by Law no. 12/1983; similarly, if some of these bodies
provided themselves quite early with internal regulations, defining their basic rules
of working and organization, some others never passed them or waited for a long
time before adopting them. As pointed out by Corcuera Atienza (2002, p. 8), the
genetic process of the Conferences in this period was ultimately characterized, at
the same time, by partiality (as to the policy sectors covered) and fragmentation
(as to the organizational template adopted). Sectoral Conferences were thus grad-
ually established in the fields of tourism policy (1984), fight against drugs (1985),
education policy, consumer policy (1987), housing, transports, environment, Eu-
ropean aﬀairs (1988), social aﬀairs (1990), and cultural policy (1992). The set up
of the new National Health System in 1986 led to the creation of the Interterrito-
rial Council of the National Health System, the Sectoral Conference in charge of
addressing intergovernmental issues related to health care policy.
In face of these developments, during the Eighties, some reform proposals were
advanced, particularly from the academic community, with the aim of reducing
the growing fragmentation of the IGAs system.
Among others, a new Report on Autonomies (Informe sobre las Autonomías),
edited in 1988 by Professor Joaquín Tornos Mas and other scholars, called the at-
tention towards the necessity of reorganizing the extant mechanisms of territorial
collaboration (Tornos Mas 1988). In their view, the goal should have been to sub-
stitute a model of IGR which had started to be managed through bilateral contacts
(see § 3.2.5) with one, more transparent, grounded on stable contacts between the
State and the regional level as a whole. In spite of the proliferation of Conferences,
indeed, multilateral cooperation remained, in the practice, particularly weak: as
observed by García Morales (2006), the Ley del Proceso Autonómico and, before of
it, the failed LOAPA Project had «led to reluctance, low confidence in cooperative
techniques, and even to a certain perception of [multilateral] vertical collaboration
as a way of maintaining shares of State influence in regional spheres, rather than to
see its true potential as a means of participation for the AACC to general decisions
[to be defined] with the State» (p. 12, translated).
Many of these reform proposals and suggestions were later included in Law no.
30/1992 of November 26th over the Legal Regime of the Public Administrations
and the Common Administrative Procedure (Ley de Régimen Jurídico de las Ad-
ministraciones Públicas y del Procedimiento Administrativo Común, also known
by its acronym: LRJ-PAC). The approval of this law marked the beginning of a
new phase in Spanish regionalism and intergovernmental relations (Aja 1996, p.
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Table 3.1: Sectoral Conferences established between 1980 and 1992.
Conference Law of Estab-
lishment
Date of Estab-
lishment (or
First Meeting)
Date of Ap-
proval of Inter-
nal Regulations
Members
Consejo de Política
Fiscal y Financiera
de las Comunidades
Autónomas
L.O. 8/1980 01/07/1981 20/08/1981 (last
amendment:
17/01/2012)
National Minister of Treasury and
Public Administration and Budget
Councilors of each A.C.
Conferencia Secto-
rial de Agricultura y
Desarrollo Rural
28/07/1983 13/12/1995 (last
amendment:
12/11/2009)
National Minister of Agriculture
and Councilors of Agriculture of
each A.C.
Conferencia Sectorial
de Turismo
06/07/1984 19/12/1995 (last
amendment:
21/10/2004)
National Ministry of Tourism; Sec-
retary of State of Tourism and
Councilors of each A.C. (or the
maximum administrative oﬃcial in
the field).
Conferencia Sectorial
del Plan Nacional
sobre Drogas
11/04/1985 09/03/1998 National Ministers of Health, Jus-
tice, Education and Culture, Em-
ployment and Social Aﬀairs, Home
Secretary; Secretaries of State of
Treasury, Economics, Relationships
with the Parliament; a representa-
tive of the Government for the Na-
tional Drugs Plan; AA.CC. Coun-
cilors in charge of the subject mat-
ter.
Conferencia Sectorial
de Educación
L.O. 8/1985 25/11/1986 22/07/1999 National Minister of Education and
Councilors of Education of each
A.C.
Conferencia Sectorial
de Consumo
12/01/1987 10/11/1997 (last
amendment:
02/03/2011)
National Minister of Health and
Consumers; four representatives of
the Ministry of Health and Con-
sumers; one representative of the
following Ministries: Agriculture,
Public Administration and Presi-
dency of the Government; AA.CC
Councilors in charge of the subject
matter.
Consejo Interterri-
torial del Sistema
Nacional de Salud
Ley 14/1986 and
Ley 16/2003
07/04/1987 20/12/1993 (last
amendment:
15/07/1996)
Health Councilors of each A.C. and
the same number of representatives
of the Administration of the State
(1986-2002) – National Minister of
Health and Health Councilors of
each A.C. (since 2003).
Conferencia Secto-
rial de Vivienda y
Urbanismo
19/10/1987 30/09/2008 (last
amendment:
22/07/2013)
National Minister of Infrastructures
and one Councilor for each A.C.
Conferencia Nacional
de Transportes
Ley 16/1987 14/06/1988 29/12/1988 National Minister of Transports and
AA.CC Councilors in charge of the
subject matter.
Conferencia Sectorial
de Medio Ambiente
29/11/1988 27/02/1995 (last
amendment:
29/07/2009)
The National Ministry of Environ-
ment; Secretario general técnico of
the Minister for Environment and
the Councilors of those AA.CC.
provided with competence in this
matter
Conferencia para
Asuntos Relacionados
con la Unión Europea
Ley 2/1997 22/12/1988 05/06/1997 (last
amendment:
15/04/2010)
The National Ministry of Public
Administration; Secretary of State
for Foreign Policy; Secretary of
State for the UE; Secretary of State
for Territorial Administrations; one
Councilor for each A.C.
Conferencia Sectorial
de Asuntos Sociales
20/03/1990 26/07/1990 (last
amendment:
23/06/1997)
National Ministry for Employment
and Social Aﬀairs and one Coun-
cilor for each A.C.
Conferencia Sectorial
de Cultura
16/11/1992 04/07/2005 (last
amendment:
14/07/2008)
National Ministry of Culture, Un-
dersecretary of Culture, the Secre-
tary of State of International Coop-
eration and one Councilor for each
A.C.
Source: own elaboration from MAP (2013).
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135).
As previously reminded, this law is generally considered as the second basic pil-
lar as to the definition of the regulatory framework of reference of institutionalized,
multilateral intergovernmental cooperation in Spain. It constituted the (partial)
legal transposition of the political content of the Second Autonomic Pacts (Segun-
dos Pactos Autonómicos), the new agreement achieved by the Government then
led by the socialist Felipe González, the Popular Party (PP) and the Socialist Party
(PSOE), on the management of the ongoing process of decentralization (February
28th, 1992)5. Besides defining the framework for the transferral of thirty-two new
competences from the State to the Autonomous Communities – with the signifi-
cant exception of health care – in order to reduce the extant asymmetry among
Autonomous Communities (see § 4.3.2), the new Autonomic Pacts intervened to
systematize the complex network of multilevel relationships.
These two processes – the progressive leveling of the Autonomous Communi-
ties’ powers and the empowerment of the multilateral tools of intergovernmental
cooperation – were seen as sharing a common logic, insofar the huge diﬀerences in
the powers enjoyed at that time by diﬀerent regional governments was considered
as one of the main factors hampering the eﬀective working of multilateral cooper-
ation. In fact, «[a]t the beginning of the 1990s, it had become obvious that, until
then, and despite the implementation of several Sectoral Conferences based on the
Law on the Autonomic Process, multilateral cooperation [. . . ] was quite limited»
(González Gómez 2008, p. 133, translated). This regulatory intervention tried
thus to give a boost to the development of multilateral cooperation by means of
the strengthening of the Sectoral Conferences.
Looking more closely at the content of the Second Autonomic Pacts, it must
be remarked, first of all, that Section no. 2 was significantly entitled El desarrollo
del principio de Cooperación, the improvement of the cooperation principle. This
latter was here defined as a "shaping" tenet of the relationships between the State
and the Autonomous Communities, a principle even «consubstantial with the good
functioning of the Autonomic State». Consequently, the necessity was acknowl-
edged to find an agreement between political parties on the general guidelines to
be followed to "make more dynamic" the eﬀective implementation of such a tenet.
As to the institutional mechanisms or "techniques" for managing intergovern-
mental relations, the 1992 Autonomic Pacts – while acknowledging a part to bilat-
eral relations (defined as "complementary" to multilateral IGR, and useful to solve
issues concerning a single Community) – pointed mainly to the development of the
Sectoral Conferences, meaningfully pictured as the «usual and ordinary means, in
5The text of the Pacts is available on the IDP - Instituto de Derecho Público web-
site: http://www.idpbarcelona.net/docs/recerca/ccaa/pdf/documentos/acuerd_auton_
gob_psoe_1992.pdf.
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terms of institutional relations, in order to combine the actions of diﬀerent Public
Administrations» (emphasis added). As a further proof of the little relevance of
the Conferences up to that time, it was stated that hey had to be reformed in order
to be made «eﬀective working bodies, endowed with their own life and content».
It was also argued that the set-up of these intergovernmental arrangements in the
policy fields still lacking intergovernmental tools would be suitable, as well as the
elaboration of internal regulations for the Conferences still devoid of them.
Consistently with this view, the Pacts pointed out the necessity to increase the
degree of institutionalization of these IGAs, acknowledging, at the same time, the
opportunity of leaving large margins of manoeuvre to the IGR actors involved.
On the one hand, they made reference to the fact the establishment of each Con-
ference as well as the definition of its internal rules of functioning had to be left
to the willingness of its members. On the other hand, some general criteria were
nevertheless listed in the Pacts. Firstly, Conferences could be accorded both con-
sultative and participatory powers (granting, in this way, the very participation
of the Autonomous Communities to State tasks and common policies); secondly,
all the Autonomous Communities should attend the meetings of the Conferences;
thirdly, Conferences working should be based on the consensus of the partners,
agreements being approved, as a rule, by unanimity (although, in a somewhat
contradictory way, the possibility was left open for the Conferences to identify
some specific cases in which agreements could instead be adopted by majority
vote).
In line with political (and organizational) principles contained in the Pacts,
Law no. 30/1992 specified the basic features of Sectoral Conferences, leaving more
specific details to be settled by each single IGA. Even if according to some observers
(e.g. Tornos Mas 1994), this regulatory intervention did not make significant
innovations in respect with provisions contained in the 1983 law, it is important
to stress that – diﬀerently from what provided for up to that moment – Section
no. 5 of this new law pointed out a number of fundamental organizational rules,
such as those concerning the agenda setting or the transmittal and sharing of
information among administrations before the meetings, as well as the procedure
for the approval of agreements within the Conferences. The primary goal of such
law was to finally provide some order into a field in which intergovernmental tools
had been growing almost out of any general and common framework of reference
(García Morales 2006, pp. 12-13).
More specifically, according to the 1992 LRJ-PAC, the general goal pursued
through these institutional tools was, as already stated in 1983, to "ensure, at all
times, the necessary coherence in the action of Public Administrations and, where
necessary, the indispensable coordination and collaboration" (Sect. no. 5.1). The
Conferences could be called for the exchange of points of view among the State
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and the Communities, and for the common examination of the problems of each
policy sector and of the means designed to address and solve them. As it should
appear evident, this definition did not add almost anything to that provided nine
years before6.
The biggest novelties were instead to be found in next subsections (nos. 2 and
3). Firstly, subsection no. 2 – while confirming the pivotal role of the central
Ministers as to the presidency of the Conferences and to the call of their meetings
– specified that these latter should be scheduled "early enough", and that should
be provided with an order of business and, "where necessary", with the documen-
tation required for the their prior preparation by the actors involved. Secondly,
subsection no. 3 regulated for the first time the procedures to be followed for
approving agreements (Acuerdos) within the Conferences. More specifically, Law
no. 30 established that agreements should be signed by the sector-related Min-
ister or Ministers and by the equivalent regional Councilors. Where appropriate,
agreements could be then formalized under the denomination of Convenio de co-
laboración (agreement of collaboration). All other agreements achieved within a
Conference would merely enjoy the status of political declarations. Finally, in con-
formity with the guidelines contained in the Autonomic Pacts evoked above, Law
no. 30/1992 provided that the specific regime of each Conference was instead to
be established by its own agreement of institutionalization and its own internal
regulations.
As reported in Table 3.2, the years immediately following the passage of this
regulatory framework were marked by the creation of several new Conferences (this
time, no one by means of a legal founding act) in those policy fields still lacking
any kind of vertical IGA (as explicitly envisioned in the Pacts). Furthermore, in
this same period, many Conferences, included some of those established in the
previous stage, provided themselves with internal regulations, defining in this way
their internal regime and basic rules of working (see also Table 3.1).
In 1996, provisions included in the Ley de Medidas Fiscales, Administrativas
y del Orden Social (no. 13/1996, section no. 136) contributed to reaﬃrm the
6Interestingly, according to some scholars (e.g. Tornos Mas 1994, p. 78), such a definition of
the Sectoral Conferences was vague enough to leave open the possibility to qualify as Conference
even all those meetings (lacking any organizational stable support) occurring between the Minis-
ter or Ministers in charge of the issue to be debated and the representatives of the Autonomous
Communities, for the common examination of the problems of the policy sector at issue and of
the means to solve them. In other words, on the bases of the definition provided by that law,
under the label of "Sectoral Conference" could have been placed both regular and stable meet-
ings (in that case, Sectoral Conference would be full-fledged Intergovernmental Arrangements, as
such provided with a minimal level of institutionalization) and more occasional meetings between
State and regional administrations. The Law, indeed, did not state that Sectoral Conferences
were established as bodies, but simply that central and regional organs of Government could
convene in meetings called "Sectoral Conferences".
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Table 3.2: Sectoral Conferences established between 1993 and 1997.
Conference Law of Estab-
lishment
Date of Estab-
lishment (or
First Meeting)
Date of Ap-
proval of Inter-
nal Regulations
Members
Conferencia Sectorial
de Infraestructuras
y Ordenación del
Territorio
10/03/1993 No Internal Regu-
lations
Members of the central Government
and of the AA.CC. executives.
Conferencia Sectorial
de Industria y Energía
14/04/1993 20/01/1994 (last
amendment:
24/02/2009)
National Minister for Industry and
Energy; Secretary of State of Indus-
try; Secretary General of Energy;
Undersecretary of Industry and En-
ergy; one Councilor for each A.C.
Conferencia Sectorial
de Pesca
29/09/1994 16/04/1996 (last
amendment:
11/04/2011)
National Minister for Agriculture
and Fishing and one Councilor for
each A.C.
Consejo Consultivo de
Política Pesquera para
Asuntos Comunitarios
15/06/2000 Internal Rules of
the Conferencia
Sectorial de Pesca
National Minister for Agriculture
and Fishing and one Councilor for
each A.C.
Conferencia Sectorial
de Igualdad (formelry:
Conferencia Sectorial
de la Mujer)
13/02/1995 16/09/1997 (last
amendment:
16/03/2011)
National Minister of Labor and So-
cial Aﬀairs and one Councilor for
each A.C.
Conferencia Sectorial
de Comercio Interior
08/05/1995 No Internal Regu-
lations
Secretary of State of Trade and one
Councilor and Director General of
each A.C.
Conferencia Sectorial
de Empleo y Asuntos
Laborales
23/07/1996 08/04/1997 Minister of Labor and Social Af-
fairs; the Secretario general técnico
of the Ministry and one Councilor
for each A.C.
Conferencia Secto-
rial de la Pequeña
y Mediana Empresa
(PYME)
14/05/1997 No Internal Regu-
lations
Secretary of State of Industry and
one Councilor and Director General
of each A.C.
Source: own elaboration from MAP (2013).
centrality accorded to the Sectoral Conferences in the Spanish system of IGR.
That law provided indeed for the involvement of these IGAs in the management
of the credits existing in the Spanish National Budget, for the implementation of
Joint Plans and Programs (cf. § 3.2.3) concerning competences constitutionally
and statutory attributed to the Autonomous Communities7.
Eventually, the legislative framework regulating multilateral intergovernmen-
tal cooperation in Spain was later further modified by new regulatory provisions
contained in Law no. 4/1999, which intervened to amend the 1992 LRJ-PAC on
various points, included those pertaining to the management of IGR. In Title I of
that Law (De las Administraciones Públicas y sus Relaciones, On Public Admin-
istrations and their Relations) was included the tenet – elaborated by the Spanish
7In these fields, an involvement of the Autonomous Communities in the management of the
funds related to joint plans and programs was necessary, in order to avoid an intrusion of the
central State – through the so called spending power – into genuinely regional competences. In
practice, this entails that every year Sectoral Conferences must find an agreement, before March
15th, on the allocation criteria of the financial resources at issue as well as on the resulting
distribution; moreover, if the Administrations represented within the Conference consider it
necessary, they can also approve the description of the goals and activities of the Joint Plan or
Program. Such legal provisions basically formalized and generalized to all Sectoral Conferences
what had been already provided, since 1990, by the internal regulation of the Conference for
Social Aﬀairs (MAP 2004).
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constitutional jurisprudence – of "institutional loyalty", pictured as the guiding
principle to facilitate the relations among diﬀerent public administrations. As to
the Sectoral Conferences, the innovative scope of this legislative intervention was
again actually quite limited, consisting essentially in the addition of some elements
of clarification and systematization to the basic regulatory framework already set-
tled in 1983 and 1992. The above-evoked doubts about the ultimate nature of
the Conferences – whether they should be intended as mere occasional meetings
between the State and the Autonomous Communities (even without any continu-
ity over time, as some regulatory provisions allowed to hypothesize), or as stable,
permanent arrangements – were definitively ruled out: Sectoral Conferences were
indeed labeled – together with Bilateral Cooperation Commissions – as "organs of
cooperation". The Conferences were thus represented as institutional bodies, to be
jointly established by the regional and the central Administrations, and character-
ized by a multilateral composition (at the level of State and regional executives)
and by a policy-specific field of intervention.
On the organizational front, the 1999 law restated that the internal regime of
each Conference had to be defined by the founding agreement and the internal
rules of procedure of the Conference itself. More interestingly, it is important to
mention that Law no. 4/1999 envisioned the possibility for the Conferences to
create Commissions and Working Groups – the so called "second level organs" –
particularly important in order to support the concrete technical and administra-
tive activity of these IGAs (Sect. no. 5.6). As to the presidency, the power to call
Conferences’ meetings, the timing of these latter, the procedures of agreements
formalization, the 1999 reform did not introduce any novelty with respect to the
rules established in 1992.
As shown in Table 3.3, the process of multiplication of vertical, sectoral IGA
has not stopped in the last years: by contrast, between 1999 and 2012, fifteen new
Conferences have been created in as many policy-related fields.
3.2.3 Powers, organization and functioning of healthcare
policy Conferences: the CISNS and the CPFF
From what discussed above, it should be evident that the Spanish vertical IGAs
landscape is characterized by an high fragmentation. This explains why, according
to many Spanish scholars it is extremely diﬃcult to give an overall assessment of
Spanish Intergovernmental Arrangements.
Sectoral variations are in fact apparent: as summed up by León and Ferrín
Pereira (2009), «these organs diﬀer greatly in their degree of activity and level of
institutionalization. Some are called occasionally and others stand out for their
intense activity. While some organs do not have technical support, others rely on a
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Table 3.3: Sectoral Conferences established between 1999 and 2012.
Conference Law of Estab-
lishment
Date of Es-
tablishment or
First Meeting
Date of Ap-
proval of Inter-
nal Regulations
Members
Conferencia Sectorial
del Juego
05/05/1999 05/05/1999 National Minister of Interior and one Coun-
cilor of each A.C.
Conferencia Secto-
rial en materia de
Administración de
Justicia
23/10/1999 23/10/1999 National Minister of Justice and one Coun-
cilor of those AA.CC. provided with compe-
tence in this matter.
Conferencia Sectorial
de Política Patrimo-
nial
Ley 33/2003 Still to be defined. The Conference has never
been called.
Comisión Nacional de
Salvamento Marítimo
Ley 27/1992 and
RD 1217/2002
14/03/2006 National Minister of Infrastructures; Subsec-
retary of Infrastructures; one representative
of each of the following Ministries: Interior,
Defense, Agriculture and Fishing, Environ-
ment (all at the level of Director General);
the Director General of Política Autonómica
of the Ministry of Public Administrations;
the Director General of the Merchant Ma-
rine; one Councilor for each A.C.
Conferencia Sectorial
de Administración
Pública
Ley 7/2007 17/12/2003 Representatives of the Central Government,
of the AA.CC. executives and of the local
governments.
Comisión de Recursos
Humanos del Sistema
Nacional de Salud
Ley 16/2003; RD
182/2004 and RD
892/2006
16/06/2004 National Ministry of Health; Health Coun-
cilors of each A.C.; the Subsecretary of the
Health Ministry, the Directors General of:
Human Resources; Economic Budgetary and
NHS Cohesion Services; Ministry High In-
spection; one Director General of each of the
following Ministries: Economy and Finances;
Education; Employment and Social Aﬀairs;
Public Administrations. The General Health
Inspector of the Ministry of Defense.
Conferencia Sectorial
para Asuntos Locales
(CSAL)
Ley 7/1985 and
Ley 57/2003
17/01/2005 National Minister of Public Administrations;
one Councilor for each A.C, and represen-
tatives of the local governments, appointed
by the Federación Española de Municipios y
Provincias.
Conferencia Secto-
rial en Ciencia y
Tecnología
24/02/2005 Still to be defined. The Conference met just
one time (2005).
Consejo de Política de
Seguridad
LO 2/1986 28/02/2005 National Minister of Interior; one represen-
tative of each A.C. and as many representa-
tives of the central State, appointed by the
Government.
Conferencia Sectorial
de Telecomunicaciones
y Sociedad de la
Información
26/10/2005 Still to be defined.
Consejo Territorial del
Sistema para la Au-
tonomía y Atención a
la Dependencia
Ley 39/2006 24/02/2005 22/01/2007 National Minister of Employment and So-
cial Aﬀairs; one representative of each A.C.;
representatives of diﬀerent ministerial De-
partments (the AA.CC. representatives must
however represent the largest share of mem-
bers of this Conference).
Conferencia Sectorial
de la Inmigración
09/07/2008 09/07/2008 Secretary General of Immigration and one
Councilor of each A.C.
Conferencia Sectorial
de Cooperación In-
ternacional para el
Desarrollo
28/10/2009 08/09/2010 National Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs and Co-
operation; the Secretary of State of Interna-
tional Cooperation; the Secretary of State of
Territorial Cooperation; the Director Gen-
eral of Planning and Evaluation of Devel-
opment Policies; one representative of each
A.C.; three representatives of the local gov-
ernments, appointed by the Federación Es-
pañola de Municipios y Provincias.
Conferencia Sectorial
de Energía
Ley 2/2011 11/05/2011 22/06/2011 National Ministry of Industry, Tourism, and
Trade; the Secretary of State of Energy;
the Director General of Energy Policy; one
Councilor of each A.C.
Consejo de Políticas
del Juego
Ley 13/2011 21/06/2011 28/07/2011 National Minister of Economy and Finances;
one Councilor of each A.C.; representatives
of the central State (as many as the regional
ones).
Source: own elaboration from MAP (2013).
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stable structure where second level bodies perform an extensive work of preparation
and follow-up of the subjects dealt by the conference, in addition to produce agree-
ments on decisions of more technical nature» (p. 42, translated). IGAs sectoral
variation proves clear if one look both at the structural organization of Sectoral
Conferences and at their actual level of activity. Aja (2008), for instance, states
that just about fifteen Conferences, over a total of ore than thirty, can be con-
sidered as actually working: many of these IGAs, in fact, have never been called,
or have met too few times to be considered as operating arrangements (González
Gómez 2008). Starting from similar remarks, Colino and Parrado (2009) divide
the Sectoral Conferences into four groups, according to the average frequency of
their plenary meetings. Since their establishment thirteen met less than once per
year (the Conference on Gambling, for instance, met just one time, while the Con-
ferencia Sectorial de Política Patrimonial was never called); four met, on average,
less then twice per year; six Conferences were called less then three times each
year, while a group of seven Conferencias met more frequently: the IGA which
was convened more times is the one devoted to Agricultural policy (which, as seen,
tends to be an highly europeanized sector and as, such, likely to spur more formal-
ized intergovernmental relations; cf. § 1.6.3), with an average of more than nine
meetings per year.
Among the Conferences characterized by a relatively intense activity we find
the two whose work impact on healthcare policy: the Consejo Interterritorial del
Sistema Nacional de Salud (CISNS; Interterritorial Council of the National Health
System) and the Consejo de Política Fiscal y Financiera de las Comunidades
Autónomas (CPFF; Council of Fiscal and Financial Policy of the Autonomous
Communities).
As long as the legal tools through which the State and the Communities may
sign an intergovernmental agreement are basically the same in all sectors, I will first
describe these tools; then, I will focus separately on the two health policy-related
Conferences, in order to describe more in depth their organizational structures as
well as their actual way of functioning.
Tools
Convenios de Conferencia Sectorial (Sectoral Conference Agreements). The Con-
venios de Conferencia Sectorial are the unique properly multilateral kind of
agreement between the Central State Administration and the Autonomous
Communities envisioned in the Spanish legal system. Provided for by Law
no. 30/1992 (Sect. no. 5.5), they are simply defined as agreements signed
by the Minister or the Ministers in charge of the issue to be debated, and
the equivalent Councilors of the Autonomous Communities (the members
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of the Sectoral Conference at issue). Legally binding for the subscribers,
these agreements should be then formally communicated to the Senate and
published in the Oﬃcial Journal of the State and of the Autonomous Com-
munities. In fact, despite the attempt to give a boost to multilateral cooper-
ation through the legal provision of such kind of agreement, the Convenios
de Conferencia Sectorial have almost never been used.
Convenios de Colaboración Vertical (Vertical Collaboration Agreements). The
Convenios de Colaboración Vertical are instead the most frequently used le-
gal tool of intergovernmental cooperation in Spain. They are agreements
between the Central State Administration and one or several Autonomous
Communities. These agreements are characterized by an high degree of free-
dom of contract. Their basic legal framework is defined again by Law no.
30/1992 (Sects. nos. 6 and 8), which identifies some basic, necessary re-
quirements this kind of convenio must fulfill. The convenios must indeed
specify: the organs subscribing the agreement itself; the competence exerted
in it by each Administration; the financing sources of the agreement; the
actions agreed by the partners to implement it; the necessity (or not) of
establishing a body for its management; its temporal validity (prorogations
being always allowed); its termination for other reasons. Once passed, these
agreements are valid for the signing partners and must be communicated to
the Senate and published in the State and Autonomous Communities Oﬃ-
cial Journals. The major problem is that the phase following the signature
of the agreements may be qualified as a terra incognita (García Morales
2009, p. 175), in the sense that the actual implementation of the conve-
nios is left to the goodwill of the actors: in fact, many agreements include
the provision of follow-up commissions, but there is little information about
the actual role played by these structures. Furthermore, the law merely
recognizes the existence of convenios, without specifying additional features
or the diﬀerentiation of these agreements into distinct types. Diﬀerently
from Italy, an established typology is thus lacking (Benzo Sainz 2004). As
a matter of fact, it is nevertheless possible to distinguish diﬀerent kinds of
agreements (even if according to largely overlapping criteria). First of all,
even if the convenio may be formally intended as a primarily bilateral tool
of cooperation (theoretically opposed, as such, to the convenio de Confer-
encia Sectorial described above), in practice large part of these agreements
have a genuinely multilateral nature, as long as the same convenio is bilat-
erally agreed by the National Minister in charge of the issue and all (or a
large part of) the Autonomous Communities. In other words, what is infor-
mally called convenio-tipo or convenio de suscripción generalizada (standard
or general subscription agreement) is nothing but a "photocopy agreement",
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that is the same text (sometimes, with minor amendments) for all the sign-
ing regional governments. This largely explains the extremely high number
of Collaboration Agreements signed by the State and the Communities each
year. According to the Ministry of Finance and Public Administration, be-
tween 1978 and mid 2012 15.345 convenios were reached by the State and
the Autonomous Communities (MAP 2012). As reminded by García Morales
(2006), «the convenios, although subscribed bilaterally, are the last piece of
a previous cooperative process, starting with the decision of a Sectoral Con-
ference and/or the development of a Plan or Programa Conjunto» (p. 19,
translated). Secondly, looking at the content of these agreements, scholars
tend to stress that, in a large majority of cases, these agreements are tools
mainly used to transfer financial resources from the Central State towards
the Autonomous Communities, or to complement the financing of these lat-
ter (in this case, they are often referred to as convenios con compromisos
financieros, that is agreements with financial commitments). According to
the data provided by the Minister of Finance and Public Administration,
in the period 2006-2011 the intergovernmental agreements involving transfer
of financial resources from the State to the Communities have represented,
on average, almost the 74% of the total amount of convenios (MAP, 2007-
2011a; 2012). Thirdly, when new convenios simply amend some features of
previously subscribed agreements, they are defined as acuerdos. These latter
may be, in turn, divided into prorogation agreements (acuerdos de prór-
roga), modification agreements (acuerdos de modificación) and development
agreements (acuerdos de desarollo) (MAP 2011). Prorogation agreements
just aim to extend the temporal validity of a convenio; modification agree-
ments are instead intended to modify some contents of a convenio, without,
nevertheless, determining a major alteration of this latter; finally, the goal
pursued through development agreements is to clarify some aspects defined
in a too general way by a convenio already in force. Eventually, as provided
by Law no. 30/1992 (Sect. no. 6.4) convenios are called Protocolos generales
when they do nothing but establish political guidelines to be followed by each
Administration for the implementation of a policy in a matter of common
interest, or set the general framework and methodology for the development
of cooperation in an area of inter-jurisdictional competence or in a matter
of mutual interest. Diﬀerently from the agreements considered above, these
convenios are not binding for the partners.
Planes y Programas Conjuntos (Joint Plans and Programs). The Joint Plans and
Programs are a particular legal tool of cooperation between the State and
the Autonomous Communities, provided for the first time by Law no.4/1999,
according to which "the General State Administration and the Administra-
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tion of the Autonomous Communities may agree to implement Joint Plans
and Programs of action for the achievement of common objectives in matters
of concurrent jurisdiction". In this case the role of the Sectoral Conferences
is formally recognized, as long as only "Sectoral Conferences are entitled to
take the initiative to agree on the realization of Joint Plans and Programs, on
the approval of their contents, as well as the monitoring and the multilateral
evaluation of their implementation". The "approving agreement" (acuerdo
aprobatorio) at the basis of these Plans and Programs must indicate the
goals of common interest to be pursued, the actions to be put into practice
by each Administration, the material and personnel contributions given by
each partner, the commitments on providing financial resources and, finally,
the duration of the Plan or Program, as well as the mechanisms designed
to monitor, evaluate and, where necessary, modify it. Eventually, provision
is made that additional convenios de colaboración may be subscribed, in a
bilateral way, in order to "complete" the approving agreement as to those
points deserving bilateral specification. Once signed by the Administrations
involved, the Plan or the Program (which may be considered as synonyms)
are legally binding for these latter. It should be reminded that before be-
ing provided by Law no. 4/1999, Plans and Programs had been already
informally used, having become an established practice in the Spanish sys-
tem of IGR even before the 1992 Autonomous Pacts. García Morales (2006)
remarks that, despite the above reminded legal provisions, Plans and Pro-
grams are still a weakly regulated tool, about whose eﬀective working little is
known: «Plans are approved by the Sectoral Conferences, which are also in
charge of their monitoring, but we do not know precisely the degree of par-
ticipation of the Autonomous Communities in elaborating the Plan, that is
which influence ability they do have in determining its contents or whether,
by contrast, the Plan is presented by the State as an adhesion contract that
the Autonomous Communities simply ratify» (p. 18, translated).
After having outlined the evolution and the features of the general reference
framework of Spanish IGAs, as well as the common legal tools of intergovernmental
cooperation, I will focus now on the two vertical IGAs specifically concerned,
in a direct or indirect way, with the management of health policy: the Consejo
Interterritorial del Sistema Nacional de Salud (the Interterritorial Council of the
National Health System) and the Consejo de Política Fiscal y Financiera (the
Council of Fiscal and Financial Policy). Because of the fragmentation typical of
the Spanish system, it is indeed necessary to look more carefully at each single
Conference.
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The Interterritorial Council of the National Health System (CISNS)
As mentioned above and reported in Table 3.1, the Consejo Interterritorial del
Sistema Nacional de Salud (CISNS) was among the first vertical IGAs established
in Spain: it was created in 1984 by the then Minister of Health, Ernest Lluch, and
later formalized in 1986 by the law establishing the new National Health Service
(Ley General de Sanidad, General Law on Health: no. 14, April 25th) as a forum of
interaction between the Central Government and the Autonomous Communities,
with the main function of ensuring general health coordination (Moreno Fuentes
2009). The Council was thus established immediately after the failure of the
LOAPA project, within the very loose legal framework resulting from Law no.
12/1983.
As to the composition of this arrangement, Law no. 14 simply provided that
the Consejo – to be chaired by the Minister of Health and Consumer Aﬀairs –
would include, besides one representative of each Autonomous Community (the
regional Councilor in charge of health policy), an equal number of the Central
State Administration representatives (seventeen). These latter were issued from a
quite long and varied list of Ministries as well as from the Instituto Nacional de
la Salud (INSALUD, National Health Institute)8. At the beginning, there were
ten representatives (with the minimum rank of Directors General) issued from
the Ministry of Health and seven from other ministerial departments, directly or
indirectly related with health issues. These departments varied through time, in-
cluding: Defense, Finance, Interior, Education, Employment and Social Aﬀairs,
Agriculture, Public Administration, Economy, Science and Technology. Between
1996 and 2002, the number of the representatives of the Health Ministry was even
a minority within the Council, as a consequence of a reorganization (and a down-
sizing) of that Ministry (Rey del Castillo 2001). An Advisory Committee (Comité
Consultivo), structurally linked to the CISNS, and composed of an equal number
of delegated of the most representatives trade unions and employers organizations,
was also created in order to introduce the voice of the social partners into the
Health System.
The Council was defined as the «permanent body of communication and in-
formation of the various health services, [that is] among themselves and with the
Central Administration» (Sect. no. 47). To this end, it was endowed with the
tasks of coordinating, among other things, the basic guidelines on procurement
policy and on contracting of pharmaceuticals and other health goods and services,
as well as the basic principles of the personnel policy. Planning functions were
also assigned to the Council, such as the approval of State-AACC Joint Health
8As it wil be explianed in the next Chapter, the INSALUD was the central agency, directly
depending on the Health Ministry, in charge of the management of regional health systems in all
those Autonomous Communities still not provided with full health policy powers (cf. § 4.3.2).
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Plans. Moreover, the Council had to be "informed" by the Central State about
the contents of the Integrated Health Plan (Plan Integrado de Salud), a planning
document embodying State, Autonomic and Joint Health Plans, along with their
financing sources: in this respect, the Council could make remarks and advance
proposals. The seventh final disposition of Law no. 14 stated that the Council
would approve its own internal regulations. These latter provided for the creation
of Commissions and Working Groups (well before the 1999 reform), in order to
address with specific issues: as it will be explained, such a possibility led to a real
proliferation of second level bodies, which rapidly grew up to more than fifty.
Rico (1998, p. 348) highlights the high level of similarity between the Spanish
Consejo Interterritorial, designed by Law no. 14, and the Italian equivalent, the
Consiglio Sanitario Nazionale (cf. § 2.2.2), set up just six years before in a similar
context (the transition from a insurance-based to a universal system of health
care): in fact, the Italian IGA would have been taken as a real template by Spanish
law-makers.
Such organization of the CISNS lasted up to 2003, when a new national law,
reforming the entire Spanish Health System, called Ley de cohesión y calidad del
Sistema Nacional de Salud (National Health System Cohesion and Quality Law;
no. 16, May 28th 2003), was passed by the Parliament.
As a result, the Interterritorial Council is currently governed by the provisions
included in that law (Ch. X, Sects. nos. 69-75), and by the new internal Regu-
lations (whose approval was envisioned by the law itself), adopted by the Council
immediately afterwards.
The Council – the highest coordination body within the Spanish NHS – is now
defined as the «permanent organ of coordination, cooperation, communication and
information of [regional] Health Services, [that is] among these latter and with the
State Administration; its goal is to enhance the cohesion of the National Health
System through the eﬀective and equitable guarantee of citizens’ rights through-
out the State» (Sect. no. 69). Its mission should consist, in general terms, in
contributing to the planning and evaluation of the Spanish NHS. More concretely,
according to the law, the CISNS shall meet, discuss and, where appropriate, make
"recommendations" on matters such as: essential functions as to the configuration
of the Spanish NHS; the development and updating of the health benefits basket;
the maximum waiting list times; the identification of the reference centers of the
NSH; the definiton of the safety and quality requirements of health centers; the
ensuring of equal access to drugs by citizens; health research; the development of
an integrated health information system; the coordination of public health policies;
the definition of general criteria on public financing of drugs and health devices;
the establishment of criteria and mechanisms in order to ensure the financial suf-
ficiency and equity of the system (significantly, the law specifies that this function
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must be exerted by the CISNS "without prejudice to the powers of the Council of
Fiscal and Financial Policy": cf. § 3.2.3). The CISNS is also required to advise
on Autonomic Health Plans as well as on the formulation of Joint Health Plans
and the Integrated Health Plan. It shall also exert a coordination function on
matters related to public health, personnel policy, as well as on those matters on
which international agreements have been reached or the EU has a competence.
Eventually, the CISNS may exert a cooperation function, by promoting agreements
between diﬀerent health administrations in order to get shared goals or by devel-
oping common criteria for implementing joint health measures.
Internal Structure and Working Organization Major innovations intro-
duced by the 2003 reform are related to the composition of this vertical IGA.
According to the Ley de cohesión y calidad, indeed, the members of the CISNS
are now the National Minister of Health and Consumer Aﬀairs, which still chairs
the Council, and, for the Autonomous Communities, the regional Councilors in
charge of health policy. In other words, the Council is no more made up of an
equal number of central State and Autonomous Communities’ representatives, but
by seventeen members representing the regional level (plus the two Autonomous
Cities of Ceuta and Melilla) and just one member in representation of the central
State.
The Conference meets usually in Madrid at the Ministry of Health and Con-
sumer Aﬀairs, even if the possibility of holding meetings in alternative locations
is left open by the internal Regulations9.
The CISNS is articulated into diﬀerent formats: the Plenary session (Pleno);
the Delegated Commission (Comisión Delegada); the technical commissions and
working groups.
The plenary format – including the President, the Vice-President, the health
regional Councilors, and the Secretary of the Council – meets on the President’s
initiative or when requested by one third of its members. In any case, it should
meet, at least, four times per year. As it will be shown, this requirement has
not always been met (see Figure 3.2). Plenary meetings can also be attended by
the Undersecretary of Health and Consumer Aﬀairs and by the Director General
of Cohesion and High Inspection of the NHS (they are not accorded the right to
vote). Further representatives of the Central State Administration as well of the
Autonomous Communities’ Administrations may also be invited by the President
of the CISNS as guests, whenever their expertise is considered as useful for the
examination of the issues to be debated. Finally, the Chairmen of the Commissions
in which the Council may be organized must attend the plenary meetings, in order
9In 2005, for instance, the CISNS plenary meetings were convened, respectively, in Sevilla,
Oviedo, Santander, and Logroño (CISNS 2006).
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to inform the Council about the conclusions of their works.
As in the Italian case, the agenda setting is formally a competence of the
President of the IGA (that is, the central Minister of Health). According to internal
Regulations, the members of the Conference must be informed about next meetings
at least seventy-two hours in advance. While, as seen, the actual working of the
Italian State-Regions Conference is based on a largely jointly-defined agenda, the
Spanish case looks quite diﬀerent: as reported by all actors asked on this point,
the process appears as largely dominated by the central State Administration. A
former advisor of the Minister of Health described the agenda-setting process in
this way:
The agenda, as a general rule, is set by the Ministry [. . . ]. However, the
repeated requests of the AACC to include a given topic could also (but not
always) force the Ministry to incorporate a particular item [into the agenda].
There are also items that are included by consensus. The date is set by the
Ministry, but taking into account the availability of the regional represen-
tatives. For example, Sectoral Conferences generally are not organized in
the days in which diﬀerent Autonomous Communities celebrate their Coun-
cils of Government. The documentation, too, is circulated by the Ministry.
[SP6]
Very similarly, a former autonomic Health General Director stated that «the
agenda, the dates and the documentation are managed by the central Government,
the Ministry of Health, although the Autonomous Communities can propose issues
to be included into the order of business of the CISNS»[SP10]. It should also be
added that, at least in the early years of functioning of the Council, a certain inertia
characterized regional representatives, rarely proposing issues to be included in the
CISNS order of business (Rey del Castillo 1998).
Even if the internal Regulations of the Conference clearly state that "the Ple-
nary will meet at the call of the President, by her own initiative or when requested
by at least one third of its members", in 2005 the then Minister of Health repeat-
edly refused to convene an extraordinary meeting of the Conference, in spite of
a request coming from seven Communities. They had to legally appeal against
such an attitude of the Minister, who was eventually forced by two Courts (the
Audiencia Nacional and the Tribunal Supremo) to call the required meeting (on
this point, see § 5.3.2).
As far as the circulation of the information necessary for the preparation of the
meetings is concerned, CISNS is no exception in respect of a quite common practice
in Spanish Sectoral Conferences (León and Ferrín Pereira 2009): on the basis of the
evidence provided by informants, it is indeed clear that the central Government
often makes use of so called "tactical delays", meaning that documentation is sent
to the members of the Conference – particularly, the regional representatives –
137
just before the session takes place. This clearly limits the possibility for regional
representatives of defining a position on the issues to be then discussed with the
Minister. A former Secretary of the Council confirmed the use of this practice,
which, according to a former Director General of the Health Ministry, could be
even defined as an "habitual" central Government strategy in the organization of
the CISNS meetings.
The designation of the Council’s Secretary is also proposed by the Minister
and ratified by the Plenum: as a rule, since 1996 this function is attributed to the
Secretario General de Sanidad (Health Secretary-General), the highest adminis-
trative oﬃce immediately below the Minister. The Secretary attends the plenary
meetings with voice but no vote. Autonomous Communities are instead entitled
to appoint, among their representatives, the Vice-President of the Council, who
substitutes the President in her absence and exerts all the functions delegated to
her by the President. The charge may be renewed every year. As set by the in-
ternal Regulations of the Council, the Vice-President must be voted at least by
an absolute majority, provided that thirteen members attend the meeting. This
appointment is generally unproblematic, insofar the established practice consists
in a rotation among Communities according to the order of the dates of approval
of their respective Statutes of Autonomy.
The activities of the Council are operationally supported by a Secretariat Oﬃce.
Its functions – of technical and administrative support to the CISNS (both in
the plenary and second-level formats) – are granted by an Oﬃce of the Ministry
of Health (the Unidad de Órganos Colegiados del Sistema Nacional de Salud),
reporting to a Directorate-General of the same Ministry.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the basic organizational structure of the CISNS.
The Delegated Commission – a novelty introduced in 2003 to increase the eﬀec-
tiveness of this IGA10 – is the major second level organ of the Interterritorial Health
System Council. The Commission is composed of the Health Secretary-General
(who chairs it), by a representative of each Autonomous Community at the level
of deputy Councilor (or equivalent), and by a representative of the Ministry of
Health and Consumer Aﬀairs (with secretary functions). As for the Plenum, the
Vice-President of this Commission, according to Law no. 16, is to be appointed
among the representatives of the Autonomous Communities. The Delegated Com-
mission acts as a "support and previous discussion body" in preparing the plenary
meetings of the Council, and should perform all the functions delegated to it by
the Council itself. The Law defines the Commission as a "body of technical and
administrative coordination" (Sect. no. 74).
10In this respect, Rey del Castillo (1993ab) remarked that the absence of an intermediary level
between Councilors and technicians contributed to the emergence of conflict on final decisions
agreed at the technical level.
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To this end, the Comisión Delegada is accorded the power to establish Sub-
commissions and Working Groups necessary for the fulfillment of its tasks. Techni-
cal Commissions and Working Groups may also be created directly by the Council.
As to the Technical Commissions, their composition, their functioning and their
specific tasks depend on the rules established each time by the Council itself.
Working Groups are instead to be composed of technicians issued from the Health
Ministry and the Autonomous Communities, as well as by other "experts" in the
field: these groups must reach a concrete and clearly specified goal, always within
a defined period of time. Such second and third-level bodies deal with specific
issues, such as those related with public health (vaccines, occupational health, flu
monitoring, and the like), transplants, information systems, and so on. The ac-
tivity of each body is coordinated by the central Government, generally by means
of the corresponding Directorate General of the Health Ministry: the Permanent
Commission of Pharmacy, for instance, is coordinated by the Directorate Gen-
eral on Pharmacy and Medical Devices. The same applies to the other technical
bodies dependent on the Council. The members representing the Autonomous
Communities are the equivalent regional Directors General11.
Eventually, the Advisory Committee (Comité Consultivo), established in 1986,
is now defined as the «body, depending on the Interterritorial Council, by which
the social involvement into the National Health System is made eﬀective, in a
permanent way, and trade unions and employers’ associations may institutionally
participate» to the NHS (Sect. no. 67.2). To this end, the Advisory Committee
is composed of six representatives of the State, as many representatives of the
Autonomous Communities, four representatives of the local Administration, eight
representatives of trade unions and eight of employers’ associations. The functions
attributed to this body are quite vague, ranging from tasks of information to those
of advice and proposal over matters of special interest for the functioning of the
NHS, on health drafts laws, CISNS’ agreements impacting on rights and duties of
the patients, and so on.
Decision Making Rules It has already been highlighted that Law no. 14/1986
defined a very loose regulatory framework in what concerns the working rules of
the Council. Furthermore, as reported by Rico (1998), up to the mid-1990s ex-
plicit decision-making rules were not provided by the internal Rules of the CISNS.
However, the established practice seemed to be, since the outset, the rule of una-
nimity. According to the provisions contained in the Reglamento passed in 2003
and currently in force, the structural quorum requires the President, half plus one
regional Councilors and the Secretary to attend the Conference. In this case, ac-
11In Figure 3.1 just Commissions and Working groups having displayed minimal working con-
tinuity in the last ten years have been reported; cf. § 3.2.3).
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Figure 3.1: CISNS: organizational structure.
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cording to Section no. 73 of the NHS Cohesion and Quality Law, the Council
may adopt agreements, which shall take the form of recommendations (recomen-
daciones): these are to be passed, where appropriate, by consensus (deliberative
quorum). The CISNS may also approve agreements of cooperation (acuerdos de
cooperación) in order to carry out joint health actions: these agreements have to
be formalized as Convenios del Consejo Interterritorial del Sistema Nacional de
Salud.
Activity As seen, the minimal frequency of the Council activity was set, since
the beginning, at four plenary meetings per year. Even if between 1987 and 2012
it met, on average, exactly four times per year, on many occasions the formal
requirement was disregarded, the activity of the Plenum having been highly irreg-
ular. In fact, as shown in Figure 3.2, the CISNS met just two times in 1996, 1999,
2000 and 2011, and just three times in 1993, 1994, 1995, 2002, 2004 and 2008.
Between 1987 and 2002 the activity trend was, on the whole, decreasing. In this
respect Rico (1998) interestingly remarks that
[a]lthough this development could also respond to the timing of the imple-
mentation process of the health reform, it seems mainly to reflect a gradual
reduction of the role that this organ plays in the formulation and implemen-
tation of health policy. In fact, the reduction in the number of meetings
coincides with a parallel, declining trend as the political relevance of the
topics discussed in the plenary sessions of the Council (p. 351, translated).
Moreover, most of the subjects addressed by the CISNS during its first ten
years of life were other than those envisioned by its founding law. While topics
such as procurement policy, contracting of pharmaceuticals, personnel policy were
only marginally treated, Public Health emerged as the main subject-matter of
discussion within this IGA. Furthermore, many of the items on the agenda were
related to the joint analysis (often consisting in simple information exchange) of
draft bills and decrees (Rey del Castillo 1993ab, 1998).
If one looks at the average number of plenary meetings celebrated each year
before and after the 2003 reform, one will notice a slight increase (from 3.75 to
4.4). However, this can hardly be interpreted as an indicator of an increasing
institutionalization, insofar as it is mainly due to the peak occurred in 2009 and
2010 (when, respectively, eight and six plenary meetings took place). By contrast,
such a trend may be seen as suggestive of a rather low level of institutionalization.
The intensified activity of the CISNS in that period was indeed linked to the
management of a transitory, specific issue (a "focusing event"): the so called "flu
pandemic" (in 2009, four plenary meetings were entirely devoted to this issue).
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Figure 3.2: CISNS: number of meetings (1987-2012). Source: own elaboration from
Ministry of Health website (https://www.msssi.gob.es/organizacion/consejoInterterri/
actividad.htm) and CISNS (2003-2012).
Furthermore, the irregularity and the quite low frequency of the plenary meet-
ings do not appear to be compensated by a higher degree of regularity and fre-
quency of the major second level body of the Council, that is the Delegated Com-
mission, in charge of "preparing the ground" of next, first-level encounters: with
two exceptions (2003 and 2005), indeed, this Commission has met, on many oc-
casions, even less frequently then the Plenum (2009, 2010, 2011). This latter was
convened less than four times in 2004 (3) and 2011 (2).
At a lower level, however, several Commissions and Working Groups have been
established, over the years, for addressing specific issues from a technical stand-
point.
The possibility of establishing such arrangements was provided by the first
Regulations of the Council, passed as early as in 1987. Between that year and 1993
a full-blown explosion of Groups and Commissions occurred, leading to the creation
of more than 50 bodies within the CISNS. Most of them proved in fact poorly
operative, if not completely inoperative. This is why in 1993 the total number
of these bodies was reduced to ten. Their level of activity proved again highly
variant, depending on the subject-matter addressed. The most active Commission
was the one dealing with Public Health, as well as the sub-commissions reporting
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to it12. The attitude of the corresponding Ministerial Departments, in charge of
the eﬀective functioning of the diﬀerent Commissions, was crucial for the actual
development and working of these bodies (Rey del Castillo 1993ab, 1998).
Looking now at the period following the reform of the Council (2003-2012),
in all more than thirty bodies have been in function, including both permanent
and ad hoc arrangements. Their working modalities do not seem to have changed
significantly, if compared with the previous phase (CISNS 2004-2013). Some of
these bodies were called just a few times, and their life only lasted one or two
years. Considering instead just those Groups and Commissions which have been
working over a minimum period of three years, it is possible to notice that the
two most active technical bodies were the Commissions dealing, respectively, with
Public Health and Pharmacy. The first one met more than one hundred times
in the period under consideration, even if more than 40% of these meetings was
celebrated in one year (2009) because of the above-evoked pandemic flu: without
such a bias, the usual frequency of meetings of this Commission is of about eight
encounters each year. Similarly, the Commission on Pharmacy met on, average,
almost seven times per year. All other Commissions and Groups have displayed
a much lower frequency of encounters, ranging to almost four (Working Group
on Epidemiological Monitoring, depending, in turn, on the Commission on Public
Health) to less than one meeting per year (this is the case of highly specific Groups,
such as the one devoted to the monitoring of the so called "mad cow" disease).
Bodies displaying higher frequency of meetings tend also to carry out their work
on more continuous bases (convening at least once a year).
As regards the agreements reached by the CISNS, their trend is shown in Figure
3.3. A part from 2011 and 2012, the annual number of agreements has fluctuated
within a fairly wide range, roughly comprised between twenty and sixty13. It is
to be noted that acts labeled as "agreements" (acuerdos) are, in fact, extremely
diversified: they range from agreements in the strict sense of the word, to the mere
approval of the minutes of the previous meetings, from the creation of new Work-
ing Groups to the appointment of autonomic representatives into mixed State-
Communities organs (internal acts). According to the data provided by the page
of the Health Ministry website devoted to the Council, between 1987 and 2004
agreements in the narrowest sense of the word were about two thirds of the total
(63%). Due to the lack of any clear, established criteria for categorizing agree-
12According to data reported by Niort (2003), between 1987 and 1999, the Commission on
Public Health would have treated 41% of the total items addressed by the Commissions, followed
by those treated by the Commissions on Human Resources (14%), Pharmacy and Transplants
(11% both).
13The peak observed in 2012 (121 agreements) seems largely due to the extremely low number
of agreements (10) reached during the previous year, when just two plenary sessions had took
place.
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Figure 3.3: CISNS: number of agreements (1987-2012). Source: own
elaboration from Ministry of Health website (https://www.msssi.gob.es/organizacion/
consejoInterterritorial.do) (1987-2004); CISNS (2006-2013).
ments as full-fledged agreements or as internal acts, it is not possible to replicate
the analysis for the period 2005-2012. Anyway, a qualitative analysis of the annual
Reports on the Council activity allows to confirm the continuity of such trend. As
in the previous period, Autonomous Communities are basically "informed" by the
Government about draft-bills and decrees on health issues. Real agreements are
often related to the annual approval of the allocation criteria employed to dis-
tribute small funds of the Health Ministry, targeted towards very specific health
questions, such as the prevention of HIV, the fight against smoking, and so on.
The Fiscal and Financial Policy Council (CPFF)
The second vertical IGA impacting on health policy is the one dealing with the
coordination of fiscal and financial policies. In fact, as implicitly emerged from
above, the CISNS has no power to debate major financial issues pertaining to
the Spanish NHS, such as the definition of financing mechanisms or the setting of
regional health needs. Because of the policy-specific design of Spanish IGAs, these
matters are debated separately by another sectorial (but transversal) multilateral
Conference, the one in charge of the coordination of fiscal and financial policies. As
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shown in Table 3.1, the Fiscal and Financial Policy Council (Consejo de Política
Fiscal y Financiera de las Comunidades Autónomas, CPFF) was even the first
vertical IGA established in Spain (1980). Its first meeting was celebrated as early as
in 1981, when only three regional Statues of Autonomy had already been approved
(see § 4.3.2).
The basic legal framework regulating such IGA is still the one designed by
Organic Law no. 8/1980, defining Autonomous Communities’ Financing regime
(Ley Orgánica de Financiación de las Comunidades Autónomas, usually referred
to by its acronym, LOFCA).
According to provisions contained in that Law, the CPFF is the coordinating
body of the State and the Autonomous Communities on fiscal and financial mat-
ters. It is composed of the national Ministers of the Economy and Treasury and
Public Administration, and of the regional financial Councilors.
The functions attributed to the Council are related to: the coordination of the
State and Autonomous Communities budgetary policies; the analysis and assess-
ment of the allocation criteria of the Interterritorial Compensation Fund14; the
analysis, the elaboration and, where appropriate, the revision of the methods used
to calculate the costs of the functions transferred to the Autonomous Communi-
ties; the assessment of the reasons justifying the perception, by each Autonomous
Community, of budget allocations, as well as the equity criteria followed for their
revision; the coordination of the debt and public investment policies.
As a consequence of Organic Law on Budgetary Stability (Ley Orgánica com-
plementaria a la Ley General de Estabilidad Presupuestaria), passed in 2001 by
the Spanish Parliament to fulfill the requirements deriving from the European
Growth and Stability Pact, the CPFF has come to play a key role (formally, at
least) in this area. The Council must indeed produce and vote, every year, an
advisory Report on the GPD growth rate set by the Government for the next
three years, prior to the oﬃcial decision by the central executive. A similar ad-
visory Report must also be prepared and voted by the CPFF members on the
budgetary stability goal set by the Government for the whole of the Autonomous
Communities: then, the Budget Minister and each single Community must nego-
tiate – within the CPFF but in a bilateral way – the budgetary stability goal for
each single regional government. Notice that the Council is called to play a part
also in case of non fulfillment of these budgetary stability objectives by one or
more Communities: it is indeed within this Intergovernmental Arrangement that
non-complying Regions must present their "Economic-Financial Recovery Plans"
(Planes Económico-Financieros).
14Provided for by Sec. no. 158.2 of the Spanish Constitution, the Fondo de Compensación
Interterritorial is a fund which should be allocated to the Autonomous Communities with the
aim of reducing interregional economic unbalances, by means of investment policies.
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More generally, the CPFF is accorded the power to deal with every aspect
related to the financial activities of the Autonomous Communities and of the
State Treasury, needing, by their nature, a coordinated action between the State
and the Regions.
Internal Structure and Working Organization The internal structure and
the working organization of the CPFF are largely defined by the provisions in-
cluded in the internal Regulations of the Council itself. The LOFCA stated,
indeed, that, in order to grant the "proper functioning" of this IGA, the Council
should approve its own rules. These were originally prepared by a Working Group,
specifically established for this task, and were unanimously passed on August 20th,
1981 (Calvo Vérgez, 2012)15.
The Plenum, as seen, is comprised of the members of the national and re-
gional executives in charge of fiscal and financial policy, plus the central Minister
of Public Administration16. Plenary meetings, chaired by the national Minister,
are convened by this latter by his own initiative or when requested by, at least, one
third of the members of the Council. In any case, the mandatory minimum ad-
vance notice for plenary meetings is set at seventy-two hours, while the minimum
frequency of these meetings should be of twice per year. In addition to convening
and chairing the meetings, the President is entrusted with the task of representing
the Council in front of the Administration of the State and of the Autonomous
Communities; signing the resolutions passed by the CPFF; ensuring the compli-
ance with its internal rules. As in the case of the CISNS, the Vice-President is to
be appointed by the Autonomous Communities among their representatives: she
remains in oﬃce for one year, and cannot be re-appointed in the next two years.
In order to address specific issues, the Plenum can establish ad hoc Work-
ing Groups, composed of oﬃcials appointed both by the State and the Regions:
their specific rules of functioning are to be set, each time, by the Working Group
founding agreement.
One Director General issued from one Oﬃce of the national Minister of Econ-
omy and Public Administration – currently, the Secretaría General de Coordi-
nación Autonómica y Local (Secretariat General of Autonomic and Local Coor-
dination) – acts as the Secretary of the Council: she must prepare the meetings
(both of the plenary sessions and, in case, of the working groups), take the minutes
of these meetings (to be then approved by the Council), prepare an annual Report
on the activity carried out by the Council. She must also attend plenary meetings,
15Since then the Council Regulations have been amended many times: in 1983; 2000; 2001;
2004; 2006; 2008 and 2010. Its basic structure and its basic decision rules, however, have not
been significantly transformed.
16Since 2001, the Budget and the Public Administrations Ministries have been merged.
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where she can take the floor, but cannot vote. Notice that this Oﬃce is in charge
not only of the CPFF Secretariat functions, but of many other tasks.
Decision-making Rules While, in many respects, the organizational structure
of the CPFF resembles that of the CISNS, decision rules are completely diﬀerent.
In contrast to the CISNS, indeed, the CPFF deliberations (which, again, take the
form of "recommendations") are not necessarily taken by consensus. Provided that
half of the members attend the meetings, in the first vote decisions may be taken
by a two-third majority (of the members); starting from the second ballot, an
absolute majority vote is suﬃcient to pass a recommendation.
It is important to remark that, according to the Council Regulations, the vote
of the central State Administration weighs exactly as the whole of the Autonomous
Communities votes: in other words, this means that the 19 Autonomous Communi-
ties and Autonomous Cities have a total of 19 votes, as many as the representatives
of the State. By consequence, in the first ballot an agreement may be passed with
the favorable vote of the State and of 7 Regions (26 over 38 votes); from the sec-
ond ballot, for the State is suﬃcient getting the consent from just one of the 19
Autonomous Communities to pass an agreement (20 over 38).
As a matter of fact, the approval of deliberations by majority is a quite common
practice within the Council: measures on the agenda are often approved with the
consent of the State and of a subset of Autonomous Communities, on the one
hand, and the abstention or the dissenting vote of the remaining Regions, on the
other hand (I will come back on this point in § 5.3.2).
Activity As seen, the minimal frequency of CPFF Plenum was legally set at two
meetings per year. However, as shown in Figure 3.4, this provision was not met on
many occasions during the 1980s and the 1990s (notice that in 1989 and 1999 the
Council did not convene at all). Since the early 2000s, at least two meetings per
year have been celebrated, as requested by law. In the last ten years (2003-2012),
the CPFF met, on average, almost four times per year, even if in a quite irregular
way, the number of annual meetings having ranged from two (2003 and 2011) to
seven (2005).
On the whole, the activity trend of this IGA appears as largely related to
the management of contingent issues (Cicuéndez Santamaría and Ramos Gallarín
2008): for instance, the approval in 1986 of the new model of common regional
financing required the celebration of seven meetings, as much as in 2005, when
an agreement on the allocation of additional funds for health financing was to be
found. The relatively higher frequency and regularity of meetings characterizing
the CPFF since the early 2000s may be largely explained as a consequence of
the legal provisions contained in Organic Law no. 5/2001 on Budgetary Stability
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mentioned above.
Figure 3.4: CPFF: number of meetings (1981-2012). Source: own elaboration from
MAP (2011b, 2013).
As to the second-level bodies of the CPFF, neither the LOFCA nor the Coun-
cil internal Regulations provide for the establishment of permanent Commissions.
The Plenum is, however, accorded the power to set up temporary, ad hoc Working
Groups. In the last ten years, six Working Groups have been operant under the
Council umbrella. As a whole, their activity cannot be considered as particularly
intense: in total, about seventy technical meetings were organized in the period
under consideration (CPFF 2004-2013; see Table 3.4). In the light of the foregoing
remarks, it should not be surprising that the Working Group displaying the highest
continuity over time and the highest frequency of annual meetings (four on aver-
age) was the one dealing with Budgetary Stability (Estabilidad Presupuestaria).
The remaining bodies, because of their ad hoc nature, met only sporadically and,
very often, over a limited span of time. This was the case, for instance, of the group
in charge of elaborating a methodology in order to implement the "Institutional
Loyalty" (Lealtad Institucional) principle provided for by the LOFCA: it met just
twice in 2003 and once in 2005, but it was never able to agree on a common working
method (CPFF 2006). A Group created in order to address the existing financing
problems of the AACC, in fact, never met as a group: its activity basically con-
sisted in that several Communities sent their written remarks on that matter to
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the Council. Other groups – such as the one tasked with Health Spending Analysis
(Análisis del Gasto Sanitario) and the one established in order to assess the im-
pact of the growth of the Spanish population (Población) on regional spending –
were more productive: they both prepared a final Report (although not shared by
all participants; see Chapter 6), to be then discussed by the Council17. It should
be also remarked that they met very few times: the Group on Health Spending
was called just eight times (three in 2005 and in 2006, two in 2007), while the unit
on Population Growth met thirteen times over four years (two times in 2004, four
in 2005, and seven in 2007). Eventually, a Group on the Sustainability of Public
Finance met five times, just in the year of its foundation (2010).
Table 3.4: CPFF Working Groups: number of meetings (2003-2012).
Working Group 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Estabilidad Presupues-
taria [2002]
2 4 4 4 6 3 3 5 2 7
Lealtad Institucional
[2002]
2 1
Población [2004] 2 4 7
Análisis del Gasto
Sanitario [2005]
3 2
Problemática del Vi-
gente Sistema de Fi-
nanciación [2006]
Sostenibilidad de las
Finanzas Públicas
[2010]
5
4 6 9 7 15 3 3 10 2 7
Total (2003-2012) 66
Source: own elaboration from CPFF (2004-2013).
Key: [ ] = year of estabslishment of the Working Group.
3.2.4 A new vertical, generalist IGA: the Conference of
the Presidents
As seen, the policy-specific design of vertical multilateral IGR and IGAs can be
considered as one of the defining features of the Spanish intergovernmental ar-
rangements system. Contrary to what happened in Italy, in fact, the Estado de
las Autonomias has been devoid – during its first twenty-five years of existence
– of any vertical generalist multilateral arrangement (such as the Italian State-
17Until 2005 inclusive, the Group on Health Spending was formally dependent on the Confer-
ence of the Presidents (see § 3.2.4): it is for this reason that no meeting is reported in Table 3.4
in 2005.
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Regions Conference) including all the central and regional heads of government.
Up to 2004, the Presidents of the Autonomous Communities had never met all
together (except in Bruxelles, at the Committee of the Regions, or in some cele-
bration with the royal family; Aja 2006, p. 789). According to many IGR Spanish
scholars, «one of the most striking deficiencies in the formalized system of vertical
cooperation in the State of the Autonomies has been the absence of a mechanism
devoted to political dialog at the highest level between diﬀerent public authorities
in order to enable a coherent functioning of the State» (Ruiz González 2012, p.
300, translated; Gálvez Muñoz and Ruiz González 2013)18.
The first proposals to create such kind of IGA in the Spanish system had been
put forward in the early Nineties. At the academic level, the establishment of a
vertical, generalist IGA had been proposed by Professor Albertí in 1993 (Gálvez
Muñoz and Ruiz González 2013). At the political level, it had been the then
Popular President of the Galician Autonomous Community, Manuel Fraga Irib-
arne, to envision, in his intervention at the Senate General Commission of the
Autonomous Communities, the set-up of a "Conference of the Presidents": the so
called "Iribarne Proposal" envisioned the institutionalization of a vertical and gen-
eralist intergovernmental arrangement characterized by regularity of meetings (to
be called, at least, every six months), and the power to adopt binding agreements
by consensus19.
Ten years later, in 2004, the issue came to the floor: the creation of a Confer-
ence of the Presidents (Conferencia de Presidentes) was indeed included by the
socialist Prime Minister Zapatero in his electoral manifesto (PSOE 2004, p. 60)
as well as in his inaugural address to the Parliament. The socialist leader pictured
the constitution of such an IGA as a way to increase – along with the reform of
the Senate (in fact, never occurred) – the overall eﬃciency of the complex inter-
governmental system characterizing the Spanish State:
[. . . ] I do want to establish a Conference of the Presidents, gathering all of us
in charge of the Governments of the whole State and of each of the Commu-
nities. A Conference whose first meeting I would like to celebrate during the
last trimester of this year. A Conference which shall be the suitable comple-
ment to a reformed Senate. Thanks to the eﬀective activity of both forums,
it will be easy to address the reform of the interterritorial cooperation tools,
and to implement the participation of the Autonomous Communities into
the formation and expression of the State will in the European Union. In
this way, we will improve the participation and the coordination of all public
powers, of all Public Administrations (Cortes Generales 2004, translated).
18For a broader comparative perspective about the possible combinations of vertical and hor-
izontal arrangements, see also Table 1.3.
19«Una idea de Fraga de la que recela el PP», El País - Edición Impresa, December 14th 2009.
150
It appears important to stress that, as in the case of first Sectoral Conferences
in the Eighties, the creation of this new Conference was again the consequence of
an essentially top-down initiative, that is wished for and autonomously taken by
the central Government (Gálvez Muñoz and Ruiz González 2013).
The actual establishment of such an IGA was preceded by a public debate over
the definition of many major features of its design, even including the vertical or
horizontal nature of the Conference. The Government finally opted for a vertical,
standing arrangement, to be – at the beginning, at least – only minimally regulated.
Another contested issue pertained to the relationships to be possibly established
between the new Conference and the existing Sectoral Conferences (should the
new IGA be conceived as hierarchically dominant over them?) (Aja 2004).
While many of these questions were still open, the first meeting of the Con-
ferencia de Presidentes was finally called by the Prime Minister on October 28th,
2004.
Internal structure and working organization
In the Conference celebrated in 2009, internal Regulations were passed, as re-
quired by the main opposition party (the PP) and promised in 2008 by the then
Prime Minister in his second inaugural address to the Parliament20. Such rules
have contributed to clarify some basic organizational and functional aspects of
the Conference, which had been working, up to that moment, following extremely
informal procedures.
The Conference is defined as the highest body of political cooperation between
the central Government and those of the Autonomous Communities, operating
according to the above-mentioned principle of "Institutional Loyalty". As in typical
"executive federalism" arrangements, the members of this Conference are the Prime
Minister (who chairs it) and the Regional Presidents (who, significantly, must
attend in person at the Conference); the Minister in charge of Regional Aﬀairs
acts as Secretary of the Conference.
As to the tasks attributed to this vertical IGA, they are delineated in quite
vague terms: the Conferencia de Presidentes shall indeed debate on the "general
lines" of public policies, on joint actions of strategic relevance, and on all those
issues relevant for the State of the Autonomies, aﬀecting both State and regional
competences; more generally, the Conference will operate to strengthen the coop-
erative relations between the State and the Autonomous Communities, as well as
to "encourage and drive" the work of the Sectoral Conferences and other intergov-
ernmental arrangements.
20Furthermore, the Prime Minister committed himself to calling the Conference in order to
reach "concrete agreements" with the Autonomous Communities on: gender violence; educational
system; climate change; Cortes Generales 2008
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In respect to the agenda setting procedures, during the first meeting (2004),
largely devoted to the institutionalization of the Conference itself, it was agreed
that meetings should be called regularly, at least once per year. 2009 Regulations
specified that the Conference is to be convened by the Prime Minister, who is also
accorded the power to set the order of business, the date and the place of the
meetings (generally, the Senate); extraordinary meetings may also be organized,
on the initiative of the Prime Minister or at the request of the majority of the
Autonomic Presidents.
From an organizational point of view, it may be interesting to remark that,
up to the last encounter (held in 2012), the Conference lacked any administra-
tive, standing structure of support such a Secretariat Oﬃce (no agreement had
been found on this point in 2004): these tasks were in fact carried out, as in-
formally established in the first meeting, by oﬃcials of the Ministry of Public
Administrations, while the Minister was responsible of the overall preparation of
the encounters. The lack of any infrastructure supporting in a stable way the
activity of the Conference led some scholars to speak not only of informality, but
of real "improvisation" as to the actual working organization of the IGA under
consideration (e.g. Aja 2006; 2008).
The internal Rules passed in 2009 aimed at reducing these dynamics, by cre-
ating two structures supporting the activities of the Conference: a Preparatory
Committee (Comité Preparatorio) and a Standing Secretariat Oﬃce. Coordinated
by the Minister to Regional Aﬀairs and composed of all the regional Councilors
responsible for territorial issues, the Preparatory Committee is in charge of analyz-
ing the items to be then discussed, and of preparing the documentation necessary
for organizing the plenary meetings of the Conference; items not addressed by the
Committee can nevertheless be included in the order of business by the Prime
Minister, as well as by one third of regional Presidents. The Committee is sup-
ported by a Standing Secretariat, reporting, in turn, to the Ministry of Regional
Aﬀairs. For the analysis of "common interest issues", the Conference has also the
power to establish ad hoc Commissions and Working groups. Even if not formally
provided, such a possibility had already been used by the Conference in 2004,
when a Working Group on health care spending had been created (cf. Chapter
6). In 2007, another Group had been established with the task of elaborating the
Conference Regulations. In 2009, the Government proposal of creating two more
Working Groups in order to address the economic crisis was instead rejected, be-
cause of the opposition of the Autonomous Communities led by the Popular Party.
In the last meeting (2012), Presidents agreed on the creation of two new Working
Groups, which, however, should work not within the Conference itself, but under
the subject-related Sectoral Conferences.
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Tools and decision-making rules
Consistently with the eminently political nature of this intergovernmental arrange-
ment, the acts adopted by the Conference of the Presidents are to be inteded as
political compromises, devoid, as such, of any legal power (Gálvez Muñoz and
Ruiz González 2013): the main Conference goal is indeed not to adopt legally
binding decisions, but rather to reach political agreements on issues of particular
relevance to the State of the Autonomies. Two kinds of acts are envisioned in the
Regulations: the Agreements (Acuerdos) and the Recommendations (Recomenda-
ciones). Agreements have to be passed by consensus (provided that two thirds of
the regional Presidents attend the Conference), while Recommendations can be
approved with the consent of the Prime Minister and, at least, two thirds of the
attending regional Presidents (they commit only the subscribers).
Activity
Despite the great emphasis publicly given to such initiative by the central Gov-
ernment, and its undisputed innovative nature in the Spanish intergovernmental
context, the Conference has been playing, up to now, a basically symbolic role.
In sharp contrast with the "eﬀective activity" of the Conference wished for by the
then Prime Minister Zapatero, the actual functioning of this IGA has been highly
irregular and characterized by a very low intensity. In the period comprised be-
tween 2004 (year of foundation) and 2012, only five meetings have been celebrated,
instead of nine as initinally agreed by central and regional Presidents. In four years
– 2006, 2008, 2010, 2011 – the Conference was not called at all. Moreover, each
session was organized following a quite diﬀerent format.
The first one was devoted to the institutionalization of the Conference itself,
to the participation of the Autonomous Communities to the Communitarian in-
stitutions, as well as to the problems related to healthcare financing. Presidents,
as seen, agreed on several organizational features of the Conference. However, no
agreement was found on the establishment of second-level bodies nor of a standing
technical Secretariat. The second meeting of the Conference of the Presidents,
of particular interest for this analysis, was called in September 2005: it focused
entirely on problems related to healthcare financing. As will be explained in more
detail further on, at the end of this meeting, the members of the Conference were
not even in agreement on whether the Conference had produced any decision or
not (cf. § 6.4). The third meeting was celebrated two years later (January 2007)
to address water, research and immigration policies: a "Joint Document" on Re-
search, Technological Development and Innovation was passed by the Conference,
which also agreed on the establishment of two new Sectoral Conferences (respec-
tively, on Water and Immigration; see Table 3.3). In December 2009, the fourth
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Conference focused on gender-based violence problem, and dealt with the issuing
of the internal Regulations of this vertical IGA. For the first time, representa-
tives of the social partners took part in the meeting. The documents approved by
the Conference were the Agreement on the internal Regulations, and a couple of
Declarations on the Spanish Presidency of the EU and gender violence; however,
no agreement was reached on other relevant issues on the agenda (employment,
sustainable development, etc.). Eventually, the last Conference meeting, held in
2012, centered on public deficit reduction.
In total, up to now, the Conference has issued two agreements, three Declara-
tions and one "Joint Document"21.
The high irregularity of the meetings celebrated so far, coupled with their ex-
tremely low frequency, the limited number of issues debated by the Conference,
together with the high informality characterizing its functioning, certainly con-
tribute to explain a certain skepticism of the Spanish literature about this Con-
ference and its role in the system of Spanish IGR. Up to this time, the approval
of the internal Regulations does not seem to have introduced any relevant change
into the actual working of this IGA.
3.2.5 The Bilateral Cooperation Commissions
Even if this analysis focuses mainly on multilateral IGAs, and multilateral IGR
may be considered as «the most developed and stable form of cooperation between
the State and the Autonomous Communities» (García Morales 2009, p. 54, trans-
lated), the description of the Spanish vertical IGR landscape would prove highly
incomplete if bilateral intergovernmental arrangements were not mentioned.
Since the beginning of the State of the Autonomies, indeed, multilateral co-
operation carried on by means of the Sectoral Conferences has been paralleled by
bilateral cooperation conducted in so called Bilateral Cooperation Commissions
(Comisiones bilaterales de cooperación). Such Commissions, which can be defined
as vertical, bilateral IGAs established for addressing intergovernmental issues in-
volving the State and one single Community, may in turn be divided into generalist
and sectoral arrangements.
The generalist Bilateral Commissions were gradually created between 1983 and
2000, as shown in Table 3.5. It is easy to note that first bilateral Commissions
were created between the State and the Communities provided, since the begin-
ning, with a broad range of powers (the historical nationalities, Catalonia, Basque
Country, Galicia, Navarre plus Andalusia). By contrast, many of the remaining
21Some of these documents are available on the webpage of the Secretaría de Estado de
Administraciones Públicas (of the Minister of Public Administrations), in the section devoted
to the Conference of the Presidents: http://www.seap.minhap.gob.es/es/areas/politica_
autonomica/coop_autonomica/Confer_Presidentes.html.
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Table 3.5: Bilateral Cooperation Commissions: year of
foundation.
Year Autonomous Community
1984 Navarre [1982]
1987 Basque Country [1979], Catalonia [1979], Galicia [1981],
Andalusia [1981]
1988 Murcia [1982], La Rioja [1982]
1989 Balearic Islands [1983]
1990 Aragon [1982], Canaries [1982]
1991 Cantabria [1981]
1992 Castile-Léon [1983], Extremadura [1983]
1993 Asturias [1981]
1995 Ceuta, Melilla [1995]
1996 Castile-La Mancha [1982]
2000 Valencian Community [1982], Madrid [1983]
Key: [ ] = year of establishment of the Autonomous Community.
Communities lacked of bilateral IGAs with the State for several years after their
establishment. Since 2000, all Communities have a generalist Bilateral Commis-
sion22.
By means of these IGAs, the State and the Community in question are given
the possibility to jointly debate and analyze issues of mutual concern, but also
to reach intergovernmental agreements (convenios) and implement joint actions
for addressing specific problems. Transfers of new powers from the State to the
Communities are generally managed making use of these Commissions.
The basic, common legal regulatory framework of Bilateral Commissions was
set only in 1999 by Law no. 4, reforming the 1992 LRJ-PAC. As seen, in 1992
the Second Autonomic Pacts tried to give a boost to multilateral cooperation. In
such a framework, Bilateral Commissions were defined as the tool to be used when
the specific issues of each Community cannot be addressed by means of Sectoral
Conferences: «Bilateral Cooperation Commissions are the most eﬀective instru-
ment for the continuous exchange of information, for negotiations and agreements,
in order to address the needs arising from the geographical, cultural, linguistic
peculiarities or from the statutory provisions of each Community»23. However,
no provision was included in the next LRJ-PAC concerning the regulation of such
Comissions.
It was thus only in 1999 that Bilateral Cooperation Commissions were finally
22On the diﬀerences in the competences accorded to the Autonomous Communities, see § 4.3.2.
23The text of the Pacts is available on the IDP - Instituto de Derecho Público web-
site: http://www.idpbarcelona.net/docs/recerca/ccaa/pdf/documentos/acuerd_auton_
gob_psoe_1992.pdf.
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given (a minimum) legal basis. The reformed LRJ-PAC stated indeed that bilat-
eral IGAs – to be composed of members of the central Government and of one
regional executive – are called Comisiones Bilaterales de Cooperación: they must
be created by means of an agreement, setting, in turn, the basic features of the
Commission itself (Sect. no. 5.2). After a reform passed in 2000 (Organic Law No.
1/2000), Bilateral Commissions have been also legally accorded a function of con-
flict prevention: they can, indeed, reach agreements for the preventive resolution
of contrasts between the State and a Community on the constitutional legitimacy
of a State or a regional act.
Eventually, in the last years, the role of some Bilateral Commissions has been
legally strengthened. Five Communities – Catalonia, Andalusia, Aragon, Castile
and Leon, and Extremadura – have indeed included the Bilateral Commissions in
their new statutory provisions: in this way, these Comisiones have become part of
the so called "Constitutionality Block".
Internal structure and working organization
Although each Commission is ruled by its own founding agreement and its own
internal Regulations, these latter tend to be quite similar (Ramos Gallarín 2008,
pp. 158-160). As to the members of these Commissions, they are always represen-
tatives issued from the central and regional executives. Some of them are standing
members of the Comisiones, while others change depending on the issues to be
debated. In representation of the State, the standing members are the central
Minister of Public Administrations, who chairs the Commission; the Secretary of
State for Territorial Cooperation; the representative of the central Government
in the Autonomous Community at issue; the Director General of the Ministry of
Public Administrations, along with an oﬃcial from the same Ministry, who acts
as Secretary. Communities are instead represented by the Vice-President (or the
councilor in charge of Institutional Aﬀairs), who co-chairs the Commission; the
Budget Councilor as well as the managers of the Community’s Legal Advisory
Oﬃce and of Parliamentary Relations (Ramos Gallarín 2008).
The agenda is jointly defined by the State and the Community in question, and
the call of meeting can be required by both actors; in no case internal regulations
provide for a pre-scheduled or minimum frequency of the meetings.
Sub-commissions and Committees may also be established by mutual agree-
ment between regional and central representatives.
Activity
Coming to the activity of these bilateral arrangements, it has been remarked that,
on the whole, «in spite of some stereotypes spread by Spanish and foreign scholars
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on the prevalence of bilateral means of collaboration or interaction, a detailed
analysis of data shows that bilateral cooperation organs have been not a widely
used tool, and, in any case, much less used than multilateral ones» (Colino and
Parrado, 2009, p. 207, translated).
For most of the Communities, indeed, the activation of the Bilateral Commis-
sions has been highly sporadic. In some cases, the Commission was even called just
once, on the occasion of the founding meeting (Castile-Leon and Madrid), or twice
(Extremadura). Just a subgroup of Communities has used Bilateral Commissions
more frequently: Navarre, Catalonia, Andalusia, Basque Country and Canaries
(Colino and Parrado, 2009). However, even in these cases, the frequency of meet-
ings has been, on average, lower than twice per year. After the above-evoked 2000
reform, the bulk of the activity carried on through these bilateral arrangements
has been related to the conflict prevention function (Ramos Gallarín 2008).
It must be finally added that some Communities have created, in addition to
the generalist Bilateral Cooperation Commissions, vertical bilateral arrangements
for addressing policy-specific issues: it is the case of Bilateral Commissions on
Taxation (in the Basque Country and Navarre)24; on Security (in the Basque
Country, Catalonia and Navarre); on European Issues (in the Basque Country,
Catalonia and Canary Islands); on Immigration (in Catalonia and Canary Islands).
With the exception of those dealing with taxation, the remaining Commissions
appear in fact to be characterized by an extremely low degree of activity (Colino
and Parrado, 2009).
3.3 The horizontal dimension of IGRs and IGAs
As mentioned in the introductory Section to this Chapter, the extreme weakness
(not to say the complete lack) of Spanish IGAs at the horizontal level is often
presented by scholars – together with the absence, for several decades, of any
vertical and generalist arrangement – as a peculiar trait of this intergovernmental
system. In its first thirty years, the Spanish State of Autonomies had indeed been
lacking of any kind of horizontal intergovernmental arrangement: interregional
collaboration might be reasonably characterized as "precarious", if not "almost
inexistent" (García Morales 2006). In sharp contrast to what happened in Italy,
intergovernmental relations – of both multilateral and bilateral nature – developed
and were channeled exclusively along the vertical dimension. Until the end of the
2000s no horizontal intergovernmental arrangement was thus set-up.
24These Autonomous Communities, as it will be explained (cf. § 4.3.2), enjoy a special fiscal
regime.
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As it was the case for for vertical intergovernmental relations, the Spanish
Constitution did not oﬀer any legal support to the establishment of any kind of
horizontal IGA. The Charter envisioned nevertheless the possibility, of "proce-
dural" collaboration between the Communities (that is the possibility to reach
formal, horizontal agreements; Sect. no. 145.2). In the opinion of many Span-
ish legal scholars, however, such constitutional provisions would have hampered,
rather than facilitating, horizontal relations, because of the high complexity of the
(ill-defined) mechanisms envisioned for formalizing such agreements (e.g. García
Morales 2006; Ruiz González 2012)25.
Such a situation persisted until the end of the 2000s, when some changes oc-
curred in the Spanish horizontal intergovernmental landscape.
In 2008, a group of Autonomous Communities – the six which had reformed
their "Statutes of Autonomy" between 2006 and 200826 – started to organize a
series of meetings, with the aim of «working together by establishing horizontal
mechanisms of cooperation» in order to implement the autonomic powers deriving
from their newly amended Statutes27. In the first meeting, which took place in
Zaragoza in July 2008 on the initiative of Aragon, the representatives of these Au-
tonomous Communities commonly declared the necessity to find a solution to the
lack of any meeting and collaboration forum among Autonomous Communities28.
After this first encounter, regional representatives met seven more times: one
more in 2008; three times in 2009 and as many in 2010. These meetings were
called Encuentros entre las Comunidades Autónomas para el desarrollo de sus
Estatutos de Autonomía (Meetings among the Autonomous Communities for the
Implementation of their Statutes of Autonomy). The initial group of Communi-
ties gradually expanded, coming to include also regional governments without a
reformed Statute of Autonomy, such as La Rioja and Castile-La Mancha (March
2010); Madrid, Galicia and the Basque Country (July 2010); Cantabria, Murcia,
Navarre and Extremadura (October 2010).
In the last Encuentro, the Autonomous Communities eventually agreed to
transform these meetings into a full-fledged horizontal, generalist intergovernmen-
25Two diﬀerent kinds of interregional agreements are envisioned by the constitutional text: the
acuerdos de cooperación (to be authorized by the national Parliament) and the convenios de co-
laboración (to be simply communicated to the Parliament). The diﬃculty to distinguish between
these two kinds of agreements and the evident willingness of the center to keep interregional co-
operation under (strict) control are often pointed out by Spanish scholars as factors undermining
horizontal cooperation in that Country: paradoxically, from a legal point of view, it would be
easier, to the Autonomous Communities, reaching international cross-border agreements than
interregional accords (Garcia Morales 2006, pp. 32-33).
26Andalusia, Aragon, Castile and León, Catalonia, Valencia and Balearic Islands.
27Press release of the Meeting held in Zaragoza, on July 9th, 2008. Document available at:
http://www.conferenciacomunidadesautonomas.org/encuentros.html.
28Ibidem.
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tal arrangement: the so called Conference of the Governments of the Autonomous
Communities (Conferencia de los Gobiernos de las Comunidades Autónomas), de-
fined as the «main body of coordination and cooperation among regional govern-
ments, without the participation of the State, promoting the development and the
right coordination of shared competences for the benefit of citizens»29. More specif-
ically, the main objectives pursued by the new horizontal IGA were to promote
the collaboration among Autonomous Communities and between these latter and
the central Administration, as well as to facilitate the celebration of the vertical
Conference of the Presidents.
To this end, regional representatives adopted a document containing highly
detailed "Rules of Working and Organization".
Internal structure and working organization
According to these Rules, the horizontal Conference – a voluntarily horizontal
cooperation tool – is articulated into Plenum, Presidency and Standing Secretariat.
The Plenum is composed of members of the regional executives: notice that
they are not the Autonomic Presidents. The possibility is envisioned of inviting
representatives of the National Government to attend the meetings of the Confer-
ence.
As to the Presidency, the Conference should be chaired by a representative
of a regional government for a six-month period: the Presidency should be sup-
ported, as for the secretariat functions, by the administrative structures of its own
Community, in charge of preparing and calling the meetings. In order to moni-
tor the agreements adopted and stimulate their actual implementation, as well as
in order to circulate the preparatory documentation between the Communities, a
Permanent Secretariat was also established.
This IGA should meet twice a year (during the first week of March and the
first week of November). Extraordinary plenary meetings may be convened, at
the instance of at least nine Communities. Policy-specific meetings may also be
organized. Each encounter should be prepared by a technical commission, whose
membership must include one representative from each Community (at the level, at
least, of Director General). Working Groups and Commissions may be established
by the Plenum.
The agenda setting process was regulated in minute detail. Plenary meeting
must be called by the Community chairing the Conference, giving a very long
advance notice (about two months); after that moment, each Autonomous Com-
munity can propose items to be included into the order of business of the meeting
(this phase should last about two weeks); as a third step, the Secretariat of the
29Press release of the Meeting held in Santiago de Compostela, on October 25th, 2010. Docu-
ment available at: http://www.conferenciacomunidadesautonomas.org/encuentros.html.
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Conference should call the technical commission, in charge of preparing a proposal
of order of business, in the light of the political feasibility and technical state of
advancement of each of the items previously proposed; then, each Community
must elaborate its own position on the order of business proposed by the techni-
cal commission; at the end of this complex process, the Community chairing the
Conference can eventually set the agenda, about one week before the date of the
plenary meeting.
Tools and decision-making rules
Deliberations may concern both the adoption of cooperation agreements (convenios
or protocolos de colaboración; see above) and of joint statements on general political
issues (declaraciones políticas). In the former case, if consensus is not reached,
decisions may be taken by majority (provided that the remaining Communities do
not vote against; in this case, agreements apply only to signatories). In the latter
case, unanimity should be the rule, even if statements may also be adopted as
the oﬃcial stance of the Conference when fifteen Communities agree. In no case
documents approved by the Conference can be considered as legally binding.
Eventually, it may be interesting to remark that the last section of these Rules
provides for the procedures to be followed by the Communities wishing to opt out
from the Conference.
Activity
Considering the whole period of organized interregional cooperation (that is, 2008-
2011), several declarations (10) and cooperation agreements have been reached
(about 20), over a range of diverse policy fields (from Industry to Fishery, from
Public Transports to Agriculture).
However, as a matter of fact, in spite of the high degree of detail of the Rules of
Working and Organization just reviewed, as well of the quite intense level of activ-
ity reached since the first interregional meeting in 2008, once formally established,
the Conference of the Governments of the Autonomous Communities has proved
to be an almost completely inoperative arrangement. Not much unlike the vertical
Conference of the Presidents, and consistently with the long-established Spanish
tradition of week, virtually inexistent, horizontal institutionalized intergovernmen-
tal coordination, the Conference met just once (2011) after its foundation. Since
then, the Conference may be considered as de facto extincted.
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Chapter 4
Comparing Italian and Spanish
IGAs: Why So Diﬀerent?
4.1 Introduction
After having outlined the major features of the Intergovernmental Arrangements
at work in Italy and Spain, in this Chapter the two national cases will be compared
in depth, in order to single out the main institutional conditions able to account
for their current contrasting institutional landscapes. Analytically, what will be
treated in Chapters 5 and 6 as the major explanatory variable, will be treated
here – taking a "systemic perspective" – as the major variable to be explained.
The basic logic of inquiry underlying the analysis proposed in this Chapter may
be portrayed as adopting a "causes-of-eﬀects" approach of explanation (Brady and
Collier 2004), as long as the main goal is explaining why two particular cases,
Italy and Spain, do present contrasting outcomes: Why do diﬀerent systems opt
for diﬀerent Intergovernmental Arrangements?
In order to identify the most relevant conditions able to explain cross-case
variations, the hypotheses derived from the review of the existing literature, ex-
tensively examined in Chapter 1, will be now empirically tested. To this end, the
historical account oﬀered in Chapters 2 and 3 – integrated with additional evi-
dence – will be systematically appraised taking a more theory-driven perspective.
Special attention will be devoted to the cluster of hypotheses referring to what I
have labeled in Chapter 1 "polity and politics factors". Because of the focus on
healthcare policy in both (EU member) countries, I will not consider specific policy
factors (diﬀerent from the kind of competence allocation) as potentially relevant
explanatory conditions in such step of the analysis. The focus will be put on those
features of the institutional architecture of the State and on its politics dynamics
identified by the literature as potentially exerting an impact on the kind of Inter-
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governmental Arrangements operating in compound contemporary democracies.
Hence, the role of conditions such as the kind of powers distribution between dif-
ferent layers of government (shared/exclusive), and among the subnational units
(symmetrical/asymmetrical), the strength of the second parliamentary chamber as
an eﬀective channel of representation of territorial interests, the number and the
features of the constituent units as well as their internal decision-making dynamics,
will be assessed.
The comparison will be based on the so called "method of diﬀerence": mostly
applicable for small-N situations, it allows focusing attention on a reduced number
of potentially relevant explanatory factors, while controlling for many other rival
explanations. The underlying "logic of elimination" will make thus possible to
exclude as candidate causes for the variance of the observed outcomes any condition
present in both cases, insofar as similarities are logically assumed not to be able
to account for the diﬀerences in the observed outcomes (and vice-versa) (George
and Bennett 2005).
Collected evidence will enable us to focus the attention on: the degree of sym-
metry of the constitutional design (partly due to diﬀerent levels of societal ho-
mogeneity within the two countries), and the kind of decision-making dynamics
prevailing within both national and sub-national governments. As it will be shown,
these are indeed the conditions showing most variance when looking at the two sys-
tems under analysis. As put in evidence by the existing literature, an asymmetric
constitutional design is particularly conductive to the establishment of relatively
weaker multilateral IGAs (Spain), while a more symmetrical setting tends to fa-
vor the emergence of stronger multilateral arrangements (Italy). Moreover, the
existence – particularly, in the "genetic phase" – of two rather diﬀerent systems of
government in the Spanish and Italian central and regional governments seems to
have played a relevant part in shaping IGAs’ evolution in diﬀerent ways. Consis-
tently with theoretical expectations recently elaborated in the literature (Bolleyer
2006, 2009; Bolleyer and Bytzek 2009), majoritarian, single-party governments are
generally associated with lower degrees of multilateral IGAs’ institutionalization
(Spain), whereas governments based on broad, overlapping coalitions appear more
likely to lead to relatively higher levels of multilateral IGAs’ institutionalization
(Italy from 1970s to mid-1990s).
In line with the adoption of a historical new-institutional approach, I will not
use cross-case comparative methods in an overly deterministic manner. The as-
sessment of the impact of each condition on the outcomes will be made by taking
into account evidence from within-case analysis (allowing to assess whether as-
sociations developed through cross-case comparison are in fact causal; Mahoney
2000a, p. 409; George and Bennett 2005), and considering the specific temporal
unfolding of each causal condition: constitutional asymmetry of powers preceding
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increasing symmetry in Spain, and power-sharing preceding majoritarian dynamics
within the constitutive units of the polity in Italy. Taking a diachronic rather than
a synchronic perspective will make possible to look at possible "path-dependent"
eﬀects (Pierson 2000; Mahoney 2000b) exerted by each explanatory condition on
the historical development of the intergovernmental machineries under analysis.
The remainder of this Chapter is organized as follows. After having summa-
rized the major diﬀerences between Spanish and Italian IGAs, already implicitly
emerged from previous discussion, I will turn to the examination of the role played
in the two national cases by the theoretically relevant causal factors pointed out
in Chapter 1. A final, comparative assessment of these factors will conclude the
Chapter.
4.2 Italian and Spanish IGAs compared
Considering the landscapes of Intergovernmental Arrangements outlined in the
two previous Chapters it appears evident that Italy is characterized by a stronger
development of multilateral IGAs (both on the vertical and on the horizontal di-
mension) than Spain. In Table 4.1 the main features pertaining to the institution-
alization dimensions of each Intergovernmental Arrangement under examination,
are summarized in a schematic way.
The most striking diﬀerences between the two national cases under analysis
pertain to the horizontal level of organized intergovernmental cooperation.
The absence of any regular, clearly institutionalized system of ongoing coop-
eration among the Spanish Autonomous Communities stands in sharp contrast to
the highly structured horizontal intergovernmental arrangement at work in Italy.
Here, as it has been described, Regions have been able to self-organize in order
to coordinate their action, particularly to foster political relationships with the
national Government. The recently established Spanish Conference of the Au-
tonomic Governments can hardly be interpreted as an equivalent of the Italian
Conference of the Regions. Although provided with a formal basis (setting, as
seen, its rules of working in a very detailed way), the Spanish Conference met
just once. This makes even impossible to assess the density of contacts among
its members as well as the actual existence and operation of the network of bu-
reaucratic and technical support designed by the Regulations of this Conference.
Consequently, the existence itself of this IGA could be reasonably even called into
question. By contrast, the Conference of the Regions, managing the relationships
among the Italian Regions since the early 1980s, can be considered as an highly
institutionalized arena, also in a broader comparative perspective1. Since 2005
1For data on and an assessment of the institutionalization level of many horizontal intergov-
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this arrangement provided itself with a document laying out in a very specific its
internal rules of working (for the most part, formalizing, in fact, long-established
informal practices). Meetings (both at the political and at the technical level)
occur in a regular and frequent way: in the last ten years (2003-2012), about 35
plenary meetings have been celebrated each year. As seen, the activity of the Con-
ference is supported by an articulated bureaucratic and technical network, made
of political Commissions and Technical Committees (split, in turn, into smaller
units), and bureaucratic oﬃces (the standing Secretariat and its branches): they
follow highly formalized procedures and, as it has been described, ensure the on-
going and "regular" working of this IGA.
Even if less sharp, diﬀerences between the two cases do exist also in what con-
cerns vertical arrangements. The initial policy-specific design of intergovernmental
arrangements was gradually substituted in Italy by generalist relationships, man-
aged by means the State-Region Conference. This multilateral IGA, established
by the central Government in the early 1980s at the request of the Regions, grad-
ually imposed itself as the major tool of regional participation to national policy-
making: strict advisory activity was gradually paralleled by increasing forms of
"co-determination" of State acts by central and regional level representatives. Al-
though generalist, large part of its activity is devoted to health policy. It meets, on
average, more than fifteen times per year, according to a pre-established calendar,
usually jointly decided with the Regions; its activity is supported by a standing
Secretariat Oﬃce, divided, in turn, into policy-related Services (notice that both
State and regional oﬃcials are included in the Secretariat staﬀ). On the whole, the
account provided in Chapter 2 has showed that this IGA cannot be easily qual-
ified, as made by some scholars, as a «purely consultative body [. . . ] convoked
on request of the central state, which also determines the agenda» (Palermo and
Wilson 2014, p. 522). By contrast, in Spain, multilateral vertical cooperation
has been managed mainly through policy-specific arrangements, which have never
been able to develop a level of activity as intense as in the Italian case: both the
Interterritorial Council of the National Health System and the Fiscal and Finan-
cial Policy Council meet, on average, four times per year, basically when convened
by the central executive; they may rely on the support of Working Groups (often,
of an ad hoc nature) for the preparation of the issues to be debated; secretariat
functions are ensured by administrative units reporting to the Ministry chairing
the Conference (which means that these IGAs are not provided with a dedicated
Secretariat), and not including regional oﬃcials. The establishment of a vertical,
ernmental arrangements (even if according to slightly diﬀerent criteria than those used here) see
Bolleyer and Bytzek (2009). See also Appendix A for an overview of main vertical and horizontal
IGAs at work in several federal and quasi-federal Western countries.
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generalist Conference, set up on the central Government initiative in 2004, has rep-
resented an interesting attempt to increase the multilateral nature of the Spanish
IGR system, by filling one of its historical "gaps": however, the very improvisation
of such (unilateral) initiative – reduced, to a certain measure, through the approval
of the Conference Regulations in 2009 – casts doubts on its very eﬀectiveness.
The analysis of the processes of multilateral IGAs formation in the two coun-
tries has also shown that while in Italy subnational governments were able to
mobilize in order to strengthen multilateral cooperation (both at the horizontal
level and at the vertical one), in Spain Autonomous Communities never acted col-
lectively to request a deeper involvement in multilateral multi-level policy-making.
4.3 Looking for an explanation
Consistently with theoretical insights outlined in Chapter 1, in this Section I will
review the role played in each national case by several potentially relevant condi-
tions, in order to single out those which – in the light of the empirical evidence
collected – may be reasonably assumed to have played a major part in shaping
current features of the horizontal and vertical IGAs in the two countries. To this
end, I will start by ruling out those factors whose impact can easily be discarded:
in this way, I will limit the spectrum of probable conditions accounting for the ob-
served diﬀerences; in the second part, I will focus the attention on this remaining
set of conditions, in order to assess more clearly their actual explanatory relevance
in the cases under analysis.
4.3.1 Ruled out explanatory conditions
The polity factors
When looking at "polity factors", it is easy to identify several conditions which,
being shared by the two selected national cases or contradicting theoretically ex-
pected causal patterns, may be ruled out as candidate causes of the institutional
developments under scrutiny.
The form of State Starting from the form of State, I argue that neither Italy
nor Spain can be considered as full-fledged federal countries. They both can be lo-
cated in a half-way point along the unitary-federal continuum (cf. § 1.2), including
some elements of federalism, without nevertheless being federations. As seen, the
labels "strongly regionalized" or "neo-regional" State (Keating 1998; Baldi 2007)
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can easily be applied to both countries (cf. Table 1.1). Although Spain is some-
times labeled as a federal country in the strict sense of the word (e.g. Sala 2014; Aja
and Colino 2014), the point remains highly controversial, and most scholars agree
on the basically hybrid nature of its form of State. As to Italy, the devolutionary
process started in the 1970s and culminated in the constitutional changes occurred
in 2001 (when the legislative powers of the Regions were strengthened through the
amendment of Title V of the Charter) have not led to a full transformation of the
pre-exisiting regional State into a full-blown federation.
Clearly, all depends on the definition of "federation" adopted. Taking as a ref-
erence point the "standard characteristics of a federation" proposed by Swenden
(2006)2, who provides a sort of common denominator of the most widespread defi-
nitions present in the literature, none of these two countries fully comply with these
requirements. In fact, neither Spain nor Italy provide for an eﬀective representa-
tion of regional governments in one of the two national parliamentary chambers
(see discussion below); neither Spain nor Italy provide for an eﬀective involvement
of lower-level governments in the process of constitutional amendment.
Following the line of reasoning based on diﬀerences in the forms of State, federal
and confederal countries should be expected to produce higher incentives towards
the institutionalization of multilateral horizontal and vertical IGAs than regional-
ized countries: «As a reflection of [their] equal constitutionally guaranteed status,
we expected lower-level governments in confederations and federal systems to be
more likely to engage in multilateral structures of coordination, both horizontally
and vertically» (Bolleyer et al. 2014). Moreover, drawing on Swenden and Jans
(2007), the functioning of vertical IGAs should be more clearly hierarchically con-
trolled by the center in regionalized than in federal polities (due to the operation
of the so called "shadow of the hierarchy").
However, even assuming Spain to be closer than Italy to the strict federal tem-
plate along the unitary-federal continuum, empirical evidence shows in our two
cases the reverse to be true: first, as discussed in the previous Chapters, Italian
lower-level governments engage much more than the Spanish ones both in the hor-
izontal and the vertical structures of multilateral intergovernmental coordination;
second, the ways in which these latter are organized clearly acknowledge more
room to regional governments in Italy than in Spain, where IGAs organization
tends to be clearly dominated by the central executive’s decisions.
Number, wealth and size of the constitutive units Coming to the features
of the constitutive units of the polity, several factors have to be taken into account.
Starting from the number of the units composing the polity, it may hardly be
considered as an institutional condition relevant to account for observed institu-
2Which are a refinement of the classical ones laid out by Watts (2008).
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tional variations. Theoretically, such a condition could impact on regional actors’
incentives towards participation in organized collective action, by altering relative
costs and benefits deriving to them from an investment in such structures. In such
a perspective, it could be argued that the higher the number of constituent units,
the higher the incentives towards IGAs’ institutionalization, and vice-versa: ben-
efits coming from cooperation would be higher when cooperation allows to reduce
otherwise high transaction costs, due to the high number of partners. However,
the number of sub-national units in Italy and Spain is roughly the same: 17 Au-
tonomous Communities (plus two Autonomous Cities) in the latter and 20 Regions
(plus two Autonomous Provinces) in the former.
In addition to the number of units composing the polity, one could argue that
multilateral cooperation could be hindered by the presence of strong economic dis-
parities among the constitutive units, undermining their willingness to cooperate
on equal footings with other governments, both in exclusively horizontal and in
vertical arrangements (Watts 2008). In this respect, it must be noted that while
interregional economic disparities are present in both countries, they are broader
in Italy than in Spain. Taking the distribution of the regional GDP per inhabi-
tant as a measure of the disparities in the economic strength of each regional unit
within the two countries, a higher variance is present in the Italian than in the
Spanish case (Eurostat 2007a)3. To this it should be added that, as remarked by
Moreno, «in Spain there is not such an abrupt north-south divide as is the case in
Italy» (2005, p. 4).
In what concerns regional demographic size, variation is quite high in both
countries. The relative distance between the most and the less populous regions
(a simple measure used by Watts, 2008, to calculate demographic disparities within
compound polities) is higher in Italy, where Lombardy is more than 80 times bigger
than Aosta Valley; in Spain the ratio between the largest unit (Andalusia) and the
smallest one (La Rioja) is lower than 404. The variation in the distribution of the
national population in the diﬀerent regional units is instead higher in Spain than
in Italy5.
The strength of a parliamentary chamber as a channel of territorial
representation The strength of a parliamentary chamber as a channel of terri-
torial representation could, in turn, have an influence on both central and regional
3The ratio between the highest and the lowest regional GDP per inhabitant is 2.16 in Italy
and 1.93 in Spain, while the Coeﬃcient of Variation of the regional GDP per inhabitant is equal,
respectively, to 0.24 and 0.18 (source: Eurostat 2007a).
4I do not consider the two (very small) Autonomous Cities of Ceuta and Melilla since they
were provided with Statutes of Autonomy only since 1995.
5In this case, the Coeﬃcient of Variation is 0.85 in Italy and 0.99 in Spain (source: Eurostat
2007b).
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actors’ incentives towards the establishment of intergovernmental arrangements.
Following this argument, indeed, an eﬀective territorial chamber would provide
the regions with an alternative (and less expensive) forum for coordinating their
action; similarly, the State could use the Senate for managing relations with the re-
gional level, reducing the need of setting up additional channels of communication
with lower-level governments. In a nutshell, a territorial chamber could repre-
sent a sort of "functional equivalent" of (executive federalism) intergovernmental
arrangements.
In this respect, formal institutional design in Italy and Spain appears, at first
sight, as quite distinct: indeed, while the Spanish system is formally provided with
a Senate in charge of representing territorial interests, Italy is not.
In spite of the evident regional nature of the Republic laid out by the Constitu-
tion, the 1948 Italian Charter did not envision the establishment of a parliamentary
chamber of territorial representation. The upper house – the Senate of the Re-
public – was indeed nothing but a sort of replica of the lower one, in terms of
both its composition and the tasks attributed to it. The constitutional provisions
imposing that the Senators were to be elected "on regional bases" and that the
seats of this Chamber should be distributed proportionally to the demographic
weight of each Region (Sect. no. 57) were possibly among the most important
provisions concerning IGR included in the Constitution. However, they proved
to be, from the outset, a too weak link between the regional and the national
arenas: in order to implement such constitutional requirement, ordinary electoral
laws simply envisioned, for the election of senators, the establishment of electoral
districts’ borders coinciding with those of the Regions. As to the Senate functions,
senators take part to all legislative processes, and the Government must rely on
the vote of confidence from both the lower and the upper house. Because of the
perfect equality of the two Chambers, such an arrangement is called "perfect" or
"equal" bicameralism. Furthermore, as seen in Chapter 2, to date, the possibility
introduced by 2001 constitutional revision of integrating with representatives of
subnational governments the Parliamentary Commission on Regional Issues has
not been implemented.
By contrast, the Spanish Senado is solemnly defined in the Charter as the par-
liamentary chamber of territorial representation (sect. no. 69). Nonetheless, as
unanimously stressed by the literature, the Spanish Senate revealed itself, right
from the outset, as a completely ineﬀective institutional tool for ensuring regional
access to national policy-making, particularly because of its design and its mem-
bership (Swenden 2006).
The Senate is composed of members directly elected in each Province (four
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for each Province, independently from its demographic weight, except for insular
Provinces) as well as by a number of senators appointed by each Autonomous
Community (at least one for each Community, plus one every million of inhabi-
tants). In practice, the Spanish upper chamber is composed, for almost 80%, by
senators directly elected by the voters (what’s more, in concurrent elections with
the lower house), and for only the remaining 20% by members directly designed
by the regional governments.
As a consequence, as clearly highlighted by Colomer (1998),
[t]his structure has produced very similar party compositions in the two
chambers, always allowing the party in central government to replicate or
enlarge in the Senate its party support in the Congress. In case of disagree-
ment between the two chambers, some bills are sent to a joint conference
committee, but the decision of the Congress always prevails in the end. The
Senate is thus not a decisive actor in the decision-making process and can-
not eﬀectively represent the autonomous communities in the national arena
(p. 50).
The attempt (implemented in in 1994) to increase the territorial nature of this
Chamber by the establishment within it of a Comisión General de las Comunidades
Autónomas (General Commission of the Autonomous Communities), composed
of senators, representatives of the Central Government and of the Autonomous
Communities, proved to be unsuccessful. According to the Senate Regulations,
this Commission must be informed about the "autonomic content" of any initiative
to be processed by the Senate. However, «apart from this scrutiny role on the
action of both the central and the regional executives, the General Committee has
struggled to establish itself as a participation channel for the ACs» (Moreno and
Colino 2010, p. 301).
As summarized by Börzel (2000), «[a]s a result of its composition and lack of
power in decision-making, the Spanish Senate does not constitute a real chamber
of territorial representation nor does it provide an eﬀective means for integrating
regional interests into national policymaking» (p. 24): regardless of its appella-
tion, the Senate has ended up being, de facto, a copy of the lower chamber, just
like in the Italian case, without the possibility to exert any specific and significant
function about autonomic issues (González 2012, p. 300). Up to now, despite
many debates occurred about the need to reform such a Chamber in order to
make it an eﬀective territorial Senate, no measure in such direction has ever been
implemented.
In view of the above, diﬀerences between Italy and Spain in what concerns the
actual role played by their Senates as eﬀective channels of territorial representa-
tion appears much more limited than the formal constitutional design could lead
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one to suppose. In none of these two countries the second parliamentary chamber
may thus be assumed to play the role of an IGA’s "functioning equivalent". By
consequence, it may be concluded that cross-country variation in the development
of institutional tools of both horizontal and vertical intergovernmental coopera-
tion cannot be reasonably traced back to the relative strength (or weakness) of
the respective Senates as territorial representative chambers: in other words, the
current weaker development of Spanish IGAs compared to the Italian ones cannot
be accounted by the existence of a chamber of territorial representation in that
country.
It should be further added that, as highlighted in the previous Chapters, in
none of these two countries Constitutions there were explicit references to the es-
tablishment and working of multilateral IGAs, neither at the vertical nor at the
horizontal level. In both cases, indeed, executive federalism institutions devel-
oped well beyond respective constitutional provisions. What’s more, the Spanish
Charter, diﬀerently from the Italian one, did envision some forms of "procedural"
interregional horizontal cooperation (see § 3.3), which nevertheless almost never
occurred.
4.3.2 Potentially relevant explanatory conditions
The cross-case comparison implemented up to now has allowed to rule out a num-
ber of theoretically relevant conditions, all pertaining to the organization of the
polity, as plausible causes of the observed variation. I will focus now on a set of
conditions which, by contrast, are not shared by the two cases. They refer both
to features of the polity and to political dynamics which developed within this
framework.
The Polity factors
The level of societal homogeneity The degree of societal homogeneity of the
polity may be assumed to play a part in shaping the level of institutionalization of
multilateral IGAs. The higher the internal consistency of a society across territory,
the more likely the emergence of multilateral cooperative relations and of struc-
tured channels of interaction among constituent units, and between these latter
and the center; conversely, the more inhomogeneous a society, the more likely the
establishment of conflicting intergovernmental relationships and the setting up, if
any, of institutionally weak multilateral IGAs (e.g. Baldi 2009). Watts (2008)
defines this dimension as the "regional distinctiveness" of the constituent units of
a compound polity.
In this respect, the two cases under analysis cannot be characterized as sharing
a similar condition, Spanish constitutive units clearly showing a higher degree of
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"regional distinctiveness" than the Italian ones.
Spain is often classified as a "plurinational State", because of the co-existence,
within it, of diﬀerent groups of population, each characterized by specific historical
and linguistic traditions, concentrated in given territorial areas of the country
(Swenden 2013).
As well-known, this led to the emergence of strong peripheral nationalisms since
the Nineteenth Century, particularly in Catalonia and in the Basque Country, and,
even if to a lower measure, in Galicia. At the end of the 1970s, after the fascist
and centralizing regime of General Franco, these territorially-based identities –
kept under tight repression for several decades – arose with renewed force. Far
from weakening regional claims of self-government, the francoist dictatorship had
in fact the opposite eﬀect, by increasing peripheral nationalisms claims of self-
government (Catalonia) or secession (Basque Country) (Moreno 2005). A strong
territorial cleavage, triggered by sentiments of neat opposition towards the center
by territorially distinct communities, has thus been present, since the beginning of
the Spanish democratic State, as a major driver of the political confrontation (see
§ 4.3.2). In the case of the Basque nationalism, these dynamics even led to the
adoption by nationalists of a terroristic strategy. The relevance of territorially-
defined identities within that country led Moreno (2005) to define Spain as a
"nation of nations" or as a "country of countries" (p. 1), where a double identity
(national and national, or national and regional) characterizes large strands of the
population.
When assessing the "regional distinctiveness" of a polity constituent units,
the demographic and economic (and thus political) weight of the areas in which
strongest local identities are concentrated should not be overlooked. Suﬃce it to
say that Catalonia has always been one of the most populous and most econom-
ically developed Spanish regions, including about one sixth of the entire Spanish
population, and being responsible, by its own, for about one fifth of the Spanish
national GDP (EUROSTAT 2007).
In Italy too territorially distinct communities have been present within the
country, since its unification. Major territorial diﬀerences are due to the presence
of small linguistic minorities, particularly in two boundary Northern areas: Aosta
Valley (French-speaking minority) and Alto-Adige (German-speaking minority).
In the latter, become part of the Italian State only at the end of WWI, terror-
ist strategies were employed during the 1950s and 1960s by nationalist groups,
claiming for secession from Italy and annexation to Austria.
While present, such territorially-based distinctions can hardly be compared to
those existing in Spain. These minorities, indeed, are concentrated in very small
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areas of the country, accounting for extremely small shares of both the population
(in total, 1% : about the 0.2% in Aosta Valley and the 0.8% in Alto Adige) and
the national GDP (respectively, about the 0.3 and the 1.2%) (EUROSTAT 2007).
The kind of allocation of competences As shown in Chapter 1, the set-up
and the features of diﬀerent horizontal and vertical intergovernmental arrange-
ments could also be interpreted as the consequence of the diﬀerent ways in which
powers are allocated between levels of government, and, within the horizontal
level, among constitutive units. Distribution of competences may vary in relation
to the degree of exclusiveness or concurrency of State and regional jurisdictions in
a given policy domain, as well as in what concerns to the degree of symmetry of the
competences under any single region’s jurisdiction: more precisely, «constitutional
asymmetry refers [. . . ] to diﬀerences in the status or legislative and executive
powers assigned by the constitution to the diﬀerent regional units» (Watts 2008,
p. 127).
Theoretical arguments suggest, on the one hand, that constitutional regimes
characterized by relatively higher levels of symmetry among constitutive units
should be more conductive towards the establishment and the institutionalization
multilateral arrangements (both horizontally and vertically), than regimes based
on asymmetry of powers. On the other hand, an allocation of competences be-
tween the State and lower level governments according to an exclusive or dualistic
criterion should create greater incentives towards horizontality than towards ver-
ticality.
Looking at the current situation in Italy and Spain in the health care field, it is
hard to find remarkable diﬀerences in what concerns either the degree of symmetry
among sub-national units or the kind of distribution of health competences between
the State and the regional levels. In both countries under analysis sub-national
units roughly enjoy the same powers (with some exceptions, in both countries, as
to the financing regime of a small set of regions); moreover, both in Spain and in
Italy competences on health policy are divided according to a concurrent criterion
between the State and the regional level, meaning that the former is responsible for
the overall coordination of the system and the setting of its basic principles, while
the latter is tasked with the planning, the organization and the actual management
of regional health services (García-Armesto et al. 2010; Lo Scalzo et. 2009).
Current similarities in the two countries may however be seen as the product
of two quite distinct historical patterns, where asymmetry of powers – although
present in both cases – played a much more relevant part in Spain than in Italy:
«Italy and Spain represent some recent examples of decentralisation in the health
care sector. Both countries have undergone a massive change in the organisation
of their health care systems, and this process has developed in diﬀerent ways»
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(Mosca 2006, p. 116). It appears thus necessary to consider carefully the kind
of devolutionary process followed by each of these two countries in the healthcare
sector.
The overall Italian regional system was constitutionally conceived as a non
perfectly symmetrical territorial organization. The 1948 Constitution designed
indeed a form of asymmetrical regionalism, characterized by the articulation of
the national territory into regional units endowed with diﬀerent powers: on the
one hand, the fifteen "Ordinary Statute" Regions (sect. no. 131) with concur-
rent legislative competences in the fields explicitly listed in the Constitution; on
the other hand, five "Special Statute" Regions: Aosta Valley, Trentino-Alto Adige,
Friuli-Venezia-Giulia, Sicily and Sardinia. This was a way to accommodate the
existence of territorial communities which, as seen, were characterized by pecu-
liar linguistic characteristics (German and French-speaking minorities in borders’
regions), but also as a way to deal with particular geographical conditions (in-
sularity: Sicily and Sardinia) and geo-political situations (Friuli-Venezia Giulia6).
For managing these territory-based diversities, the Constitution envisioned special
conditions and forms of autonomy for the Special Statute Regions, consisting in
areas of both concurrent and exclusive regional jurisdiction in a wide set of policy
fields, and in a strengthened constitutional protection (by means of the adoption
of their Statutes of Autonomy through constitutional, rather than ordinary, law;
Sect. no. 116).
The Italian territorial model displayed a limited degree of openness as to its
dynamic evolution: the number and the names of all the Regions were clearly
listed in the Charter, as well as the legislative competences attributed, at the same
time, to all the Ordinary Regions. Powers enjoyed by Special Regions depended,
instead, on the respective statutory provisions, which, in turn, became enforceable
only after the approval, by the Government, of specific "enacting decrees", to be
previously negotiated in a bilateral way with each Region7.
An asymmetry between the two blocks of Regions, not envisioned by the Con-
stitution, occurred de facto in what concerns the timing of their foundation. Four
out five Special Statute Regions (Trentino-Alto Adige, Sicily, Sardinia and Aosta
6A region bordering former Jugoslavia, and contended by this latter after WWII.
7Such negotiations take place in the Commissioni paritetitche Stato-Regione (Joint State-
Region Committees). These Committees are provided for by the Statute of each Special Region:
Friuli Venezia Giulia (Sect. no. 65); Sardinia (Sect. no. 56); Sicily (Sect. no. 43); Trentino-Alto
Adige (Sect. no. 107); Aosta Valley (Sect. no. 48-bis). They are composed of an equal number of
members appointed by the State and the Region. These Committees were not included among
the vertical IGAs discussed in Chapter 2 because they cannot be considered as composed of
representatives of the executives: although appointed by the national and regional governments,
the members of these Committees are very often University professors or, more generally, scholars
expert in the field of regional issues.
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Valley) were indeed established very quickly, in 1948, just after the approval of the
Constitution8. Ordinary Statute Regions, by contrast, remained for a long time
an issue of constitutional theory rather than of government practice: the fifteen
ordinary regional governments, indeed, were not set-up until 19709.
It should be however noted that, despite the seeming high level of asymmetry
emerging from both the diﬀerent status accorded to the two groups of Regions and
this double-step institutional building process, no dramatic diﬀerences emerged
between the Ordinary and the Special Statute Regions, at least in what concerns
health policy.
As seen, the Statutes of the Special Regions had to be implemented through
the approval, by the Government, of special "enacting" decrees, previously bilater-
ally negotiated with each Region. Without these latter, even if formally provided
with legislative competences in the health sector, Special Statute Regions could
not exert these powers. In fact, before the establishment of the Ordinary Statute
Regions, just two decrees had been issued for transferring health competences to
Special Regions. The first one was DPR no. 1111, which in 1956 enacted con-
current legislative jurisdiction of Sicily on Public Health and Health Assistance,
besides transferring to that Region many State administrative functions in these
fields. Ten years later, Friuli-Venezia-Giulia was accorded similar powers, through
the approval of DPR no. 869 August 9th, 1966. Thus, when Ordinary Statute
Regions were created in 1970 just two Special Statute Regions had already acti-
vated their own legislative health competences. Furthermore, these latter were, in
both cases, concurrent and on matters related to Public Health and Health Care:
in other words, their powers were, in fact, very similar to those (theoretically)
8Friuli-Venezia-Giulia was established only fifteen years later, in 1963.
9The period between 1948 and 1968 constituted, for Ordinary Statute Regions, a phase of
"institutional frost" (Pizzetti 1998), largely understandable by considering the atmosphere of
strong ideological opposition between the political parties of the national political system. The
eruption of the Cold War, which had already aﬀected the position of the Italian political forces
on the regionalist design during the constitutional drafting, continued to produce its eﬀects on
the fate of Italian regionalism for about twenty years. The 1950s were characterized by the
consolidation of the radical reversal of the initial positions on the field: the Communist Party,
relegated to the opposition of the national government, became, along with the Socialist Party,
a firm supporter of decentralization; the Christian Democrats, now firmly on the government,
preferred instead to tactically postpone the introduction of the Regions, in fear that some of
them would witness a strong success of opposition parties (Hine 1996; Mazzoleni 2009): the
two opposing forces – the one favorable and one opposed to the introduction of the Ordinary
Regions – ended up to neutralize their mutual eﬀects, ensuring in practice the preservation of
the institutional status quo until the end of the Sixties. It was only in 1968 that the Parliament
passed a law establishing the rules for the election of the members of the regional legislatures
(Law no. 108, February 17th). The last step towards the establishment of the Ordinary Regions
was finally accomplished in 1970, when a law on regional financing (Law no. 281, May 16th) was
approved. First elections for ordinary regions took place in June 1970.
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accorded by the Constitution to the Ordinary Regions.
Moreover, almost paradoxically, as the devolutionary process started to de-
velop, the Special Regions ended, many times, lagging behind the Ordinary Re-
gions as to the actual exercise of health powers, because of the more complex and
less flexible procedures they had to follow to get new competences: most of times,
furthermore, this delay was not later compensated by a transfer of a broader set
of powers (which were nothing but the same previously devolved to the Ordinary
Regions; Giangaspare 2006, p. 28)10.
During the Seventies, two major devolutionary waves took place in Italy (the so
called "first and second Italian regionalizations"), leading to the transfer of many
State administrative functions (along with related human and financial resources)
to the newly established Ordinary Regions. This occurred by means of several
Decrees issued in 1972 (DPR nos. 1 to 6, January 14th 1972, and nos. 7 to 11,
January 15th 1972) and in 1977 (of DPR no. 616). As to health care, Decree
no. 4/1972 envisioned a first, very limited administrative role for the Regions.
However, as far as its provisions concerned only Ordinary Regions, enacting decrees
were necessary to extend their scope of enforceability to Special Statute Regions:
Friuli-Venezia Giulia and Sardinia acquired these functions only three years later,
in 1975. The 1977 Decree, by contrast, represented a major step in the process of
Regions institutional building, because of the broad set of functions (also in the
field of healthcare) devolved to the Regions. Again, nevertheless, many Special
Statute Regions had to wait more time than the Ordinary ones for getting these
same functions: Sardinia received them in 1979; Aosta Valley in 1978 and 1982,
and Friuli-Venezia Giulia in 1987.
A deeper process of regionalization of healthcare policy, however, occurred only
from 1978 onwards, with the transformation of a Bismarckian, insurance-based
health organization into a National Health System (Servizio Sanitario Nazionale,
SSN), inspired by classical Beveridgean principles, like universality, comprehen-
siveness, free access and public funding through general taxation (Law no. 833,
December 22nd 1978). Three main temporal phases of regionalization of the Italian
NHS may be identified: 1978-1992; 1992-2001; 2001-2011 (Azzolina and Pavolini
2010).
During the first period (1978-1992), regional tasks and responsibilities in the
field were shared by the Regions in a quite confused way with two other levels
of government: the center and the municipalities. Theoretically, the State was
expected to be responsible for the national planning and the overall financing of
10In fact, the possibility of extending, in an automatic way, the provisions valid for the Ordinary
Regions to the Special ones was excluded on the explicit request of these latter: they were, indeed,
willing to diﬀerentiate their own position vis-à-vis the rest of the regional governments (Chieppa
2008, p. 1053). The identity of the powers devolved to the Ordinary and the Special Statute
Regions led to what has been defined as a "leveling" of the latter on the former.
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the system; all the Regions – consistently with 1948 constitutional provisions – were
given the responsibility of local planning and of the organization of services within
their jurisdictions; finally, municipalities – through the Local Health Units (Unità
Sanitarie Locali, USL), legally creatures of the Regions, and replacing the role
played before by sickness funds – were responsible of service provision (Maino and
Neri 2011). Municipal governments were also responsible for the appointment of
USLs boards. Law no. 833/1978 did not introduce significant diﬀerences between
Special and Ordinary Statute Regions.
The second phase of regionalization of the Italian NHS – comprised between
1992 and 2001 – was marked by the introduction, by two technical cabinets, of two
important reform Decrees (no. 502/1992 and no. 517/1993), aiming at increasing
the eﬃciency and at reducing the costs of the health system, under the pressure
of strengthening budget constraints on the country, making finance recovery par-
ticularly urgent11. These two Decrees, which defined the macro-guidelines to be
implemented into details by the Regions, introduced a "wide structural reform"
into the Italian NHS (Maino 2001; Maino and Neri 2011), determining the "real
turning point" in the regionalization of the system (Ferrera 2005). The bulk of the
organization and management of the NHS was indeed transferred to the Regions:
as put by Maino and Neri (2011), the regionalization of the Italian NHS imple-
mented in the 1990s entailed, at the same time, both «a decentralization process
from state to regions and a centralization process from municipalities to the meso
level of government» (p. 451), determining a further empowering of the regional
governments, and a sidelining of the local level in the running of the NHS (France
and Taroni 2005)12. An additional devolution of administrative functions occurred
in the second half of the Nineties. Decree no. 112 passed in 1998 provided for the
devolution to the Regions of all the administrative functions not explicitly listed
in the Decree itself as exclusively attributed to the State. These provisions were
then extended to Sardinia (2001), Friuli Venezia-Giulia (2005) and Aosta Valley
(2008). The second phase of the NHS regionalization was concluded by the pas-
11Mostly because of the financial crisis erupted in fall 1992 and the requirements imposed by
the Maastricht Treaty (1992).
12Regionalization came, this time, together with the introduction into the system of manage-
rialism and competition tenets. The Regions were indeed accorded the responsibility of appoint-
ing the chief executive oﬃcer of local health authorities, now drastically reduced in number and
transformed into public enterprises (the renamed Aziende Sanitarie Locali, ASL, Local Health
Enterprises), as many major hospitals (now Hospital Enterprises, Aziende Ospedaliere, AO), en-
dowed with large organizational and managerial autonomy. The introduction of managerialism
principles into the governance structure of the NHS was also aimed at introducing some forms of
split between purchasing and providing functions, thus creating the premises for the establish-
ment – according to models largely to be designed by the Regions themselves – of an "internal
market". Eventually, Regions retained the responsibility for financing regional health care (Lo
Scalzo et al. 2009).
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sage of a third reform decree (Legislative Decree no. 229/1999), which, while less
concerned with competition and cost containment, further increased the opera-
tional autonomy of Local Health Authorities and Hospital Enterprises, and gave
the Regions the responsibility for managing the accreditation process of the NHS
providers. In general, during this phase, as in the first one, no relevant diﬀerences
were introduced as to the legislative and administrative powers enjoyed by the two
groups of Regions.
Finally, the third stage of NHS regionalization was marked by the strengthen-
ing of the devolutionary process at the constitutional level. The Constitutional
amendment approved in October 2001 basically confirmed the institutional trans-
formation already occurred during the 1990s (a costituzione invariata, that is with-
out constitutional amendments). As to healthcare, the new competences alloca-
tion provided for wide areas of concurrent legislation between the State and the
Regions (now formally placed at the same hierarchical level), making healthcare
a largely shared responsibility of the two levels of government: as confirmed by
many IGR actors interviewed, however, the real turning-point had already been
constituted by reforms passed in 1992. Diﬀerences between Ordinary and Special
Regions in health care powers, if ever there were ones, were further reduced by the
constitutional reform.
Today, the Italian NHS may be defined as a regionally based, highly decen-
tralized national health system, with «twenty regions enjoying virtually complete
autonomy in administrative and organizational matters» (France and Taroni 2005,
p. 170). The national level is responsible for ensuring the general objectives of the
system and the setting of its common benefits package, while regional governments
are endowed with the task of delivering this package through the ASLs, the AOs
and the private accredited providers.
Major asymmetries between the Regions have to be searched for in the field of
financing: it is in this area that the distinction between Ordinary and (a group
of) Special Statute Regions acquires a certain relevance. Financial mechanisms
for the Special Statute Regions are defined by their Statues of Autonomy and the
respective enacting decrees. As for the transfer of health competences, however,
the activation of these financial mechanisms, ensuring a higher degree of fiscal au-
tonomy than for Ordinary Statute Regions, was characterized by significant delays
(Baldi 2012). Furthermore, fiscal reforms approved during the 1970s, determining
the suppression of many of the financing sources on which Special Statute Regions
were relying, made these latter highly dependent from the center (Baldi 2012).
Once implemented, however, special financial provisions have determined relevant
diﬀerences between the two groups of Regions: while the structure of financial
revenues is basically the same for all the regional governments, Special Statute
Regions control a higher share of these resources (on average, about the 61% vs.
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the 39% of the Ordinary Regions; Baldi 2012). The most relevant diﬀerence con-
sists in that Special Statutes Regions keep under their control a seizable quota of
the tax returns produced within their territories (the so called compartecipazioni
erariali; each Statute defines the percentage of tax returns attributed to each Re-
gion). This allows four of them to be in charge of the entire financing of their own
regional health systems, without receiving any contribution from the State (partic-
ularly, the VAT share): Aosta Valley and the Autonomous Provinces of Trento and
Bolzano (Trentino-Alto Adige) received this power in 1994; Friuli Venezia Giulia
in 1996; Sardinia in 2006. Sicily, by contrast, is required to cover roughly just one
half of the expenditures related to the management of its regional health service.
Turning now to Spain, the process of health care devolution from the State
toward the regional governments followed a radically diﬀerent path, made possible
by the Constitution. This latter designed, as it is often defined, an "open" and
flexible model of territorial organization of the State (the so called Estado de las
autonomías, "State of the Autonomies"). Such openness was related both to the
number (and the name itself) of the Autonomous Communities to be possibly
established and, partly, to their powers. The ambiguity underlying the whole
constitutional architecture of the State was a way to accommodate competing
views of the territorial form of State to be adopted: from the centralist option
favored by post-francoist right-wing parties to the confederal solution wished for
by regional nationalists. Such an openness set in motion the development of an
highly asymmetrical devolutionary process.
As put by Moreno (1997), «Title VIII of the 1978 Spanish Constitution made
it possible for one, three, all, or none of the autonomous communities to be self-
governing», depending on the will of their populations (p. 69). In fact, between
the end of 1978 and 1983 all Spanish regional territories constituted themselves
as Autonomous Communities (see second column of Table 4.3), after having bar-
gained with the central Government their own basic rules (Estatutos de Autonomía,
Statues of Autonomy, to be then passed by the absolute majority of the national
Parliament).
The Spanish Constitution, however, provided for two diﬀerent procedures by
means of which Communities could be created, partly impacting, in turn, on the
range of regional powers enjoyed, since the beginning, by diﬀerent subnational gov-
ernments: the so called vía lenta (slow track) and vía rapda (fast track) (respec-
tively, Sects. nos. 143 and 151). The former was a slow path towards autonomy as
far as Communities following this procedure were initially accorded just a limited
set of powers, that is those explicitly listed in the Constitution as falling under
regional jurisdiction (Sect. no. 148); only five years after their constitution, these
Regions would have the right to bargain with the State the transfer of additional
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competences. By contrast, Communities following the "fast track" procedure were
given, from the very outset, a much broader set of powers, including not only those
listed in sect. no. 148, but possibly also all those not mentioned in sect. no. 149.1
as exclusive State competences13.
To all this it must be added that the Spanish Constitution acknowledged a
special fiscal regime to two "fast track" Autonomous Communities: the Basque
Country and Navarre. Because of peculiar historical reasons, these two regions
were indeed accorded a particularly high level of financial and fiscal autonomy.
The special fiscal regime accorded to these Regions allowed them to collect their
own taxes on personal incomes and companies, as well as the VAT; a previous
bilaterally agreed quota would be then transferred by these two Communities to
the central State for covering State services and administrative functions in their
territories.
As to health powers, those explicitly listed in the Constitution (Sect. no.
148.21) as falling, since the beginning, under all Communities jurisdiction were
related, as it was in the Italian case, to "Public Health and Hygiene". In practice,
this meant that all Communities were accorded powers on basically administra-
tive functions referring to information, authorizations, medical advertising, health
activities related to establishments and industries, epidemiology, mortuary health
policy, but also on regional health care planning; in addition, all regional govern-
ments were given jurisdiction over multiple local health care networks, most of
which dating back to even the pre-social insurance period (representing about the
15% of total expenditure on health; García-Armesto et al. 2010). "Fast track"
regions, by contrast, were accorded, since their establishment, powers on a much
broader domain of health-related issues, basically consisting in the direct manage-
ment of health services and the hospital networks of the Social Security system
present in their territories. In Communities with limited health powers, the hospi-
tal networks – absorbing the highest share of financial resources devoted to public
health – were instead directly managed by the central State, by means of the
National Health Institute – Instituto Nacional de la Salud (Insalud) – a central
level body founded in 1978 and directly dependent upon the National Ministry of
Health. The State retained exclusive competences over international health issues,
"bases and general coordination of health", and legislation on pharmaceuticals
(Sect. no. 149.1.16).
In the early Eighties, two "fast track" Communities – Catalonia and Andalusia
– had already acquired full health powers. The approval in 1986 of Law no. 14 (Ley
General de Sanidad, General Health Law), which transformed the pre-existing So-
13The Communities which took this path were: the so called historical ones (Catalonia, the
Basque Country and Galicia), that is those which had already approved their own Statutes of
Autonomy during the Second Spanish Republic (1936-1939); Andalusia; and Navarre.
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cial Security System into a National Health Service (replicating the reform process
occurred in Italy in 1978), did not alter the asymmetrical devolutionary process
triggered by constitutional provisions: the Ley General de Sanidad simply stated
that «the Autonomous Communities will exert the competences assumed in their
own Statutes and those transferred or delegated to them» by the State (Sect. no.
41.1).
As seen previously, by means of the two Autonomic Pacts major nation-wide
political parties (UCD and PSOE in 1981, and PSOE and PP in 1992) agreed
on managing the devolutionary process in such a way as to gradually reduce the
growing institutional asymmetries (§ 3.2.2). As already remarked, the 1992 Pacts
provided not only for the establishment of a common regulatory framework for Sec-
toral Conferences, but also for the devolution from the State to the "slow track"
Communities of thirty-two new competences (Organic Law no. 9/1992), exactly
with the aim of smoothing, as much as possible, institutional diﬀerences among
Communities: health powers, however, were not included among these compe-
tences.
It was only at the end of 2001 that the complete devolution of health powers to
the whole set of Communities was implemented (Royal Decrees nos. 1471 to 1480,
December 27th 2001): up to that moment, the central level – embodied by the
Insalud – had transferred significant health powers only to seven (over seventeen)
Autonomous Communities, covering about 62% of the Spanish population (Mosca
2006, p. 117).
To summarize the above discussion, Table 4.2 shows the complex institutional
landscape which had gradually layered from the unfolding of the asymmetrical
devolutionary process just described, with specific reference to the health sector.
At the end of 2001 three groups of Communities might be identified. The first
one was composed of ten regions established following the procedures set by Sec-
tion no. 143 of the Constitution ("slow track") and exerting just limited health
powers (that is just those explicitly listed in section no. 148: public health and hy-
giene). The second group of regions was comprised, instead, of those Communities
which, even if established according to the "slow track" procedure, had accessed
full health powers before 2002. Finally, a third set of Communities included all
those which had followed the "fast track" towards autonomy: they all enjoyed full
health responsibilities before 2002; within this group, a subgroup may be iden-
tified, composed of those regional units enjoying the special fiscal regime evoked
above (the Basque Country and Navarre14).
In order to better understand the deepness of the asymmetry characterizing the
14To be exact, Navarre should not be properly labeled as a "fast track" Community since,
as consequence of the special constitutional provisions concerning this region, contained in the
fourth transitory disposition, it should be defined more correctly as a "special track" Community
(vía especial).
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Table 4.2: Asymmetry among Spanish AACC in health compe-
tences at the end of 2001.
AACC with Limited
Health Powers
AACC with Full
Health Powers
"Slow Track"
AACC
Aragon, Asturias,
Balearic Islands,
Cantabria, Castile and
Leon, Castile-La Mancha,
Extremadura, La Rioja,
Madrid, Murcia
Valencian Community,
Canary Islands
"Fast Track"
AACC
Catalonia, Basque Coun-
try*, Andalusia, Galicia,
Navarre*
Key: * = AACC enjoying a special fiscal regime.
process under analysis, it may be telling to look also at the number of years passed
between the establishment of each single Community (by the approval of its Statute
of Autonomy) and the transferral to each of them of full health responsibilities
(see Table 4.3). Again, three groups of Communities can be identified. The first
one comprises two "fast track" Communities (Catalonia and Andalusia) and one
"slow track" region (the Valencian Community), which took, respectively, just
two and five years after their foundation to get full competences for managing
autonomously their regional health systems. The second group is made, again, of
both "fast" and "slow track" regions, where powers were transferred in a period
of time comprised between eight (Basque Country) and twelve (Canary Islands)
years after the approval of their Statutes of Autonomy. Eventually, a third set of
regions encompasses large part of the so called "slow track" regions: in this case,
about twenty years passed before they were accorded full health powers. Notice
also that two Communities (Catalonia and Andalusia) acceded to full autonomy
in health policy even before the establishment of the new NHS (1986).
Since the beginning of 2002, the pre-existing institutional asymmetry has been
basically overcome, and the competence devolution process may be considered as
"closed", having led to a regionalized organization of the National Health Sys-
tem very similar to the institutional setting observable in Italy: such a process
has resulted indeed in «17 regional ministries or departments of health with pri-
mary jurisdiction over the organization and delivery of health services within their
territory, thus health expenditure is mainly determined by the regional adminis-
trations» (García-Armesto et al. 2010, p. 37).
While asymmetries related to policy competences proved thus to be "tran-
sitory", those pertaining to the special financial regimes applied to the Basque
Country and Navarre, on the one hand, and the ordinary one to the rest of Com-
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Table 4.3: Devolution of health competences to the Spanish AACC.
AACC Statute of
Autonomy
Full Health
Powers
Delay
Catalonia 1979 1981 2
Andalusia 1982 1984 2
Valencian Community 1982 1987 5
Basque Country 1979 1987 8
Navarre 1983 1991 8
Galicia 1981 1991 10
Canary Islands 1982 1994 12
Balearic Islands 1983 2002 19
Castile and Leon 1983 2002 19
Extremadura 1983 2002 19
Madrid 1983 2002 19
Aragon 1982 2002 20
Castile-La Mancha 1982 2002 20
Murcia 1982 2002 20
Asturias 1982 2002 20
Cantabria 1982 2002 20
munities, on the other hand, still represent the major source of asymmetry among
the Spanish Autonomous Communities.
The description of the regionalization processes of the National Health Systems
occurred in the two countries under analysis has illustrated that they followed quite
distinct rationales and paths. In Italy asymmetry, although granted by constitu-
tional provisions, clearly played a minor role in the process of regionalization of
the health policy sector, if compared with the Spanish case: in this latter, while
seven Autonomous Communities were given large self-government powers during
the 1980s and the 1990s, the remaining ten were involved – for about twenty years
– in a process of basically administrative decentralization; what’s more, devolution
to diﬀerent groups of regional governments occurred according to diﬀerent timings,
adding de facto asymmetries among Communities formally enjoying comparable
degrees of power (in the health sector, at least). Furthermore, while in Italy the
(bulk of) the health regionalization occurred together with its transformation into
a NHS, in Spain regionalization of health policy had occurred in two large Com-
munities before the set-up of the National Health System. In both countries, the
major source of asymmetry between the regional units is currently represented
by the special fiscal regime accorded to a subgroup of governments: the Basque
Country and Navarre in Spain; Trentino-Alto Adige, Aosta Valley and, in a lower
measure, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Sardinia and Sicily in Italy.
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Between polity and politics
Internal dynamics of constitutive governments As illustrated in Chap-
ter 1, in her seminal contributions on intergovernmental arrangements, Bolleyer
(2006; 2009) elaborated a set of hypotheses, systematically linking the kind of
decision-making dynamics dominating within each single regional government (in-
tragovernmental relations) with the incentives towards the set-up and regulation
of institutional bodies designed for managing relations between governments (in-
tergovernmental relationships). The major argument has been reformulated and
refined in slightly diﬀerent ways by this scholar over the years (Bolleyer 2006; 2009;
Bolleyer and Bytzek 2009): nonetheless, its core points to the fundamental dis-
tinction between power-concentrating (or majoritarian) vs. power-sharing execu-
tive/legislative relations. By majoritarian governments, Bolleyer basically refers to
one-party, power-concentrating cabinets, while power-sharing governments would
be those supported by larger (mostly, oversized) party coalitions. The decision-
making logic pervading majoritarian governments would reduce their incentives
towards the establishment of highly institutionalized horizontal and vertical In-
tergovernmental Arrangements, whilst governments based on "power-sharing" dy-
namics would be more prone to investing resources on such kind of institutional
structures.
The expected correlational pattern would be due to the operation of four diﬀer-
ent causal mechanisms, connecting the independent with the dependent variable.
The first is linked to the diﬀerent degree of (expected) stability over time of the
"interest configuration" among constitutive arenas: in presence of majoritarian
governments, a quite high instability of interest configuration – due to the rel-
atively high likelihood of governmental turnovers – should be logically expected
to reduce actors’ incentives towards the consolidation of intergovernmental ar-
rangements; by contrast, the stability of interest configuration should be expected
to be higher when the intergovernmental arena is dominated by power-sharing
governments: full turnover should be, indeed, less likely when governments are
based on oversized coalitions than when they are led by one single party. The
second causal mechanism is strictly related to the former, and relies on the con-
sideration that governments supported by oversized coalitions are more likely to
overlap in their party composition, at a given point in time, than one-party gov-
ernments: this phenomenon would, in turn, increase party (and thus ideological)
congruence between governments in power-sharing regimes if compared to majori-
tarian systems. The third mechanisms suggests, furthermore, that, given higher
turnover rates (typical of "power-concentrating" regimes), governments would be
more tempted to use "blame-shifting" strategies towards other governments, than
when governments are under a less powerful electoral pressure (as in the case of
"power sharing" regimes): a lower pressure coming form the electoral arena would
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make more fruitful investments in building institutions which can become prof-
itable only on the medium-long term. Eventually, the fourth causal mechanisms
suggested by Bolleyer stresses that "autonomy losses", deriving from intergovern-
mental interaction, should be be bigger for parties which govern alone in their
domestic arena, than for those which are based on coalitions and power-sharing
practices.
Turning to our national cases, it appears necessary, as for the assessment of the
relative degree of (a)symmetry in the distribution of health policy competences, to
look at the diachronic evolution of both systems. I will first consider the horizon-
tal dimension of the intergovernmental arena (the dimension the hypotheses just
evoked mainly refer to), then I will look at the vertical scale of intergovernmental
cooperation.
The horizontal dimension Starting from Italy, because of the relatively
higher degree of institutionalization of its multilateral, horizontal IGA, one could
expect this to be possibly linked to the prevalence, within its constitutive govern-
mental units, of power-sharing rather than power-concentrating dynamics: this,
however, is only part of the whole story. In the light of major changes occurred
during the Nineties both in the party system and in the institutional architecture
of the governments composing the arena, the analysis must be split into two pe-
riods: the first, started with the establishment of the Ordinary Regions in 1970,
ended in the early/mid-1990s (this temporal phase is commonly labeled as part
of the "First Republic"); the second period, characterized by the introduction of
the current features of the institutional design (both at the regional and at the
national level), and by the emergence of a new political system, started instead
from mid-1990s onwards (the so called "Second Republic").
During the first phase (1970-1992/4), the Italian picture seemed perfectly fit-
ting the ideal-typical template of power-sharing regimes sketched above.
The Regions (both the Special and the Ordinary Statute ones) were based on
a form of government based on the central role played by the legislatures: while
some scholars defined it as an assembly-based system, others labeled it as a strictly
parliamentary one; what was clear was the impossibility to identify the President
as the exclusive head of the regional administration (Paladin 1985, pp. 277-298).
The regional executives (Giunte) – made of the President and the Councilors –
had to be composed of members of the regional legislative Assemblies (Consigli);
birth and death of the cabinets depended on the (frequent) motions of confidence
and non-confidence voted by these latter. No mechanism was introduced in the
regional institutional architecture in order to strengthen in some way the role of
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the President, who played the role of a primus inter pares. All this was joined
with the adoption of a purely proportional electoral system, extremely similar
to the one employed for national elections15 (Loughlin and Bolgherini 2006). As
a whole, regional institutional systems proved, from the beginning, to be highly
unbalanced in favor of the legislative assemblies, where a high number of parties
was represented.
In such a framework, coalition governments were the rule, while one-party gov-
ernments, even if not inexistent, could be considered as quite rare events. During
the first temporal phase, that is between 1970 and 1992, only 8% of regional execu-
tives were run by just one party16. This was the case of the the Italian Communist
Party (PCI) which ruled without any partner Emilia-Romagna (between 1985 and
1990) and Umbria (six months in 1993); Christian Democracy (DC) as well, formed
one-party cabinets in Veneto (1970 to 1975; and 1977 to 1985), Friuli-Venezia Giu-
lia (1978-1980), Molise (1970-1975 and 1988-1993), Sardinia (1971-1972) and Sicily
(1987). In all remaining cases (92%), by contrast, regional cabinets were supported
by coalitions of parties.
As for the conditions necessary for the second causal mechanism to be working,
what matters the most for this analysis is that most regional governments in this
period were not just based on coalitions of parties, but on "oversized" alliances,
that is including also parties not necessary to form a minimum-willing coalition:
between 1947 and 1992 more than two thirds of regional governments were in fact
formed in this way (67.2%; Vassallo and Baldini 2000, p. 549). The presence of
oversized coalitions may be considered, as described above, as a condition favoring,
in turn, the overlap between diﬀerent governments’ party configurations and as
impacting, by consequence, on their higher or lower horizontal intergovernmental
congruence. As shown in qualitative terms in Tables 4.4 to 4.6, between 1970 and
1992 overlaps in party composition of regional governments were a widespread,
common phenomenon. Due to the number of parties, a quite relevant number of
configurations was possible. Most of them, however, included either the Christian
Democratic or the Socialist Party or both (in addition to small coalition partners
like the Social-Democratic, the Republican or the Liberal Parties).
Certainly, the establishment of the Ordinary Regions allowed left-wing parties
(particularly, the Communist Party - PCI), enjoying strong electoral support in
several Regions of Center of Italy (Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany and Umbria), to ex-
periment in a stable way coalition formulas precluded at the national level since the
establishment of the Republic. The Communist Party was also able to be partner
in regional governments, although in a not stable way, in Northern Regions like
15For further details on this point, see the discussion in the next paragraph.
16Own calculations based on Istituto Cattaneo dataset on regional governments, available at
http://www.cattaneo.org/it/ricerche-menu/politica-menu/istituzioni-di-governo.
html.
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Table 4.4: Regional and Central Governments Configurations in Italy (1970-
1978).
Year Regional Coalitions Regions Central Government Coalition
1970
DC + PSI + PSDI + PRI 8 DC +PSI + PSDI +PRI
DC + PSI + PSDI 1
DC + PSI + PRI 2
DC + PSI 1
DC + SVP 1
DC 3
DP + PSI + DC + RV 1
PCI + PSI + PSIUP 2
PCI + PSIUP 1
1972
DC + PSI + PSDI + PRI 6 DC + PSDI + PLI
DC + PSI + PSDI 3
DC + PSI + PRI 1
DC + PSDI + PRI 1
DC + PSI + RV 1
DC+ SVP 1
DC 4
PCI + PSI + PSIUP 2
PCI + PSIUP 1
1974
DC + PSI + PSDI + PRI 8 DC + PSI + PSDI
DC + PSI + PSDI 4
DC + PSI + PRI 1
DC + SVP + PSDI + PRI 1
DC 2
PCI + PSI + PSIUP 2
PCI + PSIUP 1
DP + UVP + RV + PSI 1
1976
DC + PSI + PSDI + PRI 7 DC
DC + PSI + PSDI 2
DC + PSDI + PRI 2
DC + SVP + PSDI + PRI 1
DC + PRI 1
PCI + PSI 6
UV + PSI + UVP + RV 1
1978
DC + PSI + PSDI + PRI 8 DC
DC + PSI + PSDI 2
DC + PSDI 2
DC + SVP + PSDI 1
DC 1
PCI + PSI + PSDI 1
PCI + PSI 5
DC + PSI + UV + UVP + RV 1
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Table 4.5: Regional and Central Governments Configurations in Italy (1980-
1986).
Year Coalitions Regions Central Government Coalition
1980
DC + PSI + PSDI + PRI 3 DC + PSI + PRI
DC + PSI + PSDI 2
DC + PSI + PRI 2
DC + PSDI + PRI 2
DC + PSDI 1
DC + SVP + PSDI 1
DC 1
PSI + PSDI + PRI 1
PCI + PSI + PSDI 1
PCI + PSI 4
UV + DC + DP 1
1982
DC + PSI + PSDI + PRI + PLI 3 DC + PSI + PSDI + PRI + PLI
DC + PSI + PSDI + PRI 4
DC + PSI + PSDI + PLI 1
DC + PSI + PSDI 2
DC + PSI + PRI 1
DC + SVP + PSDI 1
DC + PSDI 1
DC 1
PCI + PSI + PSDI 1
PCI + PSI + PSDI + PSdAZ 1
PCI + PSI 2
PCI 1
UV + DC + DP 1
1984
DC + PSI + PSDI + PRI + PLI 5 DC + PSI + PSDI + PRI + PLI
DC + PSI + PSDI + PRI 6
DC + PSI + PSDI 1
DC + PSDI 1
DC 1
DC + SVP 1
PCI + PSI + PSDI 1
PCI + PSI 1
PCI + PDUP 1
PCI 1
UV + DC + UVP 1
1986
DC + PSI + PSDI + PRI + PLI 6 DC + PSI + PSDI + PRI + PLI
DC + PSI + PSDI + PRI 5
DC + PSI + PSDI 2
DC + PSDI 1
DC + SVP 1
PCI + PSI + PSdAZ + PSDI 1
PCI + PSI + PSDI 1
PCI + PSI 1
PCI 1
UV + DC + UVP 1
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Table 4.6: Regional and Central Governments Configurations in Italy (1988-
1992).
Year Coalitions Regions Central Government Coalition
1988
DC + PSI + PSDI + PRI + PLI 5 DC + PSI + PSDI + PRI + PLI
DC + PSI + PSDI + PRI 5
DC + PSI + PSDI 1
DC + PSI 1
DC + SVP 1
DC 1
UV + DC + UVP 1
PSI + PSdAZ + PSDI + PRI 1
PCI + PSI + PSDI + PRI 1
PCI + PSI + PSDI 1
PCI + PSI 1
PCI 1
1990
DC + PSI + PSDI + PRI + PLI 4 DC + PSI + PSDI + PRI +PLI
DC + PSI + PSDI + PRI 6
DC + PSI + PSDI + PLI 1
DC + PSI + PSDI + Aut. 1
DC + PSI + PSDI 1
DC + ADP + PSI + PRI 1
DC + SVP + PSI 1
DC + PSI 1
PCI + PSI + PSDI + PRI + DP 1
PCI + PSI + PSDI 1
PCI + PSI 1
PCI 1
1992
DC + PSI + PSDI + PRI + PLI 1 DC + PSI + PSDI + PLI
DC + PSI + PSDI + PRI 2
DC + PSI + PSDI + PLI 1
DC + PSI + PRI + PLI 2
DC + PSI + PSDI 1
DC + PSI + PSDI 2
DC + PSI + PLI 1
DC + SVP + PSI 1
DC + PSI 1
DC + PSDI +PRI + PLI + FV 1
DC + PSDI + PRI +PLI 1
DC + PCI + PRI 1
DC 1
PCI + PSI + PSDI + PRI 1
PCI + PSI + PSDI + PLI 1
PCI + PSI 1
UV + PCI + ADP 1
Sources: Istituto Cattaneo dataset on regional governments, available at http://www.
cattaneo.org/it/ricerche-menu/politica-menu/istituzioni-di-governo.html;
webpage of the Italian Presidency of Council of Ministers: http://www.governo.it/
Governo/Governi/governi.html. Key: see List of Abbreviations.
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Piedmont and Liguria, and Southern ones like Calabria and Sardinia. However, it
should be stressed that the presence of the Socialist Party in the regional executives
was almost ubiquitous, cutting across quite distinct party configurations. Socialist
Councilors were indeed present, at the same time, both in regional governments
led by the Christian Democracy and in those ruled by the major antagonist of this
latter, the PCI, ensuring in this way a sort of bridge (a partial overlap) between
otherwise fully alternative party coalitions.
Looking at the stability of the interest configuration (the first causal mechanism
evoked above), it is also interesting to remark that between 1970 and 1992 only
two wholesale turnovers of regional executives occurred17: in percentage terms,
full turnovers represented thus less than 0.8% of the total number of governments’
changes18. As summed up by Vassallo and Baldini (2000), in this period «the
mechanism of turnover [. . . ] was virtually unknown to the Italian Regions» (p.
550, translated). Whenever full continuity in party composition of governments did
not occur, partial turnouts were the most common kind of government alternation.
The period starting from mid-1990s can be pictured, as I argued at the begin-
ning of this Section, as characterized by radically diﬀerent features of the party
system, the electoral competition, the coalition strategies, and the overall decision-
making logic pervading regional governments. The "happy combination" of two
pressures – one endogenous and one exogenous – led indeed to deep institutional
transformations as well as to the disintegration and recomposition of the existing
party system (Fabbrini e Brunazzo 2003). I will briefly reconstruct these dynamics,
to outline the general framework in which reforms took place.
On the internal front, the transformations occurred in the political system
should be first reminded, with the proliferation of autonomist leagues (such as the
Liga Veneta, the Lega Lombarda, and the Liga Ligure), which, since the end of
the 1980s, began to claim for more autonomy for regional and local authorities,
in the name of an overall opposition to Roman centralism, pointed as a symbol of
waste, ineﬃciency and corruption. The political platform of the Northern League,
a regionalist party born from the confederation of the various leagues (1991), would
then benefit from the advent of a major judicial inquiry – Tangentopoli – which,
17The first wholesale alternation took place in Liguria in 1975: a giunta composed of Christian-
democrats, social-democrats and liberals was replaced by a government composed of representa-
tives of the PCI and the Socialist Party. The second full turnover occurred in 1984 in Sardinia,
where a cabinet led by the DC and composed of socialists, social-democrats and republicans, was
followed by a new executive led by the PCI and including representatives of the local regionalist
party, the Partito Sardo d’Azione (PSdAZ).
18Own calculations based on the database on regional governments elaborated by the Isti-
tuto Cattaneo, available at: http://www.cattaneo.org/it/ricerche-menu/politica-menu/
istituzioni-di-governo.html.
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highlighting the high degree of corruption permeating the traditional party system,
precipitated the crisis of this latter. The Northern League, taking advantage of
the political spaces left empty by the death of the traditional parties, managed to
represent a widespread need of renewal in the relationship between government and
citizens, making the regional issue a question of national character, stably placed
on the public agenda; all the national parties would have been paying increasing
attention to that issue, including it, in diﬀerent ways, in their own programmatic
platforms (Baldi and Baldini 2008; Mazzoleni 2009). To these claims were to be
added those advanced directly by the Regions, which, collectively organized since
the early Eighties, had been considering widely unsatisfactory the role and the
powers assigned to them within the overall architecture of the State, and were
thus pressing for a greater recognition of their function.
On the external front, the process of monetary integration and the need to
comply with the Maastricht criteria (1992) exerted an indirect, but sharp eﬀect
on the local and regional systems, by putting in evidence the inadequacy of the
still largely centralist organization of the State, and by making even more urgent
the implementation of reforms capable of increasing the eﬃciency of the institu-
tional/administrative Italian system in terms of policies (Fabbrini and Brunazzo
2003).
It is in this general framework that the form of government of the Regions was
involved in a deep process of institutional transformation. There is no agreement
among scholars on the most appropriate label defining the new regional architec-
ture: many suggest to classify it as a form of "neo-parliamentary" system, char-
acterized by the inclusion of features typical of both the presidential system (the
direct election of the President and the impossibility for the legislative assembly to
substitute him during his five-years long mandate), and of the parliamentary one
(first of all, the existence of a confidence relationship between the executive and
the legislative). Anyway, what is clear is that reforms passed during the Nineties
had the eﬀect of altering, in a dramatic way, the power balance between the re-
gional Presidents (and their executives) and the Councils in favor of the former:
«The reform outlines [. . . ] an institutional framework in which the President ac-
quires an absolutely predominant role. He appoints the members of the Executive
(even choosing them from the outside of the Regional Council) and dismisses them;
"directs the policy of the Executive and is responsible of it"; exercises regulatory
powers» (Vassallo and Baldini 2000, p. 542).
This was the outcome of two reforms (Law no. 43 of February 23rd 1995 and
Constitutional Law no. 1/1999) which introduced three major innovations. The
first relates to the kind of electoral system adopted: the perfectly proportional
system in force up to that moment was in fact transformed into a mixed electoral
system, designed to grant an absolute majority of Council seats (at least, 55%) to
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the party or the pre-electoral coalition having obtained the highest share of votes.
The second major innovation consisted in the introduction of the direct election
of the Regional President: each party or coalition of parties must indeed indicate
oﬃcially its own candidate for the Presidency of the Region before elections take
place. The third change, strictly related to those just sketched, consisted in the
reduced possibility for the Councils to vote a motion of non-confidence against
the regional President: because of the direct election of this latter, in case of non-
confidence the dissolution of both the executive and of the Council occurs, and new
elections must take place (according to the so called simul stabunt, simul cadent
formula); the same happens in case of permanent incapacity, death or resignation
of the President.
The transformation of the traditional party system and the introduction of
the reforms described above led, as a result, to a completely new kind of regional
electoral competition, based on a bipolar confrontation, in all the Regions, between
two large, but non-overlapping and mutually exclusive pre-electoral coalitions,
made of center-left vs. center-right parties. The bipolar logic underlying the
confrontation clearly emerges by looking at the overall share of total votes collected
by the two major coalitions, always extremely high: 86.9% in 1995, 95.8% in 2000,
97.3% in 2005 and 94.1% in 2010 (Chiaramonte and Vassallo 2001; Scintu 2010).
The presence of a high number of parties within each coalition has led some scholar
to define this kind of bipolar competition scheme as producing a "fragmented
bipolar" system (Chiaramonte and Vassallo 2001).
In sum, reformed regional systems, even if not fitting perfectly the ideal-type
of power-concentrating regime proposed by Bolleyer (characterized, as seen, by
the dominant presence of one-party cabinets), have nevertheless clearly moved
from a power-sharing towards a majoritarian logic of decision-making: wholesale
turnovers, virtually inexistent up to the early Nineties, have become the dominant
(virtually, the only) pattern of alternation; since 1995, the two major coalitions
have been alternatively in oﬃce in ten Regions – Piedmont, Liguria, Friuli-Venezia
Giulia, Lazio, Abruzzo, Campania, Apulia, Molise, Calabria and Sardinia –, while
five regional governments have been constantly strongholds of the center-left coali-
tion (Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany, Umbria, Marches and Basilicata) and two of the
center-right one (Lombardy and Veneto).
Due to the bipolar logic regulating the electoral competition, overlaps between
alternative regional coalitions have become very rare, virtually inexistent. The two
major coalitions – center-left and center-right – are built around major, opposing
State-wide parties. Beside this "core", both coalitions can adapt their composition
depending on the regional arenas in which they compete, by deciding to include
or not smaller partners: such variations tend, nevertheless, to be internal to each
coalition. For instance, while the center-right coalition tends to include the North-
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ern League when running for regional elections in the Northern Regions, the same
coalition does not include this party when competing for the control of South-
ern Regions. Similarly, not in every Region center-left coalitions come to include
small parties like the communist PRC - Partito della Rifondazione Comunista,
which may opt to run alone. To sum up, while coalitions can be not perfectly
internally consistent across the Regions, overlaps between them are almost inex-
istent. The most relevant exception to this pattern has been represented in the
2010 regional elections by the choice of the small centrist party UDC - Unione
di Centro to either ally with its traditional partners (the center-right coalition)
or with the center-left parties or even to run alone, trying in this way to under-
mine the national and regional bipolar scheme of confrontation (Tronconi 2010).
Moreover, the two major coalitions competing for the control of regional govern-
ments tend to largely replicate the coalition formulas adopted at the national level.
Coming now back to Spain, the basic features of its subnational units have
been much more stable over time than in the Italian case.
Despite the adoption of a parliamentary form of government and a proportional
electoral rule (exactly as in the Italian case up to mid-1990s; imposed by constitu-
tional provisions: Sect. no. 152.1), the internal way of working of the Autonomous
Communities has been dominated, since the beginning, by clear-cut majoritarian
decision-making dynamics (Bolleyer 2006). This was the result of the combination
of a less fragmented party system with the disproportional eﬀects of the regional
electoral rules design, which, mimicking those adopted at the national level, have
tended to distort representation in the autonomic Parliaments in favor of biggest
parties19.
The parliamentary nature of this setting consists in that regional governments
are politically responsible to the regional legislative assemblies, which appoint the
regional Presidents; the assemblies are renewed every four years. However, the
role of the regional legislatures is generally considered quite limited because of the
neat predominance over them of the executives and, particularly, of the autonomic
Presidents (Moreno and Colino 2010, p. 300): it is for these reasons that some
scholars have come to define the actual functioning of Spanish regional systems
19Each Community could have used its own autonomy, within the proportional rule frame-
work imposed by the Constitution, to experiment very diﬀerent electoral systems. In fact, all
regional governments adopted electoral rules extremely similar to those used for the election of
the Deputies of the lower house at the national level. As is well known, the overrepresentation
of big parties is the eﬀect produced by: the small size of electoral districts and the repartition of
seats according to the d’Hondt formula. Compared with those used for national elections, dis-
tricts employed in regional elections are bigger, slightly reducing in this way the disproportional
eﬀects of the system (Araujo 2011, pp. 278-279; see next paragraph for further details on the
national electoral system).
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Table 4.7: Types of Regional Governments in Spain (1980-2011).
Single Party Coalition
67% 33% 100%
SWP 86% Only SWPs 5.4%
NSWP 14% Only NSWPs 7.1%
SWP as major partner 53.5%
NSWP as major partner 34%
100% 100%
Source: Own elaboration from the dataset of the Observatorio de
los Gobiernos de Coalición en España (University of Barcelona),
available at http://www.ub.edu/OGC/index_es.htm.
Key: SWP= State-Wide Party; NSWP=Non State-Wide Party.
as "semi-presidential" or as increasingly presidential (Magone 2009 ); as put by
Magone (2009), the «regional presidents [. . . ] play a major role in shaping the
climate of politics» in each region (p. 218). In this context, autonomic parliaments
are in fact very weak in using their controlling functions towards the governments
(relatively high thresholds to present motions of censure are pointed out, among
others, as factors limiting parliamentary influence; Magone 2009, p. 223-224).
In sharp contrast to Italy, where, as described above, coalition governments
have been the largely dominant rule, Spanish regional executives have been led,
between 1980 and 2011, by one single party in two thirds of cases (see Table 4.7).
Looking at the composition of cabinets, a bipolar logic emerges, insofar as 86%
of single-party executives were run by one of the two major State-wide parties:
either the Socialist Party (PSOE) or the Popular Party (PP). The remaining 14%
was instead composed of non State-wide parties. This is due to a peculiar feature
of the Spanish political system, which is characterized, at the same time, by a
bipolar confrontation between the two State-wide parties at the national level and
in all the Regions but in a few number of them: the existence of strong regional
or national identities in specific areas of the country, which, as seen, led to the
adoption of an open and asymmetrical model of territorial organization, led also
to the emergence of partially alternative political systems at the regional level
(Magone 2009; Wilson 2012).
The Catalan and the Basque regional political systems are those which deviate
mostly from the most common one: in both regions, indeed, the largest parties
are non State-wide, nationalist parties. In Catalonia, the CiU - Convergència i
Unió, the dominant party for many decades, is an autonomist force located on
the center-right of the political axis, reducing the electoral chances of the PP; on
its left, the PSC - Partido de los Socialistas de Cataluña is the local organization
of the nation-wide socialist party (the PSOE), while ERC - Esquerra Republicana
de Catalunya is a more leftist, non State-wide party; always on the left of the
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political space, EUiA - Esquerra Unida i Alternativa is the local partner of the
State-wide party IU - Izquierda Unida, while IC-V - Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds
is a green, left-wing party traditionally allied with IU. The CiU was always able
to form one-party governments up to 2003, when a leftist coalition, made of both
State-wide (the PSC) and region-based parties (IC-V and ERC) came in oﬃce.
In the Basque Country, the major party is a non-State wide party, the PNV -
Partido Nacionalista Vasco, which was always in government – either alone or,
more frequently, with other State-wide and/or non-State wide coalition partners
– up to 2009, when a minority government formed by the Socialist Party replaced
it. To the left of the PNV, a small, nationalist party is represented by EA - Eusko
Alkartasuna. The small region of Canary Islands has developed as well its own
party system, characterized by the central role played by a regionalist party, CC
- Coalición Canaria, which has been able to form both single-party governments
and coalitions with one of the two largest national parties, playing the role of either
junior or major partner.
In total, coalitions have been built in one third of cases of cabinets formation,
just when the party having obtained the largest share of votes could not form
an executive without the support from another partner (see Table 4.7). For the
purposes of this analysis it is important to remark that – as observed by Falcó-
Gimeno and Verge (2013) – «although it is still possible for majority parties to
build oversized coalitions or to receive the support of other SWP in the investiture
vote, these situations are very rare in the Spanish regions. The two main SWP have
never joined an oversized coalition and the support strategy to a governing party
that already had the absolute majority of votes in parliament has been chosen only
three times» (p. 395).
This largely explains that, as reported in Table 4.7, coalitions made exclusively
of State-wide parties have represented just little more than 7% of the total: as long
as oversized coalitions between the two main national parties are excluded a priori
as a possible government solution, the number of formulas including two State-wide
parties is very limited (e.g. PSOE + IU). Notice that the most common situation
is where one of the two major national parties – the PSOE or the PP – allies, as
a major partner, with one or more regionalist or nationalist forces: the coalition
formula including a small regionalist party beside the PP or the PSOE was chosen
in more than half of times when a coalition was to be built. The presence of strong
regional parties in Catalonia and the Basque Country triggered indeed a mimicking
behavior, determining the emergence of regional parties also in Communities, like
Andalusia, lacking any historical tradition of self-government (Wilson 2012). In
about one case over three, the PSOE or the PP played instead the role of a junior
partner within a coalition dominated by a region-based party: this was the case, for
instance, of the alliance between the PAR - Partido Aragonés and the PP in Aragon
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(1996-1998), or between the PRC - Partido Regionalista de Cantabria allied with
the PSOE in Cantabria (2003-2011). In many Communities – Asturias, Castile-
La Mancha, Castile and Leon, Madrid and Murcia – no regional party, although
represented in the regional legislatures, ever acceded to governmental positions.
The limited extent of overlaps between Spanish regional governments composi-
tions – due to the absence of oversized coalitions and the presence of region-based
parties in many AACC – can be intuitively understood looking at data collected in
Tables 4.8 to 4.10. We find indeed Communities led by the PSOE or the PP (alone
or with minor partners, but never together) in most of cases, and Communities
run by non-State-wide parties (alone, in coalition with minor local parties or with
one of the two major State-wide parties).
As to the stability of interests configuration, many Regions have been charac-
terized by the presence in oﬃce of a dominant party: traditional PSOE strongholds
have been Andalusia, Asturias (except in 1995-1999), Castile-La Mancha and Ex-
tremadura (both up to 2011); the PP has instead been able to control government
formation in Castile and León since the late 1980s, and, since 1995, in Madrid,
Valencia, Murcia, La Rioja and Galicia (except in 1995-1999, and 2005-2009); the
PNV was constantly in oﬃce in the Basque Country (except in 2009-2012), while
the CiU was the major government party in Catalonia (with a break in 2003-2010).
It must nevertheless be remarked that complete turnovers, although not frequent,
have neither been a rare event (particularly if compared to Italian figures, up to
mid-1990s). Between 1980 and 2011, over almost 200 changes in governments
composition, 34 entailed the whole substitution of the parties previously in oﬃce
(representing the 17.26% of the total)20.
Comparing Swiss and Spanish regional units internal dynamics for explaining
diﬀerences in their respective IGAs, Bolleyer (2006) argued that in Spain «hori-
zontal configuration is formed by two government types – namely PP and PSOE
one-party governments – which take over sub-state executives the most frequently.
Moreover, there is one bundle of configurations often formed by non state-wide
parties» (pp. 396-398). In the light of updated data provided above, the core of
this argument can be still considered valid, in spite of a clear increase of coali-
tion governments (from 15.2% reported by Bolleyer for the period 1980-2000 to
33% shown in Table 4.7 for the period 1980-2011), mainly due to the aﬃrmation
of regional parties in many Communities: as seen, however, in the majority of
cases coalitions are still dominated by one of the two major State-wide parties.
Moreover, as remarked by Wilson (2012), «distinct patterns of coalition formation
have allowed state-wide parties to access government in all regions, and displaced
predominant nationalist parties from oﬃce in Catalonia and the Basque Country»
20Own calculations from the dataset of the Observatorio de los Gobiernos de Coalición en
España (University of Barcelona), available at http://www.ub.edu/OGC/index_es.htm.
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Table 4.8: Regional and Central Governments Configurations in
Spain (1984-1994).
Year Parties or Coalitions AACC Central Government Party
1984
PSOE 12 PSOE
PP 3
CiU 1
PNV 1
1986
PSOE 12 PSOE
PP 3
CiU 1
PNV 1
1988
PSOE 10 PSOE
CDS + AIC + AP 1
PP + UM 1
PP 3
CiU 1
PNV + PSOE 1
1990
PSOE 9 PSOE
CDS + AIC 1
CDS + PP 1
PP + PAR 1
PP + UM 1
PP 2
CiU 1
PNV + PSOE 1
1992
PSOE + PR 1 PSOE
PSOE + AIC 1
PSOE 8
PP + PAR 1
PP + UM 1
PP 2
UPN 1
CiU 1
PNV + PSOE + EE 1
1994
PSOE + PR 1 PSOE [+ CiU + PNV]
PSOE 8
PP 3
UPN 1
CC 1
UPCA 1
CiU 1
PNV + PSOE + EE 1
Notes: Up to 1988, PP = AP - Alianza Popular (the PP predecessor party).
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Table 4.9: Regional and Central Governments Configurations in
Spain (1996-2002).
Year Parties or Coalitions AACC Central Government Party
1996
PSOE + CDN + EA 1 PP [+ CiU + PNV + CC]
PSOE + PA 2
PP + PAR 1
PP + PRC 1
PP + UV 1
PP 8
CiU 1
PNV + PSOE + EA 1
1998
PSOE + PA 1 PP [+ CiU + PNV + CC]
PSOE 2
PP + PAR 1
PP + PRC 1
PP + UV 1
PP 7
UPN 1
CC + PP 1
CiU 1
PNV + EA 1
2000
PSOE + PA 1 PP
PSOE + PAR 1
PSOE + IU + PSM 1
PSOE 3
CC + PP 1
PP + PRC 1
PP 6
UPN 1
CiU 1
PNV + EA 1
2002
PSOE + PA 1 PP
PSOE + PAR 1
PSOE + IU + PSM 1
PSOE 3
PP + PRC 1
PP 6
UPN 1
CC 1
CiU 1
PNV + EA + IU 1
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Table 4.10: Regional and Central Governments Configurations in Spain (2004-2012).
Year Parties or Coalitions AACC Central Government Party
2004
PSOE + PAR 1 PSOE [+ ERC+ IU + BNG + CC + CHA]
PSOE + IU 1
PSOE + ERC + ICV 1
PSOE + PRC 1
PSOE 3
PP 7
UPN 1
CC + PP 1
PNV + EA + IU 1
2006
PSOE + PAR 1 PSOE [+ ERC+ IU-ICV + BNG + CC + CHA]
PSOE + IU 1
PSOE + PRC 1
PSOE + ERC + ICV 1
PSOE + BNG 1
PSOE 3
PP 6
UPN + CDN 1
CC 1
PNV + EA + IU 1
2008
PSOE + PAR 1 PSOE [+ PNV + CC]
PSOE + PSM + UM + IU 1
PSOE + ERC + ICV 1
PSOE + PRC 1
PSOE + BNG 1
PSOE 4
PP 5
CC + PP 1
UPN + CDN 1
PNV + EA + IU 1
2010
PSOE + PAR 1 PSOE [+ PNV + CC]
PSOE + IU 1
PSOE + PSM + IU 1
PSOE + ERC + ICV 1
PSOE + PRC 1
PSOE 4
CC + PP 1
PP 6
UPN 1
2012
PP 11 PP
PSOE 2
PSOE + IU 1
CC + PSOE 1
CiU 1
UPN 1
Source: Dataset of the Observatorio de los Gobiernos de Coalición en España (University of
Barcelona; http://www.ub.edu/OGC/index_es.htm. Key: see List of Abbreviations; [ ] = parties
not included in government, but providing parliamentary support to it.199
(p. 136): the electoral share for state-wide parties (PSOE and PP) in regional
elections has risen from 67.1% in the early Nineties to 76% in the second half of
the 2000s (Wilson 2012).
To sum up, the evidence collected allows to conclude that the Italian horizontal
intergovernmental arena was characterized, up to the mid-1990s, by the presence
of "power-sharing" governments: this condition contributed to increase the level
of interregional congruence in party composition of governments, as well as the
stability, over time, of the interest configuration among the constitutive units (full
turnovers being virtually inexistent). By contrast, Spain was characterized, since
the beginning, by the prevalence of clear majoritarian decision-making dynamics
within its constitutive governments: the degree of congruence, as well as the sta-
bility of the interest configuration, were both lower than in the Italian case. As
a consequence of political and institutional transformations occurred in the early
1990s, Italian regional governments have clearly moved towards the majoritarian-
decision making pole, reducing in this way pre-existing cross-case diﬀerences.
The vertical dimension Starting from Italy, the same remarks made above
about periodization are valid for the vertical dimension of IGR, insofar the radical
changes of the political system occurred in the early 1990s, involved not only
the regional, but also the national arena, determining a move of this latter from
power-sharing dynamics towards majoritarian decision-making.
As well known, at the national level, the competitive dynamic had been almost
completely blocked up to the early Nineties: as clearly put by Pasquino (2002),
«as is very well known, the political system of the First Italian Republic and its
parliamentary model of government were characterized a) by a high governmental
instability – but by a low circulation of government personnel, i.e., the Presidents
of the Council and the Ministers; b) by a remarkable persistence of the same
government coalitions and the same five parties in that coalitions and c) by a
substantial continuity of government policies» (p. 30, translated, emphasis added).
Such remarkable persistence of the same government coalitions (and of the same
five parties composing these coalitions) can be clearly seen by looking at the last
column of Tables 4.4 to 4.6. Wholesale turnovers never occurred at the national
level: very slightly diﬀerent configurations of parties – always including the major
State-wide party (the Christian Democracy) – constantly alternated in oﬃce over
more than thirty years.
Following Ştefuriuc (2009), vertical intergovernmental congruence is «the co-
incidence of the party composition of governments across levels. This coincidence
may take three forms: full congruence – the same parties are participating in both
the regional and the central government; full incongruence – there is no overlap;
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and partial (in)congruence – some, but not all, of the governing parties at one
level are also governing at the other level» (p. 96). Considering data contained
in Tables 4.4 to 4.6, which collect regional and national governments composition
every two years in the period of reference (1970-1992), it is evident that the Italian
vertical arena was characterized by a high level of congruence. The logic of coali-
tion building dominating at the national level was indeed paralleled, in the great
majority of cases, by a very similar one when regional cabinets had to be formed.
In many cases, regional coalitions were nothing but the replica (or just a slight
variation) of the coalition formula adopted at the national level: the center-left one
(including DC, PSI, PSDI and PRI) up to 1976, and the so called pentapartito (in-
cluding also the PLI) up to 199221. The biggest diﬀerence was, without a doubt, as
previously remarked, the possibility for the Communist Party to access executive
positions in the lower-level governments (a possibility which, at the national level,
was de facto precluded as a consequence of the so called conventio ad excludendum
agreed by all other parliamentary forces against this party). Overall, this led to
the emergence of complete or partial overlaps between the party composition of
the central government and most of the regional coalitions. It suﬃce to say that
vertically full incongruent executives represented, on average, just the 4.5% of the
sample contained in the Tables. As seen before for the horizontal dimension, this
was mainly due to the widespread presence of the DC, the major national party
constantly at the government at the national level, in most regional executives,
and at the cross-cutting part played by the Socialist Party, included as a partner in
both in Christian-democratic and Communist-led regional coalitions. Because of
the high number of parties and consequent possible coalitions, the most common
form of vertical congruence was the partial one.
The transformations occurred in the party system described above, along with
a reform of the national electoral law in 1993, altered radically the kind of electoral
competition at the national level: «The majoritarian nature of the new electoral
systems, combined with the crisis of the established parties and the rise of new
ones, profoundly changed the pattern of electoral competition and government
formation» (D’Alimonte 2005, p. 254). While the electoral system in force until
the early Nineties was a proportional one (not including any device to reduce
fragmentation), the one adopted in 1993 was a mixed one, where most candidates
(75%), both for the lower and the upper house, were be elected in single-member
districts by plurality rule (D’Alimonte 2005, p. 255).
For the purposes of this analysis, it is worth noting that, as for the regional
level, «[t]he most striking development in Italian politics since the mid-1990s has
21The DC one-party governments at the central level were, in fact, executives of "national
solidarity", based on the "non vote of non-confidence" by all other parliamentary parties, the
PCI included.
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been – as summed up by D’Alimonte (2005) – the emergence and consolidation
of a bipolar pattern of electoral competition based on two dominant, clearly iden-
tiable, pre-electoral coalitions» (p. 261). This has had considerable eﬀects on the
patterns of government formation: similarly to what has been observed for the re-
gional scale, the bipolar confrontation between two major, pre-electoral coalitions
(center-right vs. center-left, each informally appointing a candidate Prime Minis-
ter prior to the election) led for the first time to wholesale alternation in oﬃce of
opposing political forces (an alternation which took place at each election between
1994 and 2010). The presence of a clear bipolar scheme of confrontation at both
the State and the regional level clearly reduced the stability of the interest config-
uration of the intergovernmental arena overtime, and increased the likelihood of
full vertical incongruence. Looking at the data collected in Table 4.11, it is easy
to note a steady increase in the number of fully incongruent regional governments:
between 1996 and 2010, indeed, an average of 40% of regional executives was run
by coalitions whose composition was fully not overlapping with the one ruling at
the national level.
As to Spain, its vertical intergovernmental arena was immediately characterized
by the presence of a number of regional governments ruled by parties and coalitions
not overlapping (not congruent) with the party in oﬃce at the central level. There,
two State-wide parties have been alternating in government since the early 1980s:
the PSOE (1982-1996; 2004-2011) and the PP (1996-2004; 2011 onwards). This
can be seen as an eﬀect of the national electoral system, whose major features were
defined between 1976 and 1977 (Hopkin 2005).
A proportional system was adopted, although highly corrected in order to avoid
excessive fragmentation of parliamentary representation: to this end, very small
electoral districts (coinciding with provincial boundaries) were designed, making in
many cases proportionality practically impossible to be achieved. Furthermore, it
was decided that seats would be allocated among parties according to the d’Hondt
formula, which, as known, contributes to further amplify the over-representation of
larger parties already ensured by the smallness of districts. The Spanish electoral
system, although formally proportional, was thus designed so to produce highly
disproportional, majoritarian-like eﬀects22. What matters the most is that the
concentration of parliamentary representation around the two largest State-wide
parties allowed the formation, at the central level, of single-party – majority or
minority – governments, led either by the PSOE or the PP.
In such a context, due to the presence of one-party executives also at the
22Parties favored by this system are the large State-wide ones (PSOE and PP), as well as
those enjoying territorially concentrated electoral support (large nationalist and regional parties:
particularly, CiU and PNV). Small parties – especially if geographically dispersed (like IU) – are,
by contrast, those most disadvantaged by the electoral system in force.
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Table 4.11: Regional and Central Governments Configurations in Italy (1996-
2012).
Year Coalitions Regions Central Government Coalition
1996
CL 10 CL
CR 7
Other 3 (2: Aut. + CL)
1998
CL 9 CL
CR 9
Other 2 (Aut. + CL)
2000
CL 8 CL
CR 10
Other 2 (Aut. + CL)
2002
CL 6 CR
CR 12
Other 2 (Aut. + CL)
2004
CL 8 CR
CR 10
Other 2 (Aut. + CL)
2006
CL 14 CL
CR 4
Other 2 (Aut. + CL)
2008
CL 13 CR
CR 5
Other 2 (Aut. + CL)
2010
CL 7 CR
CR 11
Other 2 (Aut. + CL)
2012
CL 7 TC
CR 10
Other 2 (Aut. + CL); 1 (CR+CL)
Key: CL = Center-Left Coalition; CR = Center-Right Coalition; Aut + CL or CR =
autonomist parties allied with one or more parties included within the CL or the CR
coalition; TC = Technical Cabinet; CR+CL = grand coalition, composed of parties
included within both the center-left and the center-right coalitions.
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subnational scale, the number of fully, vertically incongruent regional governments
was quite high, particularly if compared to the Italian case (first period): they
represented indeed about the 41% of the sample contained in Tables 4.8 to 4.10 (a
figure almost ten times higher than the Italian one during the First Republic, and
perfectly comparable to the Italian one from mid-1990s).
The peculiarities of the Spanish political system suggest, however, to take into
account, when defining the congruence or incongruence of a regional government
with the national one, some additional elements. The most important refers to
the fact that, on several occasions, central executives ruled by either the PP or
the PSOE have been minority governments, as such needing the parliamentary
support from other political forces. This was the case for the PSOE between 1993
and 1996, and 2004 and 2011; the same happened for the PP between 1996 and
2000.
In all these cases, insofar a collaboration between the two major parties was
excluded as a viable option, they relied on the support from the regionalist and/or
nationalist forces represented in the national Parliament. As put by Ştefuriuc
(2009), «stable agreements between government and parliamentary supporting
parties amount to camouflaged or informal governing coalitions [. . . ]. Thus, if
two parties exchange the roles of governing and supporting parties across levels,
it would be misleading to claim that the government formulae they are involved
in are incongruent» (p. 96). In 1993, the Government led by the socialist Fe-
lipe González was supported by the determining votes of CiU (plus those of the
PNV). Three years later, the popular candidate, José María Aznar, had to find a
post-electoral agreement with these same parties in order to form the new PP-led
minority Government. Finally, from 2004 to 2011, all the executives led by the
PSOE leader, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, had to rely on the votes of several "in-
formal" partners: particularly, ERC, IC-V, IU (plus CC, BNG and CHA) between
2004 and 2008; PNV and CC between 2008 and 201123.
4.4 Discussion
The analysis of the two cases implemented in this Chapter has allowed to narrow
the range of plausible causes of diﬀerent levels and kinds of institutional develop-
ment of Italian and Spanish multilateral IGAs.
Some potentially relevant factors have been ruled out insofar they were not
matched by empirical evidence. The diﬀerences in the number, the relative size
and wealth of the constitutive units of the two polities has been excluded, both
23Taking into account such feature of the Spanish political system, the number of fully vertically
incongruent regional governments clearly decreases (from about 41% to about 37% in the sample
contained in Tables 4.8 to 4.10).
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countries being very similar in this respect (from several points of view, interre-
gional fragmentation is even higher in Italy than in Spain); similarly, the presence
of a territorial Senate in Spain and not in Italy has been considered as a condition
devoid of any explanatory power, because of the completely non influential role
actually played by this Spanish institution in ensuring territorial interests represen-
tation at the central level; finally, the diﬀerence in the form of State as a possible
cause of intergovernmental institutional diﬀerentiations has been rejected for two
reasons: one one hand, none of these two countries may be qualified, in contrast
with the other, as fully "federal"; on the other hand, even assuming Spain to be
closer than Italy to the federal ideal-type, collected data show a mismatch between
theoretical reasoning and evidence: multilateral intergovernmental arrangements
are indeed much more developed, both at the horizontal and at the vertical level,
in Italy than in Spain.
A set of institutional conditions pertaining to the polity – the degree of regional
distinctiveness of the constituent units and the degree of asymmetry in powers
allocation – as well as the kind of decision-making and political dynamics prevailing
within the constitutive units of the polity have emerged, by contrast, as those
showing the highest cross-case variation; moreover, each of them is consistent
with theoretical reasoning: as expected, indeed, conditions likely to weaken the
incentives towards the institutionalization of multilateral cooperation have been
shown to be stronger in Spain than in Italy.
The analysis has also highlighted that, due to temporal variation within each
of the two national cases, cross-cases diﬀerences were particularly evident during
the early stages of health policy regionalization. As described above, while Italy
was characterized by a higher degree of societal homogeneity coupled with higher
symmetry of competences and the prevalence of power-sharing decision-making
within it (both at the regional and at the central level), Spain presented instead a
comparatively lower degree of societal homogeneity, coupled with higher asymme-
try of powers and the predominance of majoritarian decision-making dynamics at
both levels of government. "Correlational" observations are thus in line with theory.
As for Italy, empirical evidence confirms, as expected, that the degree of asym-
metry existing between the two groups of Regions – Special and Ordinary Statute
ones – never played a relevant part in shaping neither the design nor the working of
multilateral IGAs. Considering vertical (compulsory) IGAs, asymmetry could have
impacted mostly on their functioning. As illustrated in Chapter 2, the weakness of
the National Health Council – the first vertical IGA designed to deal with IGR is-
sues in the new NHS – did not originate from dynamics pertaining to asymmetries
in powers between the Regions. They rather derived from the unwillingness of the
center to provide this body with eﬀective powers and resources to play a meaning-
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ful role in the intergovernmental arena. As to the State-Regions Conference, IGR
actors interviewed for this analysis tend to play down the relevance of the divide
between Ordinary and Special Statute Regions as to the working of the Conference.
This does not mean that a divide line between the two kinds of Regions does not
exist. It means that while the participation of the Special Regions is represented
as more "superficial" or "marginal", particularly by those Regions enjoying highest
degrees of fiscal independence (Trentino-Alto Adige and Aosta Valley), their be-
havior cannot be seen as hampering the working of the Conference, even less as
jeopardizing its existence. These Regions tend to take part to the State-Regions
Conference mostly to preserve their own "special" autonomy. The following quote
from a former Director General of the Ministry of Health aptly summarizes the
general view of the role played by Special Statute Regions within the Conference:
Well, the Special Statute Regions participate in a very, shall we say, super-
ficial way, in the sense that they are there to watch their own autonomy,
so they take the good things; as to the negative ones, they ask to put on
records that they reserve their own right to apply [the special provisions
contained in] their own Statutes of Autonomy. [IT8]
At the same time, one could expect asymmetry to have produced more dis-
ruptive eﬀects on the establishment and the working of the Conference of the
Regions, the main horizontal arrangement, being this latter an organization set-
up on purely voluntary bases. Notice indeed that, every year, each member of this
Conference must pay its membership fees (set in proportion to its demographic
weight). However, in this case too, diﬀerences between the two sets of Regions do
not appear to have played a relevant part in shaping the horizontal IGA. Firstly,
no explicit opposition came from the Special Regions towards the establishment
of this arrangement: in fact, as previously reconstructed, the Conference included,
since its establishment in 1981, all the Regions, that is both the Ordinary and
the Special Statute ones. Secondly, as in the case of the vertical State-Regions
Conference just sketched, the behavior of the Special Statute Regions is described
by IGR actors as clearly less participative (these Regions Presidents attending
just a few number of meetings), but not as an impeding element for the overall
functioning of the system. The Director General of the Conference of the Regions
described the attitude of these Regions in the following way:
The Special Statute Regions are much less participative, but they want to be
there: they pay their membership fees, they want to have the opportunity
to vote when it’s time to vote.
[. . . ]
The Special [Regions] do present one single amendment in the Conference
[of the Regions]: "The powers of the Special Regions are preserved". That
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is, for them it is enough just to maintain what they have, and then they
participate here and take part [to the Conference activity].
The Special Statute Regions thus never acted in order to boycott neither the
set-up nor the working of multilateral IGAs, neither on the vertical or the horizon-
tal dimension. Since the beginning, they have rather taken part to the functioning
of multilateral IGAs in a much less intense way then the Ordinary Statue Regions,
mainly with the aim of preserving their own special autonomy (particularly in
the financial sector), but also to coordinate their action with the State and the
remaining Regions whenever common interest issues are at stake.
By contrast, and in line with theoretical expectations, in Spain the relatively
higher degree of asymmetry of competences among its constitutive units did largely
contribute to weaken both the design and the actual working of multilateral bodies
of intergovernmental cooperation. This weakening eﬀect occurred through diﬀer-
ent channels. Due to the strict interconnectedness between the level of societal
homogeneity and the asymmetrical nature of the polity, these two conditions op-
erated – in the very early stages of decentralization, at least – in a joint way.
As to the design of vertical (and compulsory) multilateral IGAs, explicit op-
position towards their set-up came indeed, since the outset of the decentraliza-
tion process, from those Communities characterized by strongest forms of regional
identity and autonomy, that is those established following the so called "fast track"
outlined in § 4.3.2: Catalonia and the Basque Country.
They both attacked the very first attempt implemented by the central Gov-
ernment to address the issue of intergovernmental cooperation in health policy. In
fact, at the end of 1981 a Royal Decree on "Health Coordination and Planning"
was issued (R.D. no. 2824/1981). Among other things, the Decree provided for the
establishment of an embryonic form of vertical, policy-specific IGA, called Con-
sejo de Planificación y Coordinación Sanitaria (Health Planning and Coordina-
tion Council): it was to be composed of the Director of the Insalud (the National
Health Institute), oﬃcials from many central Ministries Departments (Defense,
Education, and so on), as well as by one representative from each Autonomous
Community. It was endowed with basic coordination powers, particularly in the
field of hospital management.
Catalonia, which had received full health responsibility very early (in 1981, just
a couple of years after its foundation; see again Table 4.3), immediately contested
the constitutional legitimacy of that Decree, arguing that the Health Planning
and Coordination Council was accorded powers going well beyond coordination,
encroaching in this way on autonomic jurisdiction; furthermore, the non equal
composition of that IGA by State and regional representatives would violate the
principle of coordination itself. The Basque Country – although still lacking full
powers in the health sector – joined Catalonia and contested in a similar way De-
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cree no. 2824. In spring 1983 the Constitutional Court declared the constitutional
legitimacy of the contents of the Royal Decree, but, at the same, time, the insuf-
ficient hierarchical level of that regulation (Rey del Castillo 2010). What is more
interesting is that, even before the rulings of the Court (nos. 32 and 42/1983), «the
activity of planned coordination bodies was suspended at the request of the ap-
pellants themselves. As a consequence, the development of the health system was
for several years (at least until the General Health Law, 1986 [. . . ]) at the mercy
of unilateral initiatives, whether of the central or of the autonomic governments,
gradually acquiring health competences» (Rey 2010, p. 34, translated).
A similar dynamic occurred in 1982, when, even before its approval, the LOAPA,
the Organic Law trying to smooth the unfolding devolutionary process (already
discussed in § 3.2.2), was strongly opposed by nationalist parties and, again, by the
two already settled Autonomous Communities. Both the Basque Country (with
the PNV) and Catalonia (with the CiU) challenged the constitutional legitimacy of
the LOAPA in front of the Tribunal Constitucional. They interpreted this norma-
tive intervention of the State as a further, unacceptable interference of the center
into their own, constitutionally and statutory protected competences. In their
view, an Organic Law could not override regional Statutes. As stressed by Moreno
(2005), «the timing and content of such harmonizing policies from the centre, when
the structure of the centralist Francoist state still remained largely untouched» ap-
peared in fact as «inopportune and inappropriate» (p. 64). This latter, in ruling
no. 76/1983 clearly stated, even before its coming into force, the unconstitution-
ality of fourteen over thirty-eight sections of the LOAPA, denying the organic and
harmonizing nature of this latter. As seen in Chapter 3, the survived part of the
LOAPA – that is the sections not annulled by the Court – was later transformed
into an ordinary law, the newly called Ley de Proceso Autonómico, supported by
the socialist government of Felipe González and definitively passed by the Spanish
Parliament on October 14th, 1983 (Law no. 12/1983).
As far the management of intergovernmental relations was concerned, the
Basque Country and Catalonia shared a common opposition towards the estab-
lishment of the multilateral seats of State-Regions confrontation contemplated in
that law (the Sectoral Conferences), rather preferring the implementation of dual,
bilateral links between each single Community and the State, a way considered
as less dangerous for their own autonomy and more eﬀective as to the pursuit of
their own, particular interests. According to many Spanish scholars (e.g. Montilla
Martos 2006), the remarks made by the Constitutional Court – which as seen,
recognized the legitimacy of the Sectoral Conferences, but at the same time de-
limited in a clear way the legitimate scope of their intervention – paved the way
to the diﬃculty of establishing eﬀective multilateral, vertical intergovernmental
arrangements (under the eﬀects of the so called "LOAPA syndrome").
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In this framework, the design of the Interterritorial Council of the National
Health System (CISNS), introduced by the General Health Law in 1986, proved to
be highly aﬀected by the events just sketched: as seen, it was provided with quite
limited powers. Asymmetries, however, were able to aﬀect not only the formal
design of the Council, but also its actual way of working, largely contributing
to undermine its eﬀectiveness. Since the beginning, indeed, the incompatibility
between the adoption of a strictly multilateral design for the CISNS with the
high level of asymmetry existing among Communities in that policy field became
apparent. On the one hand, the bulk of the CISNS activities, both in its plenary
format and in the second level bodies, concentrated in those areas in which the
level of competences among Communities was more homogeneous, limiting this
way the actual scope of intervention of the Council. A former member of the
CISNS made this point in a very clear way:
One of the members representing the State in the CISNS was the Director
General of the Insalud. In 2001 there were 7 Autonomous Communities with
transferred health services, and 10 without. Health management topics were
of interest for just the 7 Communities with responsibility in that sector, and
for the Insalud-Health Ministry. This fostered [the emergence of ] parallel
negotiating actions, which did not arrive at the Interterritorial Council:
instead, issues of Public Health, which were fully devolved, were discussed
in the Council.
As a pragmatical way to deal with these tensions, diﬀerent Working Groups
and Commissions were created, composed of regional governments enjoying the
same levels of competences on the matters at stake (Rey del Castillo 1993ab,
1998, 2010). However, such solution did not prove particularly eﬀective in order
to reduce inter-regional conflicts deriving from asymmetry. In this respect, the
account of the internal working dynamics of the CISNS provided by Javier Rey
del Castillo (2010), senior oﬃcial of the Ministry of Health for many years and
former Secretary of the CISNS (1991-1996), appears as worthy to be reported at
length:
The AACC lacking jurisdiction in the matters related to healthcare did
not willingly accept their exclusion from Commissions or Groups whose
economic impact was greater, and even less agreed to be represented in
these Commissions by the Insalud [the National Health Institute]. [. . . ]
As to the AACC that already had these powers, they did not accept to
involve the remaining AACC in matters on which these latter were lack-
ing, albeit temporarily, responsibility, and oriented the discussion of these
issues, especially the financial ones, towards bilateral relationships (p. 268,
translated).
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All this confirms that the degree of asymmetry existing among the Spanish
Regions largely impacted on the institutional life of the CISNS. Moreover, it is in-
teresting to remark that the relevant asymmetry pertained mostly to the allocation
of health legislative and administrative powers, and not so much to the distinction
between Communities with strong regionalist or nationalist identities and parties,
on the one hand, and those lacking them, on the other hand. This seems to sug-
gest that while peripheral nationalisms could be seen, chronologically, as the initial
triggers of the asymmetrical devolutionary process, and of the uncertain design of
multilateral IGAs, the major divide line was then represented by the fracture be-
tween Communities with limited competences and those provided with full health
powers: this fracture contributed, in turn, to weaken the existing vertical arrange-
ments. Such a divide line clearly crosscut diﬀerences in the intensity of regional
and sub-national identities, insofar as regions like the Valencian Community and
Andalusia, although lacking strong self-government traditions, joined very early
the group of more powerful governments (see again Table 4.3). Moreno (2005) de-
scribes such kind of competitive relationships between the Spanish Communities as
a form of "multiple ethnoterritorial concurrence", intended as a complex «interplay
among Spanish regions and nationalities pursuing political and economic power,
as well as the achievement of the legitimization of their institutional development»
(p. 90).
Diﬀerent degrees of activity within the Interterritorial Council itself can be
taken as a further indicator of the relevant role played by interregional powers
asymmetry in undermining multilateral intergovernmental cooperation in Spain.
The only sub-field in which the CISNS was able to set up eﬀective Working Groups
and reach a minimum degree of consensus among the Communities, and between
these latter and the State, was indeed Public Health, that is the main matter
falling under all regional jurisdictions since the very beginning of the State of the
Autonomies. Between 1987 and 2004, the relative majority of both the agreements
reached and the items addressed in that Conference were concentrated in this sector
(representing about one third of the total)24.
As to the Council of Fiscal and Financial Policy (the CPFF), which, as shown,
was provided with cross-cutting competences, due to its transversal nature, its role
in health policy was quite marginal up to the early 2000s, again as a consequence
of the procedures linked to the kind of devolutionary process started in the 1980s.
On the one hand, the special fiscal regime accorded to the Basque Country and
Navarre led these two Communities to use bilateral channel of communication with
the center, instead of multilateral arrangements. On the other hand, the transfer
24Data available on the web page of the Spanish Ministry of Health, devoted to the activity of
the Interterritorial Council: https://www.msssi.gob.es/organizacion/consejoInterterri/
actividad.htm.
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of financial resources from the Insalud to the Autonomous Communities gradually
acquiring full health powers in their territories, was managed and detailed by
means of bilateral agreements reached, each time, by the central administration
and each single Community in the so called Comisiones Mixtas de Transferencias
(Mixed Transfer Commissions). The margins of discretion opened by channels of
bilateral, rather than multilateral negotiation, made possible for the State to define
financial transfers towards the Autonomous Communities following quite distinct
criteria in each case (Grau i Creus 2000; Rey del Castillo 2010). This obviously did
nothing but add further elements of diﬀerentiation among the Communities (also
among those provided with comparable levels of administrative, legislative and
fiscal competences), contributing to strengthen even more the lack of perception
of common benefits potentially deriving from concerted action.
In the light of the above, the non-establishment of any kind of horizontal ar-
rangement among the Communities, neither in the healthcare policy sector, nor,
more generally, for the overall management of intergovernmental relations, is not
surprising. In the absence of any external, compulsory pressure towards multilat-
eral cooperation (such as the one acting in the case of vertical relationships), it
is reasonable to presume that the same conflicting dynamics characterizing inter-
regional relationships within the Council reproduced along the exclusively horizon-
tal dimension, having more disruptive eﬀects on the regional governments’ will-
ingness to cooperate. Significantly, as explained in the previous Chapter, the only
initiative taken by Autonomous Communities to coordinate their action occurred
in the second half of the 2000s, when regional governments which had already
reformed their Statutes of Autonomy – similarly increasing in their overall level
of powers – started to meet on a regular basis. However, after having included
Communities lacking a new Statute, interregional meetings died down.
The same holds true for a vertical, generalist intergovernmental arrangement,
which was not established until 2004. As seen, in contrast to Italy, where a vertical,
generalist IGA was established on the collective request of the Regions, claiming
for a deeper involvement into national policy-making, in Spain the initiative was
a top-down one, having been taken by the central Government.
Asymmetry in healthcare policy competences (as well as in many other policy
fields), however, gradually reduced over time, leading in 2002 to the full equaliza-
tion of legislative and administrative powers among all the Autonomous Commu-
nities, and to the adoption of a financial regime common to all regional units (the
Basque Country and Valencia excluded). Once completed this process, the Spanish
Parliament passed a law – called Ley de Cohesión y Calidad del Sistema Nacional
de Salud (National Health System Cohesion and Quality LAw) – reforming the
whole National Health System (2003).
As it is clear from its name, one of the major goal of this Law was to increase
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the overall cohesion of the National Health System, considered, up to that mo-
ment, highly unsatisfactory (Moreno Fuentes 2009). To this end, among other
innovations, the CISNS structure was redesigned and the scope of its functions
broadened (as it has been illustrated in Chapter 3): the design of this Sectoral
Conference had indeed to be made consistent with the new institutional scenario,
characterized by the loss of direct control by the center over the management of ten
out of seventeen regional health systems, and a consequent increased need of co-
ordination. Nevertheless, as previously shown, in spite of the reform implemented
in 2003, the overall level of activity of the CISNS has not significantly changed.
More generally, the literature agrees on the very limited impact of institutional
changes induced by that reform on the overall functionality of this IGA (Moreno
Fuentes 2009).
What is more interesting is that, confirming the dynamics emerged from the
very beginning, during the last ten years the only branch of the CISNS character-
ized by a constant and relatively intense level of activity have been the Commission
and the Sub-commissions dealing with Public Health, the subfield symmetrically
transferred to all the Communities in the early 1980s (see § 3.2.3). This can be
taken as a good indicator of the long-lasting eﬀects produced by the high level of
asymmetry which had characterized for more than twenty years the development
and functioning of the Spanish National Health System. While Bolleyer (2006)
underplayed the role of asymmetry as a relevant condition accounting for the rela-
tively weak development of Spanish multilateral IGAs, in the light of the gradual
reduction, over time, of diﬀerences in Communities’ powers and the consideration
that, in any case, «a strong unity among the ACs supported by an intergovernmen-
tal body could strengthen their position in general» (p. 399), evidence suggests
more enduring eﬀects produced by the initial allocation of competences to be taken
into account.
Italy and Spain, however, diﬀered not only in the degree of asymmetry in the
allocation of health policy competences among their constitutive units, but also
in the logic of decision-making prevailing both within these latter and the central
government.
In Italy, a higher degree of symmetry coupled with the existence of power-
sharing regimes, which clearly contributed to set-up, as a whole, a favorable in-
stitutional environment for the establishment of multilateral IGAs. As seen, from
1970 to early-1990s, the Italian intergovernmental arena, compared with the Span-
ish one, was indeed characterized by: a higher stability of interest configurations
(due to the virtual absence of wholesale turnovers); more frequent governments
overlaps, because of the adoption of very similar coalition formulas in most of
the Regions, and in these latter and the central government (higher horizontal
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and vertical congruence). Furthermore, the absence of full changes in govern-
ment compositions made blame-shifting an objectively not viable option in inter-
governmental relations, increasing incentives towards institutionalized multilateral
cooperation. Collected qualitative evidence further suggests that "power-sharing
regimes" shaped regional actors’ incentives towards multilateral cooperation not
only by creating the premises for ideological congruence and reduction of relative
"autonomy losses", but by pushing regional actors (particularly, the Presidents) to
find institutional solutions able to increase their (limited) powers. In fact, despite
the high stability of interest configuration, single regional governments were char-
acterized by an extremely high level of instability: the average duration of cabinets
was indeed very low (Vassallo and Baldini 2000). Regional Presidents were par-
ticularly weak, the power balance between the executive and the legislature being
completely biased in favor of the latter. The establishment of a multilateral IGA
composed of regional Presidents could thus be seen, by these latter, as a way of
increasing their own power in the relationship with the national Government – in
front of which all the Regions were united by a similar sense of excessive subordina-
tion, irrespective of their Special or Ordinary status – but also vis-à-vis the large
coalitions of parties on whose support they were highly dependent. The Director
General of the Conference of the Regions, in charge since the Eighties, explained
this question in the following terms:
The Presidents began to discuss about how to coordinate [their action] on
an ongoing basis, for a variety of reasons. Reasons, say, of a legal, but
also - mostly indeed - of a political nature. Then, there was not the direct
election of the regional Presidents. The Presidents of the Regions were
under the Regional Councils’ thumb, from which they could receive a vote
of non-confidence every year, every six months, whenever they liked, but,
even more, they were under their own Councilors’ thumb. Why? Because,
let’s make an example: Councilors of Agriculture met each other, they went
to the Minister of Agriculture, decided on financings, distribution of funds,
things like that; then, they came back to the Regional Government, and said:
"We have made an arrangement with the Minister: this is the situation".
[. . . ]
The Presidents of the Giunte were thus inherently weak as to the decisions
to be taken by the regional government. So they decided, as I say, to create
a "coordination opportunity" to make pass, in that forum, decisions of a
general nature. [IT6]
Such a situation was radically reversed at mid-1990s. A majoritarian decision-
making logic erupted both at the regional and the national level: blame-shifting
became now a viable strategy in a bipolarized electoral competition; the level of
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party composition (and thus, ideological) incongruence increased, and autonomy
losses deriving from institutionalized intergovernmental cooperation increased as
well (particularly, for regional Presidents). In the face of such changes, one could
expect multilateral IGAs to have been weakened, if not undermined.
However, the major multilateral IGAs already in place did not show sign of
being significantly altered by these institutional changes. No strong indicators
of decreasing institutionalization can be found. At a general level, all IGR ac-
tors interviewed agree on the prevalence of continuity on change in the working
of these arrangements. If any change is to be found, both the literature and the
informants point to the relevance of the direct election of the Regional Presidents,
generally interpreted as a factor which, far from weakening the horizontal IGA,
did strengthen the Conference of the Regions. The major reasons of this evolution
should be to be found in several factors. First, the higher stability of regional
executives reflected in the consequent higher stability of the Presidency of the
Conference, which was no more limited to a six-months period, but gradually ex-
tended, as seen, over five years (as long as the regional Presidents’ mandates): such
a dynamic allowed, according to what reported by an interviewed, a "solidification
of an organization" already in place [IT6]. Second, possible tensions arising from
the bipolarization of the political competition could be managed by means of a
series of organizational solutions, designed in such a way to ensure, on an ongoing
basis, an overall balance between opposing forces: as seen, a strict bi-partisan logic
rules the selection of the President and the Vice-President, as well as the formation
of the Presidency Oﬃce and the Policy Commissions. Notice, in this respect, that
when the Presidency was rotating every six months, the Vice-Presidency did not
exist: in a sense, the continuous alternation between Presidents was suﬃcient to
ensure an ongoing, overall balance between alternative political forces (in a much
less competitive environment).
In Spain, a highly asymmetrical distribution of powers joined instead with
clear-cut majoritarian-decision making dynamics within its constitutive units.
In contrast with Italy, the Spanish horizontal intergovernmental arena was ab-
sorbed, since the beginning of the State of the Autonomies, in a political environ-
ment characterized by a higher distance among subnational units both on the left-
right and the center-periphery dimensions: the opposition between the two major
State-wide parties (the PP and the PSOE) was indeed paralleled by the presence
of dominant region-based parties in a number of Communities. Furthermore, the
Presidents of the Autonomous Communities were much less weak, if compared
with those at the head of Italian Regions during the so called First Republic: they
had not similar incentives to set-up an arrangement able to compensate for their
intra-governmental weakness, but could have experienced, by contrast, higher "au-
tonomy losses" from intergovernmental cooperation. More generally, in such an
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institutional environment, many factors reducing the regional governments’ will-
ingness to cooperate with each other were at work: quite limited governments’
party compositions overlaps (therefore, low ideological interregional congruence);
relatively high full turnover rates (making possible the use of blame-shifting strate-
gies, and reducing the stability of the interest configuration over time).
To get a clearer picture of the diﬀerences existing in the horizontal arenas of the
two countries, Table 4.12 shows the values of "horizontal ideological incongruence"
in the two cases under analysis, calculated as proposed by Bolleyer and Bytzek
(2009). This measure aims at assessing, at a given point in time, the degree
of ideological closeness among subnational governments. It is computed as the
standard deviation of the ideological positions of regional governments every two
years. Because of the potential saliency of the positions taken by parties not
only on the general left-right dimension, but also on the center-periphery divide
(particularly in the Spanish case), the level of incongruence is reported for both
dimensions25.
Data reported in Table 4.12 show that, as expected, ideological incongruence
between regional governments on the left-right axis has been higher in Spain than
in Italy up to mid-1990s. While in Spain it was quite stable, in Italy it is possible to
observe a clear trend of decreasing intergovernmental incongruence, reaching low-
est values in the period comprised between the second half of the 1970s and the first
half of the 1980s (1976-1986); in the light of the above considerations, this does not
come as a surprise: this trend can be partly interpreted as the result of the adop-
tion of very similar, if not identical, coalition formulas in most of the Regions and
the partial overlap between Communists-led and Christian-democrats-led govern-
ments (particularly, due to the cross-cutting presence of the Socialist Party and, in
a less marked way, of the Social Democratic one). The consequences of the changes
occurred both in the party system and in the institutional design of the Italian
Regions are then widely captured: between 1994 and 2006, indeed, the average
value of incongruence among Italian regional governments almost tripled the av-
erage value recorded in the previous phase, reaching values never attained before,
and constantly higher than those present in the Spanish case. Turning now to
the attention to the horizontal incongruence on the centralization-decentralization
issue, Spain is characterized, again, by higher values than Italy: this is particularly
evident comparing Spanish values with the Italian ones for the period 1970-1992;
afterwards, as expected, distance on this issue among the Italian Regions has in-
creased in a marked way, without reaching, nevertheless, an average value close to
the Spanish one26.
Due to the bipolar confrontation at both the regional and the national level, full
25For a more detailed discussion of the methodological aspects related to this measure (and the
limitations of its computation in the two national cases), see methodological notes in Appendix
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Table 4.12: Regional Governments in Italy and Spain: Horizontal Ideo-
logical Incongruence.
Italy Spain
L-R C-D L-R C-D
1970 5.96 0.89 - -
1972 8.19 0.64 - -
1974 7.31 0.64 - -
1976 4.08 0.17 - -
1978 3.90 0.19 - -
1980 3.90 0.17 7.40 1.17
1982 3.64 0.15 10.03 6.06
1984 1.10 0.63 9.70 3.27
1986 1.34 0.57 9.90 3.26
1988 10.14 0.19 11.50 2.46
1990 9.80 0.17 8.49 1.53
1992 0.88 0.28 8.86 2.35
1970-1992 (mean) 5.02 0.39
1994 9.91 0.51 7.52 3.38
1996 13.74 3.36 7.19 3.98
1998 13.54 2.61 7.21 4.35
2000 15.00 1.94 11.64 4.27
2002 12.89 1.10 11.66 4.23
2004 13.11 1.12 10.46 4.71
2006 26.87 1.19 10.53 5.48
1994-2006 (mean) 15.01 1.69
2008 - - 8.96 4.51
2010 - - 9.31 2.64
1980-2010 (mean) 9.40 3.60
Sources: Party values are taken from The Manifesto Data Collection. Man-
ifesto Project, version 2013b (Volkens et al. 2013). For Italy, composi-
tion of regional governments are taken from: Istituto Cattaneo dataset on re-
gional governments, available at http://www.cattaneo.org/it/ricerche-menu/
politica-menu/istituzioni-di-governo.html, for the period 1970-2000; Baldi
and Tronconi (2010) for the period 2002-2006. For Spain, the composition of
regional governments is based on data collected by the Observatorio de los Go-
biernos de Coalición en España (University of Barcelona), available at http:
//www.ub.edu/OGC/index_es.htm.
Key: L-R = Left-Right; C-D = Centralization-Decentralization.
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vertical incongruence, very rare in the Italian case (up to mid-1990s), was instead
a quite common phenomenon in Spain, since the early stages of decentralization.
Before concluding, it should be briefly remarked that, as already evoked in
Chapter 1, no hypothesis in the literature is able to account for the choice of a
policy-specific or a generalist design of intergovernmental arrangements. The two
cases under analysis seem however to suggest the existence of a relationship be-
tween the general strength of given IGAs and their kind of competences. As seen,
indeed, in both cases the actors opposing in the strongest way the establishment of
a generalist arrangement (at the vertical scale, at least) were those fearing to loose
the highest share of power: in Italy, this actor was the central Government, which
would have preferred to use the existing sectoral "mixed-organs", so to involve in
a very limited way regional representatives into national policy-making; in Spain,
by contrast, the opposition came from the most powerful Communities: in their
view, the fragmentation of the intergovernmental arena into several policy-specific
arenas could be interpreted as a way to limit, as much as possible, likely centraliz-
ing temptations of the central Government (like those actually experienced at the
time of the LOAPA).
To summarize, this Chapter has shown that major diﬀerences in institutional
conditions played a major role in shaping the development of multilateral IGAs
dealing with healthcare policy issues in the two countries under analysis. While
Spain and Italy are currently characterized by quite similar settings, they largely
diverged at the beginning of their (health care) devolutionary processes. Current
variance in the development of their multilateral arrangements must be traced back
to their genetic moments, when the presence of unfavorable conditions to multi-
lateral cooperation clearly characterized the intergovernmental arena in Spain, in
B.
26Because of the policy-specifc nature of Spanish IGAs and the relevance of health policy within
Italian generalist arrangements, one could expect party positions on these specific issues to be
more relevant than their positioning along the left-right or the centralization-decentralization
dimensions. The CMP, from which data on party positions are taken, does not include any
specific measurement of party positions on health care policy. The only recorded party positions
which can be linked to health policy are those about "Welfare State Expansion" (that is, favorable
mentions in party manifestos of the need to introduce, maintain or expand any public social
service or social security scheme, which includes government funding of health care, but also child
care, elder care and pensions, social housing; position no. 504) and "Welfare State Limitation"
(the opposite; position no. 505). The diﬀerence between these two positions (504-505) may be
taken as an indicator of the overall stance of a party on welfare state policies (health included).
Taking this perspective, diﬀerences between the Italian and the Spanish horizontal arenas appear
as reduced: respective standard deviation values are indeed equal to 1.64 (Italy, 1970-2006) and
2.22 (Spain, 1984-2010). However, given the very indirect relationship between the measured
party position and the specific policy sector under analysis, this finding should be taken as no
more than suggestive.
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sharp contrast with Italy, where more favorable conditions prevailed. In both cases,
the intergovernmental machinery designed in the early stages of decentralization
proved to be highly resilient, in spite of changes occurred in incentives potentially
able to aﬀect their design and their working: the overcoming of interregional pow-
ers asymmetry in Spain did not prove to be a suﬃcient condition for reducing
the relative underdevelopment of its multilateral IGAs; likewise, the abandonment
of power-sharing dynamics in Italy was not suﬃcient to reverse the institutional
intergovernmental development previously occurred. On the whole, this seems to
suggest that the timing (Pierson 2000) by which factors potentially able to alter
IGR actors’ incentives towards IGAs’ institutionalization come into play may make
a diﬀerence in the institutional development of these arrangements.
The identification of the major dimensions of variation of IGAs in Italy and
Spain as well as of the most plausible explanatory factors of such diﬀerences consti-
tutes the premise for assessing the impact (if any) exerted by the IGAs themselves
(structures) on intergovernmental relations, that is on the decision-making pro-
cesses channeled through these structures.
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Chapter 5
IGR and the Politics of Health
Policy Making
5.1 Introduction
From an analytical point of view, Intergovernmental Arrangements will be treated
in this and in the next Chapter as the main condition accounting for the kind
of intergovernmental decision-making processes observed. The main explanatory
goal of this part – which is partly exploratory, due to the limited scope of the
existing empirical literature on this point – is assessing the impact of the institu-
tional, organizational structures devoted to the management of intergovernmental
relations on the processes of actors’ preferences aggregation. The general question
to be addressed can be formulated in this way: which is the impact (if any) of
diﬀerent Intergovernmental Arrangements on intergovernmental policy-making?
The basic, fundamental theoretical premise over which such question is built
relies on new-institutional grounds. As explained in the Introduction, taking as
a reference point its "common core" (Immergut 1998), this approach focuses the
attention on the ways in which preferences expressed in politics (and their aggre-
gation) are aﬀected by the institutional context in which policy-makers do operate.
This institutional context is intended, broadly speaking, as the collection of "rules"
– whether formal or informal – which, due to a minimum degree of stability over
time, contribute to "structure" the political behavior of actors. For the the research
purposes of this and the next Chapter, and in line with the definition of ’insti-
tution’ prevalently adopted by historical new-institutionalists, that web of rules,
potentially contributing to constrain and shape the behavior of the actors (in this
case, central and regional governments), is constituted by the IGAs at work in a
given country.
While some empirical studies focus mainly on the outputs produced by means
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of Intergovernmental Arrangements (for instance, the number or the precision of
intergovernmental agreements, as an indicator of the degree and depth of observ-
able cooperation: Simmons 2002; Bolleyer 2009), I will rather look at the kind of
decision-making processes developed within these arenas.
Clearly, as seen in Chapter 1, intergovernmental policy-making processes car-
ried out by means of multilateral Intergovernmental Arrangements can be expected
to vary under several respects. I will focus specifically on the kind of conflict lines
and coalitions emerging within these power arenas. In this light, the general ques-
tion addressed through the empirical analysis carried out in the remainder, may
be refined in the following terms: to what extent does the institutional features
of IGAs contribute – in a given policy sector – to determine the kind of politics
prevailing within the intergovernmental policy-making arena? More precisely: to
what extend do diﬀerently organized IGAs have an impact on structuring the kind
of divide lines and actors’ coalitions which emerge in intergovernmental decision-
making?
In order to address this question, in the next Section the basic hypotheses
connecting the characteristics of Intergovernmental Arrangements to the kind of
coalitions and conflict lines prevailing within them, already laid out in Chapter 1,
will be briefly reviewed. Next, the existence of a general matching between these
hypotheses and empirical evidence will be checked for, by "mapping" the prevalent
conflict lines and coalitions emerging, in case of disagreement among IGR actors,
within multilateral IGAs in the two countries under analysis. Findings of this part,
discussed in the last Section, will constitute the basis for a more in depth analysis
in the next Chapter.
5.2 Conflict lines and actors’ coalitions in IGR
From this perspective, as illustrated in Chapter 1, the distinction made by Grau i
Creu (2000) among three possible forms of "political impact" on these relationships
may prove particularly useful. The first form is called by this scholar "ideological
impact", and refers to the prevalent kind of conflicts and coalitions observable
within the intergovernmental arena. The second form of political impact concerns,
instead, more the output of the decision-making processes, and is called "political
patronage", which is nothing but a privileged treatment reserved by the party in
oﬃce at the central level towards some regions (in exchange for electoral support or
other political favors). Finally, "political integration" are those intergovernmental
linkages which may be provided in intergovernmental policy-making by means of
intra-party relations: the relevance of political integration depends, in turn, on the
degree to which subnational politics is subordinated to the national one. Since my
focus is on the processes, I will concentrate the analysis mostly on the first (which
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I would rather call "congruence" rather than "ideological" impact1) and partly the
second kinds of "political impact" on IGR2.
The relevant point is thus whether in the intergovernmental game IGR actors
adopt a party or a territorial perspective, when dealing with each other to jointly
address IGR issues.
Following again Grau i Creus (2000), the major empirical, observable con-
sequence of the prevalence of one of the two alternative logics consists in the
emergence of alternative kinds of intergovernmental coalitions: if a partisan per-
spective is prevalent, one will find that «the nature of the intergovernmental game
would depend upon the political party in charge of the diﬀerent governments» (that
is, upon the degree of vertical intergovernmental congruence), and could expect,
by consequence, «to find agreements between [regions] and central government
where the parties in government were the same, and conflicts between them where
these parties were diﬀerent»; by contrast, the prevalence of «a subnational per-
spective would imply that the [regions] take institutional positions towards the
central government policies; that is, notwithstanding the party in control in cen-
tral government, the governments of the [regions] constitute the ’subnational level
opposition’. This sub-national perspective would allow for intergovernmental con-
flicts and agreements independent of the party in oﬃce at the central level» (Grau
i Creus 2000, pp. 69-70, emphasis added).
On the basis of the literature reviewed in Chapter 1 (see § 1.7), several hy-
potheses linking IGAs features to diﬀerent patterns of IGR have been laid out.
First, a comparatively high level of institutionalization of IGAs should be ex-
pected to reduce the degree of party-partisanship of the intergovernmental decision-
making processes. The supposed underlying causal mechanisms refer specifically
to three of the four dimensions of institutionalization considered above: the exis-
tence of a formal basis; the role played within IGAs by bureaucratic and technical
bodies, and the frequency and regularity of the meetings. The existence of a
formal basis, making actors’ behavior more predictable, should contribute to in-
crease their mutual trust, independently from their respective partisan aﬃliation.
The actual operation of bureaucratic and technical bodies (such a Secretariat and
policy-specialized units) should, in turn, be likely to favor the emergence of a
1Because of the way in which the term "ideological" has been used in the previous Chapter,
where higher o lower "ideological congruence" has been interpreted as a consequence of the degree
of overlap in governments’ party compositions, I suggest to use the more general expression "con-
gruence impact", intended as the impact of intergovernmental congruence in terms of government
party composition.
2A test of the "political patronage" hypothesis – that is, whether IGR outputs are actually
biased by political congruence considerations– would be out of the scope of this analysis; however,
as it will be shown in the remainder, accusations of "political patronage" by distinct groups of IGR
actors may be interpreted as an interesting indicator of the politicization of the intergovernmental
decision-making processes.
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community of experts, formed around common and shared orientations, making
intergovernmental cooperation less "permeable" to high politics (by exerting a sort
of "shielding eﬀect" on IGR): the higher the role of technical bodies, the lower
the politicization of IGR (and viceversa). As to the contacts between IGR ac-
tors, it should be expected that the higher their density, the stronger the trust
ties among participants and the problem-solving orientation, irrespective of their
partisan aﬃliation.
- H1: The higher (lower) the degree of an IGA’s institutionalization, the lower
(higher) the relevance of IGR actors’ party aﬃliation in intergovernmental
policy-making processes carried out by means of this IGA.
Second, the distinction between a generalist and a policy-specific design of
IGAs appears as worthy to be explored as well. It may indeed be expected to
exert an influence on the process of preferences aggregation in the following way:
while a generalist organization, by making possible cross-sectoral exchanges and
compensations, could widen the mediation spectrum between opposite stances, and
make cross-partisan alignments more likely, a policy-specific arrangement, which
does not allow for cross-sectoral exchanges and compensations, could by contrast
exacerbate existing tensions deriving from intergovernmental incongruence.
- H2: While a generalist design of an IGA may favor the emergence of cross-
partisan alignments, a policy-specific organization of an IGA may exacerbate
existing party-partisan tensions.
Third and finally, looking at a given country’s IGAs system as a whole (that
is, at their combination), rather than at intergovernmental arrangements taken
in isolation, one could expect the kind of prevailing IGR actors’ coalitions to be
dependent also on the kind of territorial level at which IGAs do operate. From
this perspective, an exclusively vertical IGAs system could be seen as more likely
to favor the emergence of party-partisan coalitions, compared with a system char-
acterized by the co-presence of both vertical and horizontal IGAs: the existence
of these latter could be interpreted as a condition contributing to hamper the for-
mation of partisan vertical coalitions, by favoring the emergence of territorial, and
thus cross-partisan, alignments among IGR actors.
- H3: Vertical intergovernmental partisan coalitions should be more likely when
a horizontal intergovernmental arrangement is lacking.
Obviously, all these hypotheses presuppose a similar level of intergovernmental
incongruence; hypothesis no. 1 and 2 are expected to work both at the exclusively
vertical and exclusively horizontal level.
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Empirically, coalitions and divide lines at work in the intergovernmental game
carried out through IGAs can be grasped by looking at the kind of coordinated,
collective actions developed by IGR actors (the central and the regional executives)
when they have to address intergovernmental issues.
Intergovernmental relations have often been criticized because of the secrecy
and lack of transparency surrounding them (e.g. Breton 1996). Letting aside nor-
mative considerations, such feature of intergovernmental relations clearly makes
an analysis of their unfolding a complicated research goal. As long as Intergov-
ernmental Arrangements tend to convene behind close doors, an assessment of the
kind of divide lines and coalitions of actors prevailing within these arenas must
thus rely on qualitative evidence coming from documentary analysis (of IGAs ac-
tivity reports, minutes of the meetings whenever available), interviews with IGR
actors, as well as from a reconstruction – through an extensive review of major
newspapers articles – of IGR actors’ public statements and press releases.
Major collective actions to be considered refer to all those initiatives which
actors can put in place – by groups or unanimously – in order to jointly advance a
claim or manifest their position towards the central government about specific IGR
issues or, more generally, the way in which IGR are managed through multilateral
IGAs. Looking particularly at vertical IGR, these strategies, which generally entail
the decision to carry out highly visible, public remonstrations, can take, in turn,
several forms. The most typical are:
- the request to convene a meeting: regional actors may an Intergovernmental
Arrangement to be convened, so to force the central government to address
IGR issues;
- the demand to include particular items on the agenda: similarly, regional
actors may ask for the inclusion of specific matters in the order of business
of an IGA’s meeting;
- the early abandonment of an IGA meeting underway: in this case, regional
actors make manifest their dissenting stance on IGR issues by leaving an
IGA’s meeting early;
- the boycott of an IGA’s meetings: regional actors may decide not to attend
at all a scheduled meeting with the central government in sign of protest;
- the definition of distinct voting choices: whenever voting procedures do exist,
regional actors may eventually decide to signal their position by means of a
vote.
Simplifying, I assume that in all these cases collective actions can be organized
following either a territorial or a partisan perspective. As seen, if a partisan
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perspective is prevalent, one should expect State-Regions conflicts to be dependent
on the political composition of the diﬀerent interacting governments. By contrast,
if a "subnational-level perspective" is prevalent, conflicts should be independent
on the political composition of these governments. In the former case coalitions
will be composed of actors belonging to the same political side; in the latter case,
coalitions will be instead made of actors belonging to the same territorial level.
The choice of one of these two strategies may become apparent in the convening
of prior meetings by diﬀerent groups of IGR actors, by which the position to be
collectively taken in the IGAs is defined.
Due to the distinct features of the IGAs under analysis, one could expect the
specific strategies followed by IGR actors to vary depending on the institutional
setting (IGAs’ organizational rules, powers . . . ) in which they act. This is why,
as it will be shown, partly diﬀerent indicators will be looked at in the diﬀerent
arrangements taken into consideration in this analysis. For instance, boycotts
or abandonments of IGAs by groups of actors may be the best strategy to be
followed (in order to make IGR conflicts evident) when decisions have to be taken
by consensus; by contrast, when voting procedures do exist, disagreements may
become explicit by means of distinct voting choices.
In any case, what I will try to cast light on in the remainder of this Chapter
are the prevailing interaction modalities between the central government and the
regional executives (and among these latter) in case of conflict on IGR issues, by
taking into account which kind of conflict lines these actors tend to organize along,
when they are involved in the management of intergovernmental issues by means
of multilateral intergovernmental arrangements.
As it will be shown in the next paragraphs, from a general point of view, inter-
governmental decision-making processes clearly appear as more markedly politi-
cized in Spain than in Italy. While in the former the major divide line in multilat-
eral IGR reproduces, most of the times, nothing but the government/opposition
dynamic (party-based coalitions), in the latter the major divide pertains instead
to the confrontation between two territorial actors: the State and the Regions
(territorial-level based coalitions).
In the next Chapter, I will focus on two IGR decision-making processes car-
ried out by multilateral IGAs, selected from the two national cases, in order to
look more closely at their unfolding, and check for the actual operation of the
hypothesized causal links.
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5.3 A General overview
5.3.1 Italy: a subnational level opposition
As a consequence of the relatively high degree of institutionalization of its IGAs
and the generalist design of its intergovernmental arrangements, the Italian case
is expected to be characterized by a comparatively reduced role of partisanship in
IGR channeled through multilateral IGAs. It has been also shown that these lat-
ter have developed both at the vertical and at the horizontal scale, and that they
form, jointly, an integrated interaction "matrix" for the management of multilateral
relations. The existence of a double technical philter (horizontally and vertically),
a relative high density of meetings, as well as the possibility (in principle, at least)
for IGR actors to make cross-sectoral exchanges at both levels (because of the
generalist nature of IGAs), are all institutional conditions expected to favor the
emergence of territorial rather than party-partisan coalitions.
As it will be shown in the remainder, looking at Italian multilateral relations it
is in fact possible to detect the existence, using Grau i Creu’s words, of a full-blown
"subnational level opposition". Both the existing literature on this point and all
actors interviewed agree indeed on the limited role of respective party-aﬃliations
of IGR actors when it comes to address intergovernmental issues within intergov-
ernmental arrangements: as eﬃcaciously summarized by an IGR informant, rela-
tionships among regional Presidents tend to be characterized by a strong "esprit
de corps", primarily focused on the defense of territorial interests [IT6]. As to the
relationship between the Government and the Regions, it is generally defined as an
"institutional" relation: in this respect, the role of the "President of the Presidents"
tends to be significantly likened by IGR actors to that of a "trade unionist" acting
towards the central level on behalf of the so called "regional system", irrespective
of partisan aﬃliations.
An examination of the collective actions put in place by the regional govern-
ments towards the central one during the period 2002-2012 makes it clear that
the coalition congruence or incongruence among the regional governments, and
between these latter and the central executive, was not a determining factor in
shaping intergovernmental dynamics: «The last ten years are filled with numer-
ous episodes of confrontation between the Regions and the Government, which
have generally witnessed the Regions to move unanimously, outside the logic of
national political alliances, despite the strong rootedness of national parties and
the lack of strong regional parties in the Italian party system» (Ruggiu 2011, p.
249, translated).
Every year, one of the most debated issues is the Budget Law, on which the
Regions must give their advice (by means of the Unified Conference; cf. § 2.2.2).
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Generally, the Regions unanimously express their dissenting advice on it, denounc-
ing financial cutbacks and encroachments of competences. Interestingly, according
to some actors, such a position of the Regions – collectively assumed in the Con-
ference of the Regions – is characterized by an almost "ritualistic" pattern. As
described by a former "President of the Presidents",
It was presented the Budget Law, which envisioned for the Regions some
cuts: cuts on Health, cuts on Transports, cuts on transfers. [. . . ] Then,
the usual ritual started: we [the Regions] met, we made a public statement
saying: "It is not sustainable for the Regions that this money would be taken
away, we will be no longer able to provide services to citizens" and so on . . .
[IT5]
In the remainder, I will focus particularly on the indicators of IGR actors’
interacting modalities listed above. As exposed, one of the possible collective
actions of the regions towards the central government can take the form of a
boycott or of an early abandonment of multilateral IGAs’ meetings. In the period
of reference, this has occurred several times, always after that this strategy had
been decided in a unanimous way by the Conference of the Regions. By contrast,
no "partisan blockages" – that is, boycotts or abandonments by groups of regions
depending on their congruence vis-à-vis the central government – ever took place.
In the remainder, the major episodes of intergovernmental clash within Italian
IGAs will be reviewed (see also Ruggiu 2003, 2006, 2011): Table 5.1 contains a
schematic summary of these episodes along with data on the political aﬃliation of
both regional and central level interacting governments.
In November 2002 – when most regional executives were ruled by coalitions
congruent with the one in oﬃce at the central level (center-right) – all the Regions
decided not to attend a scheduled State-Regions Conference meeting as a way
to signal their disagreement on several provisions contained in the Budget Law
for the next year (breaking, in their view, previous State-Regions agreements); in
December, they even announced their willingness to address to the President of
the Republic (an absolutely unprecedented initiative), as well as their intention
to appeal, in a bi-partisan way, to the administrative tribunal against central
Government decisions3.
3«Finanziaria, è rottura tra Regioni e governo. I governatori, dopo l’incontro con Tremonti,
disertano la conferenza stato-regioni. Domani nuovo faccia a faccia. Formigoni: "Non vogliamo
una lira in più, ma almeno la copertura degli impegni precedentemente assunti"», La Repubblica,
November 7th 2002; «Finanziaria, le Regioni rompono con il governo. «Vogliamo i trasferimenti
dei fondi per la sanità». Il ministro dell’ Economia: superati i limiti di spesa», Il Corriere della
Sera, November 8th 2002, p. 5; «Le Regioni contro il governo. "Al Tar sul decreto taglia spese".
I governatori chiedono un incontro a Ciampi e denunciano. "Nessuna risposta sulla finanziaria,
la situazione è grave". Il ricorso deciso da tutti i presidenti di entrambi gli schieramenti», La
Repubblica, December 19th 2002.
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The perhaps most relevant boycott of the State-Regions Conference by the
Regions happened in 2004 (still in a context of vertical congruence between the
majority of the regional governments and the central one) when the subnational
executives suspended for several months their participation in the vertical IGA
as a way to protest against the supposed insuﬃciency of the financial resources
devoted to the National Health System, as well as against the center-right Gov-
ernment constitutional draft-bill on "devolution". Such initiative was described
by Italian newspapers as the "Aventino" of the Regions, referencing to the deser-
tion of the parliamentary activities by socialist Italian MPs in 1924 as a protest
against the rising fascist regime4. In fact, the abandonment of the State-Regions
Conference by the Regions was not complete, as long as the regional governments
took part to a few meetings, just not to to let expire some important measures
at issue: participation was nonetheless given a symbolic meaning, by the deci-
sion of the Conference of the Regions to attend these meetings through the only
participation of its President (on behalf of all regional Presidents), and to dis-
cuss exclusively those items on the agenda which were of particular interest to
the Regions. Such an institutional strategy was paralleled by a press campaign,
by means of which the Conference of the Regions aimed to attack the unilateral
attitude of the central Government in the management of IGR, particularly in the
field of healthcare policy. In an oﬃcial press release of the horizontal Conference
the regional governments argued that:
The Presidents of the Regions and Autonomous Provinces reaﬃrm their dis-
satisfaction with the interlocutory and disappointing meeting had with the
Government [. . . ] on matters essential and vital to the Regions as insti-
tutions, related to the defense of services provided to citizens in key-areas
4«Stato-Regioni, è fumata nera. Ghigo: senza risposte dal Governo diserteremo le Conferenze.
Ma La Loggia è fiducioso: confronto aperto su fondi e istituzioni», Il Sole 24 Ore, January 30th
2004, p. 16; «Si apre un altro fronte: le Regioni. Ghigo: "Vogliamo risposte o diserteremo le
conferenze"», La Stampa, January 30th, p. 7; «Rottura Regioni-governo. Sanità, buco da 13
miliardi. I governatori mantengono la scelta di non partecipare alle riunioni istituzionali. Ghigo:
senza una risposta di Berlusconi non torneremo al tavolo», La Stampa, February 6th 2004, p. 2;
«L’"Aventino" dei Governatori - La Loggia: Regioni convocate a breve», Il Sole 24 Ore, February
12th 2004, p. 12; «Federalismo - Governo-Regioni, mercoledì l’incontro», Il Sole 24 Ore, February
13th 2004, p. 16.; «Strappo delle Regioni: «Una riforma-mostro». Stop agli incontri con lo Stato,
Ghigo scrive al premier. La Loggia: ci ripensino, così danneggiano i cittadini. L’UdC Ronconi:
solo schiamazzi», Il Corriere della Sera, March 5th 2004, p. 5; «Bloccata la conferenza Stato-
Regioni. Fermi 8 miliardi per le aree depresse. Non partono anche il fondo agricolo, quello sociale
e quello sanitario», Il Corriere della Sera, April 5th, 2004, p. 8.; common initiatives against the
constitutional draft-bill on "devolution" were also taken in September when all the Regions asked
for a meeting with the Government to express their critiques on that project: see «L’altolà dei
governatori: "Così si bloccano le istituzioni". Comunicato bipartisan dei presidenti di regione.
"Casini faccia slittare l’iter delle riforme". "Intricato e macchinoso" il progetto di riforma della
Cdl», La Repubblica, September 17th 2004.
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such as health. [. . . ] The Regions confirm the need to remain absent from
any seat of State-Regions relationships. Meanwhile, the Regions announce
a further path of public awareness5.
In 2004, the clash between the Regions and the Government reached the highest
point at the end of that year, when the regional "governors" appealed again to the
President of the Republic, and denounced the financial cutbacks (also on healthcare
policy) imposed by the Government by means of the Budget Law for 20056.
In October 2005 the Regions abandoned – together with the representatives of
the Municipalities and the Provinces – the Unified Conference: in a separated con-
ference press, they announced their decision not to attend the next State-Regions
Conference, and, more generally, to interrupt their participation in multilateral
IGAs, in sign of protest against the Government cutbacks of the Social Policies
Fund7.
While between 2006 and 2007 – a period characterized by a high level of con-
gruence (see again Table 5.1) – major conflicts between the State and the Regions
in IGAs did not occur, they became again quite apparent from 2008 onwards.
In summer 2008 – at the beginning of a new period of vertical incongruence
– a meeting with the President of the Council was required by all the Regions,
disappointed for the unilateral management of IGR inaugurated by the new Gov-
ernment: if the central executive had not changed such attitude, Regions would
have blocked again the functioning of vertical conferences8.
In 2009, several new episodes of clash between the Government and the Re-
gions led these latter to boycott a number of meetings with the central executive:
in March, the regional decision not to take part in the State-Regions Conference
had to do with the non-implementation, by the Government, of a previous agree-
ment on the allocation of funds designed for the recovery of the poorest areas
5Conference of the Presidents Press Release, February 5th 2004; available at:
http://www.regioni.it/it/show-sanita__regioni_assenti_da_sedi_rapporto_
stato-regioni_in_attesa_risposte_governo/news.php?id=76182 (emphasis added).
6«Finanziaria: le Regioni protestano e si rivolgono a Ciampi. Ghigo, chiederemo incontro
al Quirinale su rapporto istituzionale con Governo», ADNKRONOS, December 16th, 2004; «Fi-
nanziaria: Errani, saltati i rapporti tra Governo e Regioni. Non faremo i gabellieri per conto di
Berlusconi», ADNKRONOS, December 17th 2004; «Dalle Regioni appello a Ciampi», Il Sole 24
Ore, December 17th 2004, p. 2; «Le Regioni si appellano a Ciampi. «Manovra riscritta in toto
senza di noi»», La Stampa, December 17th, p. 10.
7«Metà fondo sociale: rottura con Governo», in Conference of the Regions newsletter no. 603,
October 13th 2005, available at: http://www.regioni.it/it/show-603/newsletter.php?id=
107.
8«Manovra: Berlusconi riconosce metodo sbagliato Governo con Regioni. Errani: "Bisogna
rispettare i rapporti istituzionali e dare risposte concrete"», in Conference of the Regions
newsletter no. 1197, July 31st 2008, available at: http://www.regioni.it/it/show-1197/
newsletter.php?id=1161#art884.
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of the Country (FAS funds)9. An almost complete boycott of the State-Regions
Conference (interrupted just once) was decided by the Regions between the end
of April and the end of October. At the beginning of July, in a letter sent to the
Prime Minister and the Minister of the Regions, the Conference of the Regions
explained the reasons of this new "Aventino": their unanimous opposition towards
the management of IGR by the central level, on several matters (among which,
again, health policy):
The Regions unanimously believe that a decisive meeting with the Head
of the Government and the Ministers in charge of the matter is the only
useful initiative to resume the ordinary institutional relations. Without this
essential clarification, it is not possible for the Regions to participate in any
institutional and working board10.
In September, a new meeting with the Government, called to discuss the Budget
Law with local governments and social partners, was boycotted by the Regions,
claiming for a new encounter at the highest political level, that is with the President
of the Council11.
A new "Aventino" was menaced by the Regions at the beginning of 2010. They
boycotted the first meeting of the State-Regions Conference scheduled for that
year. During summer 2010, in a new phase of congruence, a further common ini-
tiative towards the Government was undertaken by the Conference of the Regions.
In this case, the sub-national governments initially publicly announced their will-
ingness to put in place a highly symbolic action, consisting in giving back to the
State many of the administrative functions received during the 1990s, because of
the prohibitive cuts, unilaterally decided by the Government, of the financial re-
sources necessary to implement those functions. To this end, the Regions solicited
the call of an extraordinary State-Regions Conference meeting12. Some weeks later,
9«A dissent without political colors: started from Sicily, a stronghold of the center-right,
the protest against Berlusconi’s government was extended yesterday to the other regions of the
South», in «Fas, Vendola guida la rivolta contro il governo», La Repubblica, March 20th 2009.
10Document available at http://www.regioni.it/upload/LettErraniBerlusconi020709.
pdf; see also: «Errani: si interrompono le relazioni Regioni-Governo. Ora serve chiarezza, a
partire dalle risorse», in Conference of the Regions newsletter no. 1401, July 3rd 2009.
11«Legge finanziaria. Le Regioni disertano per protesta lincontro con il Governo. Manovra,
Pil a -5% e deficit a +5», La Repubblica, September 21st 2009.
12«Le Regioni inaspriscono lo scontro: "Pronte a restituire le competenze allo Stato". Tra
quelle elencate il trasporto pubblico locale, il lavoro, l’agricoltura, l’energia, l’ambiente, la
viabilità. Il presidente Errani: "Chiederemo un incontro a Berlusconi". Bersani: "Governo
irresponsabile, sottovaluta una questione di sistema"», La Repubblica, June 24th 2010; Conference
of the Regions’ Press Release: «Manovra: chiesta Conferenza Stato-Regioni straordinaria per
restituzione deleghe (L.59/97) dalle Regioni allo Stato», June 25th 2010, available at: http://
www.regioni.it/it/show-manovra_chiesta_conferenza_stato-regioni__straordinaria_
per_restituzione_deleghe_l5997_dalle_regioni_allo_stato/news.php?id=37443.
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such a position of the Regions was however softened, because of internal divisions:
Northern League Presidents were indeed in disagreement with this strategy; inter-
estingly, exactly in order to preserve the unity and cohesiveness of the horizontal
Conference, the Regions, while confirming their unanimous opposition towards the
Government, decided to give up that opposing strategy13:
The Conference of the Regions and Autonomous Provinces unanimously con-
firms all the positions contained in the documents taken in these weeks on
the budget bill, which is considered unsustainable for its eﬀects on regional
budgets. [. . . ] In order to confirm the full unity of the Conference of Re-
gions and Autonomous Provinces, the decision of the restitution of delegated
functions will be set aside.
In June 2011, regional Presidents decided not to attend the State-Regions
Conference, with the aim of forcing the Government to discuss with them about
local public transports and healthcare policies14.
Finally, in May 2012, the Regions abandoned a meeting of the State-Regions
Conference to complain about the umpteenth postponement, by the Government,
of the allocation of the National Health Fund15. A "partial" boycott was put in
place at the beginning of June, when the Regions abandoned the vertical Con-
ference, just after having discussed with the central Government the most urgent
measures at stake (particularly those related to the economic recovery of some ar-
eas of the country damaged by an earthquake). Next meetings had to be canceled,
because of the non-attendance by the Regions, protesting again for the absence,
among the items on the agenda, of the allocation of the Health Fund16 as well
as the possible eﬀects of the "spending review" measures, initiated by the central
Government, on the health policy sector17.
What is clear from this review is that all major regional initiatives towards the
central government are generally unanimously decided by the Regions, and that
vertical congruence does not appear to be a suﬃcient condition for State-Regions
13Conference of the Presidents’ Document (July 15th 2010), available at: http:
//www.regioni.it/it/show-doc_approvato_-_manovra_insostenibile_documento_
conferenza_regioni/news.php?id=104517.
14«Conti pubblici: Regioni disertano Conferenze, governo ci incontri», ADNKRONOS, June
23rd 2011.
15«Sanità: è guerra Stato-Regioni, Governatori temono tagli. Abbandonano confronto»,
ANSA, May 22nd 2012; «Rinvio riparto risorse sanità per il 2012: Regioni abbandonano Stato-
Regioni», available at http://www.regioni.it/home_art.php?id=352; «Fondo sanitario, è rot-
tura tra Governo e Regioni», L’Unità, May 22nd 2012.
16«Sanità: Regioni disertano Conferenza, saranno a Unificata», AGI, June 21st 2012.
17«Spending review, i Governatori disertano il tavolo Stato-Regioni», ANSA, July 5th 2014
; see also Conference of the Regions newsletter no. 2069 , July 5th 2012, available at: http:
//www.regioni.it/it/show-2069/newsletter.php?id=1566#art10001.
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conflicts to be played down: while the absence of strong clashes coincided with the
domination of the intergovernmental arena by the center-left alliance both at the
central and at the subnational level (mid 2006-mid 2008), major periods of intense
intergovernmental confrontation were in fact characterized by the simultaneous
presence of the the center-right coalition both at the center and in most of the
sub-national governments (2002-2004; 2011)18.
5.3.2 Spain: government vs. opposition
As seen, Spain is characterized by a relatively underdeveloped system of Intergov-
ernmental Arrangements, working (almost) exclusively along the vertical dimen-
sion, and addressing IGR issues mainly from a policy-specific perspective. The
major generalist vertical IGA – the Conference of the Presidents – was estab-
lished just few years ago, and, as seen, has not yet been able to impose itself as a
structured arena for IGR management. Moreover, informants have confirmed the
strict policy-specific design of the diﬀerent Sectoral Conferences, no links existing
between the CISNS and the CPFF.
Spanish literature tends to agree on a quite high level of politicization of IGR
carried out by means of multilateral Intergovernmental Arrangements. In this re-
spect, Grau i Creus (2000) remarks that «the intergovernmental game has clearly
developed according to a partisan perspective» (p. 70). More recently, Arbós
Marín (2009) argue that, while partisan alignments are not present with the same
intensity across all Conferences, and that the degree of technicality of the spe-
cific issues under analysis may make a diﬀerence, «the partisan politicization is a
feature of intergovernmental relations in Spain. It is not uncommon that strate-
gies are agreed in the headquarters of the parties, so that in the formal meetings
of the Sectoral Conferences Autonomous Communities of the same political color
have coordinated positions. And the general level of confrontation that may arise
will depend on whether one or other of the major parties are in government or
in opposition. [. . . ] Our informants have spoken often about the logic of govern-
ment or opposition, Spanish scale, which has been considered influential in the
development of intergovernmental relations» (pp. 28-29, translated). In their em-
pirical analysis of intergovernmental cooperation in Sectoral Conferences, based
on IGR actors’ assessments, León and Ferrín Pereira (2011) note similarly that
«[i]ntergovernmental bargaining becomes diﬃcult because the Autonomous Com-
munities governed by the main opposition party systematically oppose any initia-
tive from central government. As a result, [Sectoral Conferences] reproduce the
18As to 2012, the assessment of intergovernmental vertical congruence is more diﬃcult, because
of the presence in oﬃce, at the central level, of a "technical cabinet".
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relationship between government and opposition parties in the lower house, and
become ineﬀective as mechanisms of intergovernmental cooperation» (p. 523).
A review of the intergovernmental decision-making processes developed within
Spanish Conferences confirms the prevalence of these dynamics in cases of dis-
agreement: the achievement of an agreement within intergovernmental arrange-
ments tends indeed, on many occasions, to be interpreted by IGR actors according
to a "partisan perspective", that is as a success for the central Government and
as a consequent failure for the opposition. I will now consider each IGA under
analysis: the CISNS, the CPFF, and the Conference of the Presidents19.
The Interterritorial Council of the National Health System (CISNS)
Starting from the Interterritorial Council of the National Health System, numerous
cases have been characterized by clashes between the Government and the Com-
munities not ruled by (nor supporting) the party in oﬃce at the national level.
Such clashes have taken the form, most of the times, of boycotts or abandonments
of the CISNS by the regional governments not congruent with the center (these
protests are commonly named plantes). Actors interviewed for this analysis have
confirmed that the politización partidista (party politicization) is a typical feature
of the Interterritorial Council working.
As put by a former Deputy Director General of the CISNS Secretariat, within
this Council
coalitions have always been between parties, and never "territorial" [. . . ] de-
cisions of the CISNS are "contaminated" by political parties’ stances. [SP8]
In this logic, according to a former Director General of the Health Ministry,
in fact, the Communities ruled by a party defend the Minister belonging to
their own party, and attack the Minister when he belongs the other party.
[SP7]
Likewise, a former autonomic Director General of Health Economic Resource re-
marked that
the Autonomous Communities ruled by the same party tend to form a "com-
mon front" in case of discrepancies among AACC, and between these latter
and the Central Government. [SP10]
19I will not consider the horizontal Conference of the Autonomic Governments, because, as
seen, it met just once.
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As seen in the previous Chapter, the reform of the Council passed in 2003 does
not seem to have been able to strengthen, in a significant way, the overall insti-
tutional development this policy-specific intergovernmental arrangement. Despite
a change in its design (particularly, its membership) the composition of coalitions
prevailing within it has remained the same. One informant summarized in this
way these developments:
The General Health Law (1986) created an equally composed Interterritorial
Council, i.e. with the same number of members of the State Administration
and of the Autonomous Communities. The Council was chaired by the Min-
ister and composed of 17 Councilors and as many other representatives of
the State Ministries of the Army, Interior, Economy, Health (among which,
myself). The formula was designed to avoid State vs. AACC coalitions, so
that in case of vote the State could not maintain the lead. In fact there was
hardly any votes and coalitions were of partisan nature. The Cohesion and
Quality Law [2003] amended the Council, making it similar to other Sectoral
Conferences: Minister and Councilors. Partisan coalitions were maintained
or emphasized. [SP7]
Considering the period 2002-2012, it appears evident that the Interterritorial
Council, «whose working has been defined by the need to achieve consensus in
the decision-making process, has suﬀered from constant blockages arising from its
politicization (its use by the opposition party to boycott the policies proposed by
the government, through the actions of the health Councilors of the Autonomous
Communities under their control), which enabled to use this forum in certain
contexts (the most constructive) to reach agreements on specific issues, often of a
technical nature, but not to reflect on general policy issues, the organization and
future of the NHS» (Moreno Fuentes 2009, p. 15, translated).
Such initiatives – summarized in Table 5.2 and reviewed in the remainder of
this part – have been given a high level of public visibility by their promoters by
means of press conferences and public statements: the most contested issues have
been those related to the agenda setting power exerted by the Government.
In April 2002, when the CISNS convened for the first time after the equalization
of Communities’ competences in health policy, all the six Communities then ruled
by the PSOE (and its allies) – the major opposition party at the national level
– decided to leave that forum before the end of the meeting as a way to protest
against the supposed "invasion" by the Health Ministry of regional competences
on health workers’ training. The then Secretary General of Health Cooperation of
the Health Ministry accused these Communities to "stage" a partisan use of the
CISNS, remarking that the Councilors issued from other parties diﬀerent from the
PP (that is PNV, CiU and CC) had not joined the socialist initiative20.
20«Sanidad, Conflicto de Competencias. Las comunidades socialistas plantan a Villalobos por
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In January 2003, the socialist Communities (this time together with Catalonia
and the Basque Country) refused to sign a convenio aiming at introducing a com-
mon health card in the Spanish NHS, beacuse it did not include some additional
proposals advanced by the socialists and Catalonia21. In December 2003 (that
is, after the CISNS reform), all the Autonomous Communities led by the PSOE
(again, together with the Basque Country and Catalonia) abandoned the Council
– the last one before next general elections – to make manifest their dissent on the
supposed lack of financial guarantees on some projects (such as the plans against
cancer and ischemic heart disease) fostered by the PP Health Minister and sup-
ported within the Council by the representatives of the Popular Communities22.
Two meetings over three in 2004 were marked, again, by conflicts between
partisan coalitions. The change of the party in oﬃce at the central level simply
determined a "role reversal" within the Council.
In June, it was indeed the turn for the Communities ruled by the Popular
Party – now become incongruent with the central government, run by the PSOE
– to leave the CISNS meeting in advance, announcing as well their intention not
to take part anymore to second level bodies of the Council: their disagreement on
the agenda set by the Minister (particularly, because of the absence of a general
discussion on NHS major financial problems), and her refusal to convene an ex-
traordinary meeting, as the populars had requested, were the oﬃcial arguments
used to justify their protest. They also announced the establishment of "alternative
forums and meetings" in order to debate the major problems of the Spanish NHS,
which could not be addressed by the CISNS. Eventually, the PP health Councilors
prepared a document, to be delivered to the Secretary of the CISNS, in which
they complained of «the existence of a palpable and evident disregard towards a
number of Communities, which cannot be accepted from any point of view, even
less so given the current competence regime in health matters. Finally, they argue
that the Minister will have all their support when she will fully acknowledge that
the activity of the CISNS cannot be led by political junctures nor to be subject to
discussions driven by partisan stances» (El Mundo, June 16th 2004, translated)23.
quitarles la formación de sanitarios.», El Mundo, April 16th 2002; «Los socialistas abandonan
el Consejo Interterritorial de Salud. El debate sobre las competencias en formación divide el
organismo», El País, April 16th 2002; «El Consejo Interterritorial de Salud acaba en un nuevo
plante socialista. Sanidad acusa al PSOE de hacer "un uso partidista" de esta institución», ABC,
April 16th 2002.
21«Reunión del Consejo Interterritorial de Salud. El proyecto de una tarjeta sanitaria única
se pone en marcha sólo entre seis comunidades autónomas», El País, January 14th 2003
22«Ocho Comunidades rechazan los planes de Salud de Sanidad por falta de financiación. La
ministra garantiza el desarollo de los planes de cáncer y obesidad pese a la postura del PSOE»,
ABC (Madrid), December 4th 2003, p. 50.
23«Consejo Interterritorial. Los consejeros de sanidad del PP ’plantan’ a Salgado», El Mundo,
June 16th 2004; «Los consejeros del PP plantan a la ministra de Sanidad. El Consejo Interter-
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The opposition strategy carried out by the PP Communities became even more
aggressive on the occasion of the next meeting, called in September: popular
health Councilors collectively decided not to take part at all in the CISNS meeting,
convened in Barcelona, and organized in Madrid a "counter-press conference" to
manifest their dissent against the socialist management of that IGA. This time,
the main oﬃcial reason of the plante had to do with the non inclusion in the
agenda, by the Minister, of some items previously unanimously agreed on in the
Delegated Commission (cf. § 3.2.3), such as those related to health problems due to
immigration and, again, to the financing of the NHS. The Health Ministry reacted
by remarking that the last word on the agenda setting was up to the Minister,
and that, anyway, the financial issues had to be debated with the Budget Minister
within the Council of Financial and Fiscal Policy (CPFF)24. The kind of climate
characterizing that CISNS meeting was described in the following terms by an
article of the El País (September 23rd, translated):
The plante of the Councilors of the PP was harshly criticized by Elena Sal-
gado [the Health Minister], who accused them to "confuse partisan struggle
with institutional representation". Salgado regretted having learned of the
absence of the representatives of the PP Communities "from a press release",
and explained that the meeting was held despite the plante, since the attend-
ing Councilors considered that "there was a suﬃcient quorum", and "that
this was what the citizens were expecting from us, instead of partisan strug-
gles". "The PP Councilors have believed to be Councilors just for their own
voters," added the Minister, who remarked that the Interterritorial Council
makes decisions for all Spaniards, such as the allocation of funds for health
policies of all Communities, included those ruled by the PP.
As announced, between mid-2004 and the beginning of 2005, boycotts by the PP
regional governments were extended to second level bodies. The Popular Party
Communities suspended the participation of their Health Directors General in
several technical commissions of the CISNS (one or more times): in 2004, they
did not attend a number of meetings on Public Health, Environmental Health,
Vaccines, Cohesion Fund, Information System, and Pharmaceuticals; in 2005, they
ritorial, boicoteado por segunda vez consecutiva», El País - Edición impresa, June 17th, 2004;
«El Consejo Interterritorial de Salud se rompe, pasto de las diferencias políticas», El Global.net,
June 23rd, p. 10.
24«Consejo Interterritorial de Salud. Los consejeros de Sanidad del PP plantan a Elena Sal-
gado», El Mundo, September 21st 2004; «La sanidad española se quiebra con una lucha abierta
entre PSOE y PP. Nuevo Plante de las Comunidades del PP ante la negativa a debatir la fi-
nanciación», ABC (Sevilla), September 22nd 2004, p. 49; «El debate sanitario. El PP rompe el
consejo nacional de salud por la financiación sanitaria. La ministra de Sanidad recuerda que el
debate económico recae en el Consejo de Política Fiscal», El País, September 23rd.
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absented themselves from meetings of the Pharmacy Commission, where important
issues like drugs reference pricing were debated (CISNS 2005 and 2006)25.
Boycotts and (complete) abandonments of the plenary sessions of the CISNS by
the Communities ruled by the major opposition party were suspended during 2005
and 2006. However, new partisan strategies were experimented by the Autonomous
Communities not politically congruent with the central executive.
The PP health Councilors attended the first meeting called in 2005: neverthe-
less, they abandoned it for a while ("temporary abandonment"), in order to hold
a separate press conference, where they restated their complete disappointment
with the management of the Council by the Minister, and denounced once more
the lack of "institutional normality" in the management of health policy IGR. The
Popular Councilors also refused to approve the minutes of the previous meeting. A
separated conference press was held by PP representatives also after the Interter-
ritorial Council meeting called in June in Oviedo: they criticized the Government
draft bill on medicines, just discussed within the Council, and restated the request
of an extraordinary encounter on financing26. The meeting organized in Santander
(October 2005) was instead marked by the refusal, by the PP Councilors, to take
part in a preliminary, informal reception organized by the (socialist-ruled) hosting
Community27. The last Council celebrated in 2005, in Logroño, was character-
25«Nuevo plantón de las comunidades del PP a la Comisión de Farmacia, El Global.net,
July 25th 2004, http://www.elglobal.net/noticias-medicamento/articulo.aspx?idart=
113797&idcat=24&tipo=2;«El PP vuelve a ausentarse de la Comisión de Farmacia», El
Global.net, February 6th 2005, http://www.elglobal.net/noticias-medicamento/articulo.
aspx?idart=142329&idcat=24&tipo=2.
26«Finally, the health councilors of the PP did not leave the Council meeting. Although 24
hours earlier, the [Madrid Community] Councilor Manuel Lamela had warned, on behalf of all
the representatives of the Popular Party, that they could leave the debate, the truth is that
the session counted on their presence. This time, populars did not opt for a plante, but hold
a press conference to make several clarifications on the agenda and the issues that were being
addressed in the CI. The main target of criticism was the future Law on medicines [Ley de
medicamento], that the PP rejected in its entirety», in «Los consejeros del PP vuelven a exigir a
la ministra de Sanidad una reunión específica del Consejo para debatir sobre financiación antes
de la Conferencia de Presidentes, y rechazan el borrador de la Ley del Medicamento», El medico
interactivo, June 30th 2005 (translated).
27«The minister regretted that the PP "confuse political partisanship and bad manners" and
reminded its councilors that their duty is "to be concerned about the health of citizens" who
are the "real protagonists of health policy." "They have wasted this opportunity again," said the
Minister of Health, who appreciated the attendance by the Councilors from Aragon, Asturias,
Castile-La Mancha, Extremadura, Andalusia, Galicia and Cantabria – all governed by the PSOE
or coalitions in which socialists are present – and excused the representatives of Navarre, Canary
Islands and the Basque Country "that could not come."», in «Salgado critica la "descortesía" y
el "partidismo" de CCAA del PP por no acudir a la recepción del Consejo de Salud», EUROPA-
PRESS, October 4th 2005; «Los consejeros del PP aseguran haber ofrecido un Pacto de Estado
por la Sanidad a la ministra y obtener una respuesta negativa, El medico interactivo, October
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ized by a new separated conference press, held by the Madrid health Councilor
while the CISNS meeting was still underway, to announce, on behalf of all the
PP-ruled regions, their common opposition against the Government draft bill on
the updating of the common NHS benefits basket, discussed by the Council28;
moreover, a controversy about the methodological adequacy of the data provided
by the Madrid Community (ruled by the PP) on the waiting lists times in this re-
gion (considered insuﬃcient by the Minister) led to the emergence of an additional
partisan clash: Madrid denounced the existence of a sort of "complicity" between
the Ministry and the PSOE, at the basis of a supposed political strategy against
this Community29.
Note that in 2005 the PP Communities also adopted a parallel opposing strat-
egy, at the legal level: in April 2005, each of them – Madrid, Balearic Islands,
Valencian Community, Castile and Leon, La Rioja, Murcia and Galicia – appealed
to the Audiencia Nacional (a special high court) against the Minister’s refusal to
convene, as requested in writing by the Popular regional executives, an extraordi-
nary meeting of the Council in order to address issues such as health financing, the
introduction of new benefits and the definition of the benefits basket, health plan-
ning programs, Health Cohesion Fund and, more generally, the objectives pursued
by the socialist government in health policy30. As seen previously (§ 3.2.3), ac-
cording to the internal rules of the CISNS, extraordinary meetings are to be called
by its President, either on its own initiative or at the instance of at least one third
of the Council’s members (as it was in this case). In autumn 2006, the Audiencia
Nacional recognized the legitimacy of the request promoted by the Popular Com-
munities, and obliged the Minister to convene an extraordinary plenary session of
the Council, with an order of business including all the items required by these
regions31. The Health Minister, nonetheless, decided to file an appeal against this
judgment to the Tribunal Supremo.
A new abandonment occurred in December 2007, when the last Interterritorial
Council before the 2008 general elections was celebrated. To justify this new
protest, the arguments put forward by the Popular Communities – which left
the CISNS just few minutes after the beginning of the meeting – were in line
6th 2005.
28«CCAA del PP y Navarra rechazan el decreto sobre prestaciones sanitarias presentado por
Sanidad», EFE, December 14th 2005
29«Sanidad ofrece sus primeros datos de las listas de espera sin incluir a la Comunidad de
Madrid», El País, December 14th 2005.
30«Los consejeros de Sanidad del PP amenazan con ir a los tribunales si no hay reunión»,
Levante, February 1st 2005.
31Sees ruling of the Audiencia Nacional (Section no. 4), nos. 5651 and 5717/2006, and nos.
232, 352, 1479, 2279, 4651/2007; «La Audiencia ordena a Salgado reunir a los consejeros de
Sanidad. La agenda del encuentro deberá ser la que pidieron en 2004 los representantes del PP»,
El País - Edición impresa, November 3rd 2006.
238
with those used in previous occasions, as reconstructed above: the refusal by the
Health Minister to introduce the discussion on health financing on the Council
agenda, and to convene to this end an extraordinary meeting, as established by
the Audiencia Nacional. The new PSOE Health Minister, Bernat Soria, reacted
by using the same arguments used by his predecessor, and labeling the PP decision
as nothing but an "electoral manoeuvre": «The Council cannot be turned into the
third chamber of discussion»32.
2009 was characterized by a relatively intense and "non-confrontational" ac-
tivity of the CISNS, partly because of the necessity to address the so called "flu
pandemic" (as seen, four out of eight meetings in 2009 were entirely devoted to
addressing this potentially disastrous epidemiological issue). 2010 was character-
ized, as well, by a relatively intense level of activity, although a new conflict arose
between the PP Autonomous Communities and the Government: in May, the
popular representatives asked the central executive to exclude from the Council
agenda the discussion of the abortion law reform33. Furthermore, it was in 2010
that the requested extraordinary meeting finally took place, after that, in 2009,
the Tribunal Supremo had recognized, in a definitive way, the legitimacy of the
Popular Communities claim, forcing the central government to act consequently.
Interestingly, the Court stressed that the President of a Sectoral Conference can-
not act in a unilateral and arbitrary way, being nothing more than a primus inter
pares34.
The last episode of demonstrative action put in place by a group of regional
governments occurred in 2011: the six PP-led Communities decided this time not
to attend the CISNS meeting (boycott). The reasons given to justify this decision
appear as particularly interesting, insofar as they make explicit reference to issues
of vertical party congruence and incongruence under analysis. After many months
during which the CISNS has not been called by the Government, the Health Minis-
ter finally resolved to convene it. However, she took this decision at the beginning
of June, that is immediately after the regional elections which had took place in
May, when the Popular Party had won in the large majority of Communities. In
such a context, the Health Ministry was accused by the Popular Party to misuse
its power to call the Council, in order to "select" – on the basis of political aﬃnity
criteria – the regional interlocutors of the central Government within this arrange-
32«El PP boicotea el diálogo sanitario. Las autonomías de la oposición plantan a Soria tras
exigir reabrir ahora el debate de la financiación»El País - Edición impresa, December 13th 2007.
33"The Councilors of the Autonomous Communities governed by the PP have criticized the
haste with which, in their view, were processed the enacting texts on abortion legislation", in «El
PP presentará hoy su recurso contra la nueva Ley del Aborto. También el Gobierno de Navarra
formalizará antes del jueves su recurso», EUROPA PRESS, May 31st 2010.
34See rulings of the Tribunal Supremo (Section no. 4), nos. 2071; 2253; 5637; 5732; 5771; 5870
(2009).
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ment: at the beginning of June, in fact, the new regional governments were not
yet in oﬃce, meaning that many PSOE representatives would attend the Council
as outgoing Councilors, in place of the incoming ones (in many cases exponents of
the PP) (for governments political aﬃliations, see Table 5.2). This was labeled by
the PP representatives as a full-blown "fraud" with respect to citizens willingness.
Suspicions were further fueled by the very short notice and the kind of items intro-
duced on the agenda of that meeting: among others, an highly controversial and
ethically sensible matter such as the governmental draft-bill on "dignified death"
and palliative cares35. In this latter respect, the PP health Councilor of the Madrid
Community, one of the regional executives leading the PP front, argued that
"an act of this importance should not be treated with acting Councilors [. . . ]
What can not be [accepted]", he added, is that the Council has not been
called for six months "and now, suddenly, from one week to another, when
one realizes that he has lost six Communities, the goal is making in a hurry
a discussion on a law of such a magnitude"36.
Major episodes of intergovernmental conflict within the Interterritorial Council
are summarized in Table 5.2.
The Fiscal and Financial Policy Council (CPFF)
Turning now the attention to the other Sectoral Conference under analysis – the
Fiscal and Financial Policy Council (CPFF) – when looking at its decisional dy-
namics it is easy to find out patterns of government-opposition confrontation quite
similar to those observed for the CISNS. Considering again the period 2002-2012, it
is evident that Communities positions tend to reflect, in several cases, nothing but
the alignment of the respective ruling parties towards the national Government:
the logic majority/opposition appears to spill over within the Council, without
being previously "philtered" by the intergovernmental arrangement under analy-
sis. Major (but not systematic) exceptions are represented by Communities where
the main opposition party at the national level is replaced by a local ally (like
the UPN, replacing the PP in Navarre): as it will be shown, the alignment of
35«Las comunidades del PP boicotean el consejo interterritorial que quiere convocar Pajín.
Madrid asegura que es "un fraude" reunirse cuando algunas autonomías han cambiado de color
político tras las elecciones», El País, May 26th 2011; «Las comunidades del PP plantan a Pajín
por la "crisis del pepino. Las seis autonomías gobernadas por los conservadores no acuden a la
reunión con la ministra. Castilla y León tacha la convocatoria de "inoportuna, improcedente e
irregular"» El País, July 2nd 2011.
36«Plantón del PP en el Consejo de Salud. Los populares se ausentan de la reunión tras pedir
medidas por la ’crisis de los pepinos’ - Alegan que Pajín solo pretendía aprobar la ley de muerte
digna», El País - Edición impresa, July 3rd 2011.
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these Communities tends to be less predictable (for governments’ party aﬃliations
during the period under analysis, see Table 5.3).
As it has been observed for the CISNS, the agenda setting has often been a
subject of controversy between the Government and the politically hostile Com-
munities. In fact, requests to the Government to call extraordinary meetings of the
CPFF to address specific intergovernmental issues have been formulated, over the
years, by both the socialist and the popular regional executives, when incongruent
with the central level (as seen, these meetings may be requested by one third of
the Council’s members).
So, in 2002 the PSOE Communities urged the Budget Minister to convene a
meeting for assessing the economic burden deriving to regional governments from
the Education Quality Law then presented by the PP central Government37; be-
cause of the unwillingness of this latter, the same request was reiterated by the
socialists in 200338. In 2005, it was the PP, now in opposition, which asked for
an extraordinary meeting of the CPFF, this time to discuss the economic conse-
quences of the highly controversial reform of the Catalan Statute of Autonomy39.
The following year, the regional governments ruled by the PP forced the Budget
Minister to call an extraordinary meeting of the CPFF to discuss in a multilateral
way the fiscal agreement reached between the central Government and Catalonia40.
More interestingly for this analysis, in 2008 the PP-led regional governments called
for a special meeting of this IGA in order to adress specifically the problems re-
lated to health policy financing41. Some weeks later, the PP regional governments
asked for the inclusion of the discussion, within the CPFF, of the financial burdens
deriving to regional governments from the implementation of Ley de Dependencia,
promoted by the socialist central Government42. In 2011, the request of a special
meeting was formulated by the popular regions in the midst of the election cam-
37«El PSOE pide la reunión urgente del Consejo de Política Fiscal», ABC (Madrid), September
10th 2002, p. 34.
38«Las comunidades del PSOE exigen que se analice este curso el coste de la LOCE», El País
- Edición impresa, March 10th 2003.
39«El PP presentará proposiciones y mociones contra el Estatut en Comunidades y Ayun-
tamientos», El Mundo, October 10th 2005. The reform of the Catalan Statute of Autonomy
proved to be a particularly heated argument.
40«Los barones del PP exigen a Solbes la convocatoria urgente del Consejo de Política Fiscal»,
ABC (Madrid), January 24th 2006, p. 12; «Artur Mas advierte que quien no se sume a su pacto
con Zapatero ’se queda fuera del futuro’», El Mundo.es, January 23rd 2006; «PP intenta forzar
otro pleno del Consejo de Política Fiscal para que Solbes desvele el modelo de financiación»,
EUROPA PRESS, February 12th 2006.
41«El PP urge al Gobierno a convocar un Consejo de Política Fiscal "extraordinario" para
hablar de financiación sanitaria», EUROPA PRESS, October 7th 2008.
42«La "revuelta" contra el Gobierno de seis Comunidades ya tiene forma», Elsemanaldigi-
tal.com, October 28th 2008, available at: http://www.elsemanaldigital.com/articulo.asp?
idarticulo=88963.
242
paign, just one month before upcoming general elections. El País reconstructed
in the following way the political rational behind this initiative:
The PP wants to use its overwhelming majority in the Autonomous Com-
munities [10 vs. 2] to make opposition to the PSOE Government. For that,
they want to force the convening of a Fiscal and Financial Policy Council
meeting, where they are all represented and where they can get the executive
into trouble43.
As long as, unlike the CISNS, the CPFF may take decisions by majority, the
split of actors’ coalitions along partisan conflict lines "crystallizes" when it comes
to vote44. As seen in Chapter 3, CPFF decisions are in fact often taken following
the majority rule. In those cases in which decisions are not taken by consensus,
the Communities ruled by this latter tend to opt either to vote negatively or to
abstain, depending on the issues at stake and the internal cohesion of the major
opposition party. Abstention is generally the option chosen when Communities
ruled by the opposition party are divided on the merits of the measures under
discussion, some being in favor, and some others being against.
As it was previously explained, since the early 2000s the major documents over
which Communities are called to give their advice every year are those related to
the setting, by the Government, of the budgetary stability goals (financial stability
goals for the regional level as well as for each subnational government): this is a
fundamental step in the process of Budget Law drafting by the central executive.
While in Italy, as described above, financial issues are among those which allow
the "regional front" to unify towards (or against) the Government, in Spain they
have been transformed, on several occasions, into a full-blown battle field between
the party ruling at the central level (and "its" Communities) and the rest of the
regional executives.
This is what occurred in 2003, when the socialist regions (together with Catalo-
nia and Canary Islands) voted against the setting of the "no deficit" objective for
the AACC, proposed an alternative resolution (then rejected by the PP Govern-
ment and the popular Budget Councilors), and accused the central Government to
43In «El PP agita su poder autonómico frente al Gobierno del PSOE en vísperas del 20-N»,
El País - Edición impresa, October 11th 2011; see also «El PP pedirá la reunión del Consejo
de Política Fiscal por la asfixia de las CCAA», El Mundo, October 8th 2011; »; «Montoro pide
a Salgado un consejo de política fiscal el 17 de octubre. Las comunidades del PP exigen la
convocatoria para "clarificar el horizonte económico de 2012"», El País, October 10th 2011; «El
Gobierno no convocará el Consejo de Política Fiscal si no lo fuerza el PP. Los populares quieren
forzar la convocatoria de un Consejo de Política Fiscal y Financiera», El País, October 10th
2011; «Rajoy exige al Gobierno que reúna ya al Consejo de Política Fiscal», El País, October
15th 2012.
44The favorable vote of just one Community is suﬃcient for an agreement to be adopted.
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set unilaterally the budgetary stability goals; the repartition of these latter among
the individual regions was finally supported by the popular Councilors (plus Ca-
nary Islands, then ruled by a coalition including CC and PP), and rejected by the
socialists ones (plus Catalonia and the Basque Country)45.
In 2004, the first CPFF meeting chaired by the new socialist Minister of Budget
was celebrated: this time, the general budgetary stability goal for the Communities
– the same set in 2003 by the PP Government – was approved with the positive
vote of the socialist regions, while almost all the ones ruled by the PP decided to
abstain; the repartition of the deficit containment between the Communities was
then approved by the socialist governments and rejected by the popular ones46.
The split between Communities congruent with the central Government and
those incongruent with it occurred again in 2007: the setting of the budgetary
stability goals for the whole regional system was indeed supported by the socialist
Councilors, while the popular ones abstained (with the exception of Navarre, which
voted together with the socialists); the repartition of the deficit reduction among
the Communities was then approved with the positive votes of all the congruent
regions, the abstention of all the ones ruled by the PP, except for Castile and León,
which voted against.
With minor diﬀerences, the same dynamics occurred again in 2008 (when also
the decision of the Government to relax the stability goals previously set was sup-
ported by the socialists and Navarre, and rejected by the popular councilors)47,
and 2009: in this latter case, the general stability goal for the regions was passed
with the support of the socialist Communities and Navarre, and the opposition of
the popular executives and Canary Islands (ruled, again, by a coalition composed
by CC and PP); on the repartition of this stability goal between the Communities,
most of the PP executives decided to vote against (Galicia, La Rioja, Murcia, Va-
lencian Community, Madrid and Castile and Leon) while others to abstain (Canary
Islands, Navarre, Ceuta and Melilla).
While in 2010 all major decisions were taken by consensus, conflicts emerged
again in 2011: this time, the general stability goal proposed by the Government
was approved by the socialist regions plus Catalonia and Canary Islands, while the
Communities where the PP was in oﬃce opted either for a negative vote (Murcia)
45«El CPFF aprueba el ’déficit cero’ para las CC.AA», El Mundo - Economía, March 6th
2003; «Estabilidad. El Gobierno acuerda con las Comunidades afines el equilibrio presupuestario
para 2004-2006», El Mundo - Economía, April 11th 2003; «El Gobierno y las Comunidades del
PP pactan el equilibrio presupuestario para 2004-2006. Las seis del PSOE votan en contra», El
Mundo, March 6th 2003; «El CPFF aprueba el ’déficit cero’ para las CC.AA. Oposición de 8
regiones».
46«Consejo de Política Fiscal y Financiera. El Gobierno y las Comunidades Autónomas aprue-
ban el ’déficit cero’ para el periodo entre 2005 y 2007», El Mundo - Economía, May 21st 2004.
47«Las comunidades del PSOE y Navarra apoyan un déficit del 1% para 2008 y 2009, con el
voto en contra el PP», EUROPA PRESS, October 8th 2008.
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or for an abstention; the allocation among the Communities was then passed by
consensus48.
Eventually, in 2012, the tightening of the budgetary stability goals previously
set for that year was supported by the PP (now in oﬃce both at the center and
in most of the Communities), and rejected by the socialists and the Basque na-
tionalists49. Furthermore, in July, for the first time a group of Communities, ruled
by diﬀerent parties all incongruent with the central Government, put in place a
plante such as those carried out in the CISNS: Catalonia (ruled by the regionalist
CiU) boycotted the meeting, while Andalusia (PSOE) abandoned it, as a sign of
protest against the "discriminatory" budgetary stability goals for 2013 set by the
Government; Asturias (ruled by the PSOE) and Canary Islands (governed by a
coalition composed of CC and PSOE) voted against50.
Interestingly, on some occasions, the opposition between congruent and incon-
gruent regional governments came even to involve the set-up and functioning of
technical Working Groups within the Council. This was the case, for instance,
in 2003, when the group on "Institutional Loyalty" (see § 3.2.3) was created with
the only support of the popular Communities and Canary Islands (CPFF 2005)51;
likewise, in 2006, the institution of a Working Group charged with addressing the
revision of the whole autonomic financing system was passed with the support of
the socialist regions and the opposition of the popular ones52.
As evoked above, the stance held by the regional governments within the CPFF
is in fact often decided outside this forum, in previous meetings between the Com-
munities belonging to the same political family. León and Ferrín Pereira (2009)
report that informal meetings between politically congruent regional executives are
a quite common practice in order to define a common position towards the Gov-
ernment in Sectoral Conferences. This is clearly a way by means of which parties
48«El Gobierno mide el poder autonómico del PP en el Consejo de Política Fiscal. Salgado
somete el miércoles los criterios de gasto a los consejeros de Hacienda», El País, July 26th 2011.
49«Los barones del PP cierran filas con la reducción del déficit en el Consejo Fiscal. Andalucía
y el País Vasco se muestran en desacuerdo con los objetivos fijados por el Gobierno», El País,
March 6th 2012.
50«Plante de Cataluña y Andalusia contra Montoro por el déficit y la deuda», El País, July
31st 2012; «Plante en el CPFF. El PSOE ve "gato encerrado" en el plan de Montoro para
las comunidades», El País, August 1st 2012; «El PSOE reclama la comparecencia urgente de
Montoro. Rubalcaba: "Se ha comportado como un líder de partido y no como un ministro de
todos". El líder del PSOE acusa al Gobierno de maltratar a las autonomías socialistas», El País,
August 1st 2012; «El PP critica el desplante de Andalucía y Cataluña contra Montoro», El País,
August 1st 2012.
51«El Gobierno acuerda con las Comunidades afines el equilibrio presupuestario para 2004-
2006», EFE, April 11th 2003.
52«El Gobierno y las CCAA acuerdan revisar el sistema de financiación autonómico con la
oposición del PP. Las comunidades ’populares’ exigen conocer en detalle los acuerdos», EFE,
February 9th 2006.
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try to realign positions of "their" regional governments, which may diverge because
of diﬀerent interests, something logically particularly likely when financial issues
are at stake. Colino and Parrado (2009) stress, at the same time, the diﬃculty
to trace these meetings, because of their informality and the reluctance of IGR
informants to give details on these events. Without any claim of completeness,
due to the methodological reasons just sketched, several party meetings preceding
those of the CPFF can be reconstructed (those reported by the press).
In 2005, the PP regional representatives convened several times before the
meetings called to discuss an agreement on health financing proposed by the Gov-
ernment (I will come back more in detail on this specific episode in the next
Chapter)53. Similar meetings occurred on several occasions in 2009, when popular
regional governments had to adopt a common position on the reform of the whole
regional financing system promoted by the socialist central government (which
basically increased the amount of resources available to the regions): to this end,
in July, popular regional Budget Councilors convened with the Vice-secretary and
the Coordinator of Economic Policy in the party headquarters54. Party meetings
occurred also in 2011, when the PP regions tried to unify their front against the
Government, in order to force this latter to carry a larger share of the burden
of deficit reduction55. Interestingly, similar meetings were organized also in 2012,
when the Populars were in oﬃce both at the central level and in most of the regions,
in order to reduce the emergence of discrepancies within the PP front, particularly
on financial cutbacks imposed to the Communities by the central Government in
order to comply with EU requirements: regional representatives met with the Bud-
get Ministry, the party coordinator of Economic Policy, as well as with the Prime
Minister in person56.
53«El PP se reúne para unificar su postura sobre la propuesta del Gobierno en financiación
sanitaria», El Mundo, September 13th 2005.
54«The Vice-secretary of the PP, in charge of Regional and Local Policy, Javier Arenas, and the
coordinator of Economic Policy, Cristóbal Montoro, have called for tomorrow morning a lunch
meeting with the Budget Councilors of the Autonomous Communities governed by the PP, in
order to discuss the new model of autonomic funding. The objective of this meeting - to be held
in the national party headquarters in Madrid, calle Génova - is to bring closer [PP Communities]
positions before the meeting of the Council of Fiscal and Financial Policy», in «Arenas y Montoro
citan mañana a sus CCAA antes del Consejo de Política Fiscal para consensuar posiciones»,
EUROPA PRESS, July 13th 2009 (translated); see also «Las comunidades autónomas del PP,
divididas en torno al ’no’ o la abstención al nuevo modelo de financiación. Rajoy anima a sus
autonomías a "defender los intereses de sus ciudadanos". El nuevo modelo se aprobará mañana
con el voto de las autonomías socialistas, Canarias y Cantabria», El País, July 14th 2009.
55«Feijóo lidera la presión del PP para pedir más dinero a Salgado por la crisis. Rajoy suma
fuerzas hoy con sus barones para un difícil Consejo de Política Fiscal», El País, July 26th 2011.
56«Montoro convoca a las autonomías del PP para acelerar el nuevo plan de choque. El
ministro cita mañana en la sede del PP a los consejeros autonómicos para cerrar más ajustes»,
El País, January 9th 2012; «Montoro se reúne hoy con los consejeros del PP para estudiar más
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Similar dynamics may also be traced when looking at the PSOE. Formal party
meetings were indeed organized in 2005, in order to unify socialist Communities
positions on central Government proposal on health financing (on this point, see,
again, next Chapter)57 and in 2008, when socialist Budget Councilors met with the
Prime Minister to address, in a preliminary way, the whole reform of autonomic
financing system58.
The Conference of the Presidents
Eventually, the more recent Conference of the Presidents, the vertical, generalist
Intergovernmental Arrangement gathering together both the autonomic and the
central governments Presidents, is to be taken into consideration. As seen in
Chapter 3, just a few meetings were celebrated since its establishment in 2004:
in two over five (the first and the second), health policy was at the center of the
intergovernmental debate.
A closer analysis of this IGA makes it clear that – as for the CISNS and the
CPFF – most of its meetings were surrounded by a climate of strong partisan con-
frontation between, on the one hand, the Government and the Communities ruled
by the party in oﬃce at the central level, and, on the other hand, the Communities
controlled by the major opposition party. Several pieces of evidence support this
claim: as in the previous cases, major divide lines were of partisan nature (and,
many times, actors’ strategies were previously defined in party structures).
While boycotts and abandonments never occurred, as for the CISNS and the
CPFF the definition of the agenda was often an object of controversy, the central
Government being accused by the politically incongruent Communities to impose
the order of business.
The first Conference, called by Prime Minister Zapatero at the end of October
2004, was preceded by a sharp conflict between the representatives of the Popu-
lar Communities and the socialist Minister of Public Administration, Jordi Sevilla,
charged by the premier with the task of preparing that meeting. The most relevant
controversy concerned the preparation itself of the Conference: the Communities
recortes», EFE, January 11th 2012; «Rajoy impone recortes máximos a las autonomías pese a
Mas y Griñán», El País, March 6th 2012; «Montoro y Cospedal analizarán con los consejeros
de Hacienda del PP los planes de ajuste antes del CPFF», EUROPA PRESS, May 16th 2012;
«Rajoy reúne a sus ’barones’ para lanzar un mensaje unitario ante los ajustes», EFE, July 30th
2012; «Rajoy presiona a sus barones para que recorten más y estos aceptan», El País, July 31st
2012.
57«Las comunidades presididas por el PSOE respaldan el plan del Gobierno contra el déficit
sanitario. Zapatero defiende su modelo de financiación para no "desentenderse" de las autonomías
y "escurrir el bulto"», El País.es, September 3rd 2005
58«El PSOE reunió a los consejeros de Economía para abordar de forma preliminar la reforma
de la financiación autonómica», EUROPA PRESS, May 20th 2008.
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led by the PP claimed indeed the call of a second preparatory meeting, considering
unacceptable the agenda (almost) unilaterally set by the Government59. Because
of the refusal of the Government to include on the agenda an item proposed by
them – a debate on the overall Spanish territorial model – the Popular Communi-
ties, after having evoked the possibility to "boycott" the meeting, announced their
intention to present a separated "institutional declaration" on that issue, in order
to force the Conference to discuss and vote on it; they also required to postpone
the Conference, given the "improvisation" characterizing its organization by the
Government60. The Conference finally took place, as scheduled, on October 28th,
to discuss the items selected by the central Government: the institutionalization
of the Conference itself; the improvement of the AACC participation in the EU af-
fairs; and, more importantly for this analysis, the examination of health financing
problems. In fact, despite initial declarations, the regional Presidents representing
the Popular Party did not present the announced alternative institutional declara-
tion61, but delivered to the Minister of Public Administration a distinct document,
including a series of alternative proposals62.
The second Conference of the Presidents was called in September 2005 to ad-
dress growing problems related to health financing: as I will illustrate more in
depth in the next Chapter, the meeting was characterized by a clear conflict be-
tween the two partisan coalitions. At the end of that encounter, which had been
preceded by several party meetings, actors were not even able to agree on whether
and what had been decided63.
In January 2007 Zapatero called the third Conference of the Presidents to dis-
cuss research and innovation policies, as well as measures on environment, the
management of natural resources, and immigration. The clash between the Popu-
59«Zapatero irrita al PP al citar a los presidentes autonómicos sin la reunión preparatoria. El
Ejecutivo dice estar dispuesto a mantener las reuniones que quiera el PP previas a la Conferencia
del día 28, aunque lo juzga innecesario, y confía en que Ibarretxe asista», ABC, October 21st
2004.
60«El Gobierno se niega a incluir el modelo territorial en la Conferencia de Presidentes como
pedía el PP», El Mundo, October 26th 2002; «El PP presentará una declaración sobre el modelo
territorial en la Conferencia de Presidentes», ABC (Madrid), October 27th 2004.
61Mainly because of internal conflicts on the opportunity of such a strategy:
«Fraga impide que el PP boicotee la primera Conferencia de Presidentes. La
actitud conciliadora del presidente gallego evitó el fracaso de la cumbre», Diari-
odeleón.es, October 29th 2004, available at: http://www.diariodeleon.es/noticias/afondo/
fraga-impide-pp-boicotee-primera-conferencia-presidentes_163886.html.
62«La Conferencia de Presidentes. Zapatero apuntala la cumbre de presidentes. El Gobierno
reúne a los 17 jefes de los Ejecutivos autónomos y promete una nueva financiación de la sanidad»,
El País - Edición impresa, October 29th 2004.
63«El PP, "indignado" porque desconoce la propuesta del Gobierno sobre sanidad. Mariano
Rajoy se reunió este viernes en Génova con los presidentes autonómicos de su partido para fijar
una posición común», El País, September 11th 2005.
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lar Communities and the Government was again about the agenda: the Communi-
ties led by the conservative party asked indeed to introduce the issue of nationalist
terrorism, something which was not accepted by the central level. The decision
of asking to introduce the terrorist issue on the agenda of the Conference had
been taken the day before, when the Popular regional Presidents had convened
with their party leader, Mariano Rajoy64. After the meeting of the Conference of
the Presidents, the Minister of Public Administration interestingly reported that,
during the Conference, the President of La Rioja, who asked formally to discuss
the terrorism issue, had been contested by other colleagues, having took the floor
as a spokesman of the Popular Party: «According to the Minister of Public Ad-
ministration, Jordi Sevilla, Pedro Sanz has been criticized for speaking "on behalf
of the PP", when it is assumed that in the Conference no parties, but Autonomous
Communities, are represented» (El Mundo, January 11th 2007)65.
The fourth Conference took place in December 2009: called for dealing with
economic recovery and fight against unemployment, it was unanimously pictured
as a complete failure, due to partisan clashes. The confrontation between the PP
and the PSOE reached its peak. After a very long debate, the final document
on economic issues proposed by Zapatero, including eight over ten points claimed
by the PP, got the support of just ten Communities (those ruled by the PSOE
and the regionalist parties from Cantabria and Canary Islands): the popular ones
decided to abstain, impeding in this way the approval of that document (since
2009 two thirds are indeed required to pass a document). After the failure of the
Conference, the PP Communities accused the Government of "improvisation" and
authoritarian style in the management of intergovernmental relations, while the
PSOE accused the PP of "irresponsability" vis-à-vis serious economic problems
such those faced by Spaniards, and to have previously decided to sabotage anyway
the Conference. As reported by El País, against the unilateral attitude shown by
the central Government in organizing the fourth meeting, the Communities ruled
by the PP had in fact tried to organize a sort of "counteroﬀensive", by making use
of party channels:
The PP does not deny the concerted strategy of its Presidents. For that,
all barones met last Friday with Rajoy. There, they even appointed their
spokesmen: Pedro Sanz, from La Rioja, and Alberto Núñez Feijóo, from
64«ETA «entra» en la III Conferencia de Presidentes. Los «barones» del Partido Popular
acordaron ayer durante un almuerzo con su jefe de filas, Mariano Rajoy, llevar a la III Conferencia
de Presidentes una moción contra ETA», El Mundo, January 11th 2007.
65«Las Comunidades del PP piden a Zapatero que rectifique su política contra ETA. La reunión
comienza con un minuto de silencio por las víctimas del atentado de Barajas», El Mundo, January
11th 2007; «Zapatero califica de "muy razonable" el gesto de Ibarretxe. El PP intenta sin éxito
que la Conferencia de Presidentes debata la política antiterrorista. Chaves destaca el acuerdo en
I+D+i», El País, January 11th 2007.
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Galicia [. . . ] Moreover, there were at the Senate four people, belonging to
the leader’s inner circle, [. . . ] in touch with Génova [the PP headquarter],
who were analyzing the Government proposals and sending notes to the
Presidents. Anyway, all agree that the Zapatero’s decision not to make
public the economic document until 2.30 p.m. irritated everybody and that
[at that point] no much coordination was needed, since they were all in
agreement66.
The fifth and last Conference of the Presidents (2012) was the first called by the
Popular Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy: in the midst of the global financial crisis
in which Spain was deeply involved, the main goal of the Government was to con-
vey towards the markets and the European Union a unitary message, confirming
the commitment of the country in the process of financial and economic recovery67.
A round of party meetings, on the PP side at least, preceded the Conference68.
For the first time, probably because of the existence of a strong external pressure
and the highly unbalanced relations in favor of the PP (controlling 10 Communi-
ties, with the PSOE being in oﬃce in just 3 regional governments), no relevant
conflicts emerged between the Popular and the Socialist Communities: they were
eventually able to agree on a final document, although quite vague, stating the
general commitment of Spanish central and regional governments to comply with
financial stability principles.
66«El PP bloquea ’in extremis’ cualquier acuerdo en la Conferencia de Presidentes El Gobierno
creará grupos de trabajo para situar el déficit en el 3% en 2013. Los populares dicen que el
Ejecutivo no plantea ninguna iniciativa "de calado"» El País, December 14th 2009; see also: «La
cumbre autonómica acaba en bronca. El Gobierno fracasa en su intento de lograr un pacto de
empleo con las comunidades del PP.- "Hace falta más lealtad y madurez institucional", reprocha
Zapatero», El País, December 15th 2009; «Rajoy respalda la actuación de los ’barones’ del PP
en la Conferencia de Presidentes. El líder de la oposición dice que Zapatero "confunde la lealtad
con la adhesión inquebrantable" y critica su reacción ante la negativa de los populares a pactar»,
El País, December 15th 2009; «PSOE y PP se responsabilizan mutuamente del fracaso de la
Conferencia de Presidentes. Los presidentes populares acusan al Gobierno de improvisación y
defienden que el documento final excluía los puntos principales de sus propuestas», El País,
December 15th 2009.
67«El Gobierno se compromete a cambiar el reparto del objetivo de déficit en 2014. Acuerdo de
todas las autonomías en el compromiso de reducción del déficit», El País, October 2nd 2012;«Ra-
joy salva la cumbre autonómica con un pacto mínimo para el déficit. Compromiso para cumplir
los objetivos de austeridad en pleno vendaval financiero», El País, October 2nd 2012; «Rajoy y
las CCAA sellan su compromiso para cumplir el objetivo de déficit. Algunos han discrepado con
el reparto previsto entre administraciones», El Mundo, October 2nd 2012
68«Rajoy busca un bloque de barones del PP para hacer frente a Mas. Santamaría, Cospedal y
Arenas citaron en Génova a dirigentes autonómicos para preparar la Conferencia de Presidentes
y unificar una respuesta dura», El País, September 25th 2012.
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5.4 Discussion
On the whole, the information collected in this Chapter has allowed to capture
the existence of noteworthy diﬀerences in the ways in which intergovernmental
decision-making processes typically unfold in the two countries under analysis.
While in Italy coalitions active within the intergovernmental arena tend to be
made of members of regional executives on the one hand, and central Govern-
ment representatives on the other hand, in Spain coalitions are often built along
the government/opposition divide line: as seen, in many cases, intergovernmental
arrangements are converted into arenas reproducing the national parliamentary
dynamics.
The formation of alternative kinds of intergovernmental coalitions in these two
countries has been explored by looking at diﬀerent interaction modalities between
regional and state actors when addressing IGR issues by means of Intergovern-
mental Arrangements. More specifically, several kinds of collective actions have
been examined, pertaining to: the requests of extraordinary meetings or the inclu-
sion of specific items on the agenda; the regional participation to IGAs’ meetings
(boycotts and abandonments); prior meetings by groups of IGR actors in view of
IGAs’ encounters. In one case, these actions are typically organized by the regional
governments as such, while in the other case, the same kind of initiatives tends to
be organized by the regions according to their majority or minority status vis-à-vis
the central government.
These findings seem thus to suggest the existence of a matching between the
hypotheses laid out in this Chapter and observed evidence: this latter appears,
in other words, "congruent" with theoretical expectations (George and Bennett
2005). It still remains to see whether variations in intergovernmental relations
can actually be traced back to variations in the features of Intergovernmental
Arrangements. This will be the object of the next Chapter.
From a preliminary point of view, looking at the internal developments of the
Italian case may provide interesting evidence supporting the hypotheses.
It is indeed worth to notice that the unanimity of the so called "regional front"
– apparently resilient, as seen, to any change in vertical and horizontal congruence
– clearly came under stress in two occasions (2000 and 2005). Immediately af-
ter regional elections (and before the general ones), political aﬃliation of regional
governments seemed indeed to become a factor able to challenge usual patterns of
multilateral intergovernmental relations: partisan rather than territorial coalition
building made its appearance on the intergovernmental stage, apparently reducing
the cross-case diﬀerences outlined in this Chapter. As reconstructed in detail by
Ruggiu (2003; 2006; 2011) and confirmed by many actors, however, the initiatives
put in place according to a partisan logic proved, in the end, to be quite extempo-
raneous, being unable to exert any lasting consequence on the established patterns
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of intergovernmental confrontation.
In 2000, following regional elections, the winning center-right coalition explic-
itly announced its intention to transform the existing institutional intergovern-
mental arenas into an opposition tool against an incongruent central government,
then still ruled by the center-left coalition. In fact, for the first time, the majority
of Regional Presidents were representatives of a coalition diﬀerent from the one in
oﬃce at the central level. In such a context, their declared purpose was – exactly
as in the Spanish case – to sabotage all central Government measures which they
did not agree; to this end, they would set-up alternative channels of interregional
coordination, based on party structures, so to replace the strategies elaborated in
a unanimous way within the Conference of the Regions. As highlighted by Ruggiu
(2003), «the spirit of cooperation seemed cracking, both among the Regions and
with the Government, given the threat to use the [State-Regions] Conference as a
center-right "counter-government"» (p. 211, translated).
After a meeting in which all elected center-right regional Presidents took part
along with the national secretaries of the parties composing that coalition, the
President of Veneto summarized in the following terms the logic of the intergov-
ernmental strategy agreed with his colleagues:
Next months will be hard for the Government. It will have to toil for our
advices [in the State-Regions Conference] [. . . ] The season of consociation-
alism is over, so that left and right Regions were forming in any case a
common front69.
On the organizational side, the head of the opposition, Silvio Berlusconi, leader
of the center-right coalition, also announced the intention of setting-up a full-
fledged "standing coordination board", composed of all center-right regional Presi-
dents: it would be convened one day before every State-Regions Conference meet-
ing, in order to coordinate and unify their stance on every single measure to be
then discussed with the (incongruent) central Government70. In this wake, two
meetings were organized between the regional Presidents belonging to the center-
right coalition: the first, in Genoa, included just the Presidents of the Northern
Regions71, while the second, held in Catanzaro, included also the Presidents from
the Southern Regions (even if not all decided to attend it)72.
69«Le Regioni del Polo sfidano il governo. Al via il coordinamento dei «governatori» della Casa
delle Libertà: «Detteremo l’agenda dei lavori di Montecitorio»», Il Corriere della Sera, May 5th
2000, p. 6 (emphasis added).
70«Polo e Lega varano il coordinamento regionale. Sarà un organismo a carattere nazionale -
Critico Bossi che chiedeva un’impronta più territoriale», Il Sole 24 Ore, May 5th 2000.
71«Regioni, debutta il «governo del Nord». Il presidenti del Polo si ridistribuiscono i finanzia-
menti UE», La Stampa, June 10th 2000, p. 2;
72«Regioni: venerdì riunione presidenti CdL in Calabria», ADNKRONOS, July 18th 2000;
«Proclama dei governatori: riuniremo le due Italie», La Repubblica, July 22nd 2000.
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The completely unprecedented nature of such initiatives – aiming at under-
mining the Conference of the Regions (by the creation of alternative, party-based,
channels of interregional coordination), and at transforming the State-Regions
Conference into an additional arena of government-opposition confrontation –
emerges clearly by looking at the kind of arguments used by the central execu-
tive representatives to oppose this strategy. Members of the Government released
indeed harsh statements in this regard73. The then Minister of Public Adminis-
tration argued that such a behavior by the center-right coalition was
the exact counterpart of parliamentary obstruction in the State-Regions
Conference, an organization where decisions are fundamental to the life of
the Italians, as the allocation of 120 thousand billion [liras] of the Health
Fund. I see emerging in the Polo [the center-right coalition] the temptation to
use that forum to make war to the Government and to the center-left [coali-
tion] in an endless election campaign. This had never happened. In Italy
Christian Democratic governments have never discriminated against the red
regions. And the center-right itself, at the beginning of the legislature, has
often made a constructive opposition [. . . ]. And in the State-Regions Con-
ference until today all measures have been passed regardless of any political
color. And now what should we do? Discriminate Lombardy led by the
center-right to promote Emilia governed by the center-left? This would be
barbarism.74
The then Ministry of Transports even labeled the meeting in Genoa, where
the Northern Regions ruled by the Polo agreed on allocation criteria of financial
subsidies for industrial recovery diﬀerent from those previously set in multilateral
arrangements, as a "subversive" initiative, able to erode the very logic of intergov-
ernmental relations followed up to that moment, and likely, as such, to lead to a
dangerous "institutional drift":
A fairly normal decision has been taken, but in a subversive form. I do not
call the contents [of that decision] into question, but the method. Which is
very serious and can have dangerous implications. If you wanted a diﬀerent
allocation of money, enough to say it in its own oﬃces. [. . . ] At this point,
the next steps are to dissolve the Conference of the Presidents of the Regions,
dissolve the State-Regions Conference and convene the Regions in the party
73«Regioni del Nord è scontro tra i poli», La Repubblica, July 11th, p. 8; «Regioni del Nord,
scontro con il governo», Il Corriere della Sera, June 11th, p. 7; «Alta tensione Governo-Nord. Il
ministro Bersani: sugli aiuti comportamento eversivo - Formigoni e Ghigo: Costituzione rispet-
tata», Il Sole 24 Ore, June 11th 2000.
74«Bassanini: regioni del Polo, minacciarci è rischioso. Il ministro della Funzione pubblica:
loro sono in grado di farci male, ma noi potremmo fargliene anche di più», Il Corriere della Sera,
May 7th 2000, p. 7.
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headquarters. I would like to understand if these regions are willing to take
this step. We cannot allow such an institutional drift.75.
Negative reactions came also from regional Presidents aﬃliated to the center-
left coalition, who stigmatized the initiatives put in place by their colleagues be-
longing to the opposite political alliance. They stressed the incompatibility be-
tween the partisan and the territorial perspectives in the management of IGR:
The leader of Campania has not swallowed the recent initiatives of the ad-
verse alliance. "Singular and abnormal was the recent meeting in Genoa
between the Presidents of the Polo and Gasparri and Frattini [exponents of
the center-right coalition] – explains Bassolino –. It is said that the deci-
sions of that meeting will be brought to the Conference of the Presidents of
the Regions. Then, I am reading of proposals on security and public order
prepared by Frattini, Ghigo and Formigoni [exponents of the center-right
coalition]. A new meeting is announced in Catanzaro of the Presidents of
the Polo and political representatives of the center-right. But if this is the
method, the venue of the Conference of the Presidents of the Regions will
end up not making any sense". And again: "As for me, I would never take
part in prior meetings of the Presidents of the center-left, possibly made
with representatives of the coalition parties, on institutional matters"76.
As evoked above, a second occasion in which partisan alignments appeared
as potentially relevant in shaping intergovernmental relations occurred five years
later, again immediately after regional elections (and one year before upcoming
general ones).
In a even sharper way than in 2000, the coalition at the opposition at the
national level – the center-left Unione – had won in the great majority of the
Regions. After a coalition meeting between the national leader of the Unione –
Romano Prodi – and the newly elected governors, the creation of a permanent
coordination board of the Southern regional Presidents was announced77. The
partisan design of such initiative, elaborated by the President of Campania (a
prominent exponent of the center-left coalition even at the national level), and
75«Regioni del Nord, scontro con il governo Bersani: eversiva la scelta sugli aiuti statali.
Ghigo: no, è il federalismo solidale. Bassanini: hanno copiato un’ idea di Amato. Formigoni:
uno stimolo allo Stato», Il Corriere della Sera, June 11th 2000, p. 7 (emphasis added); «Alta
tensione Governo-Nord. Il ministro Bersani: sugli aiuti comportamento eversivo - Formigoni e
Ghigo: Costituzione rispettata», Il Sole 24 Ore, June 11th 2000.
76««Fate politica», Bassolino attacca le Regioni del Nord. Il neogovernatore della Campania
minaccia di disertare la Conferenza. Formigoni: polemiche fuori luogo», Il Corriere della Sera,
June 14th 2000, p. 6 (emphasis added).
77«Centrosinistra - Battesimo del coordinamento delle regioni meridionali», L’Unità, April 20th
2005, p. 9; «Prodi lancia il coordinamento del Sud», La Repubblica, April 20th 2005
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supported by the coalition leader in person, was evident. Initially, indeed, the
declared goal consisted in gathering together all Southern regional Presidents at the
head of winning center-left coalitions. Several Presidents from the South, aﬃliated
to the Unione, stressed unambiguously the importance of the common belonging
to the same political side as well as their intention to use such new forum to create
favorable conditions for the victory of their alliance in 2006 national elections.
As an illustration of such intentions, the words of the President of Campania,
Bassolino, major promoter of such initiative, appear particularly revealing:
"We will have to work much, each of us in his own region, and all together.
Especially in Southern Italy. By the election of Turco in Abruzzo, Vendola
in Apulia, Loiero in Calabria [all center-left candidates], the South has re-
ally changed. A new political phase is starting. We are waiting confidently
for the vote in Basilicata, the only Region which, together with our own,
was already ruled by the center-left, and which certainly will vote over-
whelmingly for the candidate of the Unione." Immediatly after the results
of the Basilicata, according to Bassolino, "it will be possible to enforce the
goal we have set in Naples, in a major initiative with Prodi and D’Alema
[both prominent national coalition leaders]: to build a Southern team of
government". An idea which today, says the governor of Campania, can be
achieved "because we have won everywhere, and because, between all of us,
there are long-standing relationships not only on the political, but also on
the personal and human level". Coordination among the Southern Regions
"is, and will be, necessary and right – in Bassolino’s view – against ’devolu-
tion’ [the center-right constitutional project] and in favor of a cooperative
and unitarian federalism. [Coordination among the Southern Regions is,
and will be, necessary and right] also on economic and social issues, on the
major matters related to a diﬀerent development quality and to a national,
long-term investment program for the South". This coordination "is mean-
ingful and valuable today in an Italy in still ruled by the center-right and –
said the President – will be meaningful and valuable tomorrow, in a country
which we want, also thanks to our role and our initiative, to be governed by
the Unione and by Romano Prodi"78.
Interestingly, such attempt was quickly turned, by its supporters, into a a
territorial, rather than a strictly partisan, interregional coordination forum. In
spite of its original design, the coordination of the Southern Regions was indeed
extended so to include the Southern regional Presidents representing the center-
right coalition (just two over eight: Molise and Sicily). A first meeting was called
in Naples in May, when all Southern Presidents agreed to meet regularly (once a
78«Mezzogiorno: Bassolino propone coordinamento regioni del Sud», ADNKRONOS, April 7th
2005.
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month) in order to coordinate their actions, both towards Rome and, particularly,
towards Bruxelles (for the definition of the Structural Funds for the period 2007-
2013, after the EU enlargement towards the Eastern countries). Meetings would
be organized, each time, by a diﬀerent Region, in order to jointly debate relevant
issues such as the Southern infrastructures deficit, the immigration policy, and so
on79. Even if not monthly, subsequent meetings took then place in Abruzzo (July
2005), where the oﬃcial creation of a "Conference of the Center-Southern Regional
Presidents" was formally announced80; in Rome, where the Southern Presidents
met with representatives of Confindustria, the major national employers’ associ-
ation, to set a common platform on infrastructures and economic recovery for
the South81; in Sicily (November 2005)82; in Calabria (December 2005), where a
convention gathering the Southern Presidents with the major labor unions and
employers’ federation was organized (Stati Generali del Mezzogiorno)83; again in
Rome in 2006 (February).
The Southern Presidents’ Conference, however, never took oﬀ in a stable way,
and, after a few months, disappeared from the public scene.
To summarize, all major attempts to introduce a partisan divide in the man-
agement of IGR – following modalities very similar to those at work in Spain (prior
partisan meetings, use by incongruent Regions of the vertical IGA as an opposition
tool against the central Government) – turned out to be just a flash in the pan. In
spite of the stated intention of their promoters to make these arrangements stable
79«Regioni del Sud, oggi nasce il coordinamento. Vertice a Napoli voluto da Bassolino»,
Corriere del Mezzogiorno, May 3rd 2005, p. 3; «Nasce la rete dei governatori del Sud. La Lega
attacca: siete la Borbonia. Riunione ’costituente’ a Napoli, varata la consulta dei presidenti.
Obiettivo: contare di più a Roma e Bruxelles», La Repubblica, May 4th 2005, p. 27; «È nata
l’alleanza per il Mezzogiorno. La prima riunione dei presidenti delle regioni meridionali. Sette
argomenti in agenda, un incontro al mese», La Repubblica (sez. Napoli), May 4th 2005, p. 1;
«Regioni, nasce il coordinamento del Sud. Neo-governatori alla prova», Il Sole 24 Ore, May 5th
2005, p. 12.
80«Pescara: vertice Presidenti Regioni Centro-Sud», July 5th 2005, in www.regioni.
it: http://www.regioni.it/it/show-pescara_vertice_presidenti_regioni_centro-sud/
news.php?id=93449; «Mezzogiorno: in Sicilia prossima Conferenza Presidenti Regioni», AGI,
July 5th 2005.
81«Finanziaria, fronte comune delle Regioni per le modifiche», October 4th 2005, in
www.regione.campania.it: http://www.regione.campania.it/portal/media-type/html/
user/anon/page/HOME_DettaglioRegioneInforma.psml?ibName=NotiziaHomePage&itemId=
1396&theVectString=-1,-1&visi=S.
82«Regioni: a Palermo la Conferenza dei Governatori del Sud. Cuﬀaro: ’Il Mez-
zogiorno al di sopra dei partiti’», November 8th 2005, in www.regioni.it: http:
//www.regioni.it/it/show-regioni_a_palermo_la_conferenza_dei_governatori_del_
sudcuffaro__il_mezzogiorno_al_di_sopra_dei_partiti/news.php?id=198309.
83«Stati generali del Mezzogiorno. Bassolino e Loiero: Il Sud diventi protagonista», Decem-
ber 15th 2005, in www.regioni.it: http://www.regioni.it/it/show-stati_generali_del_
mezzogiorno_bassolino_e_loiero_il_sud_diventi_protagonista/news.php?id=201463
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devices of interregional coordination84, both the Conference of the Regions and
the State-Regions Conference continued working without significant infringements
due to partisan aﬃliations. All IGR actors interviewed agree on the exceptional
nature of these events, and their practical insignificance as to the actual function-
ing of both the IGAs under analysis. As put by a former regional Health General
Director,
No, these were extremist positions, but they did not have any practical eﬀect.
I do not remember in the 2000s that there has been this prejudiced attitude
[. . . ] And I believe that on this has weighed [. . . ] the fact that the Pres-
idents of the Regional Governments were there to represent the [regional]
"institution", like the others, and that therefore the institutional belonging
to the world of the Regions was greater than any other lure, least of all the
relationship with the Government! That is, not because the Prime Minister
is my friend, then I . . . [IT9]
Some informant remarked the temporal closeness of these (announced) initia-
tives with electoral events. In this respect, a former President of the Conference
of the Regions stressed
Then, then I have to tell you that these, as usual, were – how to say? – the
beginning of the legislatures in which all departed with great enthusiasm,
then, taken with the ordinary course of business, these ambitions dissolved
. . . swallowed up by the contingency, the routine . . . Then, all was led back
to the "spirit of the Regions", regardless of any political aﬃliation [. . . ] [The
partisan, adversarial attitude] was then dissolved by routine and the absolute
need, instead, to see that our interlocutor was the central State . . . more
than the political faction A rather than the political faction B. [IT5]
From the perspective explored in this analysis, it is relevant to look at whether
the presence of an articulated system of intergovernmental arrangements did played
a part in neutralizing the potential "politicization" of the intergovernmental arena.
As to the 2000 episode, an important institutional element to be taken into
account, which clearly contributed to soften the center-right attempts to introduce
a partisan logic within the intergovernmental domain, had to do with the internal
rules of functioning of the horizontal Conference of the Regions. After regional
elections, the "governors" had indeed to appoint a new President at the head
84See, for instance, the press release of the President of Campania, promoter of the Southern
Presidents Conference, who stated: «The coordination of the Presidents of the Southern regions
is not a flame that will turn oﬀ early, but we will continue to carry it forward in the coming
months and years, having as a partner now the current government, and in the coming years
those that will be there», in «Mediterraneo: Bassolino, occorre una grande svolta», AGI, July
4th 2005.
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of their horizontal Conference. The established procedure required a unanimous
(and thus cross-partisan) vote. The center-left Regions, which, while having lost
the elections in most of the Regions at vote, still controlled about half of the
regional governments, accepted the principle that the new President had to be
chosen among the representatives of the center-right coalition. The need of a cross-
partisan consensus forced actors to find an acceptable solution to both sides. In
such a framework, the candidacy of the powerful President of Lombardy, exponent
of the most intransigent line of his coalition, faded quite quickly, in favor of another
center-right regional President (Piedmont): this latter was well-known for his more
moderate stance on intergovernmental issues, having already played the role of
Vice-President of the Conference under a center-left regional majority (1998-2000).
Immediately after having been elected, the new President remarked, perfectly
in line with the rhetorical arguments used by his predecessors, the unity of the
so called "regional front", in spite of any consideration on the political congruence
with the central Government:
"All the votes have been expressed unanimously – said the newly elected
President of the Conference of the Regions [. . . ] – as a sign of significant
trust and of a strong unitary vocation, for a correct relationship with the
Government, whatever it is, on territorial issues. Evidently, an institutional
culture hovers in this hall that is not always present in other locations.
We will resume the theme of institutional reforms, in order to achieve a
full-fledged federal form of State, we want to give a strong impetus to this
process, which is necessary for the modernization of our Country.”
The new number two [. . . ][President of Emilia-Romagna, representative of
the center-left coalition], is satisfied as well. "Today the Regions have made
an important and unitary choice, which clarifies how the Conference will
behave in respect of the Government, without prejudicial positions, but with
a determination to address the issues of institutional reforms and the full
realization of federalism"85.
Note that the need to find a unanimous consensus on the name of the President
of the Presidents even led the Regions to reconfirm, in 2010, the outgoing one, in
spite of a completely changed situation in terms of both horizontal and vertical
political congruence: irrespective of the victory of the center-right coalition in
most of the Regions at vote, and the consequent vertical congruence between
these Regions and the central executive (run, again, by the center-right), the
Conference confirmed for a second term the President in oﬃce, although he was
85«Regioni, Enzo Ghigo nuovo presidente della Conferenza», ADNKRONOS, June 8th 2000;
see also «Ghigo a capo delle Regioni, Errani vice. Il ’governatore’ del Piemonte (FI) eletto
all’unanimità: ’Sarò il presidente di tutti’», Il Sole 24 Ore, June 9th 2000.
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a prominent exponent of the center-left coalition, now ruling a minority set of
regional governments. While this might be partly due to divisions within the
center-right coalition (particularly between the Regions in which the Northern
League was a coalition partner and those where it was absent), it is sure that the
confirmed head of the Regions had been able, during both his mandate as Vice-
President and as his first mandate as President, to build his own reputation as a
politically unbiased "trade unionist", acting on behalf of the "regional system".
Besides its election modalities, several actors interviewed have also underscored
the role played, in first person, by the President of the Presidents, in stopping all
initiatives taken outside the established circuit of intergovernmental relations: al-
though unprovided with constraining powers and acting first of all as a spokesman
of the Regions, he actively strove on many occasions to contain the emergence of
alternative coordination forums.
Finally, the Director General of the horizontal arrangement also proposed, as
an additional explication of the failure of alternative coordination devices, the
lack, by groups of Governors, of organizational structures comparable to those –
highly structured – already provided by the Conference of the Regions, as well as
the relative appeal, to regional actors, of interregional, rather than intra-party or
intra-coalition, mechanisms: the relevance of alternative coordination boards tend
to be played down
basically, because they [the regional Presidents] lack the structure to do
these things: I mean, they must then set up an organization that regularly
organizes these meetings, prepares the documentation, puts the items on
the agenda. . . Then, there may be a Councilor who does not like so much
to participate in these things [alternative arrangements], because he does
prefer to have the connection with others, through the Conference [of the
Regions] [. . . ] so these are things that start out as fireworks, then, in a few
months. . . dissolve. . . [IT6]
To conclude, evidence provided by the within-case analysis of the Italian case
seems thus suggesting that Intergovernmental Arrangements were a factor able to
play an actual part in shaping the fate of intergovernmental relations patterns (the
kind of prevalent conflict lines and actors’ coalitions) in this country. In the next
Chapter, I will look more closely at two comparable multi-level decision-making
processes, so as to test the cross-case relevance of Intergovernmental Arrangements
variations in "structuring" intergovernmental processes.
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Chapter 6
Two Case Studies: The 2003
Italian "Fiuggi Agreement" and
the 2005 Spanish Health
Financing Agreement
6.1 Introduction
This Chapter follows on from the previous one, where the existence of the a correla-
tion between IGAs features and IGR patterns, matching theoretical expectations,
has been mapped.
In this part, an in-depth comparative analysis will be implemented of two
health policy intergovernmental decision-making processes in the two countries
under analysis: health funding bargaining in Italy (2003) and Spain (2005). By
means of purposeful case selectin, these two case studies will allow for a deeper
exploration – through Process Tracing techniques – of the hypotheses previously
outlined. In this way, it will be possible to trace the observed outcomes (the
kind of IGR actors’ coalitions) back until the hypothesized causal conditions (the
IGAs features), and to check for the presence (or the absence) of the supposed
causal mechanisms. Put diﬀerently, in this way I aim to open otherwise "black-
boxed" institutions (Immergut 1998). Given the partially exploratory nature of
this analysis, Process Tracing should prove helpful also for uncovering potentially
relevant alternative or complementary mechanisms, not included in the starting
hypotheses.
In the remainder of this Chapter, after having explained the basic criteria used
for case selection, I will focus, respectively, on the Italian and the Spanish cases:
for each of them, some preliminary information will be provided, so to put the
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episodes under investigation into their proper contexts; the unfolding of the inter-
governmental decision-making processes will be then reconstructed, by identifying
their major steps, from the entering of the issue at stake on the intergovernmental
agenda, to the final decisions taken by the IGAs activated in the process. In the
conclusive section, I will summarize and discuss the major comparative findings
deriving from the analysis.
6.2 Case selection
Methodologically, the two cases under analysis have been chosen according to
a MSSD logic (Przeworski and Teune 1970), that is trying to keep constant –
as much as possible – all those conditions diﬀerent from IGAs (relating to the
polity, the politics and the policy fields), which, based on the existing literature,
may be reasonably assumed as potentially able to aﬀect the outcome of interest
(the kind of intergovernmental coalitions). Indeed, as illustrated in Chapter 1,
several "confounding" factors may be considered as theoretically relevant in shaping
both the degree and the kind of conflicts emerging in intergovernmental relations.
By purposeful case selection, I will thus try to "single out" in a clearer way the
"formative impact" (if any) of Intergovernmental Arrangements on the structuring
of intergovernmental processes.
Starting from the "politics conditions", the most obvious factor to be taken
into account is the partisan aﬃliation of the interacting executives. Recalling the
definition quoted in Chapter 4, vertical congruence may be conceived of as the co-
incidence of the party composition of governments across levels. This coincidence
may in turn be full, when the same parties compose both the regional and the
central government; it may be absent (full incongruence), when no overlap exists;
vertical congruence may eventually be partial, in those cases where some, but not
all governing parties at one level are also in oﬃce at the other level (Ştefuriuc 2009,
p. 96). Clearly, one could imagine vertical IGR politicization to vary, depending on
the proportion of fully, partial, and non congruent governments composing the in-
tergovernmental arena. Politicization could be expected to be absent or relatively
low in case of full vertical congruence between the large majority of governments;
by contrast, the split of IGR actors into coalitions built along partisan alignments
should be more likely in case of predominance of partial and, even more, of full
intergovernmental incongruence. Meaningful comparison requires therefore the
two cases to display a similar level of intergovernmental (in)congruence. From
this point of view, the selected episodes can be considered as fairly comparable,
as long as in both cases most of the regional executives were (at least partially)
congruent with the central one: in Italy, in 2003, twelve out of twenty Regions
were ruled by coalitions (at least partly) coinciding with the one ruling at the
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center (i.e., center-right); in Spain, in 2005, in the light of the peculiarities of the
Spanish political system described in Chapter 4, ten out of seventeen Communi-
ties could be considered as congruent with the socialist Government in Madrid:
eight AACC were indeed directly controlled by the PSOE (in a single-party gov-
ernment, in three cases, or in coalition with minor partners, in five cases); two
more could be considered as partially "congruent" with the central level as long
as they were composed of parties providing parliamentary support to the central
minority government (so called "camouflaged coalitions", Ştefuriuc 2009)1. Also
considering congruence from an ideological, rather than party composition, point
of view, the distance on the left-right axis among subnational governments can be
seen as quite similar, being just slightly higher in Italy than Spain (see Table 6.1).
Turning now to "policy factors", it has been illustrated that many diﬀerent
characteristics of the policies at stake may have an influence, a shaping eﬀect, on
the way in which IGR do unfold. Limiting the analysis to just one policy field
– health care – can be seen as a first step in order to reduce variance. However,
as seen in Chapter 1, within the very large field of any subject-related policy, the
features of the specific issues to be addressed are likely to play a relevant role in
shaping the conflict potentially emerging in intergovernmental policy-making, as
in any other decision-making process. In sum, as well known, policy may be able
to "determine" politics: «a political relationship is determined by the type of policy
at stake, so that for every type of policy there is likely to be a distinctive type
of political relationship» (Lowi 1964, p. 688). Some of the policy characteristics
are relevant for determining the degree (more than the kind) of conflict likely to
develop both among the sub-national governments, and between these latter and
the central one. Each kind of policy is indeed characterized by a diﬀerent degree of
"conflict potential". From this point of view, the key-issue at stake in both selected
cases is a redistributive one: how to allocate health policy funds to the regional
governments. This kind of policy has the advantage of being, by definition, the
most contentious one, and, as such, the most likely to trigger observable tensions
and actors’ positioning within the intergovernmental arena. The highly divisive
nature of all financial (redistributive) issues was furthermore confirmed by IGR
actors in both national cases.
Policies, however, may vary also in respect to other potentially relevant di-
mensions. Among them, the ideological content of the issues to be debated is
evidently a factor which could impact directly on the kind of intergovernmental
conflict (partisan rather than territorial) potentially arising. In the health care
1These two Autonomous Communities were the Basque Country and the Canary Islands.
In the former, one partner of the regional ruling coalition (IU) supported the central executive
in the national Parliament. In the latter case, Canarian Coalition (CC) supported the central
executive of the PSOE, which, in turn, supported the minority CC government at the regional
level.
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policy field, this could be the case of highly sensitive matters, such as abortion
and euthanasia (as it was actually the case in the Spanish CISNS, as seen in the
previous Chapter), and the like. Anyway, in both cases the ideological content of
the major issue under discussion can be assumed to be exactly the same, that is
virtually inexistent. It must be also added that in none of these two cases decisions
had to be taken under the pressure of an exogenous, unexpected focusing event
(such as the "mad cow" crisis or the "flu pandemic"), which might be seen as an ex-
ternal condition able to reduce contrasts (both of territorial and partisan nature),
by forcing agreement among otherwise non-cooperative governments. The degree
of Europeanization, which could in turn represent an additional external pressure
favoring intergovernmental consensus, is, as well know, extremely limited in the
health care policy field, which formally still falls – with few exceptions – within the
competences of the EU member States (in spite of some recent forms of "authority
migration": Greer 2006). Finally, the degree of intergovernmental conflict could
be related to the relative saliency of health care policy for regional governments in
the two Countries: the higher the saliency and the visibility of a policy, the higher
the expected degree of conflict. From this point of view, suﬃce it to say that
healthcare constitutes for both the Spanish and the Italian regional governments
the most relevant competence, both in regulatory and budgetary terms2.
Eventually, among the "polity factors" theoretically considered able to exert an
impact on the relative weight of party political (in)congruence across central and
lower-level governments on intergovernmental processes, the major is the form of
State. In this respect, the basic argument already sketched in Chapter 1 relies
on the so called "shadow of the hierarchy" hypothesis, meaning that subnational
governments lacking strong constitutional guarantees would be less prone than full-
fledged federal constitutive units to engage in partisan conflicts with the central
Government: in case of contrast, they would fear, indeed, a unilateral withdrawal
of devolved powers by the State. As seen in Chapter 4, there is no agreement
among scholars on the nature of the Spanish State of Autonomies: while some
come to define it as full federal polity (e.g. Sala 2014), others are more inclined to
consider Spain a "quasi-federal" State. At the same time, the analysis carried out
in the previous Chapters has clearly shown that, from a general point of view, IGR
managed by means of multilateral IGAs are clearly more unilaterally dominated
by the central level in Spain than in Italy. For the purposes of this analysis, I
will thus assume both countries not being neither unitarian nor full-fledged federal
States.
To conclude, as summed-up in Table 6.1, both selected cases are characterized
2It is indeed the first financial responsibility both in Spain and in Italy, although in diﬀerent
percentage terms: while in Italy healthcare constitutes about two third of regional budgets, in
Spain it represents about one third of AACC budgets (the second financial responsibility being
education).
265
by: a comparable high level of redistributiveness of the key-issue at stake (the
allocation of health funds to the Regions by the central Government); comparable
levels of ideological content and of Europeanization (both extremely limited, if
not virtually absent) and high public saliency; in a context of "partial partisan
congruence" of the central Government with the majority of the regional executives,
that is, ruled by (and/or supporting) the same political parties in oﬃce at the
center, in the absence of any major external "focusing event".
6.3 Italy: the 2003 "Fiuggi Agreement"
6.3.1 Some preliminary remarks
In order to put the selected episode under analysis into proper context, it should be
briefly reminded that since the institution of the National Health System in 1978
(see § 4.3.2) the Regions had to give their advice on the annual allocation of the
National Health Fund (Fondo Sanitario Nazionale), the major financing source of
the system: the regional advice was initially given by means the National Health
Council (up to 1989), then through the State-Regions Conference (see § 2.2.2).
This amount of financial resources was of categorical nature, meaning that Regions
were not free to use it for policy fields diﬀerent from health care. According to
the Law establishing the NHS, the Fund was to be allocated on the bases of not
better specified indicators and standards, so to ensure, in a uniform way, the same
benefits to all citizens all over the country. In fact, the level of spending in each
Region in 1977 was taken as reference point for the allocation of the new Fund,
introducing in this way the so called "historical expenditure principle" as the basic
criterion for the allocation to each Region of the financial resources to be used for
healthcare policy (Toniolo 2004).
Despite the introduction of some amendments during the Eighties, major inno-
vations in the Fund allocation formula were not introduced until the early Nineties,
when a whole reform of the National Health System (see again § 4.3.2) provided
for diﬀerent distribution criteria, mainly based on the non-adjusted regional pop-
ulation: Decree no. 502/1992 identified indeed the per capita parameter as the
fundamental one, just slightly adjusted in order to compensate for interregional
patients mobility and the quality and quantity of health infrastructures each re-
gional health system could rely on. From 1996 onwards, this latter parameter had
to be abandoned.
However, Budget Law for 1997 (Law no. 662/1996, Sect. no. 1.34) did not
follow the path designed in 1992: it was indeed decided that the Fund would be
allocated among the Regions by taking into account, in addition to the resident
population, many other factors such as the frequency of health consumption by
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age and sex, territorial epidemiological indicators, as well as additional indicators
related to specific "territorial situations", able to impact on the "health needs" of
the regional consumers of health benefits. While the Budget Law pointed out
the fundamental criteria to be followed for allocating the Fund, the variables and
the weights to be attributed to each of them were not specified: theoretically,
the Interministerial Committee for Economic Planning (CIPE)3 was in charge of
this task. In fact, at least since 2000, the established practice has been diﬀerent,
the CIPE having played nothing more than a formal role in the decision-making
process. In fact, if up to that moment the Regions were simply called to give their
advice (parere) on the annual allocation of the Fund, the 1996 reform envisioned
the need to reach a State-Regions "understanding" (intesa), which, as seen, is the
deepest form of regional involvement in national decision-making (cf. 2.2.3).
It is also worth recalling that between the second half of the 1990s and the early
2000s regional financing was deeply reformed with the aim of providing the Regions
with higher levels of fiscal autonomy4. In this framework, the National Health
Found was formally abolished and substituted by a set of resources deriving from
both regional and national taxation. The total amount of these resources (which
are still commonly, although wrongly, called "National Health Fund") is set, as
before, by the central Government in the Budget Law, so to ensure that regional
health systems are provided with an overall quantity of financial resources suﬃcient
to deliver to their populations essential levels of healthcare (which constitute, in all,
the so called "national health need"): diﬀerently from before, however, these funds
are no more categorical, meaning that, provided that the regional health systems
ensure the delivery of essential levels of healthcare, the Regions are theoretically
free to spend them for whatever kind of policy goal. Minor additional funds are
still of categorical nature, in the sense that they are allocated to the Regions for
the attainment of specific targets, set in the National Health Plan (e.g. plans on
palliative cares, rare diseases, and so on).
As to the the allocation to each Region of the share corresponding to its regional
health needs, since the 2000 regional financing reform the established practice has
3A central Government body, chaired by the President of the Council and composed of all
"economic" Ministers, with competences on general economic policy planning.
4More specifically, Budget Law for 1997 introduced the regional surtax on personal income
(IRPEF), while in 1997 legislative Decree no. 446 provided for the establishment of the regional
tax on productive activities (IRAP), both to be devoted to regional health systems financing.
Between 1992 and 1995 minor regional financing sources had already been introduced (among
which the regional taxes on vehicles, on household electricity and gas supply, and sharing of the
State tax on gasoline). Major changes were not introduced until 2000, when legislative Decree
no. 56 set up a new system of revenues, based on regional sharing of national tax revenues
and surtaxes: the main novelty consisted in the suppression of most categorical State financial
transfers toward the Regions, substituted by IRAP, IRPEF surtaxes, TAV sharing, and increased
shares of gasoline tax revenues.
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been that it is up to the Regions to propose a solution for the distribution of the
(former) National Health Fund. As long as this measure must be adopted by means
of an "understanding", the regional proposal is accepted by the State-Regions Con-
ference only if there is a unanimous regional agreement on it. Otherwise, that is if
the Regions are not able to find among themselves a consensus within thirty days
from the moment in which the item has been oﬃcially put on the State-Regions
Conference agenda, the central Government, as for any other intesa, may unilat-
erally take the final decision: in other words, it may decide to distribute the Fund,
based on whatever formula compatible with the rather general principles set in
19965.
Practically, this has meant that every year the Regions have organized mono-
graphic sessions of their horizontal Conference with the aim of finding a unani-
mous agreement on the allocation of health funds. According to all informants
interviewed, such a decision represents the most demanding and politically rele-
vant measure the Regions do take by means of their self-coordination arrangement.
Usually, these meetings last a couple of days, characterized by an uninterrupted,
intense and close-doors bargaining activity. Such features led many newspapers
and regional actors to refer to these encounters as to regional "conclaves". The
first of them took place in 2000 in Venice (November 16th and 17th); the second
was organized in Perugia (December 14th and 15th 2001); the third was called in
Fiuggi (January and 2003); the next ones were convened in Rome.
6.3.2 The IGR decision-making process
The issue
At the beginning of 2003 the National Minister of Health oﬀered to the Regions
a largely renewed formula for the financial estimation of the "health need" of each
single Region. In sharp contrast with the allocation formula in force up to that
moment, which accorded a relevant weight to the regional population age, the new
criteria proposed by the Heatlh Ministry were mostly based on the non-adjusted
regional resident population (more similar to those abandoned in 1996). If im-
plemented, the practical major eﬀect of such reform would have been a massive
transfer of financial resources from the older Regions, located mainly in the Center
and in the North of Italy, to the younger ones, concentrated in the Southern areas
of the country. The ministerial proposal had been preceded by a series of public
announcements by IGR actors, lasted for more than one year.
The first public request of revising the Health Fund allocation criteria had
been formulated, in August 2001, by the President of Lombardy, the country
5Notice that while this procedure was followed since 2000, it was partly formalized in the
fundamental State-Regions Agreement of August 8th 2001 (point no. 16).
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richest Region, ruled by a center-right coalition congruent with the new central
Government6. The same request was reiterated some months later, when the
Lombard executive proposed the establishment of an ad hoc technical commission,
charged with changing the variables used for assessing regional health needs: in
its view, indeed, criteria established in 1997 weighted too much aged population,
disfavoring in an unfair way Lombardy as well as many Southern Regions7. This
time, the central Government reply was not late in coming: just few days later,
indeed, the willingness to revise the National Health Fund allocation formula was
made public by the Minister of Health, according to whom the existing rules were
based on "not perfectly correct criteria", disadvantaging particularly (but not only)
the Southern Regions: for these reasons – he announced – a "technical commission"
was to be tasked to study that issue8.
Some months later (June 2002) the same idea was confirmed by the Minister,
who also specified that the major amendment of the formula to be done was related
to the necessary reduction of the weight attributed to the age variable. The new
allocation method to be adopted – largely based on the non-adjusted population –
was defined by the Minister as the most consistent with objective and science-based
criteria:
The current criteria for the allocation of the National Health Fund do favor
some Regions by penalizing others, especially the Southern ones. Just think,
for example, that Apulia [a Southern Region], which has almost the same
population of Emilia-Romagna [a Center-Northern Region], receives almost
1,100 billion lire less just because it has a smaller number of elderly people."
[. . . ] "In the current distribution agedness is weighted too much". [. . . ]
"I am convinced [. . . ] that every correction made to the per capita quota
is a source of error. Sure, you can take into account elderly people, the
number of accidents, or hospitals, structural deficits, the territory, but it is
very diﬃcult to understand how much these individual variables have to be
weighted." The only solution, therefore, "is to base [allocation] on the per
capita quota, which is the only objective criterion to be adopted, perhaps
correcting it slightly (and not as much as now) on the basis of the number
of elderly people9.
6«Sanità: Formigoni, a settembre nuovi criteri ripartizione fondi», ADNKRONOS SALUTE,
August 8th 2001.
7«Sanità: Formigoni, rivedere ripartizione Fondo Nazionale. Serve Commissione ’ad hoc’, ora
Lombardia è penalizzata», ADNKRONOS SALUTE, December 12th 2001.
8«Fondi Sanità: Sirchia, sì a nuovi criteri ripartizione», Il Sole 24 Ore - Archivio Notizie Ra-
diocor, December 17th 2001; «Sanità: Sirchia, fondi più equi a Regioni entro 2003. Commissione
scientifica ripenserà attuali criteri ripartizione FSN», ADNKRONOS SALUTE, December 17th
2001.
9«Sanità: Sirchia, Fondo Nazionale mal ripartito. Numero di anziani per regione pesa troppo»,
ADNKRONOS SALUTE, June 10th 2002.
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Again, such statements could be interpreted as a further reply to requests which
had come from the President of Lombardy:
Time has come for the criteria by which the National Health Fund is al-
located to be revised, so to become more modern and equanimous. The
criteria in force, in fact, have been established with the specific purpose of
giving more to some Regions and less to some others10.
In face of these hypotheses, positions of IGR actors started to diﬀerentiate.
Strongest public hostility towards the revision of the allocation criteria came from
exponents of two Center-Northern Regions, characterized by the presence of large
shares of eldelry population, and historically uninterruptedly ruled by center-left
coalitions: Emilia-Romagna and Tuscany. Health Councilor from Tuscany de-
nounced that the Government, by reducing resources allocated on the basis of the
age variable, was in fact willing to "revenge" against the center-left Regions, most
of which had been able to implement the health reforms introduced in the Nineties
without producing new budget deficits. A typical "political patronage" argument
was used to attack the announced governmental plan:
Behind the [allocation] criteria, there is a real risk that the Minister and
the Government want to "revenge" against Tuscany and all those Regions
that have attempted, partly being successful, to keep the health care sector
under control [. . . ] The Health Fund is allocated based on the number of
inhabitants in each Region. But there is a strong corrective [. . . ] for the
elderly. It is evident that the elderly "consume" more healthcare than young
people. Since our Region is among those which have the most numerous
aging population, strongly growing, it is clear that this corrective becomes
a measure necessary to protect these citizens. Why should we abolish this
correction which is used worldwide as a scientific criterion for the allocation
of funds? If the Minister will act in this way, it is clear that we are dealing
with a revenge against the center-left Regions, that are those that have im-
plemented better the Bindi reform [the NHS 1999 reform: see § 4.3.2], and
have balanced budgets. It would be a declaration of war, which would cost
us hundreds of billions11.
At the end of December, although no ad hoc "technical commission" had been
established by the central executive for addressing this issue, the elaboration of a
new allocation formula was eventually publicly announced by the Health Minister:
10In «Sanità: Formigoni, rivedere ripartizione Fondo Nazionale. Criteri attuali favoriscono
alcune Regioni penalizzandone altre», ADNKRONOS SALUTE, June 10th 2002
11«Fsn & criteri di ripartizione: per Sirchia e Formigoni vanno rivisti. Protesta l’Emilia
Romagna», Il Sole 24 Ore, June 10th 2002; «Rossi lancia l’allarme: ’Una vendetta perché qui i
conti tornano’», La Repubblica (Sezione Firenze), June 17th 2002.
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We have plug away at a transparent and scientifically valid method, by
using the most up-to-date indicators and giving maximum importance to
objective, rather than subjective, parameters. The main point of reference
is the per capita quota, combined with criteria such as life expectancy and
the expected years of disability and serious chronic disease. It will be then
up to the Regions to select the most appropriate solution, among those that
we have prepared12.
IGAs at work
The main steps of the formal intergovernmental decision-making process are schemat-
ically represented in Figure 6.1: as seen, the initiative was taken by the central
Government (step no. 1); the following steps are constituted by two meetings
of the State-Regions Conference, where the governmental proposal was formally
presented to the Regions (steps no. 2 and 3). The fourth step is represented by
the meeting of the horizontal IGA (the Conference of the Regions). Step no. 5
concludes the process, by the decision taken by the State-Regions Conference.
The formal confrontation between the central Government and the Regions
did not start until the beginning of 2003, when the measure was oﬃcially put on
the agenda of the State-Regions Conference, called to debate the allocation of the
National Health Fund for 200313. This first encounter between the Government
and the Regions, entirely devoted to the discussion of the item under analysis,
was called on January 9th (step no. 2). It lasted just fifteen minutes, during
which, besides some contrasts between the Regions and the Government on the
2002 funds, all actors agreed on the opportunity to recall the Conference one week
later, in order to give the Regions enough time to assess the highly innovative
Government proposal: it was indeed envisioned that the 70% of the entire Fund
should be allocated on the basis of the non-adjusted regional resident population.
It was also agreed that the thirty-days time-limit within which an understanding
had hopefully to be reached would start from the next date. The President of the
Conference of the Regions also announced that regional governments would con-
vene separately, as they had always done since 2000, in order to find a unanimous
stance on the measure at stake.
In spite of the very preliminary nature of the meeting, two conflictive issues
emerged, related to the method by which the governmental proposal had been
12«Intervista - Parla il ministro Sirchia: «Il monitoraggio della spesa è fondamentale» - «Deve
finire lo scandalo delle liste d’attesa» «Nella sanità lotta aperta agli sprechi» Risorse 2003: il 9
gennaio la proposta alle Regioni», Il Sole 24 Ore, December 28th 2002.
13The availability of minutes makes it possible to reconstruct in detail the development of this
as well as of the following State-Regions meetings.
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Figure 6.1: Italy 2003: Formal intergovernmental decision-making process (main
steps).
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put forward: in a tit-for-tat with Government representatives (the Ministers of
Regional Aﬀairs and of Health), the President of Emilia-Romagna (and Vice-
President of the Conference of the Regions), complained indeed that the central
executive had reversed the established practice (according to which, as seen, it was
up to the Regions to propose alternative allocation formulas), and that the docu-
ment presented by the Health Ministry was nothing but a poorly understandable
table, devoid of any technical attachment.
The technicality and the very scientific nature of the Health Minister proposal
were the main subjects of controversy of several actors public statements following
the closed-doors meeting. While the Minister stressed again the scientific objec-
tivity of the new formula («It’s a new method [. . . ] Some more time for studying
it is right. Anyway, it is an objective method [. . . ] that appropriately weighs the
various factors and is based on the international literature. It is not our invention
and it seems to me a good method»14), both the President and the Vice-President
of the Conference of the Regions called into question the very technicality of that
formula. If the former defined the table "lacking scientific bases"15, the latter even
evoked that it had been designed "ex post": «Minister Sirchia must give us the
[technical] attachments. The clear impression one feels, by reading the only ta-
ble they have given to us, is that, actually, an a posteriori reasoning has been
followed: first, final figures have been constructed, then [the method] has been
reconstructed»16.
In the week between the first and the second State-Conference meeting, Liguria,
a small Northern Region, among those most penalized by the adoption of the "per
capita" parameter (being characterized by the highest regional aging index) and
ruled by a center-right coalition, moved on several fronts to mitigate the negative
eﬀects coming from the possible implementation of the new formula, favoring, in
the view of the President of this Region, bigger (Southern) Regions, with a high
number of Ministers in the Government and large fiscal problems. To this end, the
President required, and obtained, a unanimous, cross-partisan vote of the regional
legislature in defense of the Liguria’s Fund share17; the same happened two weeks
later in Tuscany18.
14«Sanità: Sirchia, confronto su FSN 2003 riparte fra 7 giorni. Metodo nuovo per riparto
basato su letteratura internazionale», ADNKRONOS SALUTE, January 9th 2003.
15«Stato-Regioni: ancora lontana l’intesa sul fondo per la sanità. I Presidenti delle Regioni
bocciano la tabella di Sirchia», ANSA, January 9th 2003.
16«Sanità: Errani, Sirchia fornisca allegati del FSN 2003», AGI, January 9th 2003; on the
questionable technicality of the ministerial proposal see Gilberto Muraro, «Sanità, ripartizione
fondi solo con criteri oggettivi. Non convincono le nuove regole sulla divisione tra Nord e Sud»,
Sole 24 Ore, January 12th 2003.
17«Sanità: fondi nazionali; Biasotti chiama Liguria a raccolta», ANSA, January 14th 2003.
18«Centrosinistra e centrodestra uniti per difendere il sistema sanitario toscano dai tagli an-
nunciati dal ministro. Voto bipartisan in Regione contro Sirchia», L’Unità (ed. Firenze), January
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While the Health Fund allocation was not but one of many items to be ad-
dressed on the agenda of the next State-Regions Conference (January 16th), large
part of the debate (unusually long) focused on it (step. no. 3 in the Figure).
The central government had indeed put forward a second, new proposal, reducing
from 70 to 65 the percentage of the Fund allocated according the the non-adjusted
per capita parameter, and introducing some further amendments to the original
formula.
This time, in contrast with the first meeting, divergences became apparent not
only between the regional and the central level, but also among the Regions vis-
à-vis the central Government. The attempt of the "President of the Presidents"
to speak on behalf of the regional level – stressing, again, methodological issues,
such as the Regions right to propose an alternative solution, and the need of time
to assess carefully the latest ministerial proposal – proved in this case unable to
hide the evident tensions existing among regional executives on the merits of the
governmental document. Explicit actors’ positions aligned along the two main
divide lines: the younger/older Regions, and the vertically congruent/incongruent
ones.
While the spokesman of the horizontal Conference tried to keep the regional
front united, the center-left Presidents and Councilors from the Regions most pe-
nalized by the new allocation formula (Center-North) were the most argumentative
during the meeting. President of the Marches (a little Central Region, ruled by
a center-left coalition) asked that a double motivation of the non-understanding
with the Government on the new formula was oﬃcially reported in the minutes:
the lack of intergovernmental agreement, in his view, was due not only to the
method followed by the central level (clearly ignoring regional prerogatives), but
also to the very content of the proposal under discussion. Such a critique to-
wards the Government document was then supported by other representatives
of the center-left coalition, ruling Central Regions (particularly, again, Tuscany
and Emilia-Romagna). The meeting quickly turned into a heated debate between
the Health Minister and the representatives of Emilia-Romagna, a Region char-
acterized by a quite high average population age and uninterruptedly ruled by
left-wing parties since 1970. Emilia-Romagna representatives firstly evoked that,
in the amended formula presented by the central executive just before that meet-
ing, special favorable conditions had been reserved, in a nontransparent way, to
(congruent) Liguria; secondly, they stressed the methodological incompatibility
between the "per capita" criterion and the constitutional duty, by the Regions, to
provide citizens with essential levels of healthcare (the demand of which would be
highly related to the regional population age).
In his reply, the Health Minister remarked that Emilia-Romagna had been
30th 2003.
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unfairly favored, during the last years, by the allocation parameters designed under
the previous (center-left) central Governments: using the same argument used by
Emilia against his proposal, the Minister defined as «absolutely arbitrary and built
"ex post"» the formula elaborated in the second half of the Nineties, which would
have been based on «neither transparent nor intelligent» criteria. Interviewed
on this point for this analysis, the then Minister of Health confirmed his stance,
putting the question in the following terms:
It was a formula constructed in order to favor one’s friends, wasn’t it? [. . . ]
A political formula, but also a dishonest one! Besides being untenable from
a mathematical point of view. . . That is, say, more generally, it was a wrong
formula. . . [IT7]
Regional representatives from the South at the head of center-right coalitions
(the Presidents of Calabria and Lazio, as well as the Apulia budget Councilor)
took instead an explicit stance in favor of the ministerial proposal, stressing that
the position of the President of the Marches was not to be intended as the oﬃcial
stance of the Conference of the Regions, and that, by contrast, they welcomed the
opening of a necessary debate on the allocation criteria.
Discussion on this issue was eventually concluded by the Minister of Regional
Aﬀairs, according to whom it would have been better if debate had not entered
into the merits of the question, in order to avoid the emergence of a «controversy
of political nature».
Such a controversy, however, reemerged just few days later, when MPs of the
main opposition party (DS -Democratici di Sinistra) presented a parliamentary
question to the Health Minister on the Fund allocation (Camera dei Deputati
2003, pp. 57-59)19.
As planned, regional representatives finally met in a special, monographic ses-
sion of the Conference of the Regions, held in Fiuggi (outside Rome) two weeks
later (step no. 4 in Figure 6.1). Isolated in a hotel, regional Presidents, Budget
and Health Councilors and technicians convened with the aim of finding a shared,
alternative solution. Given the regional positions on the ground reconstructed
above, the perspective of an interregional agreement appeared to many observers
as highly unlikely20. Just few weeks before, the President of Liguria had argued:
19Replying to the Minister, they stated: «The reasons you brought up, Minister, seem ap-
parently objective from a clinical and scientific point of view, but I would like to remind you,
Minister – even though you know it much better than me, so my reminder is just formal – that
the World Health Organization itself argued that the criterion of [health resources’] allocation
based on the population weighted by age classes and diseases is the most scientifically correct
criterion» (Camera dei Deputati 2003, p. 59); «Sanità: Sirchia, nessun taglio risorse a Regioni
ma aumenti», ADNKRONOS, January 22nd 2003.
20«I Governatori al patto delle terme. Fiuggi (29-30 gennaio): intesa disperatamente cercasi
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we will seek, by any means, an agreement, but it is clear that those favored
[by the new formula] will not be very willing to deprive themselves of the
enormous funds that would be allocated to them21.
The then health policy technical coordinator of the Conference of the Regions
confirmed that the interregional search of an alternative solution started, in fact,
from extremely unfavorable premises. In principle, existing tensions could lead to
the emergence of several coalitions, which, by breaking the "regional front", would
had favored the adoption of the new formula: a cross-partisan coalition, formed by
all young Regions, irrespective of their partisan aﬃliations, opposed to the older
ones; a partisan coalition, politically congruent with the central level, formed by
both young and old Regions, all ruled by the center-right coalition; eventually, a
partisan (sub)coalition, including only those Regions characterized by the presence
of young populations and ruled by the same coalition in oﬃce at the central level.
As summed up by Toniolo et al. (2003),
tensions on "technical criteria" covered, in fact, political and financial ten-
sions: to be in favor of non-adjusted capitation or of weighted capitation
was probably not determined only by technical-scientific principled reasons,
but especially by being or not a Region with a young or elderly population.
This then combined with other factors apparently not in the game, but in
reality very influential, such as the political orientation of the regional ad-
ministration with respect to the central government, being located in areas
of greater or lesser economic development, having significant previous finan-
cial deficits in regional health budgets . [. . . ] It is very diﬃcult to discuss
technical criteria in a truly "scientific" way, without being influenced by your
own membership to a Region or to a political part (pp. 83-84, translated).
Notice furthermore that, given the consensus requirement for reaching an al-
ternative understanding with the Government, in principle every single Region
advantaged by the new formula could exert its own veto power, making in that
way the ministerial proposal enter into force: as put by a former regional technical
coordinator, these Regions were willing to "throw a monkey wrench in the works"
[IT9].
It is under these conditions that the articulated infrastructure of the Conference
of the Regions, laid out in Chapter 2, started working.
per il riparto del Fsn 2003 tra le Regioni», Il Sole 24 Ore Sanità, January 28th 2003; «Meno
soldi per le regioni "più anziane", i governatori sul piede di guerra. Sotto accusa i nuovi criteri di
ripartizione del Fondo sanitario decisi dal ministro Sirchia», La Repubblica, January 28th 2003;
«Spesa sanitaria, bocciate cinque Regioni. Governatori oggi e domani riuniti a Fiuggi per mettere
a punto una proposta unitaria sul riparto dei 77 miliardi del fondo 2003», Il Sole 24 Ore, January
29th 2003.
21«Sanità: fondi nazionali; Biasotti chiama Liguria a raccolta», ANSA, January 14th 2003.
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A preliminary documents’ file had been prepared by the Conference Secretariat
oﬃces, gathering the most relevant information on the issue to be debated, for all
those attending the meeting (Conferenza dei Presidenti delle Regioni 2003a).
The plenary meeting was preceded by an informal select committee. Con-
sistently with the established practices described in Chapter 2, this committee
was composed of representatives of a reduced number of Regions (Apulia, Emilia-
Romagna, Lombardy, Veneto, Sicily, Umbria, Liguria, Basilicata and Campania),
representing, in a quite balanced way, all the major interests at stake: political
aﬃliation (five ruled by the center-right, four by the center-left); population age
and geographical location (three of the North, two of the Center, and four of the
South), as well as the territorial and demographic dimensions. Then, health and
budget Councilors, irrespective of their political aﬃliation as well as of individual
financial advantages of their Regions, commissioned regional technicians (both of
the health and the budget areas) to try to elaborate, despite the evident diﬃculty
of that task – due to the highly divisive impact of the formula proposed by the
Ministry – an alternative document, hopefully able to keep the "regional front"
united.
This was just the starting phase of an uninterrupted series of meetings between
Presidents, Councilors and technicians, which lasted almost two days. Technicians
were continuously tasked by Presidents and Councilors with the simulation of
alternative allocation formulas, in order to assess the potential impact of each of
these hypotheses on the budgets of every single Region.
The most likely scenario would have been the one in which Regions did split
in (at least) two separate groups, letting by consequence the ministerial proposal
enter into force. Several actors considered that the Health Minister had exactly
bet that Regions, faced with his proposal, would not reach any agreement in the
end. Unexpectedly, the interregional decision-making process took a completely
diﬀerent path: after intense negotiations, Regions proved eventually able to find a
unanimous, thus cross-partisan, consensus over a diﬀerent allocation formula than
the one proposed by the Ministry. After the meeting, the then Health Councilor
of Tuscany commented this development in the following way:
The Government wanted to divide us [. . . ] and instead we kept united. We
have found an agreement in spite of those who tried to oppose the economic
diﬃculties of the South with the very high average age of the North. Even
the Regions governed by the center-right have agreed to disregard what had
been hypothesized by the Minister, and after very long negotiations we have
found an intersection point among the various demands22.
22«Bilanci per la sanità, meno tagli alla Toscana», La Repubblica (Sezione Firenze), February
1st 2003, p. 7.
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Table 6.2: Italy 2003: chronology
August 2001 Lombardy claims for a revision of the Health Fund allocation
criteria.
December 2001 Lombardy claims again for a revision of the Health Fund al-
location criteria; the Health Minister announces these criteria
will be revised: to this end, an ad hoc technical Commission
would be established.
June 2002 New claims from Lombardy; the Health Minister explains that
the new formula will be amended by reducing the weight of
the age variable.
December 2002 The Health Minister announces that new criteria have been
drafted for the allocation of the Health Fund.
January 2003
9th: first meeting of the State-Regions Conference to address
the allocation of the Health Fund: the Government presents
its proposal to the Regions.
14th: Liguria’s regional legislature votes, in bipartisan way, in
defense of the regional share of the Health Fund.
16th: a second meeting of the State-Regions Conference takes
place: a new, amended proposal is presented by the Govern-
ment to the Regions.
22nd: the main opposition party presents a parliamentary ques-
tion to the Health Minister on the allocation of the Health
Fund.
29th: Tuscany’s regional legislature votes, in bipartisan way,
in defense of the regional share of the Health Fund.
30th-31st: the Conference of the Regions convenes in a mono-
graphic session devoted to the allocation of the Health Fund.
February 2003 1st: the final meeting of the State-Regions Conference takes
place.
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6.4 Spain: the 2005 Health Financing Agree-
ment
6.4.1 Some preliminary remarks
The devolution of full health powers to those Communities still lacking them at the
end of 2001 (cf. § 4.3.2) was preceded by the approval of a new general system of
regional financing (CPFF Agreement, July 27th, and Law no. 21/2001, December
27th), valid for all Autonomous Communities (the Basque Country and Navarre
excluded). Up to that moment, indeed, regional governments had been financed
by transfers from the center, represented by the National Health Insitute (Insalud)
(basically based on the "historical costs" principle).
As it had been the case in Italy in 2000, the regional finance reform led to the
abandonment of the categorical nature of health financing, this latter being trans-
formed into just a part of the overall amount of resources each regional Government
had at its disposal, and to the introduction of measures aiming at increasing the
level of regional fiscal autonomy23.
In spite of the non-categorical design, the computation of the total financing
need of each Community was in fact split into three "blocks", one of which was de-
voted to regional health care needs. The resources of this "block" were distributed
among the Autonomous Communities by means of two main funds: the General
Health Finance Fund and the Savings Fund for Temporary Disability24. These two
Funds were based on resources collected by regional governments, integrated by the
State through: the (small) Fondo de Cohesión Sanitaria (Health Cohesion Fund),
compensating for costs determined by patients’ interregional mobility; and, more
importantly, the Fondo de Suficiencia (Suﬃciency Fund), covering the (positive or
negative) diﬀerences between the overall financial needs of each Community and
its fiscal capacity. Further leveling mechanisms, to be agreed by the State and the
Autonomous Communities concerned, were provided for regional governments ex-
periencing an extraordinary growth of their populations, that is at least 3% higher
than the national average.
23AACC were accorded: 33 % of the personal income tax (IRPF); 35 % of the VAT; 40 %
of taxes on gasoline, tobacco and alcohol; 100 % of the taxes on wealth; inheritance and gift;
capital transfer; gambling; electricity; vehicles registration.
24The former (and largest one) was allocated among regional governments according to three
variables: the regional "protected population" (75%), the percentage of residents over 65 (24.5%),
insularity (0.5%).
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6.4.2 The IGR decision-making process
The issue
In contrast with previous systems of regional financing, which had envisioned a
systematic update every five years, the new fiscal arrangement was designed with-
out including any clause about its revision: it was indeed conceived as a definitive,
"non-revisable" system. Very soon, however, the new fiscal architecture appeared
unable to provide regional governments with resources suﬃcient to deal with their
functions, particularly with those related to the provision of health care services.
The necessity to increase the overall amount of financial resources available to the
Autonomous Communities became thus more and more evident to an increasing
number of IGR actors between 2004 and 2005.
The first Communities claiming for more money and denouncing the insuﬃ-
ciency of the regional financial means for health care were, in February 2004, that
is just one moth before general elections, those ruled by the Socialist Party (plus
the Basque Country), then incongruent with the PP central Government, which
rejected all complaints (Rey del Castillo 2006)25.
Once the PSOE in oﬃce at the central level (second half of 2004), however, the
number of Communities denouncing the insuﬃciency of health financing rapidly
grew up, coming to include – besides the socialist ones – also those ruled by
the PP. The first PSOE Community to reiterate the request of more funds was
Extremadura26. As reconstructed by Rey del Castillo (2006), roughly in the same
period the Madrid Community (PP) was instead the first to introduce the growth
of the population (particularly, due to immigration) as the main justification for
claiming more money: quickly, such argument turned into the general "doctrine"
of the Communities led by the Popular Party. Likewise, Catalonia, ruled by a
coalition headed by the socialists, pointed to the increase of its population (jointly
with the mismanagement of health policy by the previous CiU regional executive)
as one of the major causes of its deficit. While the socialists tended to stress the
need of an overall revision of the financing system then in force (passed under the
Aznar’s popular Government), the populars rather highlighted the opportunity of
some adjustments, so to take population growth into account27.
25«Las autonomías gobernadas por PSOE y PNV exigen a Pastor 1.800 millones», El País,
February 17th 2004, p. 28; «Ocho regiones reclaman 1.800 millones al Estado», Diario Médico,
February 17th 2004, p. 6 (both articles are quoted in Rey del Castillo 2006).
26«Extremadura reclama al Estado 33,8 millones por flecos transferenciales», Diario Médico,
June 16th 2004.
27For a review of several Communities requests on health financing see «Los presidentes au-
tonómicos piden más dinero. Los jefes de Gobierno de 11 comunidades explican a EL PAÍS sus
ideas sobre cómo resolver los problemas de financiación territorial», El País - Edición Impresa,
May 23rd 2005.
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In fact, as sketched above, the financing law passed in 2001 had envisioned that,
under specific, exceptional demographic circumstances, Communities’ financing
could be revised28.
IGAs at work
It is in this context that the first Conference of the Presidents – the new vertical
IGA composed by the Prime Minister and the Regional Presidents – was called
by the President of the Government (October 2004). In the previous Chapter the
climate of strong partisan confrontation prior to that (unprecedented) intergov-
ernmental meeting has already been laid out.
Problems related to health policy financing were included among the major
items on the Conference agenda29. In this respect, the decision taken by the
Government together with the Autonomous Communities was to set-up an ad hoc
Working Group on health spending (Grupo de Trabajo para el Análisis del Gasto
Sanitario) in order to address such issue in a joint way, from a technical perspective.
This Group, directly reporting to the Conference, was charged with implementing
an analysis – as more complete as possible – of the variables accounting for both the
amount and the evolution of regional health spending, through the implementation
of a new, homogeneous and transparent information system. Insofar as many
Communities had pointed out to demographic factors as those having impacted
the most on their budgets, the Conference of the Presidents also agreed on the
strengthening of another Working Group, established in September 2004 within the
Fiscal and Financial Policy Council (CPFF): it had been tasked with studying the
evolution of population in each regional territory (Grupo de trabajo de población,
Working Group on Population).
To reach their respective objectives, these two groups should have been working
in a coordinated way, sharing information and collaborating actively. They should
both prepare, by mid-2005, a final technical report. On the basis of the information
contained in these reports, the CPFF should then prepare a basic proposal to be
discussed, at a later stage, by a new Conference of the Presidents meeting. The
key-issue was thus to assess the impact of diﬀerent factors (but, particularly, of
population growth) on the evolution of regional health spending, so that the best-
suited allocation criteria could be designed for distributing resources among the
28"The level of performance of the fundamental health public service is supposed to be aﬀected
when in an Autonomous Community the increase of the protected population, appropriately
weighted by age, between one year and the following one, [. . . ] has been higher, by 3%, than
the percentage increase experienced in the same period by the national average" (Law 21/2001,
Sect. no. 67).
29«La financiación de la sanidad será el eje de la Conferencia de Presidentes», EFE, October
25th 2004.
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Communities.
To summarize, the key-steps of the (formal) intergovernmental decision-making
process started in October 2004 are schematically represented in Figure 6.2: step
no. 1 is the first Conference of the Presidents, just discussed; step no. 2 is repre-
sented by the work carried out by the two technical Groups tasked with analyzing
health expenditure growth; step no. 3 is the preliminary meeting of the CPFF, to
be called to prepare the proposal to be then discussed by the Conference of the
Presidents (step no. 4). Step no. 5, initially not envisioned, consisted in a final
CPFF meeting, celebrated to formalize the decisions previously debated within
the Conference of the Presidents (this latter being devoid of any legal power)30.
Despite their assignments, the two technical groups (step no. 2) worked in fact
largely separately: the Group on Population just provided the other Group with
updated data on regional demographic changes (Moreno, A. B. 2005). Each of
them was of vertical nature, including a number of representatives of the central
administration and one representative of each Autonomous Community.
The Working Group on Population, established in September 2004 within the
Fiscal and Financial Policy Council, concluded its activity, after six meetings, in
the first half of 2005. The main results of the analysis carried out by the Group
were contained in a final Report31: it was argued that while the increase of the
Spanish population had been highly heterogeneous across the country, in no Au-
tonomous Community it had been high enough to activate the leveling mechanisms
envisioned by the 2001 Law, sketched above (Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda
2005b). Moreover, in the last years regional financing resulted to have been in
line with (if not above) the hypothetical financial needs of each Community, as
set in 2001. All Communities dissociated themselves from this point. More gen-
erally, several regional Governments made specific remarks on diﬀerent arguments
discussed by the Working Group: the impact of population increase; the eﬀects
of immigration; the impact of population aging; the relevance of population dis-
persion, and so on. One of the major conflict lines was the one between the
Communities which had experienced a population growth above the national aver-
age and those which instead had been characterized by population increases below
that average. The distinction between these two regional groups was partially
overlapping with the distinction between the Communities led by the PP (those
most aﬀected by population growth, with the exception of Castile and León, and
Galicia) and the Communities ruled by the PSOE (with the exception of Catalo-
30Furthermore, in this period, the Conference was also lacking Internal Rules, which, as seen,
would be approved only in 2009.
31Available on the Budget Ministry website, at http://www.minhap.gob.es/es-ES/
Areas%20Tematicas/Financiacion%20Autonomica/Paginas/Grupo%20de%20Trabajo%20de%
20Poblacion.aspx
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Figure 6.2: Spain 2005: Formal intergovernmental decision-making process (main
steps).
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nia). Representatives of regions not aﬀected by demographic increases were the
ones more interested in the inclusion of variables able to adjust the number of in-
habitants, such as their territorial dispersion, their aging, and the like (Ministerio
de Economía y Hacienda 2005b).
The Working Group on Health Spending was formally constituted in January
2005, and worked until June of that same year, when a final Report was presented.
The group was chaired by the Intervención General de la Administración del Es-
tado32, and composed of four oﬃcials from the Health Ministry, four from the
Budget Ministry, and as many regional representatives as the number of the Au-
tonomous Communities and Cities. As reported by Moreno A. B. (2005), because
of time limits, the new homogeneous and transparent information system required
by the Conference of the Presidents could not be built: the analysis of the Group
relied by consequence on existing data, made available by the central and regional
administrations involved in that work. The working method, initially agreed by
the actors, consisted in that Communities could make remarks on the proposals
put forward by the Presidency (representing the central level). In the last meet-
ing, a final Report was presented33. It was concluded that the population growth
could explain just about 20% of the overall increase of regional health spending:
the major cause accounting for this latter had to do, instead, with the rise of the
per capita expenditure, due, in turn to other factors, such as the introduction of
new medical treatments and wage policies (Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda
2005a).
Technical discussion, however, had not been able to favor the emergence of a
consensus among actors on the content of the conclusions contained in that Report.
Actors’ positions were quite mixed. Dissenting remarks on the final Report came
indeed both from the socialist and the popular Communities. For instance, while
socialist Communities like Andalusia contested the age of the population as a
variable partly accounting for health expenditure, as suggested in the Report,
Aragon, ruled by the PSOE as well, was clearly in favor of this criterion.
It should be also stressed that the most critical comments were made by (a
group of) Popular Communities, which called into question not specific points of
the analysis, but the whole methodological reliability of the entire work done by
32A central Oﬃce, depending on the Budget Minister, tasked with the internal control of the
economic and financial management of the public sector.
33It was composed of five sections, devoted, respectively to: a descriptive analysis of public
health spending; the computation of the per capita health spending in each Community, as well
as the assessment of the impact of population age on spending variability; an analysis of health
spending in primary health care, specialist care, and pharmaceuticals; output indicators of the
NHS; eventually, a set of proposals on spending rationalization. The Report is available on
the Health Ministy website, at: https://www.msssi.gob.es/estadEstudios/estadisticas/
sisInfSanSNS/pdf/IGTGS2005.pdf.
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the Group: for this reason, in their view, conclusions contained in the final Re-
port could in no way be taken as the starting point of whatever decision by the
next Conference of the Presidents34. Particularly, arguments used by Madrid and
Murcia (and, in a less extended way, La Rioja) pointed to the methodological
weaknesses of that analysis (not complying with the set-up of a new and transpar-
ent information system, as required by the Conference of the Presidents) as well as
to the hierarchical control of the Group by the central administration, accused not
to share all relevant information with the Communities and to impose its stance
on many issues: Murcia spoke in this respect of "clearly arbitrary" decision-taking
and working criteria. This is why, according to Madrid and Murcia, which used
very similar formulations,
the Report of the Working Group for the Analysis of Health Expenditure,
because of its structure and its content, together with the lack of coordi-
nation with the Working Group on Population, does not constitute a tool
for decision making by the Conference of Presidents nor by the Council of
Fiscal and Financial Policy (Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda 2005a, pp.
373-374, translated).
Meanwhile, the technical activity carried out by these two Groups had been
paralleled by a a harsh conflict between the two major State-wide parties on the
very (sequence of) steps to be followed in the intergovernmental decision-making
process started in 2004 with the first Conference of the Presidents. In a parlia-
mentary debate held in March, the PSOE defended the path originally established
(as represented in Figure 6.2), whereas the PP claimed for an involvement of both
the CPFF and CISNS in the process (as seen in the previous Chapter, this is-
sue dominated the Interterritorial Council activity during all 2005), belittling the
role to be eventually played by the Conference of the Presidents: «what body
of the Administration should address the problem of health financing and define
the criteria that will govern the future financing system reform? The answer to
this question – as it was summarized by El global – depends on the parliamentary
group answering it, and remains the major object of controversy between the main
opposition party and the one in government»35. In this climate, the national PP
leader convened few days later with the popular autonomic Presidents to warn
the central Government against "discriminatory treatments" among Communities:
changes to the financial system should have been taken only by consensus and on
the basis of a technical investigation, since such an issue could not be addressed in
34This point was made in particular by the PP Presidents of the Valencian Community and
Galicia.
35«El Congreso respalda el proceso del Gobierno para abordar la financiación CiU y PP no
apoyaron la iniciativa presentada por el Grupo Socialista», El Global.net, March 21st 2005.
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depth by the Conference of the Presidents36. In July, the health Councilor of the
Madrid Community denounced that both the Group on health spending and the
one on population growth were in fact nothing but a tool by which the Prime Min-
ister was made able to present whatever kind of decision in the next Conference
of the Presidents: the very place where the Government proposal was designed,
according to this regional PP representative, was indeed the PSOE headquarter37
At the end of June 2005, when both Working Groups had concluded their
activity, the central Government finally announced the call of the second Presi-
dents’ Conference in September, with the aim of addressing, as envisioned in the
first meeting, the major financial problems faced by Autonomous Communities
in health policy. As remarked by several observers, the decision to call the Con-
ference in September (and not in June, as previously scheduled) was partly due
to the Government desire that the newly elected socialist President of Galicia (a
Community traditionally ruled by the Populars) would take part in that meeting:
in this way, the existence of a majority of Communities politically congruent with
the Government would be ensured38.
In this phase, diversified territorial interests of each single Community, irre-
spective of partisan aﬃliations, were evident. A former adviser of the then Health
Minister illustrated that point, by reminding that
for example, when allocation variables were discussed, sparsely populated
regions (Castile and León, Castile-La Mancha, among others) lobbied for
that variable to be taken into account in the model, and no matter that in
a case the PP was in oﬃce and in the other case the PSOE was. [SP6]
This contributes to explain the decision taken by the central Government to
start a series of informal bilateral contacts with regional leaders, in the period
comprised between the announcement of the new Conference and the actual orga-
nization of this latter (that is, between Steps nos. 2 and 3-4)39. The activation of
bilateral contacts – non envisioned in the formal decision-making chain sketched
above – could be seen as advantageous, for the national Government, for two
reasons: on the one hand, contrasts within its own political side (the PSOE Com-
munities) would be less apparent; on the other hand, some Communities ruled
36«Rajoy afirma que el PP no aceptará tratos discriminatorios entre las autonomías», Diario
Médico, April 6th 2005.
37«Las CCAA del PP piden a Sanidad que retire el borrador de cartera de servicios e insisten
en debatir sobre financiación sanitaria», El medico interactivo, July 1st 2005.
38«Zapatero reunirá la cumbre autonómica ante el bloqueo de la reforma territorial. La segunda
Conferencia de Presidentes abordará tras los comicios vascos la financiación sanitaria», El País,
March 7th 2005; «Zapatero convoca a los presidentes autonómicos para la primera semana de
septiembre», EFE, June 30th 2005.
39«El Gobierno sólo dará más dinero para la sanidad a las comunidades que firmen el pacto»,
El País, June 27th, p. 19.
287
by the main opposition party could be tempted to accept an agreement with the
central executive, undermining in that way the possible consolidation of a partisan
opposition front.
In fact, after having met with representatives of Communities ruled by the
PSOE, the Government organized bilateral meetings with some PP Communities
Presidents, particularly those of Balearic Islands, Valencia, and Madrid, the re-
gions characterized by the worst financial conditions. These encounters seemed,
at first, to produce the eﬀect of bringing actors’ positions closer, weakening the
cohesiveness of the popular front: in contrast with the oﬃcial line imposed by
the national direction of the PP, representatives of Balearic Islands and Valencian
Community appeared indeed ready to accept the principle, set by the Government,
that Communities could participate in deficits reduction (basically, by increasing
regional taxes), in exchange of a reasonable amount of money accorded by the
central level; Madrid reaﬃrmed instead its own opposition to such a perspective40.
In face of more and more evident fractures within the popular side, the PP
reacted in July by organizing a new meeting of its autonomic Presidents: they
convened in the party headquarters in Madrid. The explicit goal of that summit –
chaired by the PP national leader in person – was to prepare the next Conference
of the Presidents, trying to unify the position of the popular Communities. At the
end of that encounter, the oﬃcial stance of the regional governments led by the
PP consisted in asking the Prime Minister to comply with the financial system
in force (designed, four years before, by the PP Government), and to activate all
the mechanisms envisioned by that system to neutralize the impact of population
growth on health expenditure (an element not ascribable to the Communities)41,
without asking the Communities to levy new taxes. Finally, the popular rep-
resentatives accused the Government to be late in drafting a proposal, because
of the diﬃculties, for the PSOE, to prepare a document agreed by the Catalan
President42.
Bilateral meetings of the Prime Minister with several popular regional Presi-
dents continued in the following weeks. The central executive was clearly fearing
that the major opposition party would use the approaching Conference of the Pres-
idents – the most visible IGA – as an occasion to stage its hostility towards it: a
possible intergovernmental agreement could indeed be interpreted as a success for
40«Camps anuncia que Zapatero financiará la deuda sanitaria de la Comunidad», Las Provin-
cias, May 18th 2005; «El Gobierno ve posible el pacto sanitario tras negociar con dos autonomías
del PP», El País, June 30th 2005.
41As explained above, the Working Group on Population had already clarified that the con-
ditions envisioned by the 2001 Law for altering regional financing because of population growth
had not been met by any Community.
42«Rajoy y los presidentes autonómicos de PP rechazan un modelo de financiación que suba
los impuestos», EUROPAPRESS, July 12th 2005.
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the Government (and a consequent failure for the opposition)43.
At the beginning of September, a proposal on health deficit reduction was
finally made public by the Government, in spite of the agreement according to
which it was up to the CPFF to put forward a basic document. It is in this phase
that actors’ positioning started to crystallize – although following a rather bumpy
path – along partisan lines.
In the days preceding the Fiscal and Financial Policy Council and the Con-
ference of the Presidents, intergovernmental actors took a stance on the proposal
announced by the Government according to respective political aﬃliations. The
populars accused the central executive of "ignoring" the Communities led by the
PP, of increasing taxes, and of oﬀering an amount of resources completely insuﬃ-
cient to deal with regional health deficits (no more than a pittance, they said). The
total lack of clarity on the criteria used by the Government for allocating these re-
sources among the Communities arouse the PP AACC suspicions on a distribution
of the funds biased in favor of the socialist governments. From a methodological
point of view, they also stigmatized that the central Government had not yet
circulated among the IGAs’ members all the necessary documentation44.
On the opposite front, the Prime Minister convened with all socialist regional
Presidents in order to hide enduring tensions within the PSOE front: the socialist
Communities had indeed oﬀered, at first, a quite weak defense of the Government
proposal, arguing that it could be considered as a good starting point, although not
a definitive solution; several regional governments led by the PSOE had also made
critical remarks on the measures envisioned in that document, Catalonia even an-
nouncing its willingness to present a counter-proposal before the Conference of the
Presidents45. Zapatero, after having assured the socialist regional Presidents that
the Government proposal could still be amended, got their unanimous commitment
to support all the measures proposed by the central executive in the forthcoming
intergovernmental conferences46.
43«Zapatero prepara con presidentes del PP la cumbre de financiación. El jefe del Gobierno
central y el de La Rioja defienden la necesidad de un pacto sanitario», El País, July 20th 2005;
«El PSOE teme que el PP estropee la cita autonomica para no darle tregua», ABC, August 30th
2005.
44«Acebes adelanta que no habrá «contraoferta» del PP al Ejecutivo y reafirma la validez de
la financiación vigente siempre que se actualice en función de la población», ABC, September
1st 2005; «El PP asegura que la propuesta hace ’más desiguales’ a los españoles. La Generalitat
calificado de "paso adelante" la propuesta del Gobierno, aunque dice que es un "paso insuficiente"
porque "es necesario ser más ambicioso"», El Mundo, September 1st 2005.
45«’Si hay que aceptarlo íntegro, lo rechazamos’. Ibarra rechaza la propuesta de financiación
sanitaria del Gobierno por ’diferencias ideológicas’», El Mundo, September 2nd 2005; «Antes de
la Conferencia de Presidentes. Cataluña presentará su propuesta de financiación sanitaria porque
la del Gobierno es ’insuficiente’», El Mundo, September 2nd 2005.
46«Comité Federal del PSOE. Los líderes autonómicos apoyan la oferta sobre la deuda sanitaria.
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One week before the Conference of the Presidents, Zapatero eventually met
with the PP leader in person, who, nevertheless, reaﬃrmed the oﬃcial opposition
of its party against the solutions designed up to that moment by the Government
to address regional fiscal problems47.
Oﬃcial intergovernmental activity – that is directly carried out by means of
multilateral intergovernmental arrangements – restarted with the celebration of
the preliminary meeting of the Fiscal and Financial Policy Council, the forum
theoretically assumed to prepare, on the basis of the two Working Groups Reports,
the draft-agreement, to be then debated (and, in case, agreed) by national and
regional Presidents (step no. 3 in Figure 6.2). In fact, what was discussed by
the CPFF was the document previously prepared by the central Government, and
presented, within the Council, by the Budget Minister (chairing this IGA)48. The
debate lasted more than six hours, during which both the popular and the socialist
Communities asked for amendments to that document. The representatives of the
Communities ruled by the PP also presented a full-blown counter-proposal49. At
the end, the Minister, who decided not to put that document on vote, committed
to include in a new draft-agreement the remarks shared by the largest number of
Communities: such decision seemed finally to pave the way for a broadly agreed
solution in the approaching Conference of the Presidents50.
The climate of partisan confrontation, however, resurfaced few days later, just
before the convening of the vertical, generalist Conference. After having met
again with their national leader in the party headquarters, the Presidents of the
PP Communities denounced that, less than twenty-four hours before the meeting
with the Government, this latter had not informed the popular executives about
the innovations introduced in the new proposal of agreement, making impossible
for them giving their advice on it. A the end of the party meeting, the budget
Councilor of the Valencian Community argued:
Either the Government makes a move on and says exactly, specifying every
single point, which is the proposal it is going to bring [to the Conference of
Zapatero anuncia "un margen" para ampliar la propuesta de financiación de la sanidad», El País,
September 4th 2005; «Las comunidades del PSOE apoyan el plan de financiación sanitaria aunque
ven un ’margen de mejora’», EFE, September 4th 2005.
47«Rajoy: ’No he averiguado para qué me ha convocado Zapatero’», El Mundo, September 5th
2005.
48Such document – entitled Borrador de propuesta a elevar por el Consejo de Politica Fiscal
y Financiera a la Conferencia de Presidentes – is included in the 2005 CPFF Activity Report
(Annex VII) (CPFF 2006).
49«Solución alternativa a la subida de impuestos. El PP propone que el Gobierno aporte 1.800
millones para financiar el déficit del sistema sanitario», El Mundo, September 7th 2005.
50«El Gobierno mejora su propuesta de financiación sanitaria y ve posible un acuerdo. La
nueva oferta recoge las aportaciones de las comunidades socialistas y algunas del PP», El País,
September 8th 2005
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the Presidents], or he will not get a positive response by the Communities
governed by the PP51.
In case of no response by the Government, the only acceptable solution for the
popular regions would have been the one presented by their own representatives
at the last CPFF meeting52.
The second Conference of the Presidents finally took place on September 10th
(step. no. 4). After a five hours-long debate, actors did not come to any agreement.
The document drafted by the Government had been largely amended, leading to
an increase of the total amount of resources allocated to the subnational units, as
requested by both socialist and popular representatives (Rey del Castillo 2006).
In spite of the attempt of the Central Government to present the Conference
as a big success (a "basic consensus" had been reached, in the Prime Minister’s
view), the PP Autonomous Communities distanced themselves from the central
Government representation of this summit. In the press conference following the
intergovernmental meeting, popular Presidents – collectively represented by the
President of La Rioja, acting as their spokesman – remarked indeed that nothing
had been decided, that no agreement had been reached, and that, in case, real
decisions had still to be taken within the CPFF (the agreements of the Conference
of the Presidents being indeed devoid of any legal value)53. They also criticized
the very chaotic and improvised nature of the Conference. The Prime Minister
had presented its "definitive" proposal just in the last part of the summit, when
the Communities were given a half-an-hour to assess it; Zapatero had then asked
autonomic Presidents whether they had any substantive remark on that document:
since no one answered, the governmental proposal had been assumed to have been
"tacitly approved"54. From a content perspective, the major political controversies
were still on the quantity of resources made available by the central Government
to solve autonomic financial problems, considered by the populars as highly in-
suﬃcient, as well as on the lack of information on the allocation criteria used to
distribute part of these resources.
51«El PP, "indignado" porque desconoce la propuesta del Gobierno sobre sanidad. Mariano
Rajoy se reunió este viernes en Génova con los presidentes autonómicos de su partido para fijar
una posición común», El País, September 9th 2005.
52«El PP rechazará la propuesta de financiación sanitaria «sea cual sea» si no la conocen hoy»,
ABC, September 9th 2005; «Exige al gobierno que la presente ya. El PP amenaza con rechazar
el plan de financiación sanitaria ’sea cual sea’ si no lo conoce hoy«, El Mundo, September 9th
2005.
53«Zapatero anuncia un ’consenso’ en Sanidad mientras los presidentes del PP se declaran
’defraudados’», El Mundo, September 10th 2005.
54«Zapatero pone 1.677 millones para la sanidad y emplaza al PP a firmar el acuerdo el martes.
El Gobierno salda la Conferencia de Presidentes con un "pacto político" que materializará el
Consejo de Política Fiscal», El País - Edición Impresa, September 11th 2005.
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The last step of the complex intergovernmental decision-making process recon-
structed so far, was therefore represented by a new meeting of the CPFF, called to
formalize the measures previously discussed by the Conference of the Presidents
(step no. 5). The request of a final debate within the CPFF had come particularly
from the PP regional Presidents. In their view, it was there, and nowhere else,
that intergovernmental agreements could be reached. The PP announced indeed
that its final vote would depend on the specific allocation criteria formally set in
that Council: the Secretary General of the Populars restated that there were still
numerous uncertainties about these criteria, and that the PP were not willing to
accept that some Communities would be favored over others by the implementation
of "arbitrary criteria"55.
The meeting of the CPFF was preceded by a new party summit of the PP
budget Councilors56. In spite of initial public declarations, popular Communities
were highly divided on the best strategy to follow, some of them assessing quite
positively the governmental proposal57. Finally, the compromise solution adopted
by the PP representatives was to opt for abstention (while Ceuta and Melilla, ruled
as well by the PP, voted against).
After the Council meeting, four out of six popular budget Councilors decided
to use the so called voto particular option, a procedure envisioned by the internal
rules of the CPFF, allowing for dissenting opinions of single members to be in-
cluded into agreements adopted by majority. The arguments used by these regional
governments to justify their abstention were similar (CPFF 2006, pp. 387-400).
La Rioja stressed the insuﬃciency of the amount of resources; the lack of clarity on
many aspects of the agreement, particularly those related to the allocation criteria,
ignoring the importance of the population growth. Murcia underscored that what
had been discussed by the CPFF could not be considered, as it should, a proposal
of the Conference of the Presidents (where it had not been voted), but a proposal
of the central Government; that such document was characterized by "imprecision
and lack of transparency", not only on the composition of the resources devoted
to the health sector, but also on the allocation criteria used to distribute part of
them among the Communities; that population growth had not been taken into
account. Similarly, the Valencian Community, beside stressing the insuﬃciency of
55«Acebes dice que el apoyo del PP a la propuesta sanitaria del Gobierno depende de los
criterios de reparto», El Mundo, September 11th 2005.
56«El PP se reúne para unificar su postura sobre la propuesta del Gobierno en financiación
sanitaria. Mariano Rajoy ha calificado la proposición del Ejecutivo como un "parche" porque "no
va al fondo del asunto y no plantea ninguna reforma estructural"», El Mundo, September 13th
2005.
57«Los presidentes populares, entre el voto a favor y el voto en contra», El País - Edición
Impresa, September 13th 2005; El PP apoyará la financiación sanitaria si Solbes garantiza que
no hay discriminación. El Gobierno afirma que seguirá los "mismos criterios de reparto" que fijó
el Ejecutivo popular, El Pais, September 13th 2005;
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the resources, highlighted that the measures discussed by the CPFF could not be
agreed because of the non determination of the resources allocation criteria, so that
«the Valencian Community still does not know exactly which will be the financial
resources it will have available for a proper exercise of its health competences»
(CPFF 2006, p. 394, translated); because of the "arbitrariness" of the solutions
envisioned in the agreement, lacking any analytical basis; finally, because of the
"inequality" produced by that agreement, as a consequence of the non inclusion of
the population growth among the distribution variables (among those known in
that moment, at least). Eventually, the Madrid Community criticized the measures
approved by the Council, by putting in evidence: the "serious lack of definition
and information", "clarity and precision" about the amount and allocation crite-
ria of a part of the resources allocated by the Government; the overestimation,
by the central executive, of the real total amount of resources (considered, any-
way, insuﬃcient); the "unbelievable" exclusion of the population growth among the
criteria already made public by the Government for the allocation of the largest
share of resources: this constituted a full-blown "discrimination" against all those
Communities like Madrid, which had experienced high demographic increases.
6.5 Discussion
The case studies just reviewed have revealed the existence of large diﬀerences in
the ways in which the two intergovernmental policy-making processes did unfold.
While, at the beginning, the conflicting interests present in the two intergovern-
mental arenas (the Italian and the Spanish one) were rather similar, the positions
taken by the IGR actors at the end of the processes were sharply diﬀerent. Faced
with an initiative taken by the central Government, regional IGR actors did split
along a party-partisan divide line in Spain, and a territorial-level divide line in
Italy. This occurred in spite of the presence, in both cases, of an initially evident
mix of party-partisan and (single) territory-based conflicting interests among these
actors. Notice furthermore that in both cases the positive vote of just one regional
unit was a suﬃcient condition for the central executive proposal to be passed.
On the basis of the hypotheses laid out in Chapter 5, and thanks to criteria
followed for the selection of cases, the relatively diﬀerent degree of IGR politiciza-
tion observed could be expected to derive (partly, at least) from the diﬀerent levels
of institutionalization of the Intergovernmental Arrangements at work in the two
countries (H1), and/or from their alternative designs (generalist vs. policy-specific)
(H2) and combinations (just vertical vs. vertical and horizontal) (H3).
Starting from the institutionalization of vertical arrangements, as it was illus-
trated in the previous Chapters, they are clearly more developed in Italy than
in Spain: the State-Regions Conference can hardly be compared to the recently
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Table 6.3: Spain 2005: chronology
February 2004 First claims of additional financial resources by the PSOE
AACC.
May-June First claims of additional financial resources by the PP AACC
October 2004 The Prime Minister calls the first Conference of the Presi-
dents: two vertical Working Groups are created for addressing
the problems related to the increase of regional health expen-
ditures.
October 2004-mid-2005 Working Groups on Population Growth and Health Expendi-
ture at work.
March 2005 PSOE and PP clash in a parliamentary debate on the IGR
process to be followed and the IGAs to be activated.
April 2005 The PP Autonomic Presidents meet with their party leader.
Mid-2005 The two Working Groups present their final reports.
May-July 2005 The Prime Minister meets bilaterally with several Autonomic
Presidents.
End of June 2005 The Prime Minister announces the second Conference of the
Presidents will take place in September.
July The PP Autonomic Presidents meet again with their party
leader.
September 2005
1st: the Government announces a proposal has been drafted,
to be debated by the Conference of the Presidents.
4th: the Prime Minister meets with the PSOE Autonomic Pres-
idents.
5th: the Prime Minister meets with the leader of the opposi-
tion.
7th: a preliminary meeting of the CPFF takes place to dis-
cuss the proposal to be then debated in the Conference of the
Presidents.
9th: the PP Autonomic Presidents meet again with their party
leader.
10th: the second Conference of the Presidents takes place.
13th: PP budget Councilors meet before the CPFF; the final
CPFF meeting takes place.
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established Conference of the Presidents, nor to the Fiscal and Financial Policy
Council. It has also been seen that, to date, the meetings of these Spanish Con-
ferences have been characterized by a quite strong political confrontation among
actors, in contrast to the patterns prevalent within the Italian IGA.
In this case too, the Spanish Conference of the Presidents proved unable to ap-
pease existing conflicts. As seen, the lack of clarity about its very basic rules (on the
modalities of approval of agreements and on its role in the broader decision-making
process), the absence of any permanent structure of bureaucratic support (all its
functioning depending on the choices made by the central Government), did in
fact contribute to arouse suspicions among the vertically incongruent Autonomous
Communities about a possible partisan use of this arrangement by the Govern-
ment: the Conference could represent just a "showcase" for the central executive,
and a way for favoring congruent regional governments, by means of politically bi-
ased funds’ allocation formulas. This also partly explains the repeated requests by
these regional representatives to activate relatively more institutionalized, existing
policy-specific IGAs such as the CPFF and the CISNS. In this context, the two ad
hoc Working Groups set-up within the generalist and the policy-specific arrange-
ments to address the matter from a technical perspective were clearly not able to
create a climate of mutual trust among IGR actors, based on reiterated interaction
and technical expertise. The conclusions of these Groups, reached after just a few
meetings and not agreed by several Communities, were in fact disregarded by both
the regional and the central level.
At the end of this process, the document discussed by the Conference of the
Presidents was, in the view of the vertically incongruent Communities, a document
prepared by the Government, not by the Conference of the Presidents. In this
respect, a former regional Health Director General argued that the role played by
the Conference of the Presidents was in fact
very limited. The 2005 agreement was designed exclusively by the Central
Government, by means of bilateral talks with some AACC, not all. [SP10]
As seen, indeed, in contrast with the complex formal intergovernmental decision-
making process initially agreed by the central and the regional actors, the activity
of multilateral vertical IGAs – the Conference of the Presidents, the Fiscal and
Financial Policy Council and their Working Groups – was paralleled by informal
intergovernmental relations, conveyed through party and government channels.
Formal, vertical multilateral arrangements played, in the end, the role of arenas
merely confirming decisions previously taken by IGR actors elsewhere. The central
Government, by means of bilateral contacts, clearly tried to use a divide et impera
strategy. This also explains the final decision of the PP to abstain on the vote in
the Fiscal and Financial Policy Council meeting: as «this was due to the lack of
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agreement among the AACC governed by the PP: the new system was still favoring
too much some AACC, and hurting others too much» [SP10]. At the same time,
the advantaged popular Communities could not give a positive vote: in the view
of the then Coordinator of the Working Group on Health Spending and Health
Minister advisor, «abstention occurred only not give an electoral advantage to the
PSOE» [SP6].
Although, in Italy, as expected, IGR actors did not split into partisan coalitions,
it was not the vertical intergovernmental arrangement involved in the process
which played a decisive part in exerting on IGR a "shielding eﬀect" from partisan
tensions. Despite its higher institutional development compared to the Spanish
IGAs, the State-Regions Conference, on this occasion, was basically the arena in
which the proposal put unilaterally forwards by the Health Minister (solicited, as
seen, by some regional governments) was formally presented to the Regions: in this
context, the generalist design of the State-Regions Conference clearly was of no
help in bringing IGR actors’ positions closer in the intergovernmental negotiating
process; furthermore, no mixed technical Working Group, although announced,
had been established to draft the new formula. In this stage, partisan tensions, in
addition to the territorial ones, were quite evident.
From an explanatory point of view, the major relevant diﬀerence between cases
is thus to be searched by looking at the diﬀerent systemic configurations of inter-
governmental arrangements in the two countries: the exclusive vertical develop-
ment of IGAs in the Spanish case, in contrast with the presence of both vertical
and horizontal arrangements in the Italian one. In this respect, the comparative
analysis seems to confirm that – as suggested by García Morales (2009) for the
Spanish case – «the vertical configuration of the Conference of Presidents in Spain,
without a prior horizontal conference, may reproduce the problems of vertical Sec-
toral Conferences in our country: the participation of the central Government
makes it diﬃcult for the AACC reaching agreements among themselves, so that
[generally] there is not a defense of regional interests, but many times of partisan
and single territory-based interests» (p. 114, translated, emphasis added).
In contrast to Spain, where no stable arrangement for interregional cooperation
has ever been put in place and regional coordination occurred by means of party
channels, in Italy, the presence of a highly structured horizontal IGA – directly
involved in the process – played in fact a relevant part in downplaying both ter-
ritorial and partisan tensions existing within the interregional arena, preventing
these conflicts to spread in the vertical dimension of IGR (H3): both the high level
of institutionalization of this IGA (H1) and its generalist design (H2) contributed
to defuse interregional tensions.
According to several observers, the strength of the belonging feeling to the so
called "regional front" proved eventually higher then individual, short-run regional
296
interests, both from a single-territorial and a political point of view. The Regions
finally preferred to show that – if put to the test – they were actually capable to
act in a consistent way, as a collective actor, towards the central Government. As
put by the then Health Policy technical coordinator of the Regions,
The Government was certain that its proposal would pass, and at the last
minute, in fact, the Regions have reached an agreement. [. . . ] Because in
the end they [the regional Presidents] said: it will be better if we present
ourselves united, if we safeguard such ability to demonstrate that we are
government institutions . . . [IT3]
This logic was clearly summed-up in the words used by the then President of
the Conference of the Regions to reconstruct those days of complex negotiations:
In fact, one of the arguments used the most during those nights was: "Boys,
it is useless to come and ask for money, to fight for our autonomy, that you
appeal to the Constitutional Court on that rule, that you appeal. . . , and
then, when we must prove to be a body capable of taking decisions, we don’t
take them!" [. . . ] that reasoning was the reasoning that, above all, led all to
give up a piece of their own advantages. . . [. . . ] The element that pushed
even the most recalcitrant Regions to sign the agreement was, clearly, mainly
the fact that we had to demonstrate to be a body able to take decisions. . .
[IT5]
In other words, a "problem-solving" orientation, characterized by the appeal to
common values and interests, seemed able to constrain the behavior of individual
actors, imposing on many of them «sacrifices in terms of individual self-interests»
(Scharpf 1988, p. 261).
In this context, the existence of an experienced, stable network made of re-
gional managers and oﬃcials, able to address the issue at stake on the basis of
technical criteria, partly contributed to weaken interregional contrasts, and facil-
itate agreement. Obviously, as evoked above, every single allocation hypothesis
was simulated in order to assess its potential impact on regional budgets: to reach
consensus, indeed, criteria had to be both technically and politically acceptable
to all the actors. Nonetheless, the final agreed solution largely rested on technical
arguments. While no universally agreed formula exists for estimating health needs
of diﬀerent populations, and every parameter used to this end may be contested,
the allocation agreed by the Regions was not based on purely arbitrary criteria,
nor it was lacking any scientific base. As reported by an interviewed, «we worked
and we tried to devise solutions – by [using] the most objective criteria as possible
– so to mitigate the eﬀects of the ministerial proposal» [IT9]. As seen previously,
one of the most controversial issues in the relationship with the central Govern-
ment had been represented by the degree of transparency and scientificness of the
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allocation formulas under discussion. From this point of view, it is interesting to
remark that the counter-document drafted by the Conference of the Regions was
accompanied with some methodological notes justifying the variables used for the
allocation (Conferenza dei Presidenti delle Regioni 2003b)58.
Interregional agreement, however, was made easier also by additional features
of the horizontal coordination arrangement. In line with Hypothesis no. 2, the
generalist nature of the horizontal intergovernmental arrangement did play a part
in shaping regional actors’ behavior: the non policy-specific organization of the
Conference did allow, as it was hypothesized, for full-blown bargaining, based on
inter-sectoral exchanges and compensations among the Regions. As reported by
a former regional and ministerial manager, during these negotiations, when an
agreement is to be found
more general variables come into play, in the sense that. . . you don’t reason
just about health: so, for instance, I may surrender on health, because on
transports, how to say?, I have an advantage. [The cross-sectorality] is of
help, because it allows for compensations between branches. [. . . ] I repeat,
they [the regional Presidents] put it in a broader framework: "Ok, I do
surrender on health, however, don’t forget, then, when we’ll talk about
transports, I’ll deserve something more." [IT8]
Such kind of reasoning, while not systematic, may become quite explicit during
the so called "confidential sessions" of the Conference, that is when the attendance
to the meeting is restricted just to regional Presidents. It is here that they may
engage each other on mutual compensations, in order to bring their positions
closer, and find a unanimous agreement.
Negotiations, however, were not based exclusively on technical criteria and
cross-sectoral compensations. In line with a practice introduced in the Venice
meeting (2000), the allocation deriving from the straightforward application of
the (agreed) technical criteria was then partly amended by means of political ne-
gotiations among Presidents, so to reduce distances among the Regions. To this
end a (small) portion (defined "re-balancing fund") was subtracted from the total
amount of the National Health Fund and redistributed among regional govern-
ments to advantage of those getting less money (reducing, in other words, the
actual weight of variables): the Regions to be compensated were identified as all
those falling under a certain threshold of per capita financing. Such operation,
called in the Conference of the Regions’ jargon "correction by pencil" (lapis), in
fact did not alter in a dramatic way the distribution otherwise deriving from the
allocation formula: in 2003, the amount of resources used to "re-balance" the Fund
58Such document is available on-line at: http://www.governo.it/backoffice/allegati/
18286-1181.pdf.
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allocation was equal to about 1.15% of the whole set of resources. In this respect,
a former regional President and former Minister of Health, while confirming the
importance of this practice, stressed that
It was a fiction, it was a pretense to justify the deal! To be able to say [to
citizens]: "I’ve taken this [share of the Fund]. . . Okay, I’ve given up on that,
though, [in change] then they had to give me this!" [IT10]
Such an operation was made by the regional Presidents, convened in the "con-
fidential session", with the support of a very restricted number of technicians.
On the whole, the evidence coming from the two cases just discussed has shown
that the diﬀerent ways in which Intergovernmental Arrangements are organized
had a significant "formative" impact on the unfolding of intergovernmental policy-
making processes. From an explanatory point of view, the most relevant diﬀerence
between the two cases has clearly to do with the absence of any structured inter-
governmental arrangement at the horizontal level in the Spanish case, in contrast
to the Italian one, where such arrangement not only does exist, but is also charac-
terized by a high level of institutionalization, and a generalist design. The within
case analysis of the Italian policy-making process has indeed shown that it was
within this arrangement that some of the causal mechanisms hypothesized were
actually at work.
At the same time, the exploration of these two cases seems to suggest that other
features of intergovernmental arrangements – in addition to those considered in the
analysis – could have a relevant impact in structuring intergovernmental processes.
Firstly, a potentially relevant question pertains to the presence of "veto players"
within an intergovernmental arrangement, particularly in those based on voluntary
cooperation (Heinmiller 2007). Such was the case of the Italian Conference of
the Regions. As seen, in the end, no regional government decided to use its
veto power. Theoretically, this can also be explained considering the potential
consequence of a single veto not only on the specific issue under debate, but on
the institution itself. As remarked by Heinmiller (2007), indeed, in this kind of
intergovernmental arrangements «the partner governments are involved not only
in the various distinct policy games over time [. . . ] but they are also involved in
an ongoing, embedded game concerning the continued existence of the institution
itself [. . . ] their actions in one of these games can have important implications
for the other and the linkage between them is particularly intimate because of the
fundamentally cooperative basis of the institution» (p. 670). In the Italian case,
regional actors clearly perceived the issue at stake higher than just the one related
to the allocation of the Health Fund. Such mechanism was further amplified by the
generalist design of the arrangement. It was indeed evident to these actors that the
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potential incapacity of the Regions to act in a consistent collective way towards the
central level could have "spill-over eﬀects" in many other policy-sectors, making in
this way more likely future unilateral initiatives by the central Government:
they [the Regional Presidents] were aware that if the front had broken on a
topic like health policy, it would have broken on everything! Now [health]. . .
then, the Transports Fund? And then the rules to get more powers, as
Regions, towards the Government [. . . ]? [IT3]
While that specific decision could be advantageous to some Regions, the same
could not be granted in other policy-sectors or even, in the longer term, in the
same policy field: making the ministerial proposal enter into force would have in-
troduced a risky element of unpredictability on future intergovernmental decisions
and weakened, on the whole, the role played by the Conference of the Regions.
Secondly, the two cases, while selected according to the MSSD logic explained
above, were similar, but not identical. One major potentially relevant diﬀerence
pertains to the dissimilar visibility of the entire policy-making process in the two
countries. As seen, health policy is characterized by a comparable high level of
saliency in both countries, particularly for the regional governments. However,
while in Italy, in spite of the polemics surrounding it, the process followed a more
routinized path, in Spain the political saliency of the issue was clearly higher,
increasing the likelihood of IGR politicization: to this contributed both the excep-
tional nature of the Conference of the Presidents (never called before) and, above
all, the direct involvement of the Prime Minister in the whole process (starting
from the foundation of the Conference itself).
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Conclusions
Intergovernmental relations are a widespread, common contemporary political phe-
nomenon. Although responding to similar functional pressures, both these rela-
tions and the institutional arrangements designed to manage them vary in many
respects in diﬀerent countries and diﬀerent policy fields. And yet, both intergov-
ernmental relations and arrangements still represent a relatively underexplored
object of analysis in political science.
This work has tried to make a step forward in the understanding of the complex
dynamics concerning the relationships among governments in compound polities,
by comparing intergovernmental arrangements – and their role in processing in-
tergovernmental relations – in two highly decentralized European countries, in the
same policy field: healthcare in Italy and Spain. More specifically, the present
study was designed to determine both the causes and the consequences of current,
observable diﬀerences in the intergovernmental arrangements at work in these two
countries, where the policy sector under analysis is characterized by a similar level
of regionalization, joined with the presence of a National Health System.
While Spanish political science started, in the last years, to investigate in-
tergovernmental relations and arrangements from a non strictly legal perspective
(León and Ferrín 2009, 2011; Colino and Parrado 2008; López Nieto 2008), Ital-
ian literature on these topics is still largely dominated, with very few exceptions
(e.g. Baldi 2009), by legal studies (Carpani 2006; Ruggiu 2006): this is one of
the first attempts to systematically analyze Italian IGAs and IGR in a political
science framework. Moreover, while Spanish IGAs had already been analyzed from
a cross-national comparative perspective (Bolleyer 2006), studies on Italian IGAs
have been generally characterized by a high level of country-specificity.
When considered from an exclusively legal viewpoint, the role played by IGAs
tends often to be easily dismissed, because of the quite reduced set of (legal)
powers they are generally accorded. Nonetheless, as also this analysis has shown,
intergovernmental relations are not just legal but also – if not foremost – political
relationships between actors endowed with some share of power within a compound
polity. Understanding causes and consequences of intergovernmental arrangements
requires, therefore, to look at the broader institutional-political context in which
301
intergovernmental relations are embedded.
To address these questions, the comparison has thus been built starting from
an extensive review of the existing IGR and comparative federalism theoretical
literature, from which several hypotheses – referring to polity, politics and policy
factors potentially able to impact on IGR and IGAs – have been drawn. In most
cases, theoretical reasoning dwells on the causes, more than on the consequences,
of the variations in intergovernmental relations and arrangements; less frequently,
intergovernmental relations and arrangements are looked at as independent vari-
ables, potentially accounting for intergovernmental policy-making: the current
study adds to a growing body of literature where intergovernmental arrangements
are interpreted not only as the outcome of the incentives produced by diﬀerent
political-institutional settings, but also as institutional factors that – once put in
place – become in turn able to aﬀect the unfolding of intergovernmental relations,
by exerting a constraining power on the behavior of IGR actors (Simmons 2002;
Bolleyer 2009; Heinmiller 2007).
After having explored in depth the historical development and the current
features of intergovernmental arrangements at work in healthcare policy in the
two selected countries, the causes of their diﬀerences have first been analyzed, in
light of the hypotheses pointed out at the beginning of the analysis.
By taking a long-run perspective – consistent with the adoption a historical
new-institutional theoretical framework – this study has shown that current diﬀer-
ences in the intergovernmental systems designed in the two countries for dealing
with halthcare policy have to be traced back to the respective early stages of de-
centralization, when unfavorable conditions to the set-up of relatively highly insti-
tutionalized intergovernmental arrangements were present in Spain and absent in
Italy: an asymmetrical distribution of competences along with intra-governmental
relations based on power-concentration rather than power-sharing. An in-depth
analysis of each case has made possible to supplement cross-case comparison with
within-case evidence, allowing to check more closely for the eﬀective relevance of
the causal conditions singled out through cross-case analysis.
It was also shown that, in spite of a change in the institutional-political con-
ditions potentially aﬀecting actors’ incentives towards IGAs’ institutionalization,
intergovernmental arrangements, once established, proved highly "resilient" in both
contexts. While today, as a consequence of institutional transformations occurred
in the two countries, Italian and Spanish intergovernmental arenas are both nested
in a context characterized by the absence of power-sharing regimes and a compa-
rable degree of symmetry in the distribution of health competences among the
subnational units, their IGAs continue to diﬀer on many dimensions. In general,
it seems that the timing by which potentially causal conditions come into play
is a relevant question to be carefully considered: asymmetry of powers preced-
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ing symmetry in Spain, power-sharing preceding power-concentrating regimes in
Italy. In this latter respect, in a broader comparative perspective, evidence com-
ing from the Italian case appears partly confirmed, for instance, by Auel (2014)
who highlights how German horizontal intergovernmental arrangements have been
characterized by a rather high level of stability over time, having been established
before the eruption of a basically bipolar political confrontation at both the fed-
eral and the state level. Future research in this field would be of great help in
exploring – in a wider set of national contexts and policy fields – the major histor-
ical new-institutional hypothesis according to which «earlier parts of a sequence
matter much more than later parts, and hence diﬀerent sequences may produce
diﬀerent outcomes» (Pierson 2000, p. 253): it would be interesting to assess if and
under which conditions intergovernmental relations and arrangements are likely to
be locked in "change-resistant" processes; more particularly, if institutional con-
tinuity is due to the operation of full-fledged path-dependent mechanisms (such
as feed-back and increasing returns) and/or of external intervening variables, con-
tributing to defuse the impact of new (potentially relevant) conditions entering
the IGR arena.
Also because of their resistance to change, Italian and Spanish cases have pro-
vided a good institutional environment in which diﬀerent "formative" impacts of
IGAs on intergovernmental relations could be tested: while sharing many fea-
tures in terms of intergovernmental political congruence, their Intergovernmental
Arrangements vary along diﬀerent dimensions.
Assessing IGAs’ "formative impact" may entail the consideration of several,
alternative consequences on the policy process. In this investigation, the aim was
to assess to which measure IGAs are able to shape IGR actors’ coalitions: more
specifically, to which measure diﬀerently organized IGAs are capable to favor the
emergence of partisan rather than territorial coalitions. To this end, a preliminary
overview of the kind of intergovernmental coalitions prevailing in the two coun-
tries’ intergovernmental arrangements was implemented, so as to check for the
existence of the expected correlation: by looking at the conflict divides emerging
in intergovernmental arrangements in case of disagreement, it was shown that –
from a general point of view – IGR actors’ coalitions tend to be built according
to the respective status towards the central Government (majority/opposition) in
Spain, while according to the respective territorial level (state/regional) in Italy.
Nonetheless, as discussed in the second Chapter of this work, several other condi-
tions – diﬀerent from IGAs’ features – are equally potentially able to contribute to
define actors’ coalitions, and particularly their level of politicization. Furthermore,
the observation that institutional arrangements relatively underdeveloped – partly
because of their higher exposition to pressures coming from political competition –
lead to more politicized IGR patterns could be seen as a form of circular reasoning
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(being weak IGAs the outcome of more politicized IGR): in other words, while
"conguent" with theoretical reasoning, this could be due to a spurious correlation
(George and Bennett 2005).
For these reasons, two case studies were selected, trying to keep constant as
many "confounding factors" as possible, in order single out in a clearer way the
possible eﬀects of IGAs. Despite its exploratory nature and the limited number of
cases considered, the analysis suggests, in line with previous studies in the field,
that the general question "Do intergovernmental institutions matter?" (Heinmiller
2007) can be positively answered. Under similar circumstances, the emergence of a
territorial rather than a partisan coalition in the Italian case was actually favored to
the presence of a horizontal arrangement. The very ability of this latter to "shape"
regional positioning towards the Government was in turn due to its high level of
institutionalization and its generalist design, which activated several causal mech-
anisms hypothesized: a mix of problem-solving, based on technical expertise and
sharing of common interests and norms, and political bargaining, partly based on
cross-sectoral exchanges. At the same time, the analysis highlighted the relevance
of two features of intergovernmental arrangements’ organization not considered in
the starting phase of the analysis: the particular role of veto-players in voluntary
arrangements (potentially able to call into question the very existence of the insti-
tution), and the level of visibility of the Intergovernmental Arrangement in charge
of "processing" IGR.
More generally, an issue clearly worthy of being investigated more in depth
concerns the level of (multi-level) party discipline present in compared cases, and
its interplay with IGAs. This is a quite slippery issue, as such deserving partic-
ularly close consideration. In fact, while discipline imposed by political parties
on regional actors could be seen just as an exogenous factor, impacting on IGR
independently from the IGAs at work, it could also be seen as a factor endogenous
to the intergovernmental process itself: in other words, in presence of highly struc-
tured intergovernmental arrangements, political parties could refrain from trying
to convert the intergovernmental arena into a partisan battle ground, being aware
of the high likelihood for such a strategy to fail. The meaning itself of party
discipline in IGR might also be expected to vary depending on the strength of
the intergovernmental arrangements channeling intergovernmental relations. For
instance, in an integrated party system as the German one, for a long time prior
meetings by so called "A-" and "B-Länder" (ruled by vertically congruent and in-
congruent parties or coalitions), were not to be seen as a factor hampering the
reach of consensus by the states: by contrast, they served the task of defusing
partisan conflicts (Auel 2014); similarly, as reported by some Italian IGR actors
interviewed, the (rarely used) practice of informal preliminary meetings by Coun-
cilors aﬃliated to the same political coalition, is interpreted as a way of favoring,
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rather than preventing, final consensus. Because of their complexity, further re-
search is needed to address these issues.
Finally, while the current study, given its focus on processes, has only examined
the kind of coalitions emerging in the IGR arena, a logical progression of this work
would be to test the consequences of diﬀerent patterns of IGR – their "partisan ver-
ticalization" or "horizontalization" – on public policies’ outputs and expenditures.
As well-known, the study of the consequences of "federalism" on public policies is a
long-established research area (e.g. Pierson 1995; Obinger et al. 2005; Biela et al.
2013). In line with the perspective adopted in this study, it could be interesting
to explore the link between verticalization and what could be called the "political
patronage" hypothesis: whether relatively weakly institutionalized (multilateral)
IGAs are eventually conducive to IGR outputs more politically biased (that is,
designed so as to reward or punish regional actors on the basis of political aﬃnity
criteria); some empirical evidence from the Spanish case seems in fact consistent
with this possibility (e.g. León 2007).
Looking at the consequences of alternative ways of structuring IGR, it would
be also worth considering the degree of policy change observable in diﬀerent inter-
governmental contexts. For instance, a likely consequence of IGR horizontalization
(joined with consensus decision-making dynamics), such as the one described as
typical of the Italian case, could be the tendency to produce "lowest common de-
nominator policies". As originally suggested by Paul Pierson (1995) with specific
reference to social polices, in institutional settings relying on joint-decision mak-
ing – those in which national and peripheral units’ representatives each possesses
"a substantial capacity for obstruction" (p. 659) – final decisions could be likely
to produce policies reflecting «the views of the least ambitious participants in a
minimum winning coalition» (p. 460). In keeping with the theory developed by
George Tsebelis, the need of finding an agreement among the regional units, and
between these latter and the center, could have therefore the eﬀect of favoring
small, incremental, rather than radical, policy changes, increasing by consequence
the likelihood for the status quo to be preserved. By contrast, an arena character-
ized by a stronger partisan verticalization of IGR could be expected, in the end, to
be more conducive – under favorable political circumstances – to the introduction
of broader and/or more frequent policy changes. Notice furthermore that both
"political patronage" and "lowest common denominator" policies could represent
conditions contributing, in turn, to account for the stability of Intergovernmental
Arrangements over time: the latter could indeed be characterized by "institutional
protections", mechanisms deliberately introduced in the policy design so as to make
changes diﬃcult, and preserve over time the power share of each intergovernmental
actor involved in the complex policy-making process (Pierson 1995); the former
could trigger the activation of mechanisms of increasing returns.
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In conclusion, as these few examples have made clear, the broad field of in-
tergovernmental relations and arrangements encompasses a variety of relevant re-
search questions: while many have begun to be dealt with in recent years, so many
– at least – remain to be explored.
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Appendix A
Main IGAs: A Comparative
Overview
As was pointed out several times in the Introduction and in Chapter 1, a wide array of in-
stitutional solutions for managing intergovernmental relations within compound polities
is not only theoretically conceivable, but also empirically observable. In the remainder,
an overview of the most relevant IGAs currently at work in several Western federal and
quasi-federal settings will be outlined. Features related to the institutional dimensions
identified in Chapter 1 will be stressed. Whenever possible, special attention will be
devoted to the description of the machinery specifically designed to deal with inter-
governmental issues pertaining to health policy. As will emerge clearly, every national
system may be seen as characterized by a specific combination of arrangements, possi-
bly operating at diﬀerent territorial levels, with diﬀerent policy focuses, and diﬀerently
organized working structures (for a schematic representation, see Table 1.3).
A.1 US
According to Watts (2003), because of the non-parliamentary nature of the US, in this
federation «there is nothing [. . . ] directly comparable to the executive federalism and
formal intergovernmental councils prevalent» in parliamentary federal systems (p. 8).
Nevertheless, the National Governors Association (NGA) may be considered as
the most relevant horizontal, generalist intergovernmental arrangement working in the
United States. Founded in 1908, the Association is composed of the fifty State Gover-
nors; it is run by a nine-person Executive Committee, including a Chair and a Vice-chair.
Chairmanship and vice-chairmanship rotate yearly, and strict alternation between Demo-
crat and Republican Governors holding these positions is ensured. In order to grant even
more the very bipartisanship of this IGA, four members of the Committee are from the
Chair’s party, while the remaining five from the Vice-Chair’s party. NGA plenary meet-
ings are regularly organized twice a year: a Winter Meeting is held in Washington, while
the Annual Meeting, called in summer, is organized each time in a diﬀerent location.
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As reported in many oﬃcial documents of this IGA, its mission consists in providing a
bipartisan forum for governors to exchange views and best practices, to provide gover-
nors with innovative solutions and technical support, to establish bipartisan positions to
influence key federal policy initiatives. To this end, the Association is articulated into
several permanent Committees, dealing, respectively, with Economic Development and
Commerce, Education, Early Childhood and Workforce, Health and Human Services,
and Natural Resources. When particular issues are at stake, ad hoc, bi-partisan task
forces may albe created by the NGA. Each Committee or task force has a Staﬀ Advi-
sory Council, composed of gubernatorial staﬀ. Beyond that, an extensive bureaucratic
network supports the Association’s activities: an Oﬃce of Federal Relations, charged of
maintaining regular contacts with congressional leaders and federal administration oﬃ-
cials; a Center of Best Practices, a research institution, intended to favor policy learning
among Governors: it is in turn divided into five policy-specific divisions, one of which is
dedicated to health policy; an Oﬃce of Communications, tasked with coordinating media
and communication strategies of the Association; an Oﬃce of Management Consulting
and Training, assisting governors (even by means of tailored services) in managing and
leading state governments. When it comes to define common positions towards the fed-
eral government, the NGA decisions take the form of "policies": previously processed by
Committees, they must be voted at least by two thirds of Governors during the plenary
sessions.
Alongside the NGA, other two intergovernmental organizations operating in the US
federal system are worthy to be mentioned, even if they do not strictly fall under the
definition of "IGA" provided in Chapter 11: the National Conference of State Legislatures
and the Council of State Governments.
The National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), organized in a strictly bipar-
tisan way, was created in 1975 to serve legislators and staﬀ from all the states. Run by
an Executive Committee (composed of legislators and legislative staﬀ), it is articulated
into twelve policy-specific Standing Committees, one of which is devoted to Health and
Human Services: they meet two times per year, with the aim of developing "policy di-
rectives" and "resolutions" on state-federal issues in order to – as reported in the oﬃcial
Conference website – guide NCSL lobbying eﬀorts in Washington, D.C. Policy directives
and resolutions have then to be adopted at the annual Legislative Summit Business
Meeting, the most relevant plenary session of this arrangement; one more session, the
Fall Forum, is where the agenda is set for the states. Additional Task Forces may be
created, on temporarily bases, for addressing cross-cutting issues: currently, eight task
forces are at work (one is devoted to "Federal Health Reform Implementation"). Sim-
ilarly to the NGA, the NCSL too provides its members with research and technical
support in order to increase state policy-making eﬀectiveness as well as the ability of
state legislatures to voice their interests – by means of a full-blown lobbying activity –
in the federal system. According to the Rules of Procedure regulating the functioning of
1By IGAs, I mean all those permanent institutional boards, composed by representatives of
executives placed either at the same or at diﬀerent territorial levels, dealing with the management
of intergovernmental relations, (mostly) within the domestic arena.
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both the NCSL plenary meetings and Committees, decisions may be taken by majority
vote.
Up to 1975, both the NGA and the NCSL belonged to a third arrangement, the
Council of State Governments (CSG), which now works as an umbrella organization,
providing services (Bolleyer and Bytezek 2009). It is defined as a non-profit, bi-partisan
organization, designed to serve state oﬃcials from the legislatures, the courts and the
executives. Founded in 1933 and headquartered in Lexington (Kentucky; an additional
oﬃce is nevertheless present in Washington D.C.), its complex governance structure is
designed according to the "Articles of Organization". Its purpose consists in champi-
oning excellence in state governments, "bringing state leaders from across the nation
and through its regions together to put the best ideas and solutions into practice" (Sect.
no. 2). Its membership includes representatives, from all the states, from the execu-
tive branch (the governors), the legislative branch (the highest ranking legislative leader
elected by each legislative chamber), and the judicial branch (the highest ranking ju-
dicial oﬃcial from each member jurisdiction): its memberships may be thus considered
as "hybrid", insofar it does not include exclusively executive representatives. The CSG
is articulated into a Governing Board, an Executive Committee, a Leadership Council,
a set of Standing Committees and Public Policies Committees2. While there is not a
minimal frequency for the Governing Board meetings (which may be requested by the
Executive Committee or by a qualified majority of states), the Executive committee,
which is in charge, among other things, of approving "policy statements" representing
the oﬃcial position of the CSG, must be convened at least once annually. The Council
is headed by a President (a Governor) and is chaired by a member of a state legislature.
It is eventually important to remark that, even if organized on national bases, the CSG
is in turn split into four regional subunits (CSG East, Midwest, South, West), including
groups of neighboring states.
A.2 Canada
Canadian IGAs tend to be generally represented as quite weak: «the institutions of
intergovernmental relations in Canada remain, compared with some other federations,
relatively ad hoc and under institutionalized» (Cameron and Simeon 2002, p. 50). Major
IGAs actually operating in this federation are the First Ministers’ Conferences (FMCs),
the Council of the Federation (COF, formerly named Annual Premiers’ Conference –
APC) and, at a lower, policy-specific level, a number of Ministerial Councils or Confer-
ences.
First Ministers’ Conferences are a top-level vertical, generalist IGA, gathering the
heads of governments from both the national and the provincial levels. Despite its long-
established tradition (its first meetings were celebrated in 1906 and 1918) and its salient
2Greater details in on the complex governance structure regulating the CSG articulation and
working may be found on the Council website, at: http://www.csg.org/governance/pdfs/
CSG_Governance_Adopted.pdf
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role and increasing formalization during the 1960s and in the 1970s, the FMC has be-
come a much more marginal arrangement by the 1990s (Papillon and Simeon 2004).
Presently, no fixed schedule of meetings exists: in practice, their frequency is low (in
comparative terms), insofar as the FMC tends to convene, on average, every eighteen
months or a couple of years (Trench 2003, p. 19). Looking at its last twenty years of
history (1992-2012), FMC has been called just thirteen times, following a quite irregular
pattern. The call of this IGA seems largely dependent on the federal Prime Minister’s
willingness to organize it: for instance, as reported by Trench (2003), Prime Minister
Jean Chrétien proved quite reluctant to use this IGA «as he would have been facing a
chorus of unanimous opposition» (p. 19). This means that the continuity of its activities
cannot be taken as ensured: in fact, no meeting was organized in 1995, 1998, 2000-01,
2005-07, 2009-12. Besides being infrequent and discontinuous, FMC meetings are not
governed by any written rule of procedure. Established rules provide just for the order
in which premiers take the floor and the chairmanship of this IGA (accorded to the
federal Prime Minister). Decisions, taken by the implicit rule of consensus, may take
the form of a communiqué (a quite general statement over a policy issue discussed by
the Conference) or of a more formal (but not binding) agreement. Furthermore, as re-
marked by Cameron (2002), «it has no continuing institutional support, no staﬀ serving
it, no routine procedure for following up on business and reporting back» (p. 13)3. The
weakness of such an intergovernmental arrangement is possibly best summed-up by Pa-
pillon and Simeon (2004), according to whom «meetings are ad hoc, sporadic, and often
motivated by political ends only remotely tied to the management of interdependence
between the two orders of governments. There are few agreed upon decision-making
rules or procedures. There is often little organized bureaucratic preparation or follow-up
compared with other intergovernmental forums. Nor are there clear links between the
FMC and other intergovernmental institutions, or between it and federal and provincial
legislatures» (p. 114). According to these scholars, thus, the First Ministers’ Confer-
ences would be more a mechanism for dealing with pressing issues rather than an IGA
for an ongoing management of IGR: this is why, according to these scholars, «the FMC
has not emerged, despite numerous attempts in that direction, as an autonomous in-
stitution in its own right, in the sense of having a set of fixed rules and procedures, an
established organization, and a set of distinct incentives, disincentives and constraints
that are capable of influencing or shaping the behaviour and strategies of political actors»
(Papillon and Simeon 2004, p. 125, emphasis added).
The second major IGA working in the Canadian system of IGR operates at the
horizontal level, with a generalist focus: it is the Council of the Federation (COF),
comprising the thirteen Premiers from all the Canadian Provinces and Territories. Orig-
inally established under the name of Annual Premiers’ Conference (APC) in 1960 «as
3To be thorough, FMC meetings are supported by the Canadian Intergovernmental Confer-
ence Secretariat, a structure established by an agreement of the FMC itself in 1973. Its mission
– as reported in its oﬃcial webpage – is to "provide the administrative services required for the
planning and the conduct of senior-level intergovernmental conferences". In other words, it does
not serve exclusively the FMC, but other top-level IGAs as well.
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little more than a summer retreat for premiers and their families» (Cameron and Simeon
2002, p. 61), it evolved into a more structured forum through a process culminated at
the end of 2003, when a full-blown reform was passed and its name was turned into
the current one. As reported by Inwood et al. (2011), «the lack of satisfactory federal
responses to various provincial-territorial concerns, particularly health care funding and
the fiscal imbalance, led to an institutional innovation by the premiers [. . . ] At the be-
hest of Quebec premier Jean Charest, the thirteen premiers and territorial leaders joined
together with the stated goal of strengthening provincial-territorial cooperation and en-
hancing relations with the federal government» (p. 43). Unlike its vertical counterpart,
the APC and then the COF have displayed a much higher continuity, having organized
at least one meeting per year uninterruptedly since 1960 up to now. The 2003 reform
has contributed to strengthen this intergovernmental arrangement. The COF Found-
ing Agreement specifies that Provincial Premiers shall take turns chairing the Council
and that the Deputy Chair shall be the Premier who will chair the Council the follow-
ing year. While the APC was usually held once per year (in August, generally before
the FMC, when scheduled), the COF Founding Agreement has increased the minimal
frequency of Provincial Premiers’ meetings (twice per year: one in August, as before,
plus one). A Steering Committee is tasked with study, analysis and research activities,
as well as with the preparation of the COF meetings: this Committee is composed of
the provincial and territorial Deputy Ministers in charge of intergovernmental relations,
which are operationally assisted by a small Secretariat, located in Ottawa. In spite of
being an exclusively horizontal arrangement, the Council activities tend to be focused
more on federal-provincial relations than on merely inter-provincial issues. Through
horizontal self-coordination, Provinces and Territories seek foremost to minimize their
own divisions in front of the Federal Government: in practice, «so far, the Council has
served one prior goal, – according to Bolleyer (2009) – to form a stable provincial front
to extract the maximal amount of money in negotiations over federal funding» (p. 76).
Decisions are taken by consensus. Position taking by the Provinces towards the center
may thus be reasonably considered as the main gaol pursued by the IGA under consider-
ation. As stated in its founding agreement, indeed, its mandate includes objectives such
as providing "an integrated and coordinated approach to federal provincial territorial
relations through the development of shared common analysis and positions, where ap-
propriate", analyzing "actions or measures of the federal government that in the opinion
of the members have a major impact on Provinces and Territories", or developing "a
common vision of how intergovernmental relations should be conducted in keeping with
the fundamental values and principles of federalism" (Sect. no. 4).
Below both the vertical and horizontal top-level IGAs, a numerous set of policy-
specific arrangements, comprised of the ministers in charge of a given policy field, exist.
The vertical fora of specialized Ministers are generally co-chaired by a federal and a
provincial Minister (this latter rotating on a yearly basis). Frequency and regularity
of their meetings is highly varying, depending on the policy field considered, as well as
the investment made in bureaucratic networks of support like a Secretariat oﬃce. De-
cision rule is generally consensus (Meekison et al. 2002, pp. 21-22). Note that usually
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meetings occur both at the level of Ministers and at the lower level of Deputy Minis-
ters. The most relevant Ministerial Conferences deal with issues related to Environment
("Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment"), Education ("Council of Ministers
of Education"), Forests ("Canadian Council of Forest Ministers"), Employment ("Forum
of Labour Market Ministers"), Immigration, Social Policy ("Ministers Responsible for
Social Services"), Transportation, Tax, and Health.
Eventually, it should be reminded that, along these multilateral arrangements, a
set of geographically-based IGAs is at work, including just a subgroup of provincial
governments, such as the Western Premiers’ Conference and the Conference of Atlantic
Premiers.
A.3 Australia
The Australian Federation displays a quite high number of Intergovernmental Arrange-
ments, of both vertical and horizontal nature, with both a generalist and a policy-specific
focus. This makes the Australian set of IGAs a complex and rich intergovernmental in-
stitutional landscape.
The major vertical, generalist Australian IGA currently working is the Council of
Australian Governments (also known as COAG). Since the Federation (1901), oﬃcial
meetings between the heads of governments had been held, with varying frequency, in
order to jointly discuss issues of high political importance. As reported by (Galligan
and Roberts 2007), financial relations between the Commonwealth and the States have
always been one of the major topics at these meetings. During the 1970s, in fact, the
only regular heads of governments forum was the annual Financial Premiers Confer-
ence, which focused on short-run financial issues, with scant prior meetings’ preparation
(Galligan and Roberts 2007). In 1990 and 1991, a series of "Special Premiers’ Con-
ferences" was organized on the then Prime Minister’s initiative, in order to address a
general reform of Australian vertical IGR. In 1992, the reform of these Special Premiers’
Conferences led to a higher degree of formalization of this arrangement, whose name
was changed into Council of Australian Governments (Painter 1998). Its membership
includes the the Prime Minister, who chairs it, the six State Premiers, the Chief Min-
isters of the Northern Territory and the Australian Capital Territory and the President
of the Australian Local Government Association. COAG, as reported in its institutional
website, «meets on an as needed basis», with the goal of initiate, develop and monitor
the implementation of policy reforms that are of national significance and which re-
quire cooperative action by Australian governments. COAG has its own Secretariat (the
Commonwealth-State Relations Secretariat), located in the Department of the Prime
Minister and Cabinet, which makes possible to argue that «COAG is now underpinned
by an extensive set of routinised bureaucratic exchanges» (Galligan and Roberts 2007).
Even more so since the end of 2007, when the COAG members also agreed on the es-
tablishment of seven policy-specific working groups: one of them is devoted to Health
and Ageing (tasked with developing implementation plans in respect to tackling elective
surgery waiting times and investing in public dental programs) (Griﬃth 2009). In prac-
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tice, nevertheless, despite this quite extensive network of bureaucratic support, since its
establishment (1992) up to 2013 the COAG met only 36 times: while it did not convene
at all in 1998, at least one meeting per year was celebrated in all remaining years (the
maximum number of meeting per year having been four). According to some scholars,
frequency and timing of meetings are still entirely determined by the Prime Minister
(Kildea and Lynch 2011). In absence of commitment of this latter to the COAG pro-
cess, meetings’ frequency tends indeed to be very low. Central government’s dominance
would be evident also in the control and management of the meetings’ agenda by the
Prime Minister: «although input from the States on possible agenda items is invited, the
PM alone settles the final agenda for each meeting and need do no more than consider
suggestions from the States. In practice, this means that COAG invariably addresses
matters of interest to the national government. [. . . ] sometimes the Commonwealth will
only finalise the COAG agenda just days before the meeting, thus giving the States min-
imal time to prepare» (Kildea and Lynch 2011). COAG outputs may take the form of
either general statements (communiqués) released at the end of each meeting or – when
formal deals have been reached – of full-blown intergovernmental agreements. Decisions
are generally taken by consensus.
If COAG represents the peak vertical intergovernmental forum in Australia, at a
lower level Ministerial Councils operate as a support to COAG activities. These ver-
tical, policy-specific IGAs consist of Ministers from the States, the Territories and the
Commonwealth meeting to discuss particular policy areas. They have a longer estab-
lished tradition than COAG, the oldest Ministerial Council having been established in
1934 to address agricultural issues. Since the 1990s, these Councils underwent many
reforms, aiming to reduce their number (rapidly grown up to more than forty) and
to rationalize their activity. To this end, this latter should be organized in order to
implement five "strategic themes" pursued by the COAG: "a Long-Term Strategy for
Participation" (skills development, education, early childhood development); "a National
Economy driven by our Competitive Advantages" (focused on microeconomic issues, reg-
ulatory reforms and investments); "a Sustainable and Liveable Australia" (on housing
supply, climate change and energy eﬃciency measures); "Closing the Gap of Indigenous
Australians"; and one devoted to health care policy, named "a Better Health Service and
a More Sustainable Health System for Australia". Nowadays, these themes are addressed
by 21 policy-specific councils (of which just 13 are defined as permanent), forming, as
a whole, the so called "COAG Council System". They are underpinned by Standing
Committees of Oﬃcials and their major goal should be that of facilitating consultation
and cooperation between the Commonwealth and the States and Territories in specific
policy areas. Ministerial Councils develop policy reforms for consideration by COAG,
and oversee the implementation of policy reforms agreed by COAG. Annually, the Coun-
cils must report their activities to COAG. If not diﬀerently agreed, their decisions are
taken by unanimity. One of these permanent Councils is specifically designed to address
health-care policy issues (Standing Council on Health).
When coming to the horizontal dimension of IGAs in Australia, one cannot not no-
tice its long-standing weakness. The first exclusively horizontal intergovernmental body
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– named Leaders’ Forum – was established in Australia only in 1994, also as a response
to the disadvantage felt by sub-national leaders in vertical intergovernmental fora, be-
cause of their agenda setting domination by the Commonwealth (Tiernan 2008). Since
then, «they met sporadically, and with increasing informality, at Leaders’ Forum, usu-
ally held just prior to scheduled COAG meetings» (Tiernan 2008, p. 123). Time devoted
to debate was generally limited. The enduring domination of COAG by central govern-
ment led State Premiers to acquire increasing awareness of the strategical convenience
to set up a more institutionalized horizontal IGA, in order to reduce the divide et impera
strategies implemented by the Commonwealth. In July 2006 the creation of a Council
for the Australian Federation (CAF) was then announced, taking as an institutional
template the Canadian Council of the Federation. As stated in its founding agreement,
its memberships includes the premiers of the States and the chief ministers of the Terri-
tories. The minimal frequency of this horizontal IGA’s meetings was set at one meeting
per year, while its chairmanship would be on a yearly rotational basis. Interestingly,
the founding agreement established that the CAF would be supported by a permanent,
rotating Secretariat, funded by States and Territories and tasked with helping the Chair
in preparing meetings (besides performing any task attributed to it by the Council). De-
cisions are taken by consensus (which occurs when no members are against a proposed
resolution). Among its major gaols, the Agreement listed those linked to complement-
ing the work of the Council of Australian Governments and facilitating COAG–based
agreements with the Commonwealth "by working towards a common position among the
States and Territories", as well as those related to reaching, where appropriate, "collab-
orative agreements on crossjurisdictional issues where a Commonwealth imprimatur is
unnecessary or has not been forthcoming"4. In the period 2006-2013, CAF met thir-
teen times (in a continuous way, having fulfilled the requirement imposing at least one
meeting per year). According to Tiernan (2008), in its two first years of life «unlike
COAG which then provided fairly ad hoc opportunities for policy discussion and debate,
CAF provided a regular, structured forum that enabled negotiations to continue until
agreement could be achieved. The deliberative process amongst sub-national leaders was
assisted by the disciplines associated with a formal agenda for CAF, a forward work-plan
and the requirement to report progress on actions arising from previous meetings» (p.
128). These discussions allow the State and Territory Heads of Government to develop
joint positions on national issues, and to advance a common stance of the States in
negotiations with the Commonwealth.
A.4 Germany
As well-known, the main locus of vertical intergovernmental relations in Germany is
represented by the Bundesrat, the upper parliamentary chamber composed of represen-
tatives of states executives. Vertical cooperation, however, is also carried out by means
4The COF Founding Agreement is available on the Council website, at: http://www.caf.
gov.au/meetings.aspx.
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of several policy-specific, vertical Intergovernmental Arrangements, composed of state
and federal Ministers, such as: the Bund-Länder Coordination Councils for Regional
Development and for Agriculture and Coastal Protection; the Joint Science Conference;
and, since 2009, the Council for IT Technology and the Stability Council (on federal and
Länder budgetary stability). Other arrangements do not include only state and federal
representatives, but also experts and members of local governments (e.g. Council of
Science and Humanities) (Auel 2014).
The involvement of subnational governments into the national legislative process by
means of the Bundesrat led the Länder to organize in order to prepare decisions on
federal bills, and avoid competences’ encroachment by the central level. Indeed, despite
the absence of any reference to horizontal cooperation in the German Basic Law, Land
Premiers and Ministers convene in a very dense network made up of intergovernmental
Conferences, Commissions, Committees, Working Groups, and the like (Auel 2014):
Länder self-coordination, whose origins can be traced back even before the foundation
of the Federal Republic, has often been referred to its "third level" (Benz 2009).
The most relevant German horizontal, generalist IGA is theMinisterpräsidentenkon-
ferenz (the Conference of Premiers, MPK), collecting the heads of governments from all
federated units. Since the 1950s, when the Conference was created as an instrument
against central level invasion of Länder competences, Presidents regularly meet four
times per year, even if a formal, minimal frequency of encounters has not been set,
an internal regulation or founding agreement being lacking. Extraordinary meetings,
if needed, may also be called. No network of bureaucratic support has been created
to prepare such events, which are generally organized by the single Land governments.
Chairmanship, which is one-year long, rotates among Premiers, according to a fixed
order. An internal document, not accessible form outside, regulates decision-making
(Bolleyer and Bytzek 2009): in conformity with it, until 2004 unanimity was the sole
decision-rule followed by this IGA; it was relaxed in 2009, when Premiers agreed that,
except on issues aﬀecting budget or joint institutions, decisions may be taken by quali-
fied majority (thirteen votes over sixteen). Twice a year, plenary meetings are followed
by a meeting of the Länder Presidents with the federal Chancellor. After the unification
of the country, a region-based Conference also exists – MPK-East – composed of the
Presidents of Eastern Länder.
Alongside this generalist, peak-level arrangement, the German intergovernmental
horizontal landscape is characterized by the contextual presence of eighteen policy-
specific IGAs, called Länderministerkonferenzen (Conferences of Specialized Ministers
of Länder). Most of them work according to formal rules, laid out in founding agree-
ments or regulations, and meet on a regular basis. Interestingly, in some of these Con-
ferences the federal Minister is a full-fledged member, while in others she is invited as
a guest. The chairmanship rotates among Länder : the one in charge with this function
also ensures the secretariat tasks; joint secretariats – except in few cases – have not been
established; several committees and working groups, preparing the political meetings
have, nevertheless, been created at the administrative level. Decisions (never binding)
are usually taken according to the unanimity rule, even if recently some Conferences
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have introduced the possibility of (qualified or simple) majority vote: in any case, in
contrast with the voting rules followed in the Bundesrat, each Land is accorded an equal
weight. Among the Conferences which have introduced the simple majority vote option
is the one dealing with healthcare policy, the Gesundheitsministerkonferenz der Län-
der, GMK. Its foundation dates back to more than sixty years ago. Federal Minister of
Health participates regularly as a guest in such IGA. Its meetings take place regularly:
a General Conference (collecting all regional Health Ministers) is organized once a year
by the Health Secretaries of States; twice a year convenes instead the Arbeitsgemein-
schaft der Obersten Landesgesundheitsbehörden (Working Group of the Supreme Health
Authorities), made up of heads of health departments from all the Länder, to address
more technical issues. The presidency of the GMK rotates annually among the Länder.
In this landscape, an exception is constituted by the Conference of Ministers of Cultural
Aﬀairs, set up in 1948: unlike the other Conferences, indeed, this IGA is supported by an
extensive and highly structured bureaucratic network, including a Secretariat oﬃce as
well as many technical internal units (working groups, commissions and subcommissions)
(Benz 2009)5.
A.5 Austria
Because of the total ineﬀectiveness of its second parliamentary chamber as a channel of
territorial representation, the Austrian federation has often been portrayed as a "unitary
federation" or, even, as a non-federal State. According to the Constitution, indeed, in
the majority of cases the Federal Council can only exert a suspensive veto power when
issues under States legislative competence are debated. Not only that: the members of
the Federal Council have not even to be members of the Langtag, the regional parliaments
(Biela et al. 2013; Karlhofer and Pallaver 2013).
As in most of the countries under analysis, intergovernmental relations tended thus
to emerge on the executive rather than on the legislative front. The major IGA cur-
rently working in this parliamentary democracy is an horizontal, generalist one: the
Landeshauptleutekonferenz (LHK), the Conference of State Governors. While the first
meetings of this horizontal, generalist IGA date back to 1918 and 1945 (the founda-
tion of, respectively, the first and the second Austrian Republics), its is since 1970 that
Austrian State Governors have started meeting on a more regular basis (twice a year).
Extraordinary sessions may also be called. Despite the lack of any standing order regu-
lating the Conference, some working rules may be identified. The chairmanship rotates
every six months among State Governors, according to alphabetical order. Decisions,
which are not legally binding, are taken by consensus. Since 1951 the LHK activities rely
on a permanent oﬃce performing the functions of a secretariat, the Verbindungsstelle
der Bundesländer (literally, "junction of the Provinces"). Though not binding, unani-
mous decisions taken by the Conference are generally respected by the Governors. The
LHK is assessed as playing an important part in Austrian national decision making by
5See also the website of this Conference: www.kmk.org.
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many scholars, who also tend to accord it a de facto veto power in respect to several
federal decisions (Biela et al. 2013). As implicitly emerged from this description, the
bulk of LHK activities is thus devoted to the management of vertical IGR, that is of the
relations between the Provinces, on the one hand, and the Federal Government, on the
other hand. It may also be interesting to remark that – as recently summarized by Biela
et al. (2013) – «the unanimity needed for a formal decision [. . . ] has been identified
as the ’glue’ sticking the Länder together [. . . ] and thereby assuring a predominance of
state interests over party interests» (p. 54).
It should be finally reminded that the Conference of State Governors works along
with other lower-level IGAs, such as the Landesamtsdirektorenkonferenz (Conference of
the Directors of the Länder Governments), subordinated to the LHK, and responsible
for the preparation of its meetings and administrative coordination; the Referentenkon-
ferenzen, a set of policy-specific, vertical IGAs, including federal ministers and top-level
civil servants from the Provinces, and the Länderexpertenkonferenzen, policy-specific,
horizontal arrangements, operating at the administrative level.
A.6 Switzerland
In a comparative perspective, Swiss IGAs have been assessed as characterized by a
particularly high level of institutionalization (Bolleyer 2006, 2009). In this strongly
symmetrical federation, main arrangements ensure cooperation at the horizontal level,
where both generalist and policy-specific intercantonal bodies are at work.
As to the latter, the Konferenz der Kantonsregierungen – KDK (or Conférence des
Gouvernements Cantonaux ; Conference of Cantonal Governments) is made up of one
representative from each of the twenty-six Cantons, and is chaired by a President, elected
among its members and whose mandate lasts four years. Formally established in 1993,
according to its founding agreement the Conference is designed to pursue goals related
to both exclusively intercantonal collaboration and cantonal-federal relationships. The
relevance of vertical issues within the Conference is confirmed by the provision setting
the participation of the Federal Council (that is, the federal executive) at its meetings
(with no right to vote). These latter must be organized at least twice per year: de facto,
between 2003 and 2012, the frequency of ordinary meetings has been higher (about
four annual encounters). Extraordinary meetings may also be convened. An extensive
bureaucratic network supports the activities of the Conference: standing or temporary
commissions for addressing specific projects or issues of high relevance ca be created by
an Executive Committee, composed of nine to eleven members, and tasked with the man-
agement of current aﬀairs; a Secretariat, designed by the Conference in its plenary format
and depending on the Committee, is charged of the preparation of Conference meetings
and of the timely diﬀusion of the necessary documentation among all the involved par-
ties. The Secretariat Oﬃce, currently staﬀed by twenty-eight oﬃcials, is in turn divided
into specialized units, devoted to Personnel and Finances, Projects, General Services,
Internal Aﬀairs and Coordination, External Aﬀairs. At present, three "Political Commis-
sions" and twenty Working Groups are operating: their thematic focus is largely linked
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to EU-related issues, such as free circulation of people, transports, financial and fiscal
matters, and so on. As to the decision-making rules, they vary depending on the kind of
deliberation at stake: when the Conference aims at defining a common cantonal position
(towards the federal government) the structural quorum is set at eighteen Cantons, while
the deliberative quorum requires a positive stance by eighteen cantons (over twenty-six):
this means that a qualified majority rule (70%) is adopted. By contrast, when "decisions"
are to be taken, the simple majority criterion is hold valid (as provided for by the Inter-
nal Regulations passed in 2009). Furthermore, like in Canada and the US, along with
the multilateral generalist conference just described, an ensemble of regionally-based
arrangements exists, dealing with federal-cantonal or cantonal-cantonal issues more re-
lated to specific areas: they are the Regionale Regierungskonferenzen (or: Conférences
régionales des gouvernements; Regional Conferences of Governments), collecting can-
tons, respectively, from the Central, the Western, the Northwestern, the Eastern part
of the country. The Secretariat of the KDK is in constant touch with the secretariats
of these regional IGAs, which rest on written internal regulations, are articulated into
several units, and meet regularly according to scheduled calendars.
The KDS is also strictly integrated with a multitude of policy-specific, horizontal
arrangements, called Konferenz der Kantonsregierunge (or Conférences des Directeurs
Cantonaux; Conferences of Cantonal Directors): these intergovernmental fora – fifteen
in all – are composed of cantonal executives’ members responsible of a given policy-field.
Conferences of Cantonal Directors were established much earlier than the Conference of
Cantonal Governments and, like this latter, display a high degree of institutionalization
and a similar structure. The Conference addressing issues pertaining to health policy
(named Konferenz der kantonalen Gesundheitsdirektorinnen und -direktoren or Con-
férence suisse des directrices et directeurs cantonaux de la santé) dates back to 1919: it
was established in order to deal with intercantonal as well as federal-cantonal relations
(representatives of the federal administration take part in its meetings as guests). Ple-
nary sessions, which must be convened at least one time each year, are usually organized
twice a year, while the Conference’s Political Board, composed of ten cantonal execu-
tives’ members and dealing with current aﬀairs, meets more often (generally, nine times
per year). Besides this Board, this horizontal, policy-specific IGA is supported by a set
of permanent commissions (composed of cantonal directors of public health and experts
from cantonal administration, on issues such as healthcare services planning, financing,
and training), as well as by a permanent Secretariat. In most of cases, decisions taken by
the Conference are not legally binding, taking the form of "recommendations": according
to the internal regulations of the Conference, decisions may be taken by majority. Very
similar IGAs exist in the fields of education, justice and police, finance, public works and
transportation networks, energy, social aﬀairs, and so on. Decision-making rule varies
across Conferences, ranging from unanimity to majority (Bolleyer 2006, p. 401). A
structural link between these policy-specific Conferences and the Conference of Cantonal
Governments is ensured by the Conference of Secretaries of Intercantonal Conferences,
whose Secretariat is managed by the Secretariat of the KDK; furthermore, since 2001,
this latter has been given the power of settling conflicts when diﬀerent policy-specific
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Conferences disagree on their respective fields of competence (ibidem). Interestingly,
alongside these IGAs, as is the case of the KDK, a number of policy-specific intercan-
tonal Conferences operate, collecting just a group of (geographically close) subnational
units: as for health policy coordination, seven regional horizontal arrangements do exist.
It should be finally remarked that while the federal government’s representatives
usually participate as guests to horizontal IGAs in Switzerland, no vertical formal coop-
eration body exists, neither in a generalist nor sectoral format.
A.7 Belgium
In contrast with Switzerland, a complex mix of exclusively vertical – both generalist and
policy-specific – intergovernmental arrangements characterizes the Belgian institutional
landscape. In spite of the strictly dual nature of its constitutional setting, the Belgian
federation has nevertheless developed a set of intergovernmental institutional tools in or-
der to deal with vertical IGR. In the youngest federation here considered, these relations
are formally managed by means of the generalist Comité de Concertation (Concerta-
tion Committee, CC) and by a number of policy-specific Conférences Interministerielles
(Interministerial Conferences).
The CC, founded in 1989, is composed of heads of governments from both the na-
tional and the regional levels, as well as other central executives’ members. Perfect
parity of national and subnational levels as well as of linguistic communities is ensured
through a provision requiring this IGA to be staﬀed by an equal number of national
and regional governments’ members, in turn equally divided into French-speaking and
Dutch-speaking representatives (six members for each territorial level and each linguistic
community). As reported by the central Government’s website, such a vertical generalist
IGA is in charge of debating "diﬀerent issues that, in the context of good governance,
require collaboration between diﬀerent levels of power and should be checked with re-
gard to respective competences". The Concertation Committee, chaired by the federal
Prime Minister, usually meets once per month, on Wednesday morning, in the Cen-
tral Government’s Palace in Bruxelles: about ten meetings per year are celebrated. It
may be called either by central Government’s head or by one regional Minister. Its
activities are supported by a Secretariat Oﬃce, structurally depending on the Prime
Minister Oﬃce. In order to process the most complex issues at stake a number of ad
hoc working groups have been created. The meetings’ agenda tends to be the outcome
of preparatory encounters held between the advisors of national and regional heads of
government (Swenden and Jans 2007). Deliberations are only taken by consensus. As to
the tasks performed by this IGA, the Belgian Consultation Committee, as reported by
Swenden and Jans (2007), is the institutional arena where central Government’s draft
legislative acts are debated with subnational representatives, who are given in this way
the possibility to advance their comments and proposals of amendments, before the draft
is discussed by the Parliament. More generally, it could be said that Committee deals
with all IGR issues its members decide to debate. The CC may also work as a tool for
settling intergovernmental "conflicts of interests": what is reviewed, in this case, is not
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the legality but the advisability of a legislative or executive initiative (Poirier 2002), as
long as every government and every legislative assembly (both regional and national) is
accorded the power to activate the Conference whenever it feels its interests are threat-
ened by another government. Deliberation on the contested measure is thus frozen for
sixty days, during which a consensual solution must be pursued by the Committee. If no
agreement is reached, the file passes to then the Senate, which, after providing its advice
on the question (within thirty days), returns the issue to the CC, which is then given
additional thirty days for finding a consensus. If compromise is not found within these
time limits, the challenged legislative measure may be finally adopted (Poirier 2002).
In addition to this generalist arrangement, Interministerial Conferences are at work.
IMCs are vertical, policy-specific IGAs. Their institution was provided for by Law August
9th 1980 on Institutional Reforms, which defined these IGAs as "specialized committes
[. . . ] composed of members of the Government and of the Executives of the Communities
and of the Regions" with an expertise in the field of interest. Other ministers or experts
are allowed to participate as guests. Ministerial Conferences may be constituted by
the Concertation Committee, with the aim of promoting concertation and cooperation
between the State, the Communities and the Regions. Over the last twenty years, CC
has set up several Conferences, over diﬀerent policy sectors, ranging from Economy and
Energy to Employment, from Finance and Budget to Environment. Currently, eighteen
policy-specific Conferences exist. One of them is devoted to the management of inter-
governmental Public Health issues: it meets two times per year. While some of them
are chaired by the Federal Government, others are chaired, on a rotational basis, by all
their members. Interestingly, each Conference is accorded the power to establish its own
Secretariat oﬃce (independently from the one supporting the Concertation Committee)
and is free to autonomously set its own agenda and order of business. It is important to
stress that Interministerial Conferences cannot exert any binding decision power: they
can simply prepare decisions, to be subsequently possibly taken by the Concertation
Committee. Their work is often preliminary to the achievement of vertical "coopera-
tive agreements" (which can be either voluntary or compulsory), on the joint exercise
of powers as well as the creation and management of common services. Furthermore,
Ministerial Conferences are the arenas in which many compulsory consultation and co-
ordination legal requirements are fulfilled, imposing forms of information exchange or
regional hearing by the Central Government: «Although the federal government must
not always take the advice of the regions into consideration, a failure to hear their opinion
could render its decisions illegal» (Swenden and Jans 2006, p. 887). As to the frequency
of their meetings, it is diﬃcult to be generally assessed, given the high variation de-
pending on the policy field under analysis: according to Swenden and Jans (2007), while
the Conferences on environmental policy and external aﬀairs typically meet many times
per year (three to five times), others may not convene at all for several years. Some
even never convened since their formal establishment. On the whole, according to these
scholars, sectoral cooperation is quite weak in Belgium.
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A.8 UK
In the framework of devolution occurred in the UK at the end of the 1990s, vertical
intergovernmental arrangements were regulated by the Memorandum of Understanding
– MOU, agreed in 1999 and revised in 2010, setting out the principles underlying the
relations between the central Government and the devolved ones. The most relevant mul-
tilateral IGA designed by the Memorandum is the Joint Ministerial Committee (JMC),
including all four executives: the UK Governments along with the Welsh, the Scottish
and the Northern Ireland Executives. In its oﬃcial website, this institution is defined as
"the apex of formal relations between these administrations". The JMC should rely on
a Joint Secretariat: the MOU (Annex 2), while specifying that «the Secretariat will be
bound to provide an impartial service to all members of the JMC», also precises that «the
lead role within the Secretariat will fall upon the UK Cabinet Oﬃce, including respon-
sibility for servicing meetings and dispatching documents as required». The JMC was
conceived to operate in various formats. According to the MOU, the "plenary format"
includes: the UK Prime Minister (who takes the chair), the Deputy PM, the Scottish
and Welsh First Ministers, each with a ministerial colleague, the Northern Ireland First
and Deputy First Minister, and the three relevant Secretaries of State (Scotland, Wales,
Northern Ireland). In such a format, the JMC would meet at least once a year to dis-
cuss devolved and non-devolved responsibilities impinging on each other, to address, if
needed, disputes arising between the administrations, and, more generally, to review the
IGR dynamics. While the JMC met regularly in the period 2000-2002, it did not do
so between 2003 and 2007, when no meeting was called. The JMC plenary format was
reactivated in 2008, at the instance of the new Scottish Government: it thus convened
in this format also in the following two years. To sum up, the plenary format JMC
meetings proved rare, irregular and discontinuous. Literature is unanimous in according
to such an IGA little significance.
Apart from the plenary format, the JMC should also work in additional "functional
formats", whose task should be to focus on specific policy areas: they may be conceived
of as ministerial committees, since their membership includes the UK and devolved
ministers in charge of a given policy field. Accordingly, four functional formats were
established, devoted, respectively, to European Union, Knowledge Economy, Poverty,
and Health Policy. However, with the only exception of the JMC (EU) devoted to
European aﬀairs, most of these fora – the one devoted to healthcare included – did not
work after 2001. In the 2008 plenary format JMC meeting, the central and devolved
governments agreed on the establishment of a "domestic format", including all matters
such as health or education (not directly related to EU). However, in the meetings
celebrated between 2008 and 2011, no issue pertaining to healthcare policy was included
in the Committe’s order of business. As summarized by McEwen et al. (2012), all this
does not suggest that «the UK’s multi-level administrations rarely met, but when they
did it was more often outside the JMC framework» (p. 325). Informal relationships
have so far been dominant.
It should be remarked that the MOU itself is quite prudent as to the role of political
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multilateral tools for managing intergovernmental relations in the UK: from the very
outset, the JMC seemed to be designed as a sort of solution of last resort. It is indeed
stated that «the UK Government and the devolved administrations commit themselves,
wherever possible, to conduct business through normal administrative channels, either
at oﬃcial or Ministerial level» and that a dispute may formally be referred to the JMC
Secretariat only when it «cannot be resolved bilaterally or through the good oﬃces of
the relevant territorial Secretary of State» (Sections 24-25). Even more clearly, «the
presumption is that in most circumstances the administrations will arrange bilateral
meetings without the need to involve the JMC Secretariat, which will become involved
only if circumstances require it e.g. in the event of an unresolved dispute» (Annex 2,
Section 2.3). Such bilateral contacts may be managed at the level of oﬃcials (more
informally) or, when needed, at the level of Secretaries of State: devolved interests are
represented, within the UK Government, by the Scotland, the Welsh and the Northern
Ireland Oﬃces, each headed by a Secretary of State. Furthermore, the MOU contained
four bilateral agreements ("concordats") regulating the relationships between the UK
and each devolved administration (separately) over general matters such as European
Union Policy and International Relations.
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Appendix B
Methodological Notes
Horizontal Ideological Congruence Index
Following Bolleyer and Bytzek (2009), the value of the ideological position of each re-
gional executive has been computed as the weighted average of the Comparative Mani-
festo Project (Volkens et al. 2013) scores attributed to each of the coalition partners in
that moment: the weight attributed to each party depends on the number of Councilors
representing that party in the regional government (the President is considered as one
Councilor). The "ideological congruence" in a given year is equal to the standard devi-
ation between the values of each government. The higher the standard deviation, the
higher the ideological distance between the regional units (that is, the horizontal ideo-
logical incongruence), and vice-versa. Variations over time can be due both to variations
in the positioning of the parties along the left-right or the centralization-decentralization
dimension, and to changes in the party composition of governments.
As suggested by Bolleyer and Bytzek, the distance on the Centralization-Decentrali-
zation dimension is instead based on values resulting from the diﬀerence between two
scores: the anti-centralization and pro-centralization positions (respectively, nos. 301
and 302).
For Italy, composition of regional governments have been taken from: Istituto Cat-
taneo dataset on regional governments, available at http://www.cattaneo.org/it/
ricerche-menu/politica-menu/istituzioni-di-governo.html, for the period 1970-
2000; Baldi and Tronconi (2010) for the period 2002-2006. For Spain, the composition of
regional governments is based on data collected by the Observatorio de los Gobiernos de
Coalición en España (University of Barcelona), available at http://www.ub.edu/OGC/
index_es.htm.
It must be remarked that, far from being perfect, this measure suﬀers from a number
of weakness.
The first is that the CMP values measure the positioning of national-level parties
and not of regional branches of these organizations. The second is that not all parties
running at the regional level elections are included in the CMP datasets.
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These are issues particularly relevant in the Spanish case, due to the peculiarities
of its party system. For the PSC - Partido de los Socialistas de Cataluña, which is the
Catalan branch of the PSOE, I have used the scores of this latter (at national elections,
they do not present distinct manifestos and they form the same parliamentary group);
likewise, I have used the PSOE scores for the PSE-EE - Partido Socialista de Euskadi-
Euskadiko Ezkerra, the federal branch of the Socialist Party in the Basque Country.
Similarly, I have used the scores of the PP for the UPN - Unión del Pueblo Navarro, a
regionalist party replacing the Popular Party both at the regional and at the national
elections in Navarre (up to 2008); for EV - Els Verds, a Catalan green party, I have used
(for 1998-2000) the scores of IU - Izquierda Unida, since they were partners of a common
electoral alliance. Values are instead lacking for the following, (mostly, small-medium)
region-based parties: AIC - Agrupaciones Independientes de Canarias (Canary Islands);
UM - Unió Mallorquina and PSM - Partit Socialista de Mallorca (Balearic Islands);
UDG - Unión Democrática de Galicia and CG - Coalición Galega; PRP, then PR -
Partido Riojano (La Rioja); UPCA - Unión para el Progreso de Cantabria and PRC
- Partido Regionalista de Cantabria (Cantabria); PAR - Partido Aragonés (Aragón);
PA - Partido Andalucista (Andalusia); CDN - Convergencia de Demócratas de Navarra
(Navarra); UV - Unió Valenciana (Valencian Community). Notice, however, that just
two regional governments made up of exclusively non-State wide parties were ruled out
from the sample (representing the 8.7% of excluded observations). In most of cases
(almost 74%), excluded observations were relative to coalition cabinets in which either
the PSOE or the PP was the dominant government coalition partner of a region-based
party not scored in the CMP.
As for Italy, values are lacking for parties present in three Special Statute Regions:
UV - Union Valdôtaine; UVP - Union Valdôtaine Progressiste; RV - Rassemblement
Valdôtaine, DP - Democratici Popolari; ADP - Autonomistes Démocrates Progressistes
in Aosta Valley; SVP - Südtiroler Volkspartei in Trentino-Alto Adige (2006 excluded);
PSdAZ - Partito Sardo d’Azione and Laico Federalisti in Sardinia, as well as for a
number of small State-wide parties. It should be however stressed that in no point of
measurement these parties were leading one-party cabinets: in all cases, indeed, they
were partners of larger coalitions including the Christian Democracy, the Socialist Party
or the Communist Party; moreover, between 1970 and 1992, neither in Trentino nor in
Sardinia regionalist parties were never the major partners of regional coalitions.
As a general rule, I excluded from computations all cabinets for which scores were
missing for one fifth or more of their components. Excluded observations:
• ITALY: Aosta Valley (1970; 1974-2006); Trentino-Alto Adige (1970-2004); Sar-
dinia (1986; 1988; 1996-2000); Sicily (2000); Molise (1998) - (11.58% of the sam-
ple);
• SPAIN: Canarias (1988-1992); Galicia (1988); La Rioja (1990-1994); Cantabria
(1992-1998; 2004-2010); Aragón (1996-1998; 2004-2010); Navarre (1996); Baleares
(2008) - (9.43% of the sample).
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Interviews with country-experts and IGR actors
No. Role Place and date
ITALY
IT1 Regional Health Director General (1996-1999), Director General
Regional Health Agency (2000-2005)
Bologna, March 20th 2013
IT2 Health Economics Professor (Bocconi University) Skype contact, May 20th 2013
IT3 Regional Health Director General and Coordinator of Interre-
gional Health Technical Committee (1995-2005)
Padova, June 18th 2013
IT4 Manger of the Health and Social Policy Secretariat Oﬃce of the
Conference of the Regions (1987-in charge)
Rome, October 28th 2013
IT5 Regional President (1995-2005), Vice-President (1997-2000) and
President of the Conference of the Regions (2000-2005)
Turin, November 28th 2013
IT6 Director General of the Conference of the Regions (mid-1980s-in
charge)
Rome, March 11th 2014
IT7 Minister of Health (2001-2005) Milan, March 15th 2014
IT8 Regional Health Manager (1996-2003) and Director General of
the Ministry of Heath (2003-2013)
Rome, March 24th 2014
IT9 Regional Health Director General (2003-2006) and Coordinator
of Interregional Health Technical Committee (2005-2006)
Rome, March 24th 2014
IT10 Manager of the Health and Social Policy Oﬃce of the State-
Regions Secretariat (1984-2004), Director General Minister of
Health (2004-2012)
Rome, April 3rd 2014
IT11 Regional President (2000-2005) and Minister of Health (2005-
2006)
Rome, April 3rd 2014
IT12 Regional Budget Councilor (2000-2005) Rome April 7th 2014
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No. Role Place and date
SPAIN
SP1 Spanish IGR expert (Collegio Carlo Alberto) Turin, November 15th 2012
SP2 Spanish IGR expert (Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientí-
ficas - CSIC)
Rome, November 21st 2012
SP3 Spanish IGR expert (Universidad Nacional de Educación a Dis-
tancia - UNED)
Madrid, July 16th 2013
SP4 Spanish IGR expert (Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientí-
ficas - CSIC)
Madrid, July 19th 2013
SP5 Spanish IGR expert (Universidad Complutense de Madrid) Madrid, Juy 22nd 2012
SP6 Deputy Director General of the National Observatory on the Na-
tional Health System (2003-2004), Advisor of the Health Minister
(2004-2007), Coordinator of the Working Group on Health Ex-
penditure, Director General of Autonomic Cooperation (Ministry
of Public Administrations) (2007-2008)
September-October 2013 (re-
peated contacts by e-mail)
SP7 Planning Director General of the Health Minister and member of
the CISNS (2000-2004), Autonomic Director General of Health
Planning
December 2013-January 2014
(repeated contacts by e-mail)
SP8 Deputy Director General of the CISNS Secretariat (1996-2000),
Director General of Institutional Relations and High Inspection
of the Health Minister (2000-2002)
January 2014 (contact by e-
mail)
SP9 Director General of Institutional Relations and High Inspection
of the Health Minister and Secretary of the CISNS (1991-1996)
December 2013-February
2014 (repeated contacts by
e-mail)
SP10Autonomic Director General of Health Economic Resources
(2003-2012)
April 2014 (repeated contacts
by e-mail)
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Appendix C
Conferenza delle Regioni
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Figure C.1: Example of internal procedures: main steps
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